Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique

353 Pages·2022·1.971 MB·English

by  Kurtis Hagen

Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.
E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461.
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Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique
Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.
E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461.
Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison
Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.
E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461.
Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison
CONSPIRACY THEORIES
AND THE FAILURE OF
INTELLECTUAL CRITIQUE
Kurtis Hagen
University of Michigan Press
Ann Arbor
Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.
E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461.
Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison
Copyright © 2022 by Kurtis Hagen
All rights reserved
For questions or permissions, please contact [email protected]
Published in the United States of America by the University of Michigan Press
Manufactured in the United States of America
Printed on acid- free paper
First published July 2022
A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication data has been applied for.
ISBN 978- 0- 472- 13310- 9 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 978- 0- 472- 22034- 2 (e- book)
Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.
E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461.
Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison
Contents
Preface vii
Introduction 1
PART I: THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES
ONE What Is a Conspiracy Theory? 11
TWO The Philosophers of Conspiracy Theory:
Are Conspiracy Theories Epistemically Suspect? 37
THREE Conspiracist Ideation and the Revelation of
Real Conspiracies 80
PART II: THE PRE- EMINENT LEGAL SCHOLAR OF OUR TIME
FOUR Is Infiltration of “Extremist Groups” Justified? 109
FIVE Conspiracy Theories and Stylized Facts 122
SIX Were Sunstein and Vermeule Misunderstood?
An Examination of Sunstein’s Revision 141
Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.
E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461.
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vi Contents
PART III: THE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
SEVEN Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Systems 157
EIGHT Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style:
Do Conspiracy Theories Posit Implausibly Vast
and Evil Conspiracies? 180
NINE For the Greater Good:
Conspiracy and Moral Justification (an interlude) 206
TEN Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists 228
Conclusion 244
Appendix: 9/11 and Epistemic Authorities 249
Notes 273
Works Cited 317
Index 335
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Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.
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Preface
The aim of this book is to make serious consideration of conspiracy theo-
ries respectable among the sophisticated. To some this aim may seem auda-
cious, even ludicrous. But to most of the philosophers who have contrib-
uted substantially to the philosophical literature on conspiracy theories
over the past two decades— who are at least arguably the most relevant
authorities on the matter— it would be a welcome development, and long
overdue. The philosophers I’m particularly thinking of include Charles
Pigden, David Coady, M Dentith, Lee Basham, Juha Räikkä, and even
Brian Keeley, whose seminal 1999 article, “Of Conspiracy Theories,” is
often misinterpreted as arguing that conspiracy theories are generally
unwarranted.
To suggest that serious consideration of conspiracy theories ought to be
respectable, of course, does not mean that all individual conspiracy theo-
ries ought, upon consideration, to be regarded as respectable. Rather, it is
to say that conspiracy theories ought not be dismissed on account of their
being conspiracy theories, and that each ought to be given a fair hearing,
given the recognition that sometimes conspiracy theories have turned out
to be true, and also that, of the many serious attempts to provide reasons
to adopt a dismissive stance toward conspiracy theories generally (includ-
ing Keeley’s), none have survived scrutiny (as Keeley readily concedes of
his own attempt).
Further, it turns out that much of the social science scholarship on
the subject, especially the psychological study of conspiracy theorists,
has turned out to be flawed and misleading. Those flaws are not randomly
Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.
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viii Preface
directed; rather, they consistently serve to disparage conspiracy theorists
unfairly. This suggests that there may be a bias against conspiracy theo-
rists in the academy, as, indeed, there seems to be among “sophisticated”
people more generally. If sophisticated people become aware of such a bias,
they should become cautious about their own attitude; otherwise they fail a
test of sophistication. This then— apparently biased research on conspiracy
theorists— is another reason to adopt a more respectful attitude toward
conspiracy theories and the people who believe them, which, after all, is
most of us in varying degrees.
Previously Published Material
Earlier versions of following chapters were first published as indicated
below:
Chapter 4: “Is Infiltration of ‘Extremist Groups’ Justified?”
International Journal of Applied Philosophy 24.2 (Fall 2010):
153– 168.
Chapter 5: “Conspiracy Theories and Stylized Facts.”
Journal for Peace and Justice Studies 21.2 (Fall 2011): 3– 22.
Chapter 7: “Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Sys-
tems.”
Argumenta 3.2 (issue 6, May 2018): 303– 326.
Chapter 8: “Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style: Do Con-
spiracy Theories Posit Implausibly Vast and Evil Conspiracies?”
Social Epistemology 32.1 (2018): 24– 40. Available online at
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/02691728.2017.1352625
Chapter 10: “Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists.”
In Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously, edited by M R. X.
Dentith (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018): 125– 140.
The chapter published in Taking Conspiracy Theories Seri-
ously is, in turn, a revised and substantially extended version of
a short paper first published under the title “What Are They
Really Up To? Activist Social Scientists Backpedal on Conspir-
acy Theory Agenda,” in the Social Epistemology Review and Reply
Collective 6.3 (2017): 89– 95.
In addition, the booklet Conspiracy Theory: A Philosophical
Defense (Burlington, VT: Fomite, 2018), contains some material
from, or incorporated into, Chapters 8 and 9.
Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.
E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461.
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Preface ix
Acknowledgments and Backstories
Defending the view that conspiracy theories ought to be taken seriously,
which flies in the face of the “common sense” of many academics, pre-
sented challenges. For example, I encountered barriers to publication
(such as frequent desk rejections) unlike what I encounter when publish-
ing on “harmless” topics in Chinese philosophy, even when I challenged
dominant paradigms in that sphere. But the most significant barrier was
always psychological. I seriously worried that I might be wasting my time
on articles that would never be published, no matter how cogent. Giving
up always seemed a rational option. In such a situation, the encouragement
of respected friends and colleagues— so important in all cases— takes on
a heightened significance. And so, I have some thanking to do, both for
substantial help and for significant moral support.
In the early days, I received encouraging feedback from my colleagues
at SUNY Plattsburgh, E. Thomas Moran and the late Martin Lubin in
particular. I also received both encouragement and helpful proofreading
and editing services from friend and retired philosophy professor Kent
Simmons, who continues to provide aid and encouragement.
I sent a draft of my first paper, which addressed Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule’s proposal involving “cognitive infiltration,” to the writer and
political activist Marc Estrin. He was outraged at the proposed cognitive
infiltration, of which he had not been aware. Apparently, few people were
aware of it, though the offending article was published eight months earlier,
in April 2009, and an early draft had been available online since January
2008. So the proposal had been publicly available for just about two years.
(The situation reminds me a little of the Tuskegee Study in the sense that the
results were being published in academic journals and yet “nobody” knew
about it.) Estrin asked if I would mind if he wrote a blog about it, and I
approved of the idea. He published a blog on his own site January 10, 2010,
and on The Rag Blog the next day. Then suddenly, over the next several days,
a number of sites reported on the proposal, including Raw Story (which was
later credited in Project Censored’s Censored 2011). On January 15, Glenn
Greenwald got into the mix with an article on Salon.com called “Obama
Confidant’s Spine- Chilling Proposal” (2010). It seems that this little internet
buzz alerted David Ray Griffin to the issue, and he quickly wrote a book
on the subject, Cognitive Infiltration: An Obama Appointee’s Plan to Under-
mine the 9/11 Conspiracy Theory, which I reviewed (Hagen 2011b). A casual
glance at the respective copyright dates may seem to indicate that my first
article (Hagen 2010) was published before Griffin’s book (2011). But, for the
record, I know that not to be true. Griffin’s book was published first.
Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.
E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461.
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