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Consciousness in the Physical World PHILOSOPHY OF MIND Series Editor: David J. Chalmers, Australian National University and New York University Self Expression Supersizing the Mind Owen Flanagan Andy Clark Deconstructing the Mind Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion Stephen Stich William Fish The Conscious Mind Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind David J. Chalmers Robert D. Rupert Minds and Bodies The Character of Consciousness Colin McGinn David J. Chalmers What’s Within? Perceiving the World Fiona Cowie Bence Nanay (editor) The Human Animal The Contents of Visual Experience Eric T. Olson Susanna Siegel Dreaming Souls The Senses Owen Flanagan Fiona Macpherson (editor) Consciousness and Cognition Attention is Cognitive Unison Michael Thau Christopher Mole Thinking Without Words Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism José Luis Bermúdez Derk Pereboom Identifying the Mind Introspection and Consciousness U.T. Place (author), George Graham, Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar (editors) Elizabeth R. Valentine (editors) The Conscious Brain Purple Haze Jesse J. Prinz Joseph Levine Decomposing the Will Three Faces of Desire Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein, Timothy Schroeder and Tillmann Vierkant (editors) A Place for Consciousness Phenomenal Intentionality Gregg Rosenberg Uriah Kriegel (editor) Ignorance and Imagination The Peripheral Mind Daniel Stoljar István Aranyosi Simulating Minds The Innocent Eye Alvin I. Goldman Nico Orlandi Gut Reactions Does Perception Have Content? Jesse J. Prinz Edited by Berit Brogaard Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal The Varieties of Consciousness Knowledge Uriah Kriegel Torin Alter, Sven Walter (editors) Consciousness in the Physical World Beyond Reduction Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa (editors) Steven Horst What Are We? Eric T. Olson Consciousness in the Physical World Perspectives on Russellian Monism Edited by TORIN ALTER YUJIN NAGASAWA 1 1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 © Oxford University Press 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Consciousness in the physical world : perspectives on Russellian monism / edited by Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa pages cm ISBN 978–0–19–992735–7 (alk. paper) 1. Consciousness. 2. Monism. 3. Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970. 4. Materialism. 5. Dualism. I. Alter, Torin Andrew, 1963–editor. B808.9.C666 2015 147′.3—dc23 2014033395 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Contents Acknowledgments  vii Contributors  ix Editors’ Introduction—Torin AlTer And Yujin nAgAsAwA  1 PART I: Precursors 1. Monadology 17 and Letter to De Volder (excerpt)—goTTfried wilhelm von leibniz  17 2. Critique of Pure Reason, A270/B326–A278/B334 (excerpt)—immAnuel KAnT 19 3. The Principles of Psychology (excerpt)—williAm jAmes  23 PART II: Russell and Commentaries 4. Excerpts from Analysis of Matter (1927), Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948), Portraits from Memory (1956), and My Philosophical Development (1959)—berTrAnd russell  29 5. Russell, Russellian Monism, and Panpsychism—leopold sTubenberg  58 6. Russell on Russellian Monism—donovAn wishon  91 vi Contents PART III: Modern Classics and Recent Works 7. Rigid Designators and Mind–Brain Identity (excerpt)—grover mAxwell 121 8. The Grain Problem—michAel locKwood  143 9. Real Materialism (with new postscript)—gAlen sTrAwson 161 10. Russellian Physicalism—bArbArA gAil monTero  209 11. Causality and the Combination Problem—gregg rosenberg  224 12. Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism—dAvid j. chAlmers  246 13. The Short Slide from A Posteriori Physicalism to Russellian Monism—Torin AlTer And roberT j. howell  277 14. Consciousness, Physicalism, and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties—derK pereboom  300 15. Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?—dAniel sToljAr  324 16. A Physicalist Critique of Russellian Monism—AlYssA neY  346 17. Against Constitutive Russellian Monism—philip goff  370 18. Pessimism about Russellian Monism—AmY Kind  401 19. What Is Russellian Monism?—Torin AlTer And Yujin nAgAsAwA  422 Name Index 453 Subject Index 459 Acknowledgments DaviD Chalmers, Derk Pereboom, Howard Robinson, Seth Shabo, Galen Strawson, Leopold Stubenberg, and two anonymous reviewers gave us useful comments and suggestions. Donovan Wishon was especially helpful in rec- ommending Russell selections. Tyler Brockett, Mitchell Dykstra, and Sarah- Louise Johnson helped us to prepare the manuscript. We thank them all. We are also grateful to the authors and publishers who let us reprint their work and especially those who wrote new papers for this volume. Finally, we thank Peter Ohlin and Lucy Randall of Oxford University Press, who both provided impeccable editorial support, and Pete Shulte, who provided the original cover art drawing. Sources Chapter 1 Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1714), selection from Monadology. Translated by Robert Merrihew Adams for this volume. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1699), selection from letter to De Volder, March 24/ April 3, 1699. Translated by Robert Merrihew Adams for this volume. Chapter 2 Immanuel Kant, Immanuel (1781), Critique of Pure Reason, A270/B326–A278/B334. Translated by John Miller Dow Mieklejohn (1855, London: Henry G. Bohn) with some alterations by Derk Pereboom. Chapter 3 William James (1891, originally 1890), The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1, London: Macmillan, pp. 158–61. viii Acknowledgments Chapter 4 Bertrand Russell (1927), Analysis of Matter, London: Kegan Paul, pp. 382–93 and pp. 400–02. Permission by the Russell Foundation Bertrand Russell (1948), Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, London: Taylor and Francis, pp. 244–47. Permission by Taylor and Francis. Bertrand Russell (1956), “Mind and Matter” in his Portraits from Memory, New York: Simon and Shuster, pp. 145–65. Permission by the Russell Foundation Bertrand Russell (1959), My Philosophical Development, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Republished by Routledge, pp. 16–27. Permission by the Russell Foundation. Chapter 7 Grover Maxwell (1978), “Rigid Designators and Mind–Brain Identity,” C. W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 265–404. Permission by the publisher. Chapter 8 Michael Lockwood (1993), “The Grain Problem,” in Objections to Physicalism, Howard Robinson (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 271–91. Permission by Gilliam Lockwood and the publisher. Chapter 9 Galen Strawson (2008), “Real Materialism” (revised version, with postscript), Louise M. Antony and Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 49–88. Permission by the author and publisher. Chapter 12 David J. Chalmers, “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism,” first published as the 2013 Amherst Lecture in Philosophy:  http://www.amherstlecture.org/index. html. Permission by the author and publisher. Chapter 19 Alter, T., and Y.  Nagasawa (2012), “What Is Russellian Monism?,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9–10), pp. 67–95. Permission by the author and publisher. Contributors Torin Alter is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama, USA. David J. Chalmers is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University, Australia, and Professor of Philosophy at New York University, USA. Philip Goff is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Central European University, Hungary. Robert J.  Howell is Professor of Philosophy at Southern Methodist University, USA. William James was a 19th–20th–century American philosopher and psycholo- gist. He is the founder of pragmatism and a pioneer of American psychology. Immanuel Kant was an 18th–19th–century German philosopher. He is a cen- tral figure of late modern philosophy. Amy Kind is Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College, USA. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz was a 17th–18th–century German philosopher. He made major contributions to a wide range of disciplines including philoso- phy, mathematics, physics, and technology. Michael Lockwood is Emeritus Fellow of Green Templeton College, Oxford, UK. Grover Maxwell was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota, USA. Barbara Gail Montero is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center and the College of Staten Island, City University of New York, USA. Yujin Nagasawa is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham, UK. Alyssa Ney is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rochester, USA.

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