CONGRESS AND UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHINA, 1945-1950

120 Pages·06.203 MB·English

by  READ, WILLIAM S

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
D ate August 17, 1951_______19.
Read, William Sftnwifla —December 5, 1925
Author Birth Date
Congress and U. S« Relations with China; 1945-1950
Title of Dissertation
_Committee on International Kelations----------------iU—M*-----------------August, 1951-----------
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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CONGRESS AND UNITED STATES RELATIONS
WITH CHINA: 1945-1950
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BY
WILLIAM S. READ
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
AUGUST, 1951
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The w riter la Indebted to Mr. Earl H. Pritchard and to
Mr. Walter Johnson for th e ir helpful suggestions and constructive
criticism s. The w riter Is also Indebted beyond words to his wife,
Sarah Hooper Read, without whose assistance and Inspiration, th is
paper could never have been w ritten.
11
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I . INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 1
I I . UNITED STATES EFFORTS AT MEDIATION: THE HURLEY
M ISSIO N ............................................................................................. 4
I I I . UNITED STATES EFFORTS AT MEDIATION: THE
MARSHALL MISSION............................. 15
IV. WITHDRAWAL OR INTERVENTION? THE ADMINISTRATION
VERSUS THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS ....................................... 31
V. THE DEBATE OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE
IN CHINA............................................................................................. 73
VI. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................... 107
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................... 115
111
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The problem of foreign policy formulation and Implementa­
tio n In a democracy has always been a serious one. I t Is doubt­
fu l, however, If I t has ever been more serious than I t Is now, In
the c ritic a l years of decision of the mid-twentieth century.
An Important aspect of the problem of conducting success­
fully the foreign relatio n s of a democracy Is the relatio nsh ip be­
tween the Executive and the Legislature In that process. This
aspect Is especially Important In the United States, where the
Congress Is taking an increasingly active and Important part In
the foreign rela tio n s of the United S tates. In older, perhaps
happier, days the chief issue between the two branches of the
Government of the United States had been the treaty Issue, when,
on occasion, an obstreperous Senate would embarass the Executive
by fa llin g to advise ra tific a tio n of a treaty already concluded.
That Issue has now receded In Importance, giving way to a host of
new problems, which include the need of obtaining Congressional
approval for United States foreign assistance programs and the
need for the Executive to defend Its policies before the searching
eyes of Congressional investigative committees.
Thus, more than ever before, the Executive must take Into
account the a ttitu d e s of Congress when considering any policy
which i t might want to pursue. Because of i t s essen tial position
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2
In the carrying out of United States foreign relatio n s, especially
through Its control of the funds which are so v ita l an adjunct of
modern United States foreign relatio n s, and because of the struc­
tu ra l d iffic u ltie s Inherent In the relationship between the Execu­
tive and the L egislative, the w riter believes that a thorough
analysis of the d iffic u ltie s obstructing positive and wise cooper­
ation between the President and the Congress In the field of for­
eign relatio n s Is a most necessary endeavor.
As a small contribution to th is needed study, the w riter
has attempted a study of the role of Congress and, more particu­
larly , a study of the role of the Republican opposition, in the
formulation of United States policy with regard to China during
the c ritic a l years, 1945 to 1950. I t Is his belief that such a
study Is most relevant, since the evolution of American policy
concerning China constitutes a special case quite Illu stra tiv e of
the great problems involved In the carrying out of foreign re la ­
tions In a democracy such as the United States in the crisis-ridden
m id-twentieth century.
The method of study Is quite simple. An attempt has been
made to ascertain the nature of the China policy of the United
States, as pronounced by representatives of the Executive, and to
examine Congressional action and reaction In the implementation
and criticism of that policy. The approach has been h isto ric al,
involving a periodization of the events according to the phases
through which United States policy progressed during the years
covered In our study. An example Is the Marshall Mission phase,
when the United States used Its mediatory Influence In an abortive
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endeavor to effect a coalition government between the Chinese
Communists and the Kuomlntang regime. A fter the presentation of
an h isto ric a l analysis of the relatio n of Congress to American
policy in China, I have endeavored in my concluding remarks to
abstract from the experience w ith regard to China lessons relevant
to the improvement of procedure for policy formation in the
fu tu re.
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CHAPTER I I
UNITED STATES EFFORTS AT MEDIATION:
THE HURLEY MISSION
Tha years 1944 to 1946 ware crucial in the formation of
tha United States* post war foreign policy w ith regard to China.
During the fin al phase of tha war in the P acific, the United
States "based i ts policy upon two fundamental n ecessities; namely,
tha need of keeping China in the war on the side of tha a llie s ,
and the longer range necessity of tha development of a strong,
unified China as an essen tial element of a satisfactory post war
settlem ent in the Far East. The attainment of these important
alms was endangered by factors in the in tern al situation of China,
such as severe economic dislocations, increasing governmental
corruption and the Immobilization of Important portions of the
Commjnist and N ationalist forces because of mutual suspicion; and
by in tern atio n al relationships between the United States and China
on one hand, as symbolized by the Stilwell-Chlang impasse, and be­
tween the Soviet Union and China on the other,^
President Roosevelt, realizing the serious consequences of
the progressive deterioration of the situation in China, late in
the summer of 1944, dispatched Major General P atrick Hurley and
production expert Donald Nelson to China to serve as h is personal
S. Department of S tate, U. S. R elations w ith China
(Washington: U. S. Government P rin ting Off ic e , 1949), p. 59•
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5
representatives In an attempt to remedy the situation. In the
meantime Roosevelt had made strong representations to Generalissimo
Chlang Kai-shek as to the seriousness of the situation and as to
the ad v isab ility of giving General S tllw ell command over a ll troops
1
In China. General Hurley was to serve the twofold purpose of
promoting “harmonious relatio n s between Chlang Kai-shek and General
Jo.seph Stllw ell" and fa c ilita tin g "the la t t e r ’s exercise of com-
„o
mand over the Chinese armies placed under his direction.
When Hurley arrived In China, he found that relatio n s be­
tween the Communists and the N ationalists were extremely b itte r.
In fac t, I t might ju stifiab ly be said that each faction was more
interested In augmenting Its power at the expense of the other
than in fighting the common enemy, Japan. Moreover, United States-
Chlnese cooperation In the prosecution of the common war had been
reduced to almost nothingness by the mutual antagonism between
Chlang and S tllw ell. This antagonism was aggravated s t i l l more by
Roosevelt's August, 1944 telegrams strongly advising Chlang to
place Stllw ell In command of a ll troops.
The so-called "Stllw ell crisis" was resolved with the re­
c all of General S tllw ell, but the problem of Communist-NatIonalist
cooperation In prosecution of the war remained unsettled.
In the f a ll of 1944, Hurley launched his mediatory effo rts
to bring about a coalition government and a u n ification of a ll
Chinese forces. The N ationalists and the Communists had already
*U. S. Relations w ith China, pp. 64-68.
2Ib ld ., p. 71.
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made efforts to bring about th is greatly to be desired u n ifica­
tio n , but l it t le had as yet been accomplished* The fundamental
d iffic u lty lay in th e ir divergent interpretatio n s of the word
"co alitio n .” For Chlang Kai-shek coalition meant integration of
the Communists into the then existent governmental structure under
his absolute control; for the Communists i t meant a sharing of
power with the N ationalists, a procedure by which they were con­
fident that ultim ately they would a tta in complete mastery over
China. Nevertheless, General Hurley lent his good offices to the
negotiations which interm ittlngly ensued through 1945. By
September, 1945, the areas of disagreement, according to Hurley,
had been reduced to the problems of provincial control in Commu­
n ist areas and of the number of Communist divisions to be incor­
porated into the new army. 1
While the delicate negotiations between Chlang Kai-shek
and the Communists were in progress, two events occurred which
completely changed the complexion of the situ atio n in China. In
February, 1945, the controversial Yalta Agreement was concluded.
According to th is agreement, the Soviet Union received in te r a lia
the old pre-1905 T sarist rights in Manchuria in return for entry
into the war against Japan and for diplomatic reaffirm ation of the
S oviet's recognition of the N ationalist Government as the le g iti­
mate government of China. The N ationalist confirmed the fa it
accompli in the Sino-Sovlet Treaty, signed in August, 1945. This
treaty served to iso late the Chinese Communists diplom atically,
\ l. S. Relations with China, pp. 105-07.
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