Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement

229 Pages·2009·3.423 MB·English

by  Christina J. Schneider

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Conflict, Negotiation and European Union
Enlargement
Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political ten-
sionsandconflict.Existingmembersfeartheirmembershipprivilegeswill
diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of
membership.Despitetheseconflicts,enlargementhasalwayssucceeded–
so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current
members might lose from their accession? Combining political economy
logicwithstatisticalandcasestudyanalyses,ChristinaJ.Schneiderargues
that the dominant theories of EU enlargement ignore how EU members
andapplicantstatesnegotiatethedistributionofenlargementbenefitsand
costs. She explains that EU enlargement happens despite distributional
conflictsiftheoverallgainsofenlargementareredistributedfromtherela-
tivewinnersamongexistingmembersandapplicantstotherelativelosers.
If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently great, a redistribu-
tionofthesegainswillcompensatelosers,makingenlargementattractive
forallstates.
CHRISTINA J. SCHNEIDER is a Fellow at the Niehaus Center of
Globalization and Governance at Princeton University and an External
ResearcherattheMaxPlanckInstituteofEconomics.

Conflict, Negotiation
and European Union
Enlargement
CHRISTINA J. SCHNEIDER
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521514811
© Christina J. Schneider 2009
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the
provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part
may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2008
ISBN-13 978-0-511-46373-0 eBook (EBL)
ISBN-13 978-0-521-51481-1 hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication,
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
To my parents

Contents
ListofIllustrations pagex
ListofTables xi
ListofAcronyms xiii
Acknowledgements xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 ThepoliticsofEUenlargement 5
1.2 Organizationofthebook 8
2 EUenlargementsandtransitionalperiods 12
2.1 TimelineofEuropeanUnionenlargement 13
2.2 TheformalEUenlargementprocess 16
2.3 Accessionnegotiationsandenlargementoutcomes 19
2.3.1 Implementationoftheacquiscommunautaire 20
2.3.2 TheformulationofacommonEUposition 24
2.4 Conclusion 30
2.5 Appendix 31
3 ArationalistpuzzleofEUenlargement? 33
3.1 Wideninganddeepening:twopillarsofEU
integration 34
3.1.1 Functionalismandneo-functionalism 35
3.1.2 Intergovernmentalism 36
3.1.3 Newinstitutionalism 37
3.2 IntegrationtheoriesandthecalculusofEU
enlargement 38
3.2.1 ThegainsofEUenlargement 41
3.2.2 ThecostsofEUenlargement 44
3.3 ThepuzzleofEUexpansion 47
vii
viii Contents
3.4 AlternativeexplanationsofEUenlargement 49
3.5 Conclusion 52
4 Atheoryofdiscriminatorymembership 55
4.1 Basicassumptionsofthetheoreticalmodel 56
4.2 ThecalculusofEUenlargement 57
4.2.1 Theemergenceofdistributionalconflicts 61
4.2.2 Theresolutionofdistributionalconflicts 65
4.2.3 Thetransitionalnatureofdiscrimination 69
4.3 Hypothesesonexpansionanddifferentiatedmembership 73
4.4 Conclusion 76
5 EUenlargement,distributionalconflicts,andthedemand
forcompensation 77
5.1 Researchdesign 79
5.1.1 Dependentvariables 81
5.1.2 Modelspecification 83
5.2 Freemovementofworkers 85
5.2.1 Variablesanddatasources 86
5.2.2 Estimationresults 91
5.2.3 Predictedprobabilities 94
5.2.4 Conclusion 103
5.3 CommonAgriculturalPolicies 104
5.3.1 Variablesanddatasources 108
5.3.2 Estimationresults 110
5.3.3 Predictedprobabilities 113
5.3.4 Conclusion 120
5.4 CommonStructuralPolicies 120
5.4.1 Variablesanddatasources 121
5.4.2 Estimationresults 122
5.4.3 Predictedprobabilities 126
5.4.4 Conclusion 131
5.5 Thedemandforcompensation:conclusion 132
5.6 Appendix 134
6 Thediscriminatoryofmembership 138
6.1 Researchdesign 139
6.1.1 Dependentvariable 140
6.1.2 Explanatoryvariables 140
6.1.3 Modelspecification 143