Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee PDF
Preview Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee
Confederate Florida Confederate TheRa Florida ad to Olustee William H. Nulty The University of Alabama Press Tuscaloosa Copyright © 1990 The University of Alabama Press Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487-0380 All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America The paper on which this book is printed meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Science-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI A39.48-1984. First Paperbound Edition 1994 3 4 5 6 7 • 02 01 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nulty, William H. Confederate Florida: the road to Olustee / William H. Nulty p.cm. Bibliography: p. Includes index. ISBN 0-8173-0748-6 1. Olustee IFla.), Battle of, 1864. 2. Florida-History-Civil War, 1861-1864-Campaigns. 3. United States-History-Civil War, 1861-1865-Campaigns. I. Title. E476.43.N85 1990 89-33849 973.7'3-dc20 Contents Illustrations vi Preface vii 1. The Jilted Bride Florida's Early Years in the Confederacy 1 2. Blockade and Raid The Middle Civil War Years in Florida 41 3. Renewed Interest in Florida 53 4. Surprise and Success The Landing and Exploitation 76 5. The Battle of Olustee 124 6. Lost Opportunities The Retreat and Pursuit 170 7. Heroes, Goats, and Survivors 203 8. A Final Look 219 Notes 226 Bibliography 248 Index 267 Illustrations The Battle of Olustee Frontispiece Scenes from the 1864 Federal Expedition 77 Olustee Battlefield Monument 204 Maps 1. Railroad Map of the Confederacy 21 2. Railroad in Northeast Florida and Southeast Georgia 22 3. Areas of the South under Federal Control, 1863 62 4. Federal Area of Operations, Northeast Florida 79 S. Grant's Sketch of the Ocean Pond Battlefield 120 6. The First Stage of the Battle 132 7. The Second Stage of the Battle 138 8. The Third Stage of the Battle 149 9. The Fourth Stage of the Battle 157 Preface Florida was the third state to secede from the Union, taking that action on January lO, 1861. Psychologically, economically, socially, and politically, Florida was closely attuned with the other Southern states, and the state's leadership believed it was in her best interest to take this step. An undetermined segment of the population was against secession, but their voices and their votes were overshadowed by the vocal majority. Florida's initial enthusiasm for the Southern cause was demonstrated by her haste to secede and her efforts to support that cause loyally with men and material. The amount of moral support, enthusi asm, and loyalty that Florida contributed, however, was not needed as much as were more tangible assets such as man power, arms, and manufactured goods; unfortunately, these were in short supply in Florida. Early in the Civil War, Florida found herself abandoned mili tarily by the Confederacy. There was nothing of any major stra tegic importance to the Confederacy within Florida, and her liabilities, particularly her long, vulnerable coastline and lim ited transportation network, far outweighed her assets. Her manpower resources were comparatively limited in relation to other Southern states, and after an early period of recruiting competition between state and Confederacy, most of what was even remotely available ended up in the Confederate army and had departed the state by the end of 1862. When this happened, Florida was left to defend herself as best she could, using her viii Preface own resources. These resources included a mostly irregular military force that was small in size, poorly armed, unevenly trained, and widely dispersed over the state. By early 1862, Federal forces occupied Fernandina, St. Au gustine, Key West, and Fort Pickens and controlled Pensacola, Apalachicola, and the entrances to the St. Johns and Chat tahoochee rivers. A tightening Federal naval blockade strangled the state's economic life, and a continuing series of small-scale raids by Federal forces caused destruction and created havoc and terror in coastal communities. Many Floridians withdrew into the interior of the state, where the remaining hard-core Confederate supporters were congregated. By the end of 1863, Florida's enthusiasm for secession had long since withered; militarily, economically, psychologically, and politically, she was vulnerable to Federal exploitation. At the end of 1863, the Federal forces in the Department of the South, which comprised the South Atlantic coastal states, were stalemated. An abortive attack on Charleston had re sulted in a standoff, and large numbers of Federal land and naval forces were tied up in seige operations against Charleston and Savannah that showed little progress or promise. These forces were available for employment elsewhere within the De partment of the South. The commander of that department, Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore, requested permission of his su periors to use those forces for an expedition into Florida. To support his request, he listed objectives of recruiting blacks for his Negro regiments, cutting off commissary supplies that were going from Florida to other parts of the Confederacy, dis rupting the railroad system within Florida, and preventing Confederate attempts to remove rails from that system for use elsewhere. Later, General Gillmore added the objectives of opening a Florida port to trade and the restoration of Florida to the Union. The requests for the expedition were approved, and on February 7, 1864, Federal forces landed at Jacksonville, Flor ida, with high hopes and a very strong probability of success in achieving their objectives. The Federal expedition into Florida was a limited operation in terms of time, resources committed, geography, and objec- Preface ix tives. It was not part of any larger strategic plan and was not coordinated with other activities going on at the same time. Lasting about a month, it received little notice at the time and today is rarely mentioned in any general history of the Civil War or recognized outside of the state of Florida. It was, how ever, the largest Civil War engagement in Florida and contained a Union defeat at the six-hour-long battle of Olustee that, by proportion of casualties to men engaged, was the third blood iest defeat of the entire war for the Union.l At the same time, it came very close to severing Florida from the Confederacy; it forced the Confederacy to divert seventeen thousand men from a thinly manned defense of Charleston and Savannah, it de layed the critical reinforcement of the Southern Army of the Tennessee at a time when that army was fighting desperately to prevent the Union invasion of northwestern Georgia, it gave further proof of the ability of black soldiers to fight, and for a time it put a severe crimp in the subsistence supply lines that fed two Southern armies. In respect to the number of men the Union committed to this operation and the long-range ramifications of the expedition, the Federal expedition into Florida in 1864 was a success! It was indeed a costly one that fell too short of achieving its full potential, but yet a successful one if one considers a gain for one side as a loss for the other side. The 1864 Federal expedition into East Florida has been ex amined by a small group of writers. In most cases, they have given the expedition a brief, general coverage in order to set the stage for a more detailed coverage of the battle of Olustee, the high (or low) point of the expedition. Their emphasis stresses the political motivation for the expedition (as it apparently re lated to the 1864 presidential election) as its primary initiating cause and then assesses its success or failure in that frame work. The Federal expedition, however, had a number of very valid, attainable military objectives which were, in fact, achieved. The political situation existing at the time has been given greater importance than it deserves and has colored the treatment of the expedition. A more comprehensive view of the battle of Olustee can be obtained if it is considered within
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