COMMUNISM'S COLLAPSE, DEMOCRACY'S DEMISE? Conununislll's Collapse, Delllocracy's Demise? The Cultural Context and Consequences of the East German Revolution Laurence H. McFalls Assistant Professor of Political Science Universite de Montreal, Canada M MACMILLAN © Laurence H. McFalls 1995 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1995 978·0·333·62817·1 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted sa'>:e with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Totten ham Court Road, London WIP 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 1995 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world ISBN 978-1-349-39361-9 ISBN 978-0-230-37326-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230373266 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95 Contents Preface vii 1 Who Overthrew Honecker? 1 It Can't Happen Here: From Totalitarianism to Revolution 3 Research Methodology: The Intensive Survey 11 Overview 18 2 Behind the Wall: The East German Sonderfall 23 From the Anti-Fascist Bloc to the Anti-Fascist Wall 25 The Lebensliige of the Wall 31 Honecker and the Social Contract 35 The GDR: Best of a Bad Situation or Doomed from Birth? 41 3 Popular Explanations of the Popular Revolution 45 Reunification and the Revolution 45 The Self-Destruction of the Party-State 53 Societal Mobilization against State Socialism 62 The Economic Untenability of Communism 66 From Structural to Individual Explanations 70 4 The Modest Germans: The Cultural Context of Mass Mobilisation 75 Political Culture and Interpretive Method 76 The Contradictions of East German Culture 84 5 Different Strokes for Different Volks 101 Quantity vs Quality: Problems of Verification 103 Quantitative Analysis of a Qualitative Problem 108 A Model for All Respondents 113 Differentiating between Demonstrators 119 Party Members against the Party-State 121 Young and Old Demonstrators 124 Why the Religious and the Heathen Raged 127 Regional Variance in Protest Motives 129 Gender and Protest 132 Interpreting the Interpretations 134 v VI Contents 6 The Cultural Legacy of Communism 139 The Lingering National Identity Crisis 143 The Clash of Cultures 148 Excursus: How Success Spoiled Unification 156 Cultural Continuities in Eastern Germany 160 Appendix: The Survey Questionnaire 167 Notes 195 Select Bibliography 199 Index 209 Preface Few of us who watched the Berlin Wall crumble in 1989 would have suspected that within five years of communism's collapse in East Germany, democracy would be in danger in an enlarged Federal Republic of Germany. Yet, at the time of writing, reunited Germany's economy is descending into its worst crisis since 1933; its social order is riven with anomie and racist violence; and its political system is facing its greatest challenge in over forty years. Voters will be go ing to the polls on 19 different occasions at the local, re gional, national and European levels in 1994. Culminating in the vote for a new Bundestag in October, these elections will reshape Germany's political landscape for the close of the century, and the prospects do not look good. Although the contingencies and dynamics of an eight-month electoral campaign and voting cycle render the prediction of exact outcomes impossible, current trends nonetheless suggest that the new balance of political forces will threaten the survival of German democracy. Over the course of forty years the western Federal Republic had developed a stable and effective 'two-and-a-half' party system in which the small Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalesced in alternation with either the larger Christian Democratic Union parties (CDU and CSU) or the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Now, with voters increasingly abandoning - whether out of protest or conviction - the two-and-a-half traditional parties to support the Republikaner on the far right, the Greens on the left, the Statt Partei (the 'instead' party) in the centre, or most likely the so-called party of non-voters, it is unlikely that a stable, coherent majority will emerge from the 1994 elec tions. Instead, perhaps only a grand coalition of CDU and SPD will be numerically capable of governing. Unfortunately, such a government would probably lack the leadership and the programme to pull Germany out of its post-unification economic, social and political crisis and would thus further polarise and fragment the electorate. The possible demise of German democracy so close on Vll viii Preface the heels of communism's collapse comes as something of a surprise. In the triumphant mood of 1989 and 1990, some went so far as to proclaim the world-historic victory of lib eral capitalist democracy: the failure of the only apparent alternative, socialist authoritarianism, left no choice. Yet today liberal capitalist democracy is not taking root in Eastern Europe and is in crisis not only in Germany but through out much of the West. Of course, not everyone saw capital ist democracy as the only alternative for the future. Well before communism's final crisis, Vaclav Havel (1978) diag nosed a fatal illness common to communism and capital ism. Communism, however, would succumb first, because its modern, rationalist hubris was greater and its capacity to perpetuate consumerist productivism was less than that of the capitalist West. If liberal democracy finds itself in crisis, is it perhaps because capitalism today, like communism yes terday, cannot find rational solutions to the problem of economic growth that do not incur unsustainable social and ecological costs? Germany's current social, economic and political prob lems are certainly not unique, but they do have some causes particular to Germany's recent history. In fact, the peculiarities of German history and geography mean that the country is once again a crucible for world-historic trends. For forty years, divided Germany was the focal point of the East-West conflict, the two states becoming model children of the opposing social systems that had adopted them. Thus, it is natural that the most powerful image from the momentous events of 1989 remains that of the German people emotionally rediscovering their kinship atop the Berlin Wall on the night of 9-10 November. With formal unification on 3 October 1990, Germany again became a test case: there alone one nation, one political system faced the task of reconciling forty years of divergent social, economic, and cultural de velopment. If Germany did not succeed in this task of reconciliation, the rest of Europe and of the world could scarcely hope to mend the wounds of the Cold War. Germany's experience with unification has not yet been a complete failure or success. The economic, social and pol itical costs have been high, but the standard of living has risen in the East and remained high, though threatened, in Preface ix the West; the outbursts of racist violence have spurred nearly universal indignation and constructive citizens' initiatives; and faith in democratic institutions has kept strong even as disapproval of particular politicians and parties has grown. In 1994, Germany thus stands at a turning-point. Whether the economy recovers or slips further into crisis, whether social tensions diminish or rise, and whether Germans turn against democracy depend largely on the outcome of the year's elections. Germany probably cannot afford to con tinue to muddle through its post-unification crisis without stable and effective leadership. A Bundestag in stalemate will win neither investors' nor voters' confidence, and liberal capitalist democracy in Germany may thus soon find itself on the rapid road to defuiile. This book offen an explanation for Germany's present political problems. Specifically, it argues that the democratic crisis stems in large measure, though of course not exclus ively, from conflicts within German political culture that have their roots in communism's collapse in the German Demo cratic Republic. While i:hi's book may not be the first or the last to link Gerrnahy's current crisis with reunification and the East German revolution, it presents the only empirically grounded cultural analysis of these political events. Based primarily on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of over 200 original survey interviews, this book shows how the undermining of a specific, regime-stabilising East German political culture t:ontributed to the revolutionary mobilisa tion of 1989 nnd how the subsequent conflict between East and West German cultural values has exacerbated the prob lems of unification. In offering a cultural account of the East German revolution and of post-unification politics, this book does not pretend to substitute but rather to comple ment the necessary but insufficient economic, social and political structural analyses. I hope, however, that its readers will in the end agree that without a cultural counterpart, structural analyses have limited meaning. Cultural interpretation is a very personal undertaking, but it can occur only within a particular context. Hence, while I must alone take responsibility for the quirks and foibles of my analysis, I owe great thanks to those who made them possible in the first place. I therefore wish first of all to