Commonsense consequentialism: wherein morality meets rationality

287 Pages·2014·2.113 MB·English

by  Portmore, Douglas W

Commonsense Consequentialism
Oxford Moral Th eory
Series Editor
David Copp, University of California, Davis
Drawing Morals: Essays in Ethical Th eory
Th omas Hurka
Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality
Douglas W. Portmore
Commonsense
Consequentialism
Wherein Morality Meets Rationality
D OUGLAS W. P ORTMORE
1
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Portmore, Douglas W.
Commonsense consequentialism: wherein morality meets rationality / Douglas W. Portmore.
p. cm.—(Oxford moral theory)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-979453-9 (alk. paper)
1. Consequentialism (Ethics) 2. Ethics. 3. Practical reason. I. Title.
BJ1031.P67 2011
171'.5—dc22 2010050743
ISBN-13: 9780199794539
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
For my wife and daughter, Erin and Fiona Portmore
This page intentionally left blank
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
Abbreviations xiii
1. Why I Am Not a Utilitarian
3
1.1 UTILITARIANISM: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 3
1.2 THE PLAN FOR THE REST OF THE BOOK 6
1.3 MY AIMS 10
1.4 OBJECTIVE OUGHTS AND OBJECTIVE REASONS 12
1.5 CONVENTIONS THAT I WILL FOLLOW THROUGHOUT THE BOOK 23
2. Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism
25
2.1 THE TOO-DEMANDING OBJECTION: HOW MORAL RATIONALISM
LEADS US TO REJECT UTILITARIANISM 25
2.2 THE ARGUMENT AGAINST UTILITARIANISM FROM MORAL
RATIONALISM 29
2.3 HOW MORAL RATIONALISM COMPELS US TO ACCEPT
CONSEQUENTIALISM 32
2.4 WHAT IS CONSEQUENTIALISM? 34
2.5 THE PRESUMPTIVE CASE FOR MORAL RATIONALISM 38
2.6 SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 51
3. Th e Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons
56
3.1 GETTING CLEAR ON WHAT THE VIEW IS 57
3.2 CLEARING UP SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE VIEW 66
3.3 SCANLON’S PUTATIVE COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE VIEW 71
3.4 ARGUMENTS FOR THE VIEW 75
vii
viii Contents
4. Consequentializing Commonsense Morality
84
4.1 HOW TO CONSEQUENTIALIZE 85
4.2 THE DEONTIC EQUIVALENCE THESIS 87
4.3 BEYOND THE DEONTIC EQUIVALENCE THESIS: HOW CONSEQUENTIALIST
THEORIES CAN DO A BETTER JOB OF ACCOUNTING FOR OUR CONSIDERED
MORAL CONVICTIONS THAN EVEN SOME NONCONSEQUENTIALIST
THEORIES CAN 103
4.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEONTIC EQUIVALENCE THESIS 108
4.5 AN OBJECTION 111
5. Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality,
and Overridingness
118
5.1 SOME QUICK CLARIFICATIONS 120
5.2 MORAL REASONS, OVERRIDINGNESS, AND AGENT-CENTERED
OPTIONS 124
5.3 MORAL REASONS, OVERRIDINGNESS, AND SUPEREROGATION 131
5.4 A META-CRITERION OF RIGHTNESS AND HOW IT LEADS US TO ADOPT
DUAL-RANKING ACT-CONSEQUENTIALISM 137
5.5 NORCROSS’S OBJECTION 143
5.6 SPLAWN’S OBJECTION 145
5.7 VIOLATIONS OF THE TRANSITIVITY AND INDEPENDENCE AXIOMS 148
6. Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options
151
6.1 KAGAN’S OBJECTION: ARE WE SACRIFICING RATIONAL OPTIONS TO GET
MORAL OPTIONS? 151
6.2 IMPERFECT REASONS AND RATIONAL OPTIONS 157
6.3 SECURITISM 161
6.4 SECURITISM AND THE BASIC BELIEF 183
6.5 SECURITISM’S SUPPOSITIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 191
7. Commonsense Consequentialism
200
7.1 THE BEST VERSION OF ACT-UTILITARIANISM: COMMONSENSE
UTILITARIANISM 200
7.2 SECURITIST CONSEQUENTIALISM AND THE ARGUMENT FOR IT 222
7.3 COMMONSENSE CONSEQUENTIALISM AND HOW IT COMPARES
WITH TRADITIONAL ACT-CONSEQUENTIALISM 224
7.4 WHAT HAS BEEN SHOWN AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE SHOWN 232
Glossary 237
References 251
Index 259
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Consequentialism is typically taken to be an agent-neutral theory: a theory that
gives each agent the exact same set of aims. Unfortunately, no agent-neutral
theory can accommodate all of our commonsense moral intuitions. For instance,
no agent-neutral theory can accommodate the intuition that it would be wrong to
break a promise even so as to prevent two others from each breaking a comparable
promise, for the only way to accommodate such an intuition is to give each agent
the distinct aim of, say, minimizing his or her own promise-breakings—thus,
giving me the aim of minimizing my promise-breakings and you the aim of mini-
mizing y our promise-breakings.
In a graduate seminar taught by Jamie Dreier at Monash University in 1994,
I was fi rst introduced to the possibility of combining a consequentialist moral
theory with an agent-relative ranking of outcomes. I found this to be an intriguing
possibility, for it has the prospect of bringing consequentialism in line with our
commonsense moral intuitions. I have, ever since, been trying to work out how
this might best be done. My fi rst attempt came in the form of the dissertation
that I wrote at the University of California, Santa Barbara, with Matthew Hanser
supervising and Christopher McMahon and Burleigh Wilkins rounding out the
committee. I thank them for their guidance during those early years.
After graduate school, I continued to work in this area, publishing a number of
articles. Th is brought on a small but formidable wave of critics, which included
Michael Byron, Betsy Postow, Ben Sachs, Mark Schroeder, and Jussi Suikkanen.
I have learned a lot from these critics, and my views have changed substantially due
to their infl uence. My greatest debt is owed to Mark Schroeder. If it were not for his
penetrating criticisms of my earlier views, this book would have never taken shape.
It was by grappling with his criticisms that I came to the conclusion that conse-
quentialists should rank outcomes, not according to their agent-neutral (or even
their agent-relative) value, but according to how much reason each agent has to
desire that those outcomes obtain. And it was this conclusion that led to my mak-
ing certain crucial connections between my views about morality and my views
about practical reasons, the very connections that lie at the heart of this book.
ix