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Commentary on Husserl’s Ideas I Commentary on Husserl’s Ideas I Edited by Andrea Staiti DE GRUYTER ISBN 978-3-11-042628-1 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-042909-1 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-042912-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2015 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Typesetting: Konrad Triltsch, Print und digitale Medien GmbH, Ochsenfurt Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck ♾ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com Table of Contents Essential bibliograpy–Husserl’s Ideen I VII Andrea Staiti Introduction 1 John J. Drummond “Who’d ’a thunk it?” Celebrating the centennial of Husserl’s Ideas I 13 Claudio Majolino Individuum and region of being: On the unifying principle of Husserl’s “headless” ontology Section I, chapter 1, Fact and essence 33 Robert Hanna Transcendental normativity and the avatars of psychologism Section I, chapter 2, Naturalistic misconceptions 51 Andrea Staiti The melody unheard: Husserl on the natural attitude and its discontinuation Section II, chapter 1, The thesis of the natural attitude and its suspension 69 Hanne Jacobs From psychology to pure phenomenology Section II, chapter 2, Consciousnessand natural actuality 95 Burt C. Hopkins Phenomenologically pure, transcendental, and absolute consciousness Section II, chapter 3, The region of pure consciousness 119 Sebastian Luft Laying bare the phenomenal field: The reductions as ways to pure consciousness Section II, chapter 4, The phenomenological reductions 133 VI TableofContents James Dodd Clarity, fiction, and description Section III, chapter 1, Methodological pre-considerations 159 Dan Zahavi Phenomenology of reflection Section III, chapter 2, Universal structures of pure consciousness 177 Dermot Moran Noetic moments, noematic correlates, and the stratified whole that is the Erlebnis Section III, chapter 3, Noesis and noema 195 Nicolas de Warren Concepts without pedigree: The noema and neutrality modification Section III, chapter 4, On the problems of noetic-noematic structures 225 John J. Drummond The Doctrine of the noema and the theory of reason Section IV, chapter 1, The noematic sense and the relation to the object 257 Daniel O. Dahlstrom Reason and experience: The project of a phenomenology of reason Section IV, chapter 2, Phenomenology of reason 273 Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl Husserl’s analogical and teleological conception of reason Section IV, chapter 3, Levels of universality of the problems of a theory of reason 287 Appendix Ben Martin A Map of the noesis-noema correlation 329 Authors 337 Index 339 Essential bibliograpy–Husserl’s Ideen I German editions ofIdeen Husserl,Edmund(1913):„IdeenzueinerreinenPhänomenologieundphänomenologischen Philosophie“.In:JahrbuchfürPhilosophieundphänomenologischeForschungI, pp.1–323. Husserl,Edmund(1950):„IdeenzueinerreinenPhänomenologieundphänomenologischen Philosophie.ErstesBuch:AllgemeineEinführungindiereinePhänomenologie“.In: Husserliana.Vol.III.TheHague:Nijhoff. Husserl,Edumund(1976):„IdeenzueinerreinenPhänomenologieundphänomenologischen Philosophie.ErstesBuch:AllgemeineEinführungindiereinePhänomenologie“.In: Husserliana.Vol.III/1.TheHague:Nijhoff. English translations ofIdeen Husserl,Edmund(1931):Ideas.GeneralIntroductiontoPurePhenomenology.TranslatedbyW. R.BoyceGibson.London:AllenandUnwin. Husserl,Edmund(1983):„IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoa PhenomenologicalPhilosophy.FirstBook:GeneralIntroductiontoPurePhenomenology“. TranslatedbyF.Kersten.In:CollectedWorks.Vol.II.TheHague:Nijhoff. Husserl,Edmund(2014):IdeasforaPurePhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophy. TranslatedbyD.Dahlstrom.Indianapolis:Hackett. Translations ofIdeen in other modern languages (Chinese)Husserl,Edmund(1996):纯粹现象学通论：纯粹现象学和现象学哲学的观念(第1卷). Beijing:商务印书馆. (French)Husserl,Edmund(1985):Idéesdirectricespourunephénoménologiepureetune philosophiephénoménologique.Paris:Gallimard. (Italian)Husserl,Edmund(1965):Ideeperunafenomenologiapuraeunafilosofia fenomenologica.Libroprimo:Introduzionegeneraleallafenomenologiapura.Torino: Einaudi. (Polish)Husserl,Edmund(1975):Ideeczystejfenomenologiiifenomenologicznejfilozofii.Tom 1.Warsaw:WydawnictwoNaukowePWN. (Portuguese)Husserl,Edmund(2006):Idéiasparaumafenomenologiaeparaumafilosofìa fenomenológica:Introduçãogeneralàfenomenologiapura.Aparecida,SP:Ideias& Letras. (Romanian)Husserl,Edmund(2011):Ideiprivitoarelaofenomenologiepurăşilaofilozofie fenomenologică.Carteaîntâi:Introduceregeneralăînfenomenologiapură.Bucharest: Humanitas. VIII Essentialbibliograpy–Husserl’sIdeenI (Russian)Husserl,Edmund(2008):Идеикчистойфеноменологииифеноменологической философии.Moscow:AcademicProject. (Spanish)Husserl,Edmund(2013):Ideasrelativasaunafenomenologìapurayunafilosofìa fenomenològica.Libroprimero:Introducciòngeneralalafenomenologìapura.Mexico: Institutodeinvestigacionesfilosòficas/Fondodeculturaeconòmica. Monographs and edited volumes on Ideen I Brainard,Marcus(2002):BeliefandItsNeutralization.Husserl’sSystemofPhenomenologyin IdeasI.Albany:StateUniversityOfNewYorkPress. Grandjean,Antoine/Perreau,Laurent(Eds.)(2012):Husserl:Lasciencedesphénomènes.Paris: CNRSeditions. Embree,Lester/Nenon,Thomas(eds.)(2013),Husserl’sIdeen.Dordrecht:Springer. Kohák,Erazim(1978):Idea&experience:EdmundHusserl’sprojectofphenomenologyin IdeasI.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress. Lavigne,Jean-François(2009):Accéderautranscendental?Réductionetidéalisme transcendantaldanslesIdéesIdeHusserl.Paris:Vrin. Mancini,Roberto(2011):VisioneeVerità:UnViaggioNellaFenomenologiaAttraversoleIdeenI diEdmundHusserl.Assisi:Cittadella. Ricœur,Paul(1996):AkeytoHusserl’sIdeasI.Milwaukee:MarquetteUniversityPress. Andrea Staiti Introduction InhisessayStructuralisminModernLinguisticsErnstCassirerdescribesHusserl’s earlyworkagainstpsychologismintheProlegomenazueinerreinenLogik(1899) as having had “the effect of a great thunderstorm. It dispelled the clouds and clarified the whole intellectual atmosphere” (Cassirer 1945:103).The same can- notbesaidforthefirstbookofIdeen.Ifanything(andinkeepingwithCassirer’s meteorological metaphor), Ideen let the temperature in the intellectual atmosphere drop below the dew point and the clouds returned. BythetimeIdeenappearedastheopeningessayofthenewlyfoundedJahr- buch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (1913), a certain equili- brium seemed to have been achieved in the demarcation of empirical and philosophical disciplines, partly thanks to Husserl’s earlier work, as Cassirer recognizes.Theviewunderlyingsuchequilibriumwasasfollows:empiricaldis- ciplinesworkonvariousprovincesofrealitywiththeaidofvariousmethodolog- ical devices (experimentation and induction for the natural sciences, description, deduction, and statistical projection for the human sciences)¹; philosophical disciplines, on the contrary, do not have any direct purchase on empirical being, but only on issues of validity (Geltung) and justification. In this picture, conscious experience is the province of empirical psychology, whilelogicandthetheoryofknowledge(Erkenntnistheorie)aredisciplineswork- inginanapriorifashiononidealobjectsandlaws.Onthismodel,acceptedby virtually all Neo-Kantian philosophers of the time and rendered canonical by Husserl’s Prolegomena, no claim about the empirical structure of human con- sciousnesshasabearingonlogic(or:theaprioristructureofscientifictheory), and,conversely,noclaimaboutlogic(or:theaprioristructureofscientifictheory) can function as a premise to determine how human consciousness actually works. IfthesecondvolumeofHusserl’sLogicalInvestigationsalreadyentailedsig- nificantgesturestowardaproblematizationofthisdualisticview,Ideenseemed todisruptitcompletely.First,inIdeen phenomenologyispresentedasanewsci- ence,andnotsimplyasanewwayofreflectingonthealreadyexistingsciences, asitwouldbefitaphilosophicaldisciplineinaccordancewiththepredominant Neo-Kantian model. In the introduction to Ideen Husserl claims that there is a  On the deductive and statistical method of the humansciences see for instance Mill 1846: 547–549.MygratitudetoClaudioMajolinoforthisreference. 2 AndreaStaiti fieldofresearchthathasbeenhithertooverlookedandthatphenomenologyhas uncovered for the first time. Furthermore,phenomenology is declaredtobe the fundamentalscienceforphilosophy(Ideen3/3),thatis,phenomenologyisadis- cipline that carves out a new intellectual space, in which the traditional problems of philosophycan be posed in a new keyand raised to an unprecedented levelofscientificrigor.Inthissense,Ideenismeanttoactuallycarryoutthere- search projectoriginally presented in the famous Husserlian manifesto Philoso- phy as a Rigorous Science, published two years earlier (Husserl 1981). Last but not least, inId een phenomenology is introduced as an eidetic science, that is, one thatdoes not studyfacts,but ratheressences,on the basis of an operation labeled Wesensschau or eidetic intuition. Puzzlingly enough, however, Husserl definesthenovelfieldofinquiryatissuewithtermslike‘consciousness’and‘experience’,which,paceHusserl,doesseemtoleadthewholeprojectbacktothe object-domain of psychology! Unsurprisingly, commentators and reviewers raised a veritable welter of questions and critiques. How could phenomenology deal with consciousness and yet claim to have nothing to do with psychology (see Messer 1914)? How could Husserl argue that phenomenologists help themselves to the essential structuresofconsciousnesswithoutconsultingthedeliverancesofempiricalpsy- chology(seeMaier1914)?HowcouldHusserlusestronglyrealistic-soundinglan- guageinthecharacterizationofthe‘essences’graspedbyphenomenology,and yet claim to remain uncommitted to any form of metaphysical Platonism (see Elsenhans 1915, pp. 240–250)? Moreover, how could a philosopher working in the Neo-Kantian age consider essential structures to be intuitively accessible rather than conceptually constructed (see Natorp 1917 and Rickert 1920, pp.28–29)?Andfinally,howcouldHusserl,themostfamouscriticofpsycholo- gism, now argue that precisely a science of consciousness ought to deliver the ultimate foundations of philosophy (see Steinmann 1917)? InadditiontoexternalcriticismIdeenelicitedawaveofinternalcriticismby the group of young phenomenologists who worked with Husserl in Göttingen and, famously,by Heidegger. As is well known, a cohort of young and brilliant philosophystudentshadmovedtoGöttingenafterreadingtheLogicalInvestiga- tion, attracted by what they considered a refreshing surge of realism in a time that they perceived as dominated by subjectivism and skeptical relativism. Manyof them (including the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden) were baffled upon readingwhattheyconsideredtheirmentor’sinexplicableturn toidealism in Ideen, where Husserl unabashedly declares that “an absolute reality is no moreorlessvalidthanaroundsquare”(Ideen102/120)andthatanannihilation of the world would leave the being of consciousness intact (see Ideen 89/104). Heidegger,on his part,criticizedthe determination of the field of phenomenol-