Commando Tactics : the Second World War

302 Pages·2011·17.36 MB·English

by  Bull

Contents
List of Plates
Acknowledgements
Preface
1. Desperate Force
2. Norway
3. St Nazaire
4. Dieppe
5. The Making of Commandos
6. Close Combat and Lessons Learned
7. D-Day: Assault Infantry
8. Conclusion
Appendices:
I: British Commando Clothing and Equipment, European Theatre
II: 43 RM Clothing and Equipment, Yugoslav Theatre
III: Establishment and Armament of a Royal Marine Commando Troop
IV: Commando Battle Drill 1945
Bibliography
List of Plates
The original model for the ‘Commando’
A Bren gunner aboard a landing craft off Vaagso
Sketch map of Peter Young’s street battle at Vaagso
Private Tom McCormack of No. 2 Commando
Commandos pose with the Union Flag on return from Dieppe
Captain Gerald Charles Stokes Montanaro of No. 6 Commando
An NCO of No. 1 Commando rock-climbing during training in Scotland
‘The Sentry Hold’ from W. E. Fairbairn’s All-in Fighting
Use of the Commando knife from W. E. Fairbairn’s All-in Fighting
Commandos jump from assault boats during training
A Commando crawls through undergrowth
Training with the Fairbairn-Sykes knife
Assault course, bridging exercises, and the use of pyrotechnics
Use of the Smatchet
Rifle in close-quarter fighting
Basic section formations in Section Leading and Fieldcraft for Cadets
Instruction on disarming a knife-wielding opponent
Use of the Bren during attack and retreat
One way to disarm an enemy rifleman
Advancing rapidly through smoke
Folding ‘Assault Boat Mk III’
Cover from the 1942 edition of Shooting to Live
Commando raider on the beach at Hastings
Peter Young instructs two camouflaged snipers
Heavily stowed Commando equipped for a landing
Commando memorial at Spean Bridge
Method of forming a ‘night-fighting patrol’
Small folding-type assault boat
Rock-climbing exercise
Men of 12 Commando
Acknowledgements
Virtually all works of non-fiction build upon libraries and archives, as well as
the help and advice of others: this book is certainly no exception. The following
individuals and institutions have been vital, and unstinting, in their efforts to
assist – though apologies are offered to any inadvertently omitted from this list.
The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King’s College proved
particularly valuable and is here acknowledged specifically for access to, and
permission to quote from, the archives of Major General Sir Robert Laycock;
Brigadier Derek Mills-Roberts; Brigadier G. C. S. Montanaro; Lieutenant
Colonel H. C. J. Hunt; Captain J. G. Burton; also the history of 30 Assault Unit,
Royal Navy, compiled by Nutting and Glanville; and the E. J. Embleton
collection. The archives collection of the Imperial War Museum proved
similarly accommodating and is likewise warmly thanked for access to the
papers of Major General J. C. Haydon; Lieutenant S. Weatherall; Lieutenant R.
M. Lyons; A. E. Hines; A. F. L. Colson; Lieutenant J. B. Wetjen; Captain F. R.
J. Nicholls; Lieutenant D. J. Carnegie; Major General T. B. L. Churchill; G. W.
Read; P. H. B. Pritchard; Colonel N. A. C. Croft; J. E. C. Nicholl; I. C. D. Smith;
and J. H. Patterson.
Ian Maine, my former colleague at the National Army Museum, and now
Curator of the Royal Marines Museum, and his assistant Matthew Little, were
extremely helpful to the enterprise. Similarly Dennis Reeves, Curator of the
Liverpool Scottish Museum, has proved invaluable with his extensive
knowledge of ‘No. 4’ Independent Company, and early Army Commando
organisation and records. Jane Davies, Curator of the Queen’s Lancashire’s
Collection, and Colonel John Downham, have provided information on a number
of links between local regiments and the Commando forces. Lancashire
Libraries succeeded in unearthing a number of fairly obscure volumes – some of
which were ultimately tracked down only through inter-library loans from other
institutions. The late Dr Paddy Griffith is remembered, for both inspiration and
for organisation of a number of relevant study days.
Preface
Since 1945 there have been dozens of works on the British Commandos of the
Second World War. This first ‘special’ force has been covered in everything
from comic books to memoirs, unit histories, and learned dissertations. Indeed a
disproportionate amount of ink has already been spilt on this fairly small body of
men – who have arguably received better coverage than whole regiments and
corps of the ‘ordinary’ Army – yet their mystique has remained considerable. As
a child I recall that our neighbour had served as a Commando in the Second
World War, and the very mention of the unit awed many of my elders – who had
themselves served creditably – into silence. It was also a term with even greater
playground resonance than ‘cowboy’ or ‘spaceman’. The venerable and still
much-respected title ‘Commando’, now more than a century old, remains in use,
proudly borne by the modern Royal Marine Commandos, whose deeds continue
to add lustre to the name.
Nevertheless, it may reasonably be asked what a new book could possibly
have to offer. Yet, whilst the subject matter is not new, there are still significant
questions that have not been posed, and material that has not been deeply
plumbed – and sometimes not even consulted. It is also remarkable that events
so recent in history can give rise to such divergent opinions, and such different
accounts, even when eyewitness testimony is involved. What is attempted here is
not just ‘another narrative’ but some attempt at the ‘whys and hows’ of
formation, purpose, minor tactics, and ultimate significance of the Commando
force. Not all the answers are comfortable: there were times when the
Commandos were clearly more effective as a propaganda weapon than a fighting
force – being bluster rather than ‘cold steel’. On occasion they were almost
victims of their own, sometimes inaccurate, reputation. There were times when
even Churchill, at least the pragmatic midwife at the birth of Special Forces, if
not their unequivocal champion, lost faith in their efficacy. There were, indeed,
some disasters that no amount of positive media, medals, or extreme personal
bravery, could possibly conceal.
Yet these falterings are essentially footnotes. For, in asking bigger questions
about strategic deployment, tactical methods and doctrine, a different – arguably
more interesting – story emerges. In short, there was no single, simple, set of
‘Commando tactics’; no single bible of combined operations, assault, movement
and close combat, but many. The techniques of the Commando developed with
his task and with the equipment available. From the outset, Commando leaders
drew a distinction, not always welcome, between their men (with their intelligent
application of the novel) and the ‘herding together’ of the Regular Army – who
all too often did not learn to think or look after themselves. Moreover, the true
Commando ethos was extreme tactical flexibility combined with self-reliance
and team spirit. In this they became the experimental laboratory of both the
invasion of Europe and future small-unit tactics. It was no accident that they
learned to operate in smaller groups, nor that they sometimes pioneered the
introduction of new equipment and techniques, nor that they learned to move in,
or on, virtually anything over land or water; and that when all else failed they
were usually better at the old skills – forced marches, climbing, swimming and
tactical movement than virtually anybody else. Many of their virtues remain
those required of Special Forces to this day.
In concentrating on tactics, training, and examples of raids and small-unit
combat, it has to be acknowledged that the following account is not a seamless
chronicle. Certainly it cannot claim to be a complete history of all Commando
units and deployments. Such a work would perforce be much longer, and
probably obscure the specific and hopefully salient points presented. The main
focus here is Europe, which was where many of the key methods were evolved,
and on the ‘sharp end’ of significant events in which techniques, weapons,
equipment, and too often, men, were tried to destruction. Here ‘first use’ and
outcomes are regarded as more important than a repetition of all possible
instances. Space is also devoted to training and the notion of ‘lessons learned’ –
that was indeed the main mechanism by force of which knowledge and tactics
were advanced. Finally, the effectiveness of the Commando idea is examined: