Table Of ContentCOMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST
UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
The German and the Czech Models
Budapest
1994
COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST
UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
The German and the Czech Models
edited by
CSABA VARGA
Budapest
1994
Contents
Preface VII
Bibliography XIX
Verjährung von Straftaten, die in der ehemaligen DDR begangen wurden 1
THE GERMAN LAW I ON STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
Initiatives, drafts
Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Hans de With, Hermann Bachmaier, Hans
Gottfried Bernrath, Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Hans-Joachim Hacker, Walter
Kolbow, Dr. Uwe Küster, Dr. Jürgen Meyer (Ulm), Dr. Eckhart Pick, Margot
von Renesse, Dr. Jürgen Schmude, Wieland Sorge, Ludwig Stiegler, Dieter
Wiefelspütz, Dr. Peter Struck. Hans-Ulrich Klose und der Fraktion der SPD 7
[Drucksache 12/2132]
Gesetzesantrag der Länder Bayern, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Thüringen 10
[Drucksache 141/92]
Gesetzentwurf des Abgeordneten Dr. Wolfgang Ulimann und der Gruppe
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 30
[Drucksache 12/2332]
Scholarly opinions at the Bundesrat hearing
(11 November 1992)
Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen einer Regelung der Verjährung von
Unrechtstaten in der ehemaligen DDR
Stellungnahme für don Rechtsausschuß des Deutschen Bundestages 39
Stellungnahme zur Frage der Verjährung von DDR-Unrechtstaten (Anhörung
des Rechtsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages am 11. 11. 1992) 47
Stellungnahme zur nichtöffentlichen Anhörung zu den Entwürfen eines
Gesetzes zur Verjährung von SED-Unrechtstaten am 11. November 1992 vor
dem Rechtsausschuß des Deutschen Bundestages 50
Zur Verjährung von SED-Unrechtstaten 59
The Law
Gesetz über das Ruhen der Verjährung bei SED-Unrechtstaten (VerjährungsG) 65
III
THE GERMAN LAW II ON STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
Initiatives, drafts
Gesetzesantrag des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (3 March 1992)
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verlängerung strafrechtlicher Verjährungs-
fristen 11
[Bundesrat. Drucksache 147/92]
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion der SPD (12 February 1993) Entwurf eines ...
Strafrechtsänderungsgesetzes — Verjährung von Straftaten nach §§ 234 a,
241 a StGB (...SlrÄndG) 81
[Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode. Drucksache
Antrag des Freistaates Sachsen (6 May 1993) Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Verlängerung strafrechtlicher Verjährungsfristen 85
[Bundesrat, Dni-Liiti« 519 93|
Empfehlungen der Ausschüsse (9 July 1993) Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Verlängerung strafi-echtlicher Verjährungsfristen 97
[Bundesrat, Drucksache 319/1/93; Dem icher Bundestag. 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/5613]
Gesetzentwurf der Gruppe BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (7 September
1993) Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verlängerung von strafrechtlichen
Verjährungsfristen bei DDR-Unrechtstaten 106
[Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 12/56281
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU, SPD und F.D.P. (7
September 1993) Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Vereinheitlichung straf-
rechtlicher Verjährungsfristen 1 1 1
[Deutscher Bundestag, 12 Wahlpcnotfc, Drucksache 12/5637)
The Law
Gesetz zur Verlängerung strafrechtlicher Verjährungsfristen (2.
Verjährungsgesetz vom 27. September 1993) 1 19
[aundesgwcbLn 1993. Teil 1. Nr. 51.p 1657]
THE MESSAGE OF THE GERMAN PATTERN
An Interview with HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK 1 23
[by Zsolt Zetenyj * Am Ii Tarkany-Szücs, h-om Üj Ita&vronzag, I (30 November 1991) 185. pp. 2 * 4]
A Letter to the Editor by HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK 1 34
[excerpts, on the 20th of Januar)-. 199-1]
THE CZECH LAW ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE
COMMUNIST REGIME
Zákon a protiprávnosti komunistického režimu a odporu proti nemu (9
July 1993) 139
Duvodova zpráva 140
[motion No. 376 in original type]
Constitutional Court decision No. 19/93 (21 December 1993) 145
[from original typescript]
APPENDIX
THE MESSAGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Expert Opinion to the Hungarian Parliament by M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI 173
[on the 30th of October. 1991)
A Letter to Dr. Zsolt Zétényi by Lord KlRKHILL 175
[on the 28th of June. 1993)
PREFACE
In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have undertaken to
change their political systems in recent years, the natural desire to start
life anew could rest exclusively on another desire altogether — namely,
on the need to settle the issues of the past Whether explicitly or mutely,
the latter can manifest itself in several different forms, ranging from a
prevalence in society of the ethos of aversion to acting in any which way,
from steering a sober middle course to a radical means of calling to
account or even to letting all hell break lose: This apparent freedom of
choice may give the impression that the only reasonable and practicable
option, that which also entails genuine social goals, is to focus our
attention exclusively on our future. After all, if we become wrapped up
by our past, we are bound to remain captives of our instinctual selves.
Only our grievances or some externally elicited desire have the power to
make us bury ourselves in our past. However, both have only negative
and destructive results to offer, since they cannot be simultaneously
constructive or beneficial in any way.
Meanwhile, the experiences of those regional countries that
approach the issue from different angles lead us to conclude that, after
all, our choice does make a difference. Our answers to the questions of
the past set a course for our approach to the future. This is why the
history, traditions, and customs (and of course also the prevailing degree
of maneuverability and preconditions) of each country have a direct
influence on the extent to. which their peoples identify with these
dilemmas and also on the answers they eventually find. People may be
prepared to look all sorts of problems in the face in a calm and level
headed manner. They may just as well feel an urge to just wipe these
problems under the carpet. And they may also feel inclined to dodge
these problems by loosening the reins or fanning passions to a heat.
However, since man is caught between past and future, his answer to one
set of problems directly determines his answer to another, related set of
problems. Le style, e'est I'homme mime. But style is also the system
itself. And this problem becomes all the more pronounced if we make
people conscious of the fact that in the realm of the law, the relationship
between past and future is not merely logical or social in nature. If we
consider these problems in a legal context, we are bound to realize that
our constitutional ideals cannot hold water if they do not simultaneously
help us to look our past in the face. Should these ideals turn out to be
unfit in helping us transcend the past, our initial enthusiasm would
inevitably cool off, our constitutional ideals themselves would lose their
moral cohesion and appeal, and would eventually dry out, as it were,
democratic pathos and perspective evaporating away.
Hungary was among the first countries in the region to have made
serious efforts toward finding appropriate answers to this historically
arduous massive and exceptional challenge. As well known, at the time,
there were no external patterns for this country to adopt. We are familiar
with the results of the efforts Hungary has made over the past few years,
and we are aware of the occasional mistakes, the weaknesses, and the
lack of organization this process has entailed. And yet, we cannot but
admit that the actual results of these diverse efforts and often
contradictory attempts were to a decisive extent determined by hard facts
and the external and internal conditions that defined the process of
changing the nation's political system.
The experiences of success and failure can both be lost to memory.
At the same time, the realm of the subconscious is immense in both the
community and the individual. We have a broad stage on which to
maneuver, and freedom of choice is also ours. But the interaction
between past and future we can never ignore. Our past is our future. And
this is true the other way around as well; our power and ability to control
the future has its roots primarily in our past.
*
One of the toughest nuts to crack for those attempting to look the past in
the eye has been the dilemma over the issue of delivering historical
justice. In a strictly legal sense, statutory limitation lies at the core of this
problem.
Practically speaking, we can identify only one approach to the
issue of statutory limitation as prevailing in Hungary today. This
approach is the one that bears the seal of approval of the Constitutional
Court — the legal body charged with exercising control over the
sovereign powers of Parliament. This approval is considered
authoritative, and in principle it is irrevocable. Of course, people are free
to ask whether the decision at issue fits into the established traditions of
constitutionalism in Europe; whether it peremptorily follows or can at
least be deduced from the text of our prevailing Constitution; or whether
it is theoretically well-founded and buttressed by anything other than the
seal of the body itself. But it is to no avail to ask such questions, since
they have no power whatsoever to alter the decision's definitive force.
In Hungary, this development is not in the least accidental or
lacking in precedent. Among other things, it entails that peculiar
