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Combined Arms Operations in Allenby's Palestine Campaign PDF

56 Pages·2014·2.58 MB·English
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Air University John F. Regni, Lt Gen, Commander Air Command and Staff College Ronald R. Ladnier, Brig Gen, Commandant James W. Forsyth, Col, PhD, Dean Dr. William T. Dean III, Director of Research, Series Editor Carol Atkinson, Lt Col, PhD, Series Editor Dr. William T. Dean III, Essay Advisor Air University Press Dr. Shirley B. Laseter, Director Emily J. Adams, Content Editor Sherry C. Terrell, Copy Editor Vivian D. O’Neal, Prepress Production Daniel Armstrong, Cover Design Please send inquiries or comments to: Editor The Wright Flyer Papers Air Command and Staff College (ACSC/DE) 225 Chennault Circle, Bldg. 1402 Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6426 Tel: (334) 953-6810 Fax: (334) 953-2269 E-mail: [email protected] Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED FEB 2005 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Armageddon’s Lost Lessons: Combined Arms Operations in Allenby’s 5b. GRANT NUMBER Palestine Campaign 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air University,Air Command and Staff College,Maxwell AFB,AL,36112 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT In September 1918, the EEF concluded its campaign in Palestine by routing the Turkish forces at the battle of Megiddo. Under command of British general Allenby, the EEF successfully executed one of the most decisive engagements in any theater of World War I. Ably employing and synchronizing infantry, cavalry, and air forces, Allenby provided future military professionals and historians with a shining illustration of the efficacy of combined arms operations. In terms of surprise, concentration, and operational balance of forces, the culmination of the Palestine campaign was a foreshadowing of the German blitzkrieg used in World War II. Unfortunately, the true lessons of Allenby?s campaign were lost for future generations of military officers. Focusing on the culture and romanticism of the horse cavalry, students of the Palestine battles garnered little instruction on the emerging trends of combined arms operations that integrated air and ground mobility into a decisive operationallevel weapon. This paper analyzes the reasons those in the profession of arms missed the lessons of airpower and its role in combined arms operations. It examines the context of the Middle Eastern theater of World War I, describing how ?western front myopia? added to the overshadowing of operations conducted in Palestine. The paper also delves into the role of airpower in the Middle East and how Allenby integrated a relatively new weapon system into his force structure and operational planning and execution. Though largely unexplored by military professionals and historians, Allenby?s final campaign in Palestine proved to be a momentous step in the evolution of combined arms operations. 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 54 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY Armageddon’s Lost Lessons Combined Arms Operations in Allenby’s Palestine Campaign GREGORY A. DADDIS Major, US Army Air Command and Staff College Wright Flyer Paper No. 20 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama February 2005 This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are avail- able electronically at the Air University Research Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil. Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.Cleared for public release:distribution unlimited. ii Foreword It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best student research projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC research program encourages our students to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their own professional devel- opment and in “advancing air and space power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. Projects selected for publication combine solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, organiza- tional, and operational questions. Some of these studies pro- vide new solutions to familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making these research studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas. RONALD R. LADNIER Brigadier General, USAF Commandant iii Acknowledgments The origins of this paper lie in my own preparation for attending ACSC. As an Army officer preparing to represent my service at an Air Force school, I wanted to ensure that I had some background in the origins and development of airpower. After reading some short works on the subject, I came upon Robin Higham’s Airpower: A Concise History. Early in the book, there was a short entry entitled “Airpower in Action: The Ideal.” In less than two pages, Higham dis- cussed Gen Edmund H. H. Allenby’s Palestine Campaign and how aircraft from the fledgling Royal Air Force (RAF) had been integrated with traditional ground forces to achieve a tremendous victory. For something so momentous in the evolution of combined arms operations—the “ideal” as Higham noted—I thought a few scant paragraphs on the subject appeared rather incom- mensurate with its importance. The more I looked into it, I found that relatively few historians had paid much attention to the campaign and even less to airpower’s role in it. This paper is an attempt to fill a perceived void in the history of World War I, while also hopefully drawing out lessons that are still applicable for today’s military professionals. As with any historical work, this paper is truly a collabo- rative effort. First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. William Dean for his professional guidance, extreme pa- tience, and unyielding ability to focus my research and writing. He is not only a teacher, but also a mentor. I would also like to thank Dr. Kevin Holzimmer, RAF Wing Comdr Stephen Cockram, Dr. Michael Grumelli, and Maj William Pinter for reviewing drafts of the manuscript and providing invaluable advice and assistance. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Susan, and daughter, Cameron, for cheer- fully allowing me to accommodate General Allenby and his Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in our home for the bulk of our tour at Maxwell. v Abstract In September 1918, the EEF concluded its campaign in Palestine by routing the Turkish forces at the battle of Megiddo. Under command of British general Allenby, the EEF successfully executed one of the most decisive engage- ments in any theater of World War I. Ably employing and synchronizing infantry, cavalry, and air forces, Allenby pro- vided future military professionals and historians with a shining illustration of the efficacy of combined arms opera- tions. In terms of surprise, concentration, and operational balance of forces, the culmination of the Palestine cam- paign was a foreshadowing of the German blitzkrieg used in World War II. Unfortunately, the true lessons of Allenby’s campaign were lost for future generations of military officers. Focusing on the culture and romanticism of the horse cavalry, students of the Palestine battles garnered little instruction on the emerging trends of combined arms operations that inte- grated air and ground mobility into a decisive operational- level weapon. This paper analyzes the reasons those in the profession of arms missed the lessons of airpower and its role in com- bined arms operations. It examines the context of the Middle Eastern theater of World War I, describing how “western front myopia” added to the overshadowing of operations con- ducted in Palestine. The paper also delves into the role of airpower in the Middle East and how Allenby integrated a relatively new weapon system into his force structure and operational planning and execution. Though largely unex- plored by military professionals and historians, Allenby’s final campaign in Palestine proved to be a momentous step in the evolution of combined arms operations. vii

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Armageddon's Lost Lessons: Combined Arms Operations in Allenby's. Palestine . The Turkish Empire, having entered the war on. Germany's side . Integration with German leadership proved to be as trou- blesome as logistical .. weather grounded aircraft, Arab cooperation never materi- alized, and
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Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.