Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation

223 Pages·2000·5.35 MB·English

by  Keith L. Dougherty

Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation
Rather than focusing on why the states did not contribute to the
national government under the Articles of Confederation, Collective
Action under the Articles of Confederation asks why the states did con-
tribute. Why did states pay large portions of their requisitions to the
federal government when problems of collective action and the lack of
governmental incentives imply they should not have? Using original
data on Continental troop movements and federal debt holdings within
each state, Dougherty shows that states contributed to the national
government when doing so produced local gains. Such a theory stands
in stark contrast to the standard argument that patriotism and civic
duty encouraged state cooperation. Material incentives and local inter-
ests bound the union together and explained the push for constitu-
tional reform more than the pursuit of mutual goals.
Keith L. Dougherty is an assistant professor of political science at
Florida International University and a recipient of a 1998 Fulbright
Scholarship. His research interests include American political develop-
ment, federalism, and constitutional design. Several of his works on
the Articles of Confederation have appeared in Public Choice and the
Journal of Theoretical Politics, as well as in edited volumes.

Collective Action under the Articles
of Confederation
KEITH L. DOUGHERTY
Florida International University
CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521782098
© Keith L. Dougherty 2001
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2001
This digitally printed first paperback version 2006
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Dougherty, Keith L., 1965-
Collective action under the Articles of Confederation / Keith L. Dougherty.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-521-78209-0
1. Federal government — United States — History — 18th century. 2. State rights.
3. Constitutional history — United States. I. Title.
JK316.D68 2001
320.973'09'033 - dc21 00-031264
ISBN-13 978-0-521-78209-8 hardback
ISBN-10 0-521-78209-0 hardback
ISBN-13 978-0-521-02758-8 paperback
ISBN-10 0-521-02758-6 paperback
To my father Paul and to David Lalman,
for the fundamentals of writing, politics, and constructive thought

Contents
List of Tables and Figures page ix
Acknowledgments xi
1 The Mystery of State Contribution 1
The Confederative Design 3
Explanations for Poor Compliance 7
State Compliance and Private Gain 13
Overview of the Book 15
2 National Interests and State Sovereignty:
Objectives of the Confederation 17
Philosophical and Legal Origins of the Articles 18
Goals of the Confederation 25
Conclusion 32
3 Collective Action and the Provision of Public Goods 34
The Voluntary Provision of Pure Public Goods 35
Actual State Payments 42
Joint Products 45
Conclusion 49
4 The History of State Compliance 51
The Revolutionary Years, 1775-1780 52
The Morris Years, 1781-1784 59
Waning Years of the Confederation, 1785-1789 77
Conclusion 82
5 State Contributions and Private Interests 84
An Empirical Evaluation 85
Manipulating Private Benefits 98
Conclusion 101
viii Contents
6 Reacting to Rebellion 103
Significance of the Shays Requisition 105
Two Unrests 107
Governmental Responses 115
Discussion 124
Conclusion 127
7 A New Constitution 129
More Efficiency 131
Institutional Solutions 132
The Pragmatics of Reconstitution 153
Conclusion 160
8 Conclusion 162
The Federalist Debates 163
A Confederation Based on Virtue 173
Lessons from the American Confederation 179
Appendix: Olson's Collective Action Game 183
Glossary 193
References 197
Index 207
List of Tables and Figures
TABLES
3.1 The Requisition to Suppress Shays' Rebellion 38
4.1 Old-Money Requisitions, 1775-1779 54
4.2 General Requisitions, 1780-1788 79
5.1 State Compliance with Requisitions for Soldiers,
1777-1783 89
5.2 Regressions of State Contributions and the Distance of the
Continental Army 92
5.3 State Compliance with Requisitions for Money,
1784-1789 95
5.4 Regressions of State Contributions and the Public Debt 97
FIGURES
3.1 Quarterly Requisition Payments and Compliance 43
3.2 Frequency of State Payments, 1782-1789 44
4.1 Federal Expenditures and Soldiers in Continental Pay,
1775-1783 63
5.1 Compliance (in Regular Soldiers) and the Distance of the
Continental Army, 1777-1782 91
5.2 Monetary Compliance and the Public Debt, 1782-1789 96
A.I The Provision of Public Goods in an Institution-Free
Setting 185
A.2 Reaction Curves 187
A.3 Rational Provision of Public Goods under the Articles 191