Collected Works

175 Pages·2003·17.468 MB·English

by  Gustav Bergmann

DEUTSCHE HOCHSCHULSCHRIFTEN Gustav Bergmann
seit 1987
Collected Works Vol. I
REPRINT PHILOSOPHY
Modern Classics of Analytical Philosophy
Edited by
Rafael Hiintelmann • Erwin Tegtmeier • Kathe Trettin
vol. 1 Selected Papers 1
DR. HA.NSEL-HOHENHA USE N
FRANKFURT A.M. • MUNCHEN • LONDON • MIAMI • NEW YORK
Bibliographische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek GUSTAV BERGMANN
Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
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http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar Selected Works
Volume I
Contents
The Metaphysics ofL ogical Positivism
1. Remarks on Realism................................................................. 18
2. Sense Data, Linguistic Conventions and Existence.................. 41
3. Russell on Particulars ................................................................ 62
4. On Nonperceptual Intuition..................................................... 80
5. A Note of Ontology.................................................................. 84
6. Bodies, Minds, and Acts ............................................................. 89
7. Two Types of Linguistic Philosophy......................................... 110
8. The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Formalist Definition of
©2003 DR. HANSEL-HOHENHAUSEN AG "Identity" ..................................................................................... 136
Verlag der Deutschen Hochschulschriften 9. Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of
Hanauer Landstr. 338, D-60314 Frankfurt a.M.
Metaphysics.................................................................................. 145
Tel. [phone] Fax [phone]
ISBN 3-8267-1231-5 Meaning and Existence
ISSN 0944-7091
2003 10. Particularity and the New Nominalism .................................... 193
11. Some Remarks on the Ontology of Ockham ........................... 208
12. Professor Quine on Analyticity ............................ .................... 219
Alie Texte, etwaige Grafiken, Layouts und alle sonstigen schOpferischen 13. Intentionality ............................................................................. 224
Teile dieses Buches sind u.a. urheberrechtlich geschiltzt. Nachdruck, Speicherung,
Sendung und Vervielfaltigung in jeder Form, insbesondere Kopieren, Digitalisi.eren, Sm?othing, 14. Russell's Examination of Leibniz Examined ............................. 258
J(omprimierung, Konvertierung in andere Formate, Farbverfremdtmg s?w1e Bearb~tung 15. The Revolt Against Logical Atomism ....................................... 292
und Ubertragung des Werkes oder von Teilen desselben in andere Med1en und Speicher
sind ohne vorherige schriftliche Zustimmung des Verlages unzulassig 16. Frege's Hidden Nominalism ...................................................... 324
und werden verfolgt.
17. Sameness, Meaning, and Identity ............................................... 344
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Printed in Germany.
9
ERWIN TEGTMEIER
INTRODUCTION
Bergmann was born in Vienna (Austria) in 1906. After finishing
the Gymnasium he registered at the University of Vienna. Be
fore he took a Ph.D. in mathematics with a minor in philosophy in
1928, he had already been invited along with his Gymnasium class
mate Kurt Godel to join the Vienna Circle, where he was especially
influenced by Schlick, Waismann and Carnap. In 1929-30 Bergmann
taught mathematics at a Realschule in Vienna and in the following
year he went to Berlin to work as assistant of Einstein together with
W. Mayer, his dissertation director. Discouraged by the discrimina
tion against Jews at German and Austrian universities Bergmann re
turned to Vienna to study law. He took a JD and went into a firm
of corporation lawyers. When Nazi Germany annexed Austria in
1938 Bergmann emigrated to the United States with financial assis
tance from Circle Member Otto Neurath. In 1939 he obtained an
appointment at the University of Iowa as an assistant to the psy
chologist Kurt Lewin. He was employed to develop a mathematical
representation of Lewin's psychological field theory. In 1940 Berg
mann became assistant professor at the Department of Philosophy,
and in 1950 full professor of philosophy and psychology. During
the 1960s and 1970s Bergmann had a major impact on contem
porary philosophy and contemporary issues in the philosophy and
methodology of psychology, attracting brilliant students who went
on to teach in philosophy and psychology departments of leading
universities of the United States. Bergmann and his philosophy stu
dents and followers were sometimes referred to as " The Iowa
School" or " The Iowa Realists". It brought national and interna
tional status to a small philosophy department of a middle-sized
midwestern university. From 1967-68 he served as president of the
American Philosophical Association (Western Division) and in 1972
he was awarded the first named professorship in the College of Lib-
10 11
eral Arts at the University of Iowa as Carver Professor. Bergmann are two categories of existents in the world, particulars and univer
retired in 1974 and died in 1987. sals, Bergmann's reconstructed formulation would hold that his
In the beginning of his scientific career in Austria and Germany ideal language has two types of descriptive signs, individual and
Bergmann published exclusively mathematical papers (mainly in his predicate signs. Correspondingly, the ontological question "what
specialty of topology), except for one paper in the psychoanalytic exists?" is transcribed into " what is represented by the descriptive
journal Imago, which dealt with literary criticism. Bergmann's early signs of the ideal language?", more precisely, " ... what is represented
philosophical work concerned the foundations of psychology and by the primitive, i.e. undefined, descriptive signs of the ideal lan
physics (topics were e.g. the behaviorist J.B.Watson, operationism, guage?". Bergmann takes the view that the ontologist uses "exist" in
psychoanalysis, psychological measurement, psychophysics, emer a special sense such that only what is simple exists. He points out
gence and quantum physics). From the early 1950s he concentrated that the ontological question "what exists?" would be utterly trivial,
his research on metaphysics and ontology. He developed an onto as it is simply answered by "everything"-- if the verb "exist" is un
logical system, at first a rather simple one, that became more and derstood in the customary sense. Thus he also rejects Quine's influ
more complicated and sophisticated. It culminated in the posthu ential criterion of ontological commitment which takes into ac
mously published "New Foundations of Ontology" and his last count only signs associated with quantifiers: to be is to be the value
three papers. of a variable. Bergmann suspects that Quine is simply misled by the
Bergmann gave the provocative title "The Metaphysics of Logical term "existential quantifier".
Positivisr:p" to his first volume of selected papers, which appeared in Bergmann claims that the ideal language method makes possible a
1954. It suggests that the logical positivists, of which he was one, reconstruction of metaphysics. He credits Russell and the Wittgen
having been a member of the Vienna circle, had an implicit meta stein of the Tractatus with the first attempts at it, even though the
physics. In the selected papers, Bergmann points out that the phe Tractatus takes the Moorean discourse about the ideal language to
nomenalism of some and the materialism of others of his fellow be meaningless. By "reconstruction of metaphysics" Bergmann not
positivists are metaphysical views. More importantly, he claims that only deals with traditional metaphysical problems in a sound way
in spite of the anti-metaphysical attitude of its advocates logical posi but also reformulates and explicates the main traditional metaphysi
tivism allows one to do metaphysics and to solve, rather than dis cal positions. It is fully in the logical positivist spirit that Bergmann
miss, traditional metaphysical problems. He thinks that there is expects the reconstruction to exhibit the common sense core of the
merely a new method , though one that is radically new, of ap classical metaphysical answers and to show that they are not incom
proaching the old questions. The new method is linguistic. It is the patible. Thus the reconstructionist need not take sides but merely
method of constructing an ideal language in which grammatical and see and describe.
logical form coincide and which is also designed to represent the Nevertheless, Bergmann takes sides in central metaphysical contro
1
categorial structure of the world. Bergmann remains a logical posi versies, before all, in that between materialism, phenomenalism and
tivist in holding that his linguistic turn, as he has called it, is neces realism. The materialist holds that there is nothing mental, the phe
sary to make metaphysics meaningful. However, he also holds that nomenalist that everything is mental, more precisely, that every
metaphysical statements taken literally are non-commonsensical and thing is a sense datum or made of sense data. However, the world of
meaningless. They need to be translated into commonsensical dis the realist consists of two realms, the mental and the physical, the
course about an ideal language, called "Moorean discourse" by mental being capable to intend the physical as well as the mental.
Bergmann. Instead of saying, e.g., in the traditional way that there Bergmann was always opposed to metaphysical materialism. As he
13
12
. If h b "a reluctant phenomenalist in the style of the same or does it fall into a series of momentary entities as Ber
himse says, e egan as · · l' f h
. c· 1 " d turned in the 1960ties mto a 11 rea ist t e keley and Hume thought? 4. are relations monadic or polyadic as
0
the Vienna ire e an · ·d d
· I riety" In the 1950ues Bergmann consi ere Russell claimed? 5. Are sameness and diversity basic or are they de
p h enomeno1 o g1ca va . . bl f h . H
-1 h bl f mind to be the basic pro em o metap ysics. e rived and definable? Bergmann advocates with respect to the 5 prob
t e pro em o . l · · · • I · h'
· d acy of the main log1ca posmvists so ution to t is lems 1. that there are particulars and not only universals; 2. that
put t h e ma equ . fl f 1 . I h 1
own to the dominant m uence o c ass1ca p enomena - properties are universal; 3. that ordinary things are series and not
prob l em d . 1 H' I ·
· (H me) which does not admit menta acts. is own so uuon simple persistents; 4. that relations are polyadic universals; 5. that
h k h d'.
!gSeitlsl its Uin spiration from G.~.Moore w ~ ta es up t e act tra it10n sameness and diversity are basic and permit no criterion nor defini
f Brentano and Locke. Usmg Brentano s term, Bergmann empha tion.
:zes that the characteristic feature of the mental is intentionality, Bergmann's positions are diametrically opposed to those of main
i.e. the directedness of the mental act towards its object. Bergmann stream analytical philosophy, especially to materialism and nomi
adds a logical sign to his ideal language which is to be interpreted as nalism. Nevertheless, he reconstructs the mostly implicit ontologies
"means". True sentences with this sign represent the intentional of contemporaneous analytic philosophers such as Carnap, Wittgen
connection between a mental act and its object. These sentences are stein, Goodman and Ryle.
taken to be analytic by Bergmann, who defends the dichotomy ana No few analytic philosophers credit Quine with a renewal of ontol
lytic versus synthetic against Quine's attack and conceives of analy ogy. This is clearly off the mark if only because he never seriously .··
ticity in the narrow sense of logical truth. The problem of analytic attempts to develop an ontological system and because he frequently
ity is the second basic problem of metaphysics according to Berg reveals his conviction that ontology is a matter of our conceptuali
mann. It turns out to be closely connected to the first. Another zation, not a matter of the structure of the world in itself. There
problem which Bergmann deals with is that of universals. He advo will occur no renewal of ontology proper and on a par with the old
cates universals and rejects nominalism pointing out that a nomi ontology before the writings of Gustav Bergmann are studied more
nalistic language, i.e., by his analysis of existence a language without closely.
predicate symbols would be patently inadequate. This first volume of a planned three volume edition of works of
With respect to all metaphysical problems Bergmann stresses the re Gustav Bergmann contains papers published during the years 1946 -
quirement that they be solved within the frame of a comprehensive 1958. Although, there are 17 papers in this volume, they form only
ontology, i.e., a complete categorial inventory of the world. Some part of Bergmann's papers of that time. The most important earlier
times he counts the search for an ontological inventory among the papers on first philosophy have been selected, starting with two es
basic problems of metaphysics and even classes it as the most basic. says which were designed to clarify the realism issue or, more pre
This basic problems branches into several subproblems according to cisely, to show how positivists can preserve the common sense core
the different categories. The problems which Bergmann treated in of epistemological realism.
the 1950s and wich are represented ::n the present volume were The first two papers of this volume were designed to clarify the real
mainly the following: 1. are there particulars as well as universals or ism issue or, more precisely, to show how positivism can preserve
do ordinary things like stones and clouds consist of universals only the common sense core of epistemological realism. He holds that it
as Russell thought at a certain stage of his philosophical develop is incumbent upon positivism, as upon any other serious meta
ment? 2. are the properties of ordinary things universal or, as nomi physical position, to preserve the commonsense cores of all other
nalists hold, particular? 3. does an ordinary thing persist as one and positions. Influenced by G.E.Moore, Bergmann takes the view that
14 15
philosophical analysis tries to reconstruct commonsense ~nd noth "Bodies, Minds, and Acts", he arrives at a primitive mental term af
ing but commonsense (in a very narrow sense). The first paper ter giving a comprehensive survey of the mind-body problems, the
"Remarks on Realism" which appeared in 1946 tries to recover the alternative solutions and their difficulties. He introduces primitive
commonsense conviction that experience has to be founded on exis nonrelational predicates for different kinds of propositional atti
tence and not, as the positivist does, the other way round. Berg tudes (traditionally called "mental acts"). These predicates combine
mann offers as corresponding to positivism as well as to realism a with sentences, which is syntactically unusual in Bergmann's sym
meaning criterion which derives in opposition to "current garden bolic ideal language derived from "Principia Mathematica".
varieties of positivism" verifiability from meaningfulness rather The 1952 paper "Two Types of Linguistic Philosophy" discusses
than vice versa. This criterion allows, as Bergmann indicates, also to formalist and antiformalist linguistic philosophy referring to Car
recover the common sense core of the dualistic position. nap's "Logischer Aufbau der Welt" and Goodman's "Structure of
The second paper "Sense Data, Linguistic Conventions, Existence" Appearance", on one side, and to an anthology of British analysts
of 1947 criticizes Ayer for salvaging Berkeley's formula "esse est edited by A.Flew, on the other side. Formalists are accused of play
percipi" by linguistic convention, by defining existence in terms of ing mathematical games for the sake of the game, some of which
direct apprehension. Bergmann rejects the formula as patently and turn out to be philosophically irrelevant or even misleading and
irremediably false for reasons given by G.E.Moore. He also holds it similarly antiformalists are reproached of being probers and pruners
to be misplaced in sense datum language which has the mechanism' of the idiom unwilling to recognize philosophical problems and to
of variables and operators, since in such a language one can speak spend themselves on puzzles that are often not relevant.
about the existence of things not directly apprehended. As in the Sameness and diversity remain one of the main themes of Berg
first paper, he argues that it is this mechanism which allows the mann. Under the heading "The Identity of Indiscernibles and he
positivist to do justice to the common sense core of realism. Formalist Definition of "Identity"" (1953) he tries to clarify the ar
The article "Russell on Particulars" which also appeared in 1947 guments for the analyticity of the respective proposition and he
criticizes Russell's attempt at a particular-free analysis made in "In points to differences between philosophical and mathematical uses
quiry into Meaning and Truth". The bundle-theory here advocated of the key notions such as 'definition' and 'analytic' but also 'iden
by Russell, its structural roots and consequences and its ontological tity' and 'difference'.
alternative remained a main theme of Bergmann's thinking. It is in Next is Bergmann's great programmatic essay of 1953 "Logical Posi
teresting to compare his arguments and position with those in the tivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics" on the
later book "Realism". linguistic method of Positivists in metaphysics. The idea of the
In 1949 Bergmann published the short paper titled "On Nonpercep method finds itself already in the earlier papers of this volume but
tual Intuition", borrowing a term from C.D.Broad. It is directed here Bergmann comprehensively deals with its history, problems
against simple necessitating relations, including a simple relation of and contemporary solutions as well as with the loss of metaphysical
causation. A succinct refutation of such relations is constructed in problems in formalism, scientism and casuism. Bergmann's main
it. The short "Note on Ontology", published in 1950, compares points were that the positivist frame allowed to solve the traditional
Bergmann' s conception of ideal language ontology with Quine' s. metaphysical problems and to solve them in a meaningful way by
In the first paper of this volume Bergmann still holds that the ideal the ideal language method.
language has only defined but no simple mental terms. In a talk at a The new nominalists referred to in the 1954 paper "Particularity
meeting of the American Philosophical Association of 1952, titled and the New Nominalism" are W.V.Quine and N.Goodman.
17
16
criticizes in it the rejection of the subject predicate dis- nalism forces the multiplication of entities upon Frege. Serious flaws
Bergmann . d' .
· · and Goodman's category of m iv1dual. of Frege's system are brought out and his function nominalism is
unction ,,
The result of Bergmann's 1954 paper Some Remarks on the On- compared with Quine's common name nominalism.
tology of Ockham" is that Oc~ham ~as _what r:cently is called a The last paper of this volume "Sameness, Meaning, and Identity"
·trope ontology, that Ockham s qualitative accidents are tropes (1959) summarizes not only the development of Bergmann's think
(Bergmann uses the designation "instances of a quality"). ing about sameness, which is central indeed, but also that about the
In "Professor Quine on Analyticity" (1955) Bergmann wants to structure of mind, another focus of Bergmann's. In Frege's difficulty
show that his view of analyticity is superior to Quine's and more of the identity of meanings both problems cross over. Bergmann
suitable to defend the reasonableness and usefulness of formal logic. removes the difficulty by distinguishing two uses of "same", be
The paper "Intentionality", which appeared in the same year, devel tween the basic use, for which there cannot be a criterion and
oped the analysis of the mental of the 1952 talk. The nonrelational "same" in the sense of "analytically equivalent". In addition, identity
mental primitive predicates are turned into one relational predicate defined by Leibniz' formula of the identity of indiscernibles is
M (to be read as "means"). Also, Mis not a descriptive but a logical placed as a third. Bergmann investigates the relation between the
relation (or rather, as Bergmann says, a "pseudo-relation") like con two kinds of sameness and identity in a world with and without
nectives as conjunction and disjunction. This revision entails an ex mind.
tension of the notion of analyticity. Certain sentences involving M This is to be the first volume of a three volume selection of Berg
become analytic. mann' s papers and his book "Realism". The second volume which
The 1956 paper "Russell's Examination of Leibniz Examined" refers will appear later contains papers of the middle and late Bergmann.
to Russell's book on Leibniz published in 1900. It treats Leibniz'
ontology as a whole and Russell's reconstruction of it focusing on
the problems of substance, predication, relation, and space and time. Darmstadt, Germany, October 2001
Lessons for contemporary issues are drawn.
In "The Revolt Against Logical Atomism" (1957) which was
prompted by a book of Urmson on the development of philosophy
between the two wars examines the rejection of the logical atomism
of Russell and the early Wittgenstein and metaphysics in general ini
tiated by the later Wittgenstein. Bergmann defends logical atomism
and points out the mistakes its adversaries (particularly their confu
sions about meaning) and the connections of these to 19th century
idealistic philosophy.
In "Frege's Hidden Nominalism" (1958) Bergmann diagnoses an
implicit nominalism insofar as Frege does not secure full ontological
status to functions which have to ground characters. The mapping
by Frege's functions is contrasted to the exemplification of univer
sals in Bergmann's universal-realistic ontology and a connection be
tween mapping and nominalism is shown as well as how the nomi-
18 19
THE METAPHYSICS OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM
(among other things) upon existence. To be sure, this is but
a bare and crudely formulated schema of an issue that has
been argued for a long time. Also, contemporary analysts
REMARKS ON REALISM \\' for the most part do not discuss the issue directly; they give
their attention to preliminary and, therefore, more funda
mental questions. Like experienced chess players, who know
to which characteristic situations in the middle game certain
openings will eventually lead, we try to convince each other
POSITIVISTS and phenomenalists of all sorts maintain, and
of the excellence of our respective openings. There is, in par
long have maintained, some variant of the following thesis
ticular, one fundamental or opening move that is now widely
concerning the existence of physical objects: Such statements
discussed and which, I believe, most of us examine with a
as 'There is (exists) now a wall behind my back' are synony
view to the position in which we shall find ourselves-in the
mous with a class of statements of which the following is
middle game-with respect to the realism issue. I refer to
representative 'If I shall turn my head (have certain kinaes
the clarification of the relations between meaning and veri
thetic experiences), then I shall also have the visual experi
fication 1 or, to put it the way positivists do, to the formula
ence called 'seeing a wall'.' This amounts to proposing what
tion of an adequate meaning criterion. Let me indicate the
many of us call a philosophical analysis of 'exist' or, more
connection between these questions and the crude schema I
precisely, of one meaning of 'exist'; for the thesis implies that
have given for the realism issue. According to current gar
this verb, in the sense in which we use it when we say 'This
den varieties of positivism, a statement is (empirically)
wall exists', is dispensable in the sense of being definable.
meaningful if it is verifiable by (future) experience. 'There
Realists, who oppose the thesis, hold that 'exist', in the sense
is a wall behind my back' is, in this view, meaningful because
mentioned, is what I would call an undefined descriptive
it is synonymous with a class of statements each of which is
predicate; and then they go on to recommend that instead
verifiable by future experience. More pointedly, the familiar
of defining existence in terms of what we (shall) see, we had
common-sense statements about the existence of physical
better say that we shall, if we turn, see a wall because there
objects are considered as meaningful because they are verifi
is a wall (and because we have put ourselves in a position to
able. This has again the subjectivistic ring realists dislike so
perceive it). Thus one could say, perhaps, that the realists
much; so they may again be inclined to convert the positiv
wish to convert the positivistic position; instead of founding
istic position, if only tentatively and because they feel
existence upon experience, they want to found experience
that a piece of realistic common sense would thus be pre
0 Philosophy of Science, 13 (October, 1946), 261-73. Reprint~d by served. But to make the conversion is to say that 'There
permission.
1 'Verification' is used in its generic sense which includes falsification
and, if you please, also confirmation and its opposite.
20 21
REMARKS ON REALISM THE METAPHYSICS OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM
is a wall behind my back' is verifiable because it is mean paper I propose to analyze, as another partial clarification,
ingful. another group of interrelated questions. But I have still to
One of the conclusions of the following analysis may b~ ex explain why I have, in this introductory statement, singled
pressed by saying, as the realists do, that the familiar state out a result which some will be inclined to regard as a mere
ments about the existence of external objects are verifiable verbalism, and a trifling one at that, namely, that we should
because they are meaningful-and I shall arrive at this con say, and as positivists may say, that certain statements are
clusion within the framework of my own positivistic position. verifiable because they are meaningful, rather than to say
But perhaps I had better explain why I believe such a that they are meaningful because they are verifiable.
"verbal" concession to be important when it occurs in the The point has something to do with my views on the na
context of what is, after all, a positivistic position, and also ture and function of philosophical analysis. Whether or not
what in my opinion constitutes a positivistic position on the philosophical analysis is, as many believe, definitional recon
realism issue. To begin with the second question, a positivist struction is not at the moment my concern, though I think
will ( 1) embrace the thesis that has been stated in the open that as such sweeping formulae go, this one is rather sug
ing sentence of this paper, and he will ( 2) distinguish two gestive. But while we may not know exactly what reconstruc
meanings of 'exist'. The first meaning is that in which the tion is, there is, to my mind, no uncertainty about what it is
term occurs in 'This wall exists (This is a real wall)'; this that we wish to reconstruct. Philosophical analysis tries to
meaning we have, in ( 1), analyzed and thus, in a well-known reconstruct ordinary common sense and nothing but ordinary
sense, rejected. In its second meaning the term occurs in common sense. In arriving at this opinion I have been greatly
descriptions, that is, in the phrase 'There is (exists) a such influenced by G. E. Moore; so I shall, as a means of explicat
and-such', which we symbolize by combining the prefix 'E' ing it, indicate where I disagree with what I take to be his
with a bound variable. This phrase, thus symbolized, belongs views on the matter. ( 1) I wish to circumscribe common
to the logical or nondescriptive skeleton of our language; its sense so narrowly that all philosophical statements, no mat
use is, therefore, by no means prejudicial to one's position ter how inchoate or naive, remain excluded. 'This is a real
on the realism issue while, on the other hand, failure to dis wall' is, .according to this view, a common-sense statement;
tinguish between the two meanings of 'exist' confuses that 'Walls are real' is a border case, to say the least. ( 2) I would
issue beyond repair. One of the pecularities of the situation is insist that while the reconstruction of common sense is our
that positivists who neglect the distinction are virtually goal, our analysis (or reconstruction-that amounts to the
forced to accept the patently absurd meanings of the ambigu same thing) need not and, as a rule, will not itself be
ous formula esse est percipi. All this I discuss elsewhere, 2 as commonsensical. ( 3) Reconstruction is, in a certain sense,
one partial clarification of the realism issue; in the present purely linguistic. This means two things to me and I shall, in
order to explain them, use the case at hand. (a) In recon
2 "Sense Data, Linguistic Conventions, and Existence," Philosophy of
Science, 14 (April, 1947), 152-63, and also following this article. structing such words as 'real', 'meaningful', 'verifiable'- terms
23
22
THE METAPHYSICS OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM
REMARKS ON REALISM
·n some of their usages to the language of schema, 'There is a such-and-such', and the various schemata
that beI ong on I Y 1 . · h ·
e must not be expected to vmd1cate t e1r for universal statements, such as 'Every so-and-so is a such
common sense-W
· al meanings that is, to reconstruct sentences in and-such' are all well formed, while 'This exists (Ea)' and
metaph ys1c '
which they occur and which, though they belong to our 'green exists ( Ef1)' are not. 3 The second part of the criterion
hilosophical tradition, do not belong to the language of is what I have elsewhere 2 called a Principle of Acquaintance
~ommon sense. ( b) We shall be the more successful the more (abbreviated: PA). I shall state it for a sense data language,
closely we reproduce, in talking about our reconstructed lan- that is, for a language whose particulars (proper names)
uage, the verbal patterns of our common usage in all those refer to the sort of momentary givennesses many philosophers
~ases where this usage does lie within, or very close to, the call sense data and whose undefined predicates (of the first
limits of common sense. In this sense, I agree with the realists, type) designate qualities of and relations between sense
the schema 'verifiable because meaningful' does preserve a data. Stated for this language, the PA requires ( 1) that a
piece of "realistic" common sense, which the converse seems particular is to occur in a statement only if its referent is
to abandon. And in this sense, I feel, it is incumbent upon immediately apprehended-in perception, memory, or imag
positivism, as upon any other serious metaphysical position, ination-by the speaker; and ( 2) that an undefined predicate
to preserve the common-sense cores of all other positions. is to occur in a statement only if at least one exemplification
of it is known to the speaker. Thus, if 'green' and 'square'
I are, by assumption, two undefined predicates with which the
The meaning criterion I propose has two parts. To be speaker is acquainted while he has never seen a green square,
:meaningful, a statement is, first, required to have a certain then the two propositions 'There are green squares' and 'All
for:nJ· It must be what logicians call a well-formed sentence squares are green' are both meaningful for him, though he is,
according to the (syntactical) rules of that logic which, as for obvious reasons, not likely to entertain the latter. The
we have overwhelming reasons to believe, is in fact the logic customary example is 'There are centaurs', or something like
of the language that we all speak about the world, or-to put that, rather than 'There are green squares'. But I do not yet
it even more cautiously-which would become the logic of want to mention physical objects. So much for the proposed
our language, if that language could be perfected in the version of the meaning criterion. It restores, quite generally
direction perfection has been sought during the past decades and not just for certain statements about physical objects,
of analytical labor. This logic is a subject-predicate schema an important piece of common sense, for it allows us to say
with an unramified type rule, and it contains the ordinary unambiguously that when a proposition is meaningful, it is
connectives ('and', 'or', etc.) as well as operators and vari so by virtue of what we know when we entertain it. Now for
ables ('all', 'some'); it is, in brief, the logic of the noncon some comments and explanations.
troversial parts of Principia Mathematica. This part of the
a Symbols with subscripts, such as 'f1', stand for constant predicates; 'f'
criterion has the familiar consequence that the existential is always a variable.