Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development. Unknown Deleuze and Speculative Realism

446 Pages·2007·6.34 MB·English

by  Robin James Mackay

Computer Deleuze
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Editorial Introduction
Robin Mackay
Welcome to our third volume, the greater part of which is
devoted to the work of Gilles Deleuze.1 Alongside a number
of searching examinations of his work, it also features two
previously untranslated texts by Deleuze himself. Although
assembled under the working title ‘Unknown Deleuze’, the
volume announces no scandalous revelation, no radical
reinterpretation; rather, this title simply indicates a humble
acknowledgement of the fact that, philosophically speaking,
Deleuze remains something of an enigma.
It is not without trepidation that we devote almost an
entire volume to one particular philosopher; even more so
given the ever-accelerating trend of secondary commentary
and the rash of titles claiming to apply Deleuze’s thought to
1. In the second part of the volume we present a record of the conference ‘Speculative
Realism’, which elaborates certain themes taken up in Collapse Volume II. Since
these themes were already introduced in that volume, we will remark here only
that one should not anticipate a discursive statement of fully-formed philosophi-
cal positions, but rather a continuation – in the absence of the extended interviews
featured in previous volumes – of Collapse’s commitment to the publication of
‘live philosophy’. ‘Speculative Realism’ is a conversation between four philosophers
who think outside partisan affiliations to particular thinkers or schools, and thus
is genuinely exploratory. Its ‘unfinished’ aspect reflects its status as a document of
contemporary philosophy in the making, in which new conceptual approaches are
proposed, the borders between science and philosophy probed, and the history of
thought mined for fresh insights.
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COLLAPSE III
areas as diverse as dance, feminism and geography. These
latter might be taken as proof enough of the continuing
fecundity of Deleuze’s philosophy, but they belie the fact
that it is still difficult to situate his work philosophically.
Interdisciplinary appropriations too often compound this,
turning ‘Deleuzianism’ into a game of recognition and thus
merely succumbing to a new image of thought (everyone
knows what a rhizome is …) Although doubtless such
works can and do succeed in producing worthwhile and
productive syntheses, it is difficult to assess their claim to
represent Deleuze’s thought without a renewed, properly
philosophical effort to examine the latter. But should this
even matter, given that Deleuze himself told us simply to
use concepts ‘like a toolbox’? Such a riposte typifies the
most deleterious aspect of the ‘success’ currently enjoyed
by Deleuze; for any precision tool must be mastered before
it is ‘put to work’, and for this one must understand, in turn,
its own workings and its interaction with the rest of the
conceptual ‘equipment’ in hand.
The first of our texts by Gilles Deleuze himself, a
short interview from 1981, offers a review of the enduring
concerns of his ambitious philosophical project. Despite
its brevity, the exchange merits translation because it sees
Deleuze, despite his antipathy to being asked ‘general
questions’,2 speaking on a general level about his philo-
sophical work, even going so far as to make a distinction
– heretical by the lights of Capitalism and Schizophrenia –
between his own concerns and those of Félix Guattari
in that work. In this exchange Deleuze recapitulates and
reaffirms the major themes of his thought – a renewed
2. Dialogues II, 1.
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Editorial Introduction
philosophy of nature; the problem of the image of thought;
the construction of a science of the problem, and of a new
metaphysics; the battle against neurosis and the typology
of multiplicities. The other contributors to our volume take
up, in various ways, the question of the interconnection of
these themes – how do they come to be integrated into a
philosophy?
With a style that combines the resources of the
conceptual, the poetic, the mythical and the etymologi-
cal, ArnAuD VillAni has constantly aspired in his work
to do justice to the richness of Deleuze’s thought, just as
this thought itself, he argues, aims above all to do justice
to the ‘burl’ of the real.3 Gerard Manley Hopkins, who
Villani cites here, is indeed an intriguing reference-point
for Deleuze, with his language of ‘inscapes’ and ‘instress’,
‘oftening’ or repetition, and ‘cleaves or folds’ in the ‘burl of
being’; but it is Villani’s aim, without annulling this poetic
affinity, to distance Deleuze from any model that would
have us rely on God’s grace (Hopkins) – and equally, on
the grace of the universal (Badiou)4 – to take us from one
‘cleave of being’ to another.
For, as critics who attribute to Deleuze a politically
suspect ‘aestheticism’ point out, it is in the practical sphere
that an affirmation of ‘life, in all its frightening complexity’5
is not enough: this complexity must be negotiated, reduced,
decided upon. Against charges that Deleuze falls short of
this exigency, Villani emphasizes the importance of the
moral and political in his work, arguing that the central
3. A. Villani, present volume, 52.
4. See E. Alliez, ‘Badiou: The grace of the universal’, Polygraph, vol. 17, 2005:267-73.
5. G. Deleuze, ‘Questions’, present volume, 42.
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problem of a Deleuzian metaphysics is that of ‘isolating the
conditions of possibility for a complex act’.6 Indeed, Villani
suggests that philosophy itself begins precisely when we try
to think experience without sublimating its infinite riches
by investing them in back-worlds. Succeeding in this would
mean that action, no longer having a special status to whose
strictures the poetic and noetic would have to be submitted,
would multiply their infinite riches: like the sensible and
thought, it would remain true to the ‘burl of being’ rather
than fearfully ceding to a vicarious relation to it. Ethical
action would not betray the infinitude of experience but
would affirm it in its every work.
Such complexity would not at all preclude action from
being ‘pointed’, punctual;7 only it would be a matter of an
intense, implicated concentration rather than a decisive
rupture: singular in the sense of the haecceity, the non-sub-
stitutable moment, rather than levelling all moments with a
dis-qualified void. Here Villani pinpoints the most troubling
consequence of the demand – increasingly made in respect of
Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) work – that a philosophy should
prove its political mettle before even being considered as
philosophy. This is a question of beginnings: in beginning
with the infinitude of lived experience, Deleuze wished
to see the ‘drastical’ rise to it; whereas in beginning with
the demand for ‘decision’, we decide in advance against a
truly philosophical – metaphysical – thought, thus impov-
erishing action and making political ‘truth’ the locus for
an effect closer to the positive feedback of hype, drastically
6. Villani, present volume, 56.
7. Ibid., 58.
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Editorial Introduction
disengaged from the real, than to a ‘labyrinth of creation’8
with a ‘thread’ always connecting it to the outside, keeping
it open.9
Why would a ‘pure metaphysician’ see a theory of
artistic creation as an essential component of his project?
Precisely because ‘complex action’ finds at least one of its
models in the artist’s attempt to endow the work – through
a series of selections or decisions ‘concerning for example
the relation of two neighbouring colours’10 – with the
infinite complexity of his experience. This is the process
that Éric Alliez & JeAn-clAuDe Bonne detail in Matisse-
Thought,11 where they advance a radical new thesis with
regard to Matisse’s development – namely, that the ‘Fauve
period’ was not a wild anomaly but a period of rigorous
experimentation which laid a methodological groundwork
for everything that would follow. In the process, they
demonstrate the pertinence of a Deleuzian ‘metaphysics’,
in the rich sense explored by Villani, to an alternative
conception of modern art and, indeed, modernity.
Rethinking Matisse’s painting as a practice of the ‘all-
over’, in which the force of local actions is always determined
in relation to neighbouring forces within a virtual ‘whole’,
Alliez and Bonne recall the importance for Matisse of ‘a
complete vision’ of this ‘whole’12 – not a formal blueprint
to be ‘transferred’ to the canvas but ‘an idea which one
8. Ibid., 56.
9. T. Duzer, present volume, 254.
10. Villani, present volume, 56.
11. E. Alliez & J-C. Bonne, La Pensée-Matisse: portrait de l’artiste en hyperfauve (Paris: Le
Passage, 2005).
12. Cited in Alliez & Bonne, Pensée-Matisse, 75.
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does not truly know except in so far as it develops with the
growth of the painting’.13 Their thesis is that the importance
of Fauvism, for Matisse, lay in a ‘strict quantitative ordering’
by which it governed this processual development.
As ‘the empirical exercise of sensibility [...] can grasp
intensity only in the order of quality and extensity’,14 so the
indissociability of quality and quantity indicates their mutual
origin in intensity. The pursuit of the Idea in the processual
unfolding of the work is not a quest for a particular contrast
between ‘a certain red and a certain green’,15 since these
qualities mean nothing apart from their quantity; it seeks,
rather, an actualisation (one of many cases of solution) in
which the ‘proportions of tones’ (quantities of qualities)
will act like a kind of lens, converging sensations in order
to repeat or rehearse an Idea (focus imaginarius) in itself
imperceptible since intensive.16 The Idea of the whole does
indeed come first, but its expression is assured only through a
painstaking process of experimental construction.17
13. Alliez & Bonne, present volume, 209.
14. Difference and Repetition, 240.
15. Alliez & Bonne, present volume, 217-8.
16. Ibid., 217; on the Idea as ‘ideal focus’ see Difference and Repetition, 169.
17. In a recent book, film-maker David Lynch adumbrates the characteristics of this
constructivist-expressionist conception of the Idea as infinite heterogeneous multi-
plicity, and its actualization as intensive unfolding of differences: (1)All at Once: The
Idea as event or encounter, as a singular moment or haecceity (the Idea is neither
foundational or generic, but is always encountered within lived series). Why does
touching the roof of a car heated by the sun ‘cause’ the appearance of ‘the Red
Room […] the backwards thing […] and then some of the dialogue’? (2) Fragments:
The encountered Idea is already partially unfolded into a set of sensible fragments,
only ever encountered in a state of ‘degradation’, but this degradation is in its very
nature in so far as it appears. (3) Expression: The ‘adventurous character of Ideas’
implies a dialogue, a continuing conspiracy (‘The Idea tells you to build this Red
Room. So you think about it. Wait a minute, you say, the walls are red, but they’re
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Editorial Introduction
An early experience during Matisse’s apprenticeship
with Moreau shows how this problematic had exercised
Matisse, from the very first attempt to copy a painting in
the Louvre, Chardin’s The Pipe: he was ‘baffled’ by ‘an
elusive blue […] a blue that could look pink one day, green
the next.’ In a strange, inverted prefiguration of his mature
method, Matisse ‘even cut up his own preparatory oil
sketch and stuck bits on to Chardin’s canvas, where each
separate section was a perfect match, but when he put them
together, there was no longer any correspondence at all. “It
is a truly magical painting,” he said, adding that this was
not hard walls. Then you think some more […] they’re curtains. And they’re not
opaque, they’re translucent. Then you put these curtains there, but the floor […]
it needs something […]’). This pregnancy of the Idea, in the process of its expres-
sion-construction, suggests a new understanding of anamnesis: The retention of the
singularity and the unpacking of its intensive differences ‘incarnates’ the Ideal event,
so the work becomes the ground for repetition, rehearsal or recollection of what was
inactual but was somehow encountered (‘[…] you go back to the idea, and there was
something on the floor, it was all there. So you do this thing on the floor, and you
start to remember the idea more […]’) The successive posing of questions operates
an ‘enframing’ of the Being-Idea-Problem constraining it to bring forth ‘cases of
solution’ (beings) to which the former remains irreducible but without which it would
remain the object of a sterile and mute contemplation (whether phenomenological
or ‘Platonic’). In this sense, and contra Heidegger, science, when it experiments, is no
different from art, their estrangement merely responding to a conventional partition
of Problems-Ideas on the basis of the apparent duality of quality and quantity, itself
testifying to an ‘image of thought’ that capitulates to the covering-over of intensity or
difference-in-itself. (The theme of mathesis universalis) (4)The whole must be made: This
estrangement is dissolved in a ‘superior empiricism’: Ideas as experienced intensive
states, in pure memory, employed in the assessment of an attempted repetition
(‘when you veer off, you know it […] this isn’t like the idea said it was’), in ensuring
a fidelity to the event through its mediate reconstruction (or retro-struction) through
the manipulation of quantity and quality in an ‘all-over’ organisation (‘The idea is the
whole thing – if you stay true to the idea, it tells you everything you need to know
[…] You try some things and you make mistakes, and you rearrange, add other stuff,
and then it feels the way the idea felt.’) (D. Lynch, Catching the Big Fish: Meditation,
Consciousness, and Creativity (London: Tarcher/Penguin, 2007).
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the only copy he had in the end to abandon.’18 Matisse was
to pursue the reverse-engineering of this ‘magic’, the life of
the painting, throughout his career – and this, as Alliez and
Bonne show, through a meticulous and rigorous thinking of
the dynamic relations between the intensive and extensive,
quality and quantity.
That Alliez and Bonne see this new conception of
painting as implicitly prefiguring a new political formation
only makes more urgent the completion of Villani’s
‘typology of complex action’: for does politics, can politics,
really proceed in such a fashion (even if ‘the factors of
decision and prediction are limited’): ‘by experimenta-
tion, groping in the dark, injection, withdrawal, advances,
retreats […]’?19 In any case, their analyses, like Villani’s, are
invaluable in uncovering the connection between what we
might have understood as Deleuze’s metaphysics stricto sensu
(the typology of multiplicities, the necessity of the virtual,
difference), his ethics (denunciation of the priestly type,
active and reactive forces), and his aesthetics (the notion of
intensity as infinitely expressive force). Rendering back over
to every instant of life what properly belongs to it, rather
than sequestering it in an inaccessible site from which it will
subject us, requires all of these resources.
As the coruscating conclusion to Quentin MeillAs-
soux’s contribution reminds us, it is not a question of ‘full
communication’, which on the contrary represents a kind
of extinction instinctively repugnant to the philosopher,
personified in the conceptual incontinence of the
18. H. Spurling, The Unknown Matisse: A Life of Henry Matisse, (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1998; 2 Vols.) Vol.1, 85-6.
19. A Thousand Plateaus, 461.
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Editorial Introduction
‘ideas men’.20 Against all ‘anarcho-delirious’ worship of flux,
Meillassoux reads Deleuze as a Bergsonian philosopher of
subtraction.
The symphonic sweep of Meillassoux’s text – from the
scherzo of the opening conceit, which introduces an ‘unknown
Deleuze’ in the guise of an obscure pre-Socratic, to the
thunderous challenge with which it closes – is an index of
the mercurial tenor of Deleuze’s own work. Meillassoux’s
methodological proposal that we approach Deleuze through
a mere fragment in order to ‘reconstruct’ his thought is not
at all facetious: Better a modest, even reductive, model
culled from a Deleuzian fragment, but understood ‘from
the inside’ – through (re)construction rather than exegesis,21
than an opaque interpretative quagmire where partially-un-
derstood terms become precious tokens too profound to be
understood – much less rationally reconstructed – by the
profane. But in fact, Meillassoux meticulously demonstrates
how the quest for immanence, the theme of ‘selection’,
the refusal of the reactive, and the logic of matter, are all
comprised, concentrated, in the tiny fragment, a prismatic
shard in which is revealed a distinct-obscure image of the
whole of Deleuze’s thought.
Pursuing Deleuzian immanence through Bergson’s
critique of Kant and his theory of pure perception, we
meet again with Villani and Alliez and Bonne’s analyses,
in so far as the thing-in-itself is also a ‘telephone to the
beyond’: a true metaphysics opposes Kantian critique
with an affirmation that everything is before us just as it
20. Meillassoux, present volume, 105; See What is Philosophy?, 10.
21. See Meillassoux’s own justification of the methodological approach, present
volume 69-70.
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