Coercive Energy Policy: Russia and the Near Abroad BY RYAN C. MANESS BA, University of

226 Pages·2013·1.51 MB·English

by  Ryan Maness

Coercive Energy Policy: Russia and the Near Abroad

BY

RYAN C. MANESS
B.A., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008

THESIS

Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2013

Chicago, Illinois

Defense Committee:

Andrew McFarland, Chair and Advisor, Department of Political Science
Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasgow
Barry Rundquist, Department of Political Science
Paul Hensel, University of North Texas
Eamonn Butler, University of Glasgow
This thesis is dedicated to Priscilla, Jimmy, and Caleigh, without whom this research
would have no purpose.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my dissertation committee—(Andrew McFarland, Brandon
Valeriano, Barry Rundquist, Paul Hensel, Eamonn Butler)—for their unwavering support and
assistance. They provided insight, guidance, and knowledge that helped me accomplish my
research goals and become the scholar that I am today. I would also like to thank Dennis Judd
and Marilyn Getzov for their bureaucratic support as well as their faith in me to complete this
five year journey at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
Special thanks go to Brandon Valeriano, whose support is why I am here defending my
dissertation today. He has taught me how to be a better writer, researcher, publisher, and scholar.
His mentorship has been unequivocal and I am forever indebted to his guidance. I hope to work
with him on many more projects for years to come and throughout our careers. Finally, I would
like to thank Doug Bond of the Virtual Reader’s Associates (VRA) for his assistance in the
collection of the events data for this research project.

RCM

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION: RUSSIAN COERCIVE ENERGY POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY ... 1
A. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1
B. IMPORTANCE OF THIS RESEARCH .......................................................................... 2
C. REEVALUATING RUSSIA’S PLACE IN THE WORLD ............................................. 4
D. RUSSIAN ENERGY POWER....................................................................................... 12
E. PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION ................................................................................. 19

II. LITERATURE REVIEW: RUSSIAN ENERGY POLICY, RUSSIAN IDENTITY,
HEGEMONIC STABILITY AND COERCIVE HIERARCHY, AND ECONOMIC
STATECRAFT ............................................................................................................................. 23
A. INTRODUCTION: RUSSIAN ENERGY POLICY RESEARCH ................................ 23
B. CONSTRUCTIVIST LITERATURE: RUSSIA’S POST-SOVIET IDENTITY .......... 30
C. HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY AND COERCIVE HIERARCHIES ............... 32
D. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT ........................................................................................ 34
1. Baldwin’s Economic Statecraft .................................................................................. 36
E. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................ 38

III: A THEORY OF COERCIVE ENERGY POLICY................................................................. 41
A. INTRODUCTION: BRIDGING THE GAP .................................................................. 41
B. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY ........................................................................................... 43
C. THE ISSUE-BASED APPROACH ............................................................................... 44
D. SALIENCE OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION TO RUSSIA.................................. 50
1. The presence of a permanent population. ................................................................... 52
2. The (confirmed or believed) existence of valuable resources. ................................... 52
3. The strategic economic or military value of the territory’s location. ......................... 52
4. The existence of a state’s ethnic and religious kinsmen in the territory. .................... 52
5. Whether or not the territory is considered part of the homeland or is a dependency. 52
6. Whether or not the territory is part of the mainland or is offshore. ............................ 52
7. Issue management: ..................................................................................................... 52
8. Past interactions: ......................................................................................................... 52
9. “Institutional context: ................................................................................................. 53
10. Adversaries: ................................................................................................................ 53
E. THE ENERGY SALIENCE SCALE ............................................................................. 53
1. Natural Gas: ................................................................................................................ 54
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2. Transit: ........................................................................................................................ 54
3. Ethnic: ......................................................................................................................... 54
4. Past interactions: ......................................................................................................... 55
5. Adversaries: ................................................................................................................ 55
6. The Institutional Context: ........................................................................................... 56
F. THE UNITED STATES-RUSSIA RIVALRY IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION ..... 64
G. RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION OF COERCIVE ENERGY POLICY IN POST-SOVIET
SPACE ...................................................................................................................................... 67
1. Domestic Sources of Rivalry ...................................................................................... 67
2. Russian Public Support for Coercive Energy Policy .................................................. 69
H. RUSSIA’S GREAT POWER IDENTITY: POST-SOVIET REGIONAL
IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY SUB-COMPLEXES: EUROPEAN, CAUCASIAN,
CENTRAL ASIAN ................................................................................................................... 74
I. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................ 77

IV. ENERGY SALIENCE: COMPARISON OF COERCIVE ENERGY POLICY IN THE
CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA .......................................................................................... 79
A. INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TWO REGIONS ....................................................... 79
B. RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................................... 82
C. CAUCASUS ENERGY SALIENCE: RIPE FOR COERCIVE POLICY ..................... 85
1. Salience of the Caucasus ............................................................................................ 88
2. The United States-Russia Rivalry in the Caucasus .................................................... 92
3. Public Opinion of the Caucasus States and the United States .................................... 95
4. Russian Great Power Identity in the Caucasus: This Land is Our Land .................. 100
5. Caucasus Dependent Variables: High Prices and Pipeline Politics .......................... 102
D. CENTRAL ASIAN ENERGY SALIENCE: LIMITED COERCION ......................... 107
1. Salience of Central Asia ........................................................................................... 110
2. The United States-Russia Rivalry in Central Asia ................................................... 112
3. Public Opinion of the Central Asian States and China ............................................. 116
4. Russian Great Power Identity in Central Asia .......................................................... 122
5. Central Asian Dependent Variables: Russian Rewards and Pipeline Politics .......... 124
E. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 128

V. RUSSIAN COERCIVE ENERGY POLICY WITH NATURAL GAS: A DATA ANALYSIS
..................................................................................................................................................... 132
A. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 132
B. REVIEW: HYPOTHESES OF COERCIVE ENERGY POLICY ............................... 134
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C. RUSSIAN ENERGY POWER..................................................................................... 135
D. RUSSIAN ENERGY COERCION IN THE EUROPEAN SUB-COMPLEX............. 137
E. RESEARCH DESIGN: RUSSIA’S ENERGY POLICY IN THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION .................................................................................................................................... 143
1. Impact Factors .......................................................................................................... 144
F. DATA ANALYSIS: RUSSIA’S ENERGY BULLY PULPIT ........................................ 148
G. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................... 158

VI. DOES RUSSIAN COERCIVE ENERGY POLICY WORK? A QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS USING EVENTS DATA ....................................................................................... 161
A. INTRODUCTION ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND FOREIGN POLICY
RESPONSES .......................................................................................................................... 161
B. THE EVENTS DATA METHOD AND HISTORY.................................................... 168
C. RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................................. 171
D. DATA ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT .................................................................. 172
E. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF RUSSIAN COERCIVE ENERGY POLICY .... 180

VII. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?..................................................... 186
A. INTRODUCTION: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT RUSSIAN COERCIVE ........ 186
ENERGY POLICY? ............................................................................................................... 186
B. COERCIVE ENERGY POLICY RESEARCH: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
194
C. CONCLUSION: FINAL THOUGHTS ........................................................................ 197

CITED LITERATURE ............................................................................................................... 200

VITA ........................................................................................................................................... 212

APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................. 214

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LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

TABLE I: GAZPROM SUMMARY OF SALES 2008 ................................................................ 16

TABLE II: NATURAL GAS SLAIENCE SCORES BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND FORMER
SOVIET STATES (LOW 0-4, MODERATE 5-9, HIGH 10-13) ................................................. 56

TABLE III: RUSSIAN OPINION OF STATES IT CONSIDERS UNFRIENDLY OR HOSTILE
....................................................................................................................................................... 70

TABLE IV: RUSSIAN OPINION OF ITS CLOSEST ALLIES.................................................. 71

TABLE V: RUSSIAN OPINION ON USING ENERGY AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL .... 72

TABLE VI: RUSSIAN OPINION OF CUTTING OFF GAS TO UKRAINE AND WESTERN
EUROPE AND INCREASING NATURAL GAS TARIFFS FOR UKRAINE .......................... 73

TABLE VII: FORMER USSR REGIONAL SUB-COMPLEX SALIENCE SCORES .............. 76

TABLE VIII: NATURAL GAS SALIENCE SOCRES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE
CAUCASUS (LOW 0-4, MODERATE 5-9, HIGH 10-13) ......................................................... 89

TABLE IX: TOP FIVE FDI ENERGY INVESTORS IN AZERBAIJAN ($/MILLION) ........... 94

TABLE X: RUSSIAN OPINION OF STATES IT CONSIDERS UNFRIENDLY OR HOSTILE
IN THE CAUCASUS ................................................................................................................... 96

TABLE XI: RUSSIAN OPINION OF ITS CLOSEST CAUCASUS ALLIES ........................... 97

TABLE XII: RUSSIAN OPINION ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FOREIGN
POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA .............................................................. 97

TABLE XIII: RUSSIAN OPINION OF THE CUASE OF THE AUGUST 2008 RUSSIAN-
GEORGIAN CONFLICT ............................................................................................................. 98

TABLE XIV: RUSSIAN OPINION OF WESTERN SUPPORT OF GEORGIA IN THE
AUGUST 2008 CONFLICT ......................................................................................................... 99

TABLE XV: NATURAL GAS PRICING IN THE CAUCASUS REGION: $/MILLION CUBIC
METERS (MCM) ....................................................................................................................... 103

TABLE XVI: EXISTING CAUCASUS NATURAL GAS PIPELINES ................................... 105

TABLE XVII: PROPOSED CAUCASUS NATURAL GAS PIPELINES ................................ 107
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TABLE XVIII: NATURAL GAS SALIENCE SCORES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CENTRAL
ASIAN STATES (LOW 0-4, MODERATE 5-9, HIGH 10-13) ................................................. 111

TABLE XIX: CHINESE NATURAL GAS AGREEMENTS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN
STATES ...................................................................................................................................... 114

TABLE XX: RUSSIAN OPINION OF ITS CLOSEST ALLIES IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN
REGION ..................................................................................................................................... 117

TABLE XXI: RUSSIAN OPINION OF CENTRAL ASIAN STATES IT CONSIDERS
UNFRIENDLY OR HOSTILE ................................................................................................... 118

TABLE XXII: RUSSIAN OPINION OF RELIABLE INTERNATIONALPARTNERS IN
CENTRAL ASIA ........................................................................................................................ 119

TABLE XXIII: RUSSIAN OPINION OF CENTRAL ASIAN STATES THAT ARE THE
MOST POLITICALLY STABLE AND ECONOMICALLY SUCCESSFUL .......................... 119

TABLE XXIV: RUSSIAN OPINION OF RUSSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS ...................... 120

TABLE XXV: RUSSIAN OPINION ABOUT THE FUTURE OF RUSSIAN-CHINESE
RELATIONS .............................................................................................................................. 121

TABLE XXVI: NATURAL GAS PRICING IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION: $/MILLION
CUBIC METERS (MCM) .......................................................................................................... 125

TABLE XXVII: EXISTING CENTRAL ASIAN NATURAL GAS PIPELINES .................... 127

TABLE XXVIII: PROPOSED CENTRAL ASIAN NATURAL GAS PIPELINES ................. 128

TABLE XXIX: RUSSIAN ECONOMIC STATECRAFT WITH NATURAL GAS PRICES ($
PER MCM) ................................................................................................................................. 150

TABLE XXX: RUSSIAN ECONOMIC STATECRAFT WITH NATURAL GAS PRICES ($
PER MCM) WITH DYADIC DUMMIES ................................................................................. 155

TABLE XXXI: CONFLICT-COOPERATION EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN NATURAL GAS
PRICING ($ PER MCM), NO CONTROL VARIABLES ......................................................... 173

TABLE XXXII: CONFLICT-COOPERATION EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN NATURAL GAS
PRICING ($ PER MCM) ............................................................................................................ 175

TABLE XXXIII: CONFLICT-COOPERATION EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN NATURAL GAS
PRICING ($ PER MCM) WITH DYADIC DUMMIES ............................................................ 177

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LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

1. Russian and U.S. GDP Growth Comparison 1997-2008……………………….................7

2. Russian Exports and Imports 1994-2007……………………………………….................9

3. Yearly Percentage Change in Russian Military Expenditures…………………...............10

4. Sources of Russian Energy Policy Outlook………………………………………...........45

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BCM Billion Cubic Meters

BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan

BTE Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum

CAC Central Asia Center

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CNPC Chinese National Petroleum Corporation

COPDAB Conflict and Peace Data Bank

COW Correlates of War

CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization

DCOW Diplomatic Correlates of War

EIA Energy Information Administration

ENP European Neighborhood Policy

EU European Union

EurEC Eurasian Economic Community

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FSB Federal Security Service

FSU Former Soviet Union

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GEDS Global Events Data System

GUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova

HSE Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott

ICOW Issue Correlates of War

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