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197 Pages·2012·5.65 MB·English

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LE SCIENZE COGNITIVE IN ITALIA 2011

AISC’11

a cura di
Franco Rubinacci - Angelo Rega
Nicola Lettieri

Atti dell’ottavo Convegno Nazionale
Associazione Italiana di Scienze Cognitive

Milano 1-2 dicembre 2011

Laboratorio per lo studio
dei sistemi cognitivi naturali e artificiali
Università deli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”

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© 2011 Università degli Studi di Napoli
“Federico II”

Tutti i diritti sono riservati
Prima edizione italiana Dicembre 2011

Le scienze Cognitive in Italia 2011. AISC’11
Franco Rubinacci, Angelo Rega, Nicola Lettieri
(a cura di)

Napoli: Università degli Studi Federico II, 2011

ISBN 978-88-904539-4-6

1. Tecnologia 2. Scienze Umane 3. Scienze della Salute
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Indice

“Look at it! He smashed the guitar!” – Finding the Cinematic Relevance………………………………………………..7
di E. Acotto and E. Terrone

Mental representations of music………………………………………………………………………………………….10
di E. Acotto

Toward a computational theory of the cognitive relevance of musical similarities and repetitions…………………..…14
di E. Acotto

L’internalismo dei correlati fisici della coscienza: un’ipotesi scientifica o metafisica?....................................................18
di M. C. Amoretti, R. Manzotti

Il modello ACR della creatività…………………………………………………………………………………………..21
di A. Antonietti, B. Colombo

Compiti di inferenza con condizionali, congiunzioni e disgiunzioni incompatibili:
processi di ragionamento deduttivi o probabilistici?..........................................................................................................24
di I. Baldassarre, O. Matarazzo

Bellezza e creatività artistica in sistemi dinamici continui e discreti…………………………………………………….29
di F. Bertacchini, E. Bilotta, P. Pantano

Assessment Battery for Comunication: decadimento della abilità pragmatica e prospettive riabilitative……………….33
di F. M. Bosco

Ergonomia narrativa: Interagire con tecnologie semi-intelligenti ……………………………………………………….35
di A. Brizio, M. Elena, D. Mate, R. Rezzonico, M. Tirassa

The Big Five Personalità Factors as predictors of Facebook Usage……………………………………………………..38
di B. Caci, M. Cardaci,M. E. Tabacchi

Sulla modularità e creatività della mente………………………………………………………………………… ..……41
di Maurizio Cardaci

Il progetto BLOCK MAGIC: una tecnologia cognitiva per il sostegno all'apprendimento………………………..…….44
di M. Caretti, A. Rega, L. S. Sica

Fisica ingenua: uno studio nella teoria e pratica……………………………………………………………………….…46
di M. Carnesecchi, A. Rizzo

Patricia stopped smoking. An experimental study on processing
presuppositions…………………………………………………………………………………………………………...52
di E. Carrea, F. Romaneschi

Come i mezzi divengano fini: meccanismi psichici…………………………………………………………………...…58
di C. Castelfranchi.

Effetti del contenuto pragmatico degli enunciati e della disponibilità, esplicita o implicita,
di antecedenti alternativi sul ragionamento condizionale…………………………………………………………….….62
di V. Cocuzza, B. Nuzzo, O. Matarazzo.

Incorporamento e dual system theories…………………………………………………………………………………..67
di G. Consoli.

Sull’inferenza del significato in uso……………………………………………………………………………………...70
di M. Cruciani.

Discutere via forum: effetti sul sistema di cognizione distribuita online………………………………………………...73
di S. Cucchiara, M. B. Ligori

A mental model account of enactment effects………………………………………… ……… ……… ………………78
di I. Cutica, M. Bucciarelli

Doing as you’re told: a cognitive robot model of motor imagery, action and verbal instruction………………………..82
di V. De La Cruz, A. Di Nuovo, S. Di Nuovo

Uno sguardo sulle epistemologie contemporanee della Conoscenza…………………………………………………….87
di E. De Nardis

Compito di selezione: il ruolo del contesto e dell’interpretazione dell’enunciato……………………………………….90
di F. Ferrara, O. Matarazzo

Simulando l’educazione. Per una robot/etica dei legami d’interferenza………………………………………………95
di G. Ferraro

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Iconicità, non arbitrarietà: simbolismo fonetico ed evoluzione del linguaggio verbale……………………………...…100
di A. Flumini.

Sistemi di classificazione diagnostica basati su modelli cognitivi della categorizzazione per l’estrazione di conoscenza
nosologica………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……104
di F. Gagliardi

Risonanza emotiva e risonanza motoria: le radici ‘embodied’ dell’empatia………………………………. ...….. ……108
di G. Galloni, M. Della Rocca, C. Morabito

Motor attention in procedural learning: behavioral and cerebral changes……………..……………………………….111
di E. Geda, F. D’agata, G. Geminiani, F. Cauda, S. Duca, M. Zettin, R. Virgilio, G. Belforte, G. Eula, S. Sirolli, S. Appendino, K. Sacco

BrainFarm: Cervelli robotici a portata di mouse……………………………………………………………….……….116
di O. Gigliotta, G. Petrosino, M. Schembri

Le scienze cognitive nei Social Networks……………………………………………………………………………...119
di C. Lucchiari, E. Frumento, P. Tagliapietra, F. G. Pizzetti

Rational Gut Feeling…………………………………………………………………………….…………………...…124
di M. Maldonato, S. Dell'Orco

Esternalismo ed esperienza fenomenica: La mente allargata………………………………………………………......127
di R. Manzotti

La medicina delle 5P: una prospettiva psico-cognitiva alla cura del paziente………………………….……………...132
di M. Masiero, A. Gorini, G. Pravettoni

Dove è la mente? Contestualismo, esternalismo e neuroscienze………………………………..…………………......136
di P. Moderato, R. Manzotti

Cinesi e Italiani: Quanto si fidano? Risultati comportamentali di un gioco economico…………………………….....140
di R. Morese, D. Rabellino, A. Ciaramidaro, M. R. Elena, B. G. Bara, F. M. Bosco

Being in a natural or virtual world: New enactive perspectives and methodological implications
for spatial cognition research ……………………………………………………………………………….…………143
di F. Morganti

The Turing Machine as a cognitive model of human Computation……………………………………...….…………147
di S. Pinna

Verso una modellazione realistica dell'altruismo…………………………………………...……………….…………150
di A. Plebe, S. Nucera

Giustificazioni pubbliche e modelli di giustizia distribuiti…………………………………………………....……….154
di D. Porello

Modelli neuro-robotici applicati allo studio della socialità………………………………………………..…….…….158
di F. Pugliese, D. Parisi

What mechanisms underlie dyadic cooperation? A study with neuro-robotics models……………………….…...….162
di F. Pugliese, M. Ponticorvo, O. Miglino

Third Party Punishment. La punizione altruistica nell’incontro fra culture…………………………………………...166
di D.Rabellino, R. Morese, A. Ciaramidaro, B. G. B. e F. M. Bosco

Multisensory assessment of Wind Turbine Noise: an Immersive Virtual Reality study…………………………........169
di F. Ruotolo, T. Iachini, L. Maffei, V. P. Senese, G. Ruggiero, M. Vinciguerra, O. D'Errico

“Teaching to Teach with Techonology” (T3): una metodologia di utilizzo delle nuove tecnologie in contesti di
Apprendimento…………………………………………………………………………………………………………174
di L. S. Sica, A. Rega, M. L. Nigrelli

Mirror neurons system (MNS) and goal understanding…………………...…………………………………………...180
di N. Simonetti

Pedagogia e tecnologia: un possibile alleanza per l’inclusione………………………………………………………...183
di M. Striano, S. Fiorentino, C. Freda.

What is preserved? On the notion of memory………………………………………………………………………….186
di D. Tagliafico.

Motor cognition during free games in 3 years old children builts up on factors involving space organization and
social interaction………………………………………………………………………………………………………..189
di P. Tortella, F. Tessaro, G. Fumagalli.
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Prefazione

L’incessante sviluppo delle tecnologie dell’informazione e della comunicazione, fattore propulsivo
di progressi impensabili solo pochi anni fa, è alla base di un processo che determina giorno dopo
giorno l’emersione di nuovi stili di vita sia individuali che sociali. In questo scenario, così
fortemente condizionato dalla tecnologia, le scienze umane tutte (la filosofia come la medicina, la
psicologia come l’economia o la linguistica) sono chiamate a riconsiderare e ridefinire i concetti di
umanità, identità e cognizione
La continua interazione tra queste aree, infatti, oltre a produrre nuovi oggetti, causa profondi
cambiamenti nel modo in cui gli individui vivono, si relazionano tra loro e, soprattutto, pensano.
Giunto alla sua ottava edizione, il convegno nazionale dell’Associazione Italiana di Scienze
Cognitive “Tecnologia, Scienze Umane e Scienze della Salute” i cui atti sono qui raccolti ha
rappresentato una occasione di fecondo confronto tra esperti di discipline diverse (scienziati
cognitivi, medici, filosofi, economisti, ergonomi, informatici, designer) tutti a vario titolo impegnati
a riflettere sulle trasformazioni indotte dalla pervasiva rivoluzione tecnologico-culturale che ci vede
attori e spettatori.
Il volume ospita una corposa selezione di contributi che, traendo ispirazione dalle considerazioni
sopra accennate, si spingono a esplorare e rileggere i tanti temi in cui articola la multiforme
prospettiva di ricerca delle scienze cognitive. Nelle pagine seguenti si succedono lavori che
spaziano dallo studio dei processi di apprendimento alla percezione; dal tema della coscienza
all’indagine delle basi fisiologiche e neurali dei processi cognitivi fino ad arrivare, in coerenza con
il titolo del convegno, a lavori che focalizzano la loro attenzione su applicazioni concrete delle
tecnologie digitali.
Non è possibile ripercorrere in questa breve introduzione la ricca e appassionante varietà dei
quasi cinquanta contributi selezionati. Vale tuttavia la pena fermarsi a rimarcare il fermento che
anima la comunità italiana di studiosi di scienze cognitive.
La costruzione di occasioni di confronto e di dialogo interdisciplinare, tratto caratteristico
imprescindibile delle scienze cognitive, è opera spesso non agevole anche per il permanete di
resistenze e diffidenze che è bene vengano superate. La qualità, il numero e l’eterogeneità dei lavori
qui proposti rappresenta dunque una spinta a dare seguito agli sforzi sinora compiuti dall’AISC.
Nel licenziare queste pagine, un ringraziamento va a tutti coloro che hanno reso possibile il
raggiungimento di questo risultato e che, questo il nostro auspicio, continueranno ad animare anche
in futuro il dibattito dentro e con l’associazione.

FRANCO RUBINACCI ANGELO REGA
NICOLA LETTIERI

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“Look at it! He smashed the guitar!”
Finding the Cinematic Relevance

Edoardo Acotto, Enrico Terrone
Edoardo Acotto University of Turin, Turin, c.so Svizzera 185, 10149 Italy (e-mail: acotto @di.unito.it).
Enrico Terrone Laboratory for Ontology, University of Turin, Turin, I-10124 Italy (e-mail: [email protected]).

Abstract— We propose a method to apply the relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/2005) to narrative films. We
consider as the minimal unity which can bear relevance in a film the propositional analogon, meaning: a film segment that
induce the spectator to form some proposition p. The relevance of a propositional analogon will thus depend, on one side, on
the processing effort made in order to extract the proposition p and to connect it with the previous propositions extracted,
and, on the other side, on the cognitive effect obtained by acquiring the information p.

Index Terms— relevance theory, cinema, film, image
I. RELEVANCE AND NARRATION
The Relevance Theory was initially formulated as a cognitive-pragmatic theory of communication (Sperber &
Wilson 1986/1995), but later has been developed as a general theory of human cognition (Wilson & Sperber 2004). The
relevance of an input to an individual is defined as the optimal ratio between the processing effort and the cognitive
effect, that is: “a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input,
the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time. b. Other things being equal, the greater the
processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.” (Wilson & Sperber
2004).
An input is relevant for an individual in a certain context when it can be related to the information recorded in
memory and accessible, and when this relation yields a “positive cognitive effect”, that is “a worthwhile difference to
the individual’s representation of the world” (Wilson & Sperber 2004). The relevance of an input is a continuous
variable, and the relative concept is comparative and non quantitative (“x is more relevant than y, for P in the context
C”, cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995, §3.2, §3.5, §3.6). The major problem of Relevance Theory is however the
impossibility to formalize and quantify this parameter without some major limitations. Sperber & Wilson (1986/2005)
do not propose any method for calculating the relevance of an input but they only show at which conditions a verbal
input turns out to be more or less relevant than another.
Yet this is a pertinent question for cinematic perception: a complete formalization of cinematic cognition seems to be
impossible, insofar as the images of a film are analogical representations, but typically a film has also a narrative
structure. From Aristotle’s Poetics we can derive an elementary account of the narrative structure as constituted by a
conflict (or at least a question or a problem: in Aristotle’s terms, “a knot to untie”), and shaped by a three-act schema
(the knot tying, its resisting, its untying). What we want to account for is thus the relevance of that structure together
with the relevance of the moving images composing the film. If “Human cognition tends to be geared to the
maximization of relevance” (Wilson & Sperber 2004, the Cognitive Principle of Relevance), and if the human mind
confronted with cinema is a kind of thought comparable with other forms of thought, the Relevance Theory has to apply
also to narrative cinema.
II. RELEVANCE BEARERS
In order to offer a version of cinematic relevance we have to account for the cognitive effect (CE) and the processing
effort (PE) of the cinematic cognition. Since Sperber and Wilson’s main examples concern the evaluation of the
relevance of linguistic utterances, first of all we have to identify the best candidates to the role of “relevance bearers” in
the case of a film: which are the minimal units of a film which require a PE and which are the minimal units of a film
which imply a CE? The result of the debate about the possibility of a semiotics of cinema (cf. Currie 1995, Carroll
2008, Gaut 2010) is that films do not have semantic units (units that have the same role that words have in a language).
Moreover, it does not seem useful to consider as a pseudo-semantic unity either the cinematic frame – which is a
technical unity, not perceivable per se by the viewer –, or the shot, which is a technical-practical unity representing a
single fictional event, a part of an event or a plurality of events, and, in particular cases (i.e. Sokurov’s Russian Ark)
coincides with the entire film.

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Even though cinema is not a language, and a film is not a set of propositions, in watching a film the viewer implicitly
utters a set of propositions by means of which he summarizes and stores in his semantic memory the information the
film gives him. An example is the way in which a child, who watches a cartoon, comments on it and extracts its
meaning: “Look at it! He smashed the guitar!”.
So a film does not have a propositional structure but it provides the viewer with a lot of propositional knowledge.
Yet, the number of propositions that can be raised by a small segment of a film is potentially enormous. Furthermore, a
film elicits the same cognitive abilities that ordinary perception does (cf. Jullier 2002), and therefore a film segment
raises propositions the same way a window overlooking a street could do.
The essential difference is that we regard the film as a narrative-oriented discourse. Among the many propositions,
both simple and compound, raised by a film, we select those that are most relevant for the purposes of narrative
discourse. Therefore, we can define two main concepts. We call candidate propositional analogon any film segment
that could induce the viewer to form a proposition, while we call propositional analogon a candidate propositional
analogon that raises a proposition whose narrative relevance consists in helping the viewer to summarize the film plot.
Candidate propositional analoga and especially propositional analoga play the role of relevance bearers in the
experience of a film. So, we can now define CE and PE with respects to these kinds of relevance bearer.
III. COGNITIVE EFFECT AND PROCESSING EFFORT
The CE of the propositional analogon is the CE of the proposition p that such an analogon elicits. This proposition p
asserts that a state of affairs subsists in the fictional world, and it can be about the fictional characters, their actions,
their mental states, and the environment in which they live. From this basic information value (“in the fictional world,
things are such and such…”), the CE of p can be increased by taking into account the following factors:
(cid:1) The quantity and relevance of the propositions that were previously extracted from the film and that can be
connected to p
(cid:1) The quantity and relevance of the propositions about the fictional world that can be inferred from p
(cid:1) The narrative tension elicited by p, i. e. the extent to which the fact represented by p entails problems or
conflicts for the characters, and raises questions and expectations (cf. Huron 2006) in the viewer.
(cid:1) The narrative release determined by p, i. e. the extent to which the fact represented by p entails solutions for
the characters, and contributes to give answers to the viewer.
According to this method for assessing the CE, the film is conceived as a series of propositions; so the cinematic
narration is led back to the linguistic narration. Yet we can retrieve the specificity of the cinematic narration from the
evaluation of the PE in films: every proposition p is indeed extracted from its propositional analogon through the
processing of pictures and sounds. In this sense the PE is determined by the effort of extracting p, and by the effort of
connecting p to the propositions previously extracted. The PE should thus be assessed by taking into account the
following factors:
(cid:1) The duration of the propositional analogon
(cid:1) The variations of the point of view (editing cuts, camera movements) within the propositional analogon
(cid:1) The layering of pictures and sounds (dialogues, noises, music, visual depth, framings, writings) within the
propositional analogon
(cid:1) The quantity of propositions extracted from the film up to that moment
IV. CASE STUDY
Our definition of cinematic relevance is actually qualitative, but it is potentially suitable for quantification and
formalization. In order to test our hypothesis, we propose to consider some target films and to analyze and model them
in a series of propositions. As a first step, we consider the initial three minutes of David W. Griffith’s silent film An
Unseen Enemy (visible at the web page: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z83UktMXv6Q). The propositional
analoga that we have individuated are the following:

1. Proposition: “The deceased doctor orphans tearfully view their father’s empty chair” (intertitle)
CE: medium (it evidences a problem – the death of the father – and suggest that the two orphans are the main
characters)
PE: reading the intertitle

2. Proposition: while one orphan consoles the other, the maid comes in, console the two girls in her turn, and then
goes into the next room.
CE: medium (it illustrates the preceding proposition and introduces the personage of maid, possibly the
enemy)
PE: 1 shot, 30’’

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3. Proposition: while dusting the room the maid focuses on a hole in the wall
CE: medium (it reveals us the existence of a hole in the wall that could raise a future narrative tension)
PE: 1 shot, 15’’, problem-solving: the spectator should relate the hole in the wall with the “unseen” enemy of
the title

4. Proposition: the two sisters move into the next room, from which in the meantime the maid comes out, and
then they come back in the other room
CE: low
PE: 3 shots, 25’’

5. Proposition: a man arrives by bicycle, and shows some money to the two sisters who embrace it
CE: medium (we wonder who is the man, and whether the presence of unexpected money could raise
problems) PE: 2 shots, 40’’

6. Proposition: “Their brother having disposed of a portion of the small and it being after banking hours, places
the money in the safe”
CE: medium (we discover the identity of the man, and the fact that the money is not deposited in the bank
increases the likelihood of problems: perhaps we make a logical link between the money and the hole in the
wall)
PE: reading the intertitle

7. Proposition: The man and his two sisters place the money in the safe and then go away, while the maid stands
in the next room, near the door.
CE: medium (the scene just illustrates the intertitle, but the maid has a suspect attitude)
PE: 3 shots, 25’’

8. Proposition: The maid comes in and try to open the safe, but fails to.
CE: high (there is a real problem: the maid intends to stole the money)
PE: 2 shots, 20’’
REFERENCES
[1] N. Carroll, The Philosophy of Motion Pictures, Blackwell, Oxford, 2008
[2] G.Currie, Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1995
[3] B. N. Gaut, A Philosophy of Cinematic Art, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010
[4] D. Huron, Sweet Anticipation. Music and the Psychology of Expectation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006
[5] L. Jullier, Cinéma et Cognition, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2002
[6] D. Sperber & D. Wilson, Relevance. Communication and Cognition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986/1995
[7] Wilson, D. and D. Sperber . "Relevance theory", in: Handbook of Pragmatics. Eds. G. Ward and L. Horn, Blackwell, Oxford, 2004: 607-632.
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Mental representations of music in cognitive science

Edoardo Acotto
Edoardo Acotto, University of Turin, Turin, c.so Svizzera 185, Italy (phone:; e-mail: acotto @di.unito.it).

Abstract— That of “mental representation” is a controversial and fundamental (foundational) concept for the philosophy
of mind and the cognitive science but classical cognitive science encountered a lot of problems in treating it and connexionism
did a great effort for getting rid of it. In philosophy of mind MR means mental entities with a content; in cognitive science
MR means information structure coded in the mind with some role in cognitive tasks. In cognitive musicology the use of the
concept is quite widespread but ambiguous and vague. We discuss its use and we compare the concept of mental
representation of music with that of intentional sound object.

Index Terms— Mental representations, music, GTTM, sound object
I. MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS IN COGNITIVE MUSICOLOGY
IN COGNITIVE MUSICOLOGY the use of the concept of mental representation is quite widespread but ambiguous and
vague. The mainstream cognitive musicology maintains that mental representations of music are non-conceptual or, in
Dretske's (1997) taxonomy, sensory mental states: experiences, sensations, feelings):

Fig. 1. Dretske’s (1995) taxonomy of representations

In Lerdahl and Jackendoff's Generative Theory of Tonal Music (GTTM) - one of the most popular cognitive theories
of music - the term 'representations' is used whithout particular specification about their nature (syntactic and not
semantic, with non-conceptual content): “We have restricted ourselves to a formal characterization of the listener's
intuitions about musical structure (that is, of his mental representation of music).” (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983, p.332).
In many cognitive theories of music, mental representations of music are considered to be implicitly construed by the
mind according with the perception of musical flow, as tacite knowledge. By contrast, in GTTM the mental
representations of music are considered in the framework of a final-state theory, and the authors are not committed to
explain musical cognition online: “Our approach to music theory has not been concerned with questions of memory
capacity, real-time processing, brain localization, and the like” (Lerdahl & Jackendoff 1983, p. 42). The symbolic
representations of GTTM are alleged to represent the static mental representation of a piece of music (that's a kind of
natural and spontaneous musical analysis made by the mind).

Fig.2 Time-span reduction (from Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983): this one exemple of the representational structures of GTTM.

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