Class Struggle #5

36 Pages·1981·3.025 MB·English

CLASS STRUGGLE
Trotsk:yist quarterly edited by SPARI<
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
REAGAN'S POL ICY:
A SCENARIO FOR WORlCER.S' SACRIFICES Page l
THE u.A.w.'s POLICY:
A DEAD END FOR. 'DIE WORlCER.S Page 7
THE c.1.0. :
FROM MIL !TANT STRUGGLE
TO CLASS COLLABORATION Page 13
THE AMERICAN c.P. :
GOOD-BYE TO THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
HELLO TO THE DEMOCRATS! Page 21
A STARVING WORLD FED UP Winl PROFITS Page 25
EL SALVADOR.:
'lllE NEx.T VIET NAM'l Page 31
REAGAN'S POLICY:
A SCENARIO FOR
WORKERS' SACRIFICES
Hollywood came to Washington when Reagan delivered his Budget Message. His
scriptwriters created a speech for him which conveyed the sense of an Adminis
tration seriously trying to come to grips with the economic problems facing
the nation. Feelingly evoking the sense of an economic crisis almost as severe
as· that of the Great Depression, he called on everyone to make sacrifices
today , ..... teniporary ones, of course -- so that tomorrow the economy could be
restored to health. Calling inflation the nation's worst enemy, he admitted
and loudly at that -- that it was the government deficit spending whi~h had
caused the inflation, and he spoke of his resolve to cut that spending -- even
if that must mean that everyone will be temporarily discomforted.
Underneath all the Hollywood veneer, there were some proposals, most of
them· vague, to be sure; but even these vague proposals allow us to see the
of his actual policy.
outlin~s
First, he is calling for cuts in the currently mandated government expen
ditures for 1982. 'lbese cuts will total nearly 49 billion dollars, with more
than '40 billion of them coming directly out of the social programs. (Of course,
we have ·to take all these figures with a large grain of salt; the budgets sub
mitted by presidents have always been notoriously -- and self-servingly --
ina c'cura te.)
Se~ond, he is calling for a total increase in direct military spending of
almos·t 42 billion dollars', ·with additional funds to be directed toward activi
ties which reinforce the military, such as Radio Free Europe and the mari
time industry.
Third, he is calling for a roll-back of income taxes -- totalling sup
posedly 44 billion a year to individuals, and 10 billion a year to the cor
porations.
Finally, he is proposing to deregulate much of industry, to let the so
called more efficient companies win out over the less efficient, to let the
big corporations increase productivity by removing most of the regulations on
consume't and worker safety and health, and on environmental standards.
'lbese are the main lines of Reagan's proposals -- these are the tools he
proposes to use to right the economy and get rid of inflation.
A_·~ IQ GET RID OF INFLATION .:.=. OR TO GET AROUND IT?
Reagan, himself, admits that stopping inflation isn't really part of his
"scenario" this year. Oh, certainly, he has promises for later on, but as far
as the next 2 or 3 years are concerned, he says that ail he can do is pick up
the mess Carter has created. (Carter, of course, said the same thing about
Ford 1 s b'udget.)
-t-
Even with Reagan's rosiest "scenarios" of what next year's budget will
produce, he is forced to admit that there will be a deficit of 45 billion
dollars. In fact, because of the way he estimates the r~sult of the tax cut,
this figure is undoubtedly grossly understated -- for he assumes the tax cut
will not really lower government revenues. In addition, some of the increase
in military spending is to be included in this year's current expenditures,
and so while formally it may not show as a part of next year's budget deficit,
in fact, the money will be spent, and will add to the tota 1 growing deficit,
no matter which year it appears in. But even assuming that all of Reagan's
figures were correct, what we see is a budget deficit which will continue to
fuel the fires of inflation, over the next year or two.
And what about-;the. more distant future, 3 or 4 years from now? In fact,
Reagan says one of the main causes for inflation is that people nbw expect it
to happen and act accordingly, in anticipation of it. this is why, he says, he
proposes such severe sacrifices -- they are a kind of shock therapy to destroy
inflationary expectations. In other words, Reagan's prescription for stopping
the inflation is: Don't expect it!
The fact that Reagan's budget eliminated the government's precise econom
ic predictions, as rosy as they were, and replaced them with pleasant "scenar
ios" of how the budget ought to fare if people allow Doctor Reagan to work on
their psychological expectations -- this fact in itself is a tacit admission
on Reagan's part of the strong likelihood of inflation continuing on into the
foreseeable future.
Certainly, up until now, the bourgeoisie has been able to avoid the worst
effects of the inflation for itself by making others pay the cost of it. In
the four years of Carter's administration, the inflation was one of the primary
means by which the bourgeoisie protected itself against the inroads of the eco
nomic crisis. In those 4 years, wages increased by only 31%, a good deal less
than the 41% increase in consumer prices; while profits increased by 55%, sig
nificantly more than the rate of inflation. In fact, so long as it is manage
able, the inflation is a useful tool for transferring resources to the bour
geoisie, at the expense of the laboring and other poor layers of the popula
tion. It was used that way during Carter's administration, and it is clear
that Reagan will continue policies which will allow the inflation to be used
in the same way.
Of course, at a certain point, the inflation could become a problem for
the bourgeoisie itself. And in fact, if all Reagan's proposals for tax cuts
and for budgetary increases in spending were enacted, there would be an enor
mously increased deficit which might easily push the inflation beyond the
bourgeoisie's reasonable bounds. It is to forestall this possibility that
Reagan has been applying the broad ax to all the social programs. The· cuts he
is asking for are a partial means of compensating for the increases he wants.
In reality, Reagan's cuts couid in no way eliminate the inflation. They
are only the means by which Reagan hopes to limit it, maintaining it at some
thing like the current rate, preventing i.t from getting totally out of hand,
and in this way, continuing to make the working class and other poor layers of
the population pay for the current crisis, without there being too big a
price paid by the big bourgeoisie. · ·
IF NOT INFLATION. THEN WHAT IS REAGAN AIMING AT?
Reagan's policy is marked by a single-minded purpose to protect the
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bourgeoisie against the ravages of the current economic crisis. Above all, he
is looking to protect the big monopolies.
First, the new Administration plans to spend more on the military-goods
producing industries. This is, apart from the role it plays in foreign policy
considerations, primarily a plan to subsidize most of the big monopolies that
dominate the c.ountry. For military contracts go not only to airplane, tanks
and weapons manufacturers; they also go to the steel, the auto, the tin, .the
aluminum, the plastics, the chemical, the oil, the electronics, the data pro
industries, etc.
ces~ing
Military spending may be the most spectacular and the most significant
way by which subsidies are given to the large monopolies, but it is by no
means the only way. Reagan proposes to continue many of the other typical
means such as subsidies to highway construction, maritime, and even the
oil industry.
, Second, Reagan proposes tax cuts for everyone. In reality, under the
guise of ,an across-the-board tax cut, he is proposing to shift the tax burden
eve.n more onto the working class. That is, he is proposing to take money from
the poorer layers of the population and give it to the bourgeoisie and its
corporations.
In the first place, although Reagan has proposed a tax cut for both busi
ness and for individuals, it is corporate taxes alone which have been cut so
retroactive to January l, in fact, while the individual tax cut has been
f~r,
postponed, supposedly only until June. Of course, this short postponement
could always lengthen, if the Administration happens t6 notice the inflation.
But even if the individual cuts are enacted, they won't mean the same
thing for the wealthy and for those who work for a living. The last few de
cades of inflation have continued to push the workers into much higher tax
brackets, with the result that they now pay a much higher rate of tax than be
fqre. The wealthy were already in the top bracket, so their income tax rates.
not increased over the years. The result of course is that there is much
hav~
less. difference today in the tax rate paid by the wealthy and that paid by the
workers, than there was, for example, 20 years ago. Reagan's across-the-board
cut does nothing to remedy the fact that the income tax is becoming more and
more regre.s s i ve •
.M p:reover, in reality the poor will see very little, if any, of this cut;.
Given the fact that this year also the poor will continue to be pushed into
the higher tax brackets by the inflation, and given the fact of another social
security tax increase, the taxes of the workers will remain relatively the
same -- if the individual tax cut is ever enacted. The wealthy, of course, are
not affected in the same way by these changes, and so they will see the
full ~Oi..
A~d, of course, the bourgeoisie will benefit twice -- first as the QWners
of the big corporations, and second as individuals.
Third, Reagan proposes "deregulation. 11 The justification for this is. that
Americai;t business has become less and less productive, that it stands a.t mor~
and more of a disadvantage to the other imperialisms, especially to the Japan
ese and the German, precisely because its natural bent for productivity has
been strangled by government red tape and regulations. Reagan says that a re
moval of the red tape would be accompanied by greater competitiveness, and, he
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implies, lower prices.
And so Reagan is proposing to cu't back on many inconvenient regulations
which limit the bourgeoisie in certain areas. The health and safety of workers
and c~nsumers; environmental protection; the cushion for small businessmen and
farmers against the· weight of the big monopolies -- all of the regulations
which set' limits as to how far the big monopolies could go in these areas are
to be shaved away. In reality, the protections that were aiecorded because of
government regulations were minimal, nonetheless, the elimination of even mini
mal standards will give to the big monopolies a not totally insignificant way
to increase their profits. Certainly, no one can be so naive as to expect that,
just because the companies had used the imposing of these same· regulations to
justify price increases, now the removal of restrictions will be accompanied
by a lowering of prices. We have already seen proof it doesn't work this way
with the deregulatio"n· of the airline industry over the past several years.
What was supposed to be used to create greater competition and lower prices in
fact was accompanied by increases of great magnitude in airline fares.
is nus ~NEW ROAD FOR THE GOVERNMENT?
In none of these programs is Reagan setting otf on an entirely different
course than Carter. It was Carter himself who began the cuts in the· social
programs at the same time tnat he increased military spending. It was Carter
who deregulated the oil and trucking industries and the airlines -- Reagan
only advanced the date for final deregulation of oil. It was Carter who im._
posed the latest inflationary spiral on the working class. It was CJrter who
gave money to Chrysler while refusing unemployment extensions.
The new administration has the same goal as the old: to shift the burden
of the continuing economic crisis onto the working class and the poorer layers
of the population. Obviously, in times like these, the bourgeoisie and· its
politi.cians don't willingly choose other roads. And up until now, the working
class and other poor layers of the population have done nothing to cause· the
bourgeoisie to question this road.
If there is a difference in Reagan and Carter, it lies first in the fact
the crisis continues, and even gets worse; given this, Reagan proposes a more
radical version of Carter's policy. Second, Reagan has taken a different tack
toward .the working class in imposing the policy. He makes a point ·of calling
on the working class to sacrifice .
.I n fact, all of Reagan's Hollywood flourishes have one· important goal:
to convince the workers to impose on themselves a real austerity program. He
asks .tJle American workers to believe that they can have no hopes for thein
selves unless Ametitan business can be revived.
And this has implications way beyond Reagan's budgetary policy. For, in
fact, he is calling on the workers to make whatever saLrifices are necessary
in order to restore business to good health. He spea.k.s, of the need to make
American business "competitive," of the need to help it "re-industrialize."
Implied in this is that the workers must take actual wage cuts -- not just
those imposed by inflation -- that they must tolerate the speed-up and accept
unemployment, all in order to· 'increase th'e "competitiveness" of the big
American monopolies.
In dramatic fashion, Reagan has given notic~ to the workers that they can
expect very little of their lives but sacrifice over the next several years.
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The bourgeoisie certainly must hope that in the Hollywood actor, it has
found a useful con man to front for it.
Whether the workers are fooled by him remains to be seen. Even if the con
tinuing inflation disabuses them of any hope for improvement, it also remains
to be seen if the workers are ready to take upon themselves the road of
struggle against the bourgeoisie.
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THE POLICY=
U.A~V'S
A DEAD ENO FOR THE WORKERS
In discussing the 1981 Chrysler contract, Doug Fraser, president of the
United Aut.o Workers union, called it, "the worst econ_omic settlement the union's
ever been involved in." But then, of course, he recommended its ratification
and signed the contract.
This was the third round of concessions to Chrysler in a little more than
a year. Ea.ch con.tract made ever greater concessions to Chrysler than the previ
a
ous one. The latest concession will mean a wage cut of al.most $50 week start
ing March, 1981. And since the newest contract gave up a cost~of-living aliow
ance, the workers' wages will continue to fall ever further behind inflation.
Altogether by September, 1982, when this contract expires, Chrysler workers
are expected to earn $4 an hour less in wages and benefits than GM or Ford
workers. (This is assuming that their wages are not cut also.) Moreover, there
is little chance that most of the 60,000 Chrysler workers,. half its 1979 work
force, who are now permanently laid off will get their jobs back.
The UAW says that Chrysler'~ financial situation made it a special case
which gave the union no choice. Said Fraser, "These conditions were imposed on
us." But is Chrysler so special? During a crisis any company can be or pretend
to be· in bad financial shape .• According to Fraser's logic, every company can
expect the workers to bail it out. This should serve as a warning to all work
ers that the union will not protect them.
The UAW has already proven this in the case of Ford, which has not taken
long in shoving its foot in the door by demanding $1.50 an hour wage cuts for
the over 5,000 workers in its steel-making operations. The UAW leadership -
as we might expect -- pushed the Ford steel workers also t.o accept these cuts.
The UAW is not alone in pushing the companies' wage cuts. The other union
apparatuses act no differently. Already several rubber companies have gotten
wage concessions from the United Rubber Workers. The Teamsters union at Bran
iff Airlines accepted a 10% wage cut. If the UAW has become a kind of symbol,
it is because of its reputation in the past for militancy and for being in the
forefront of winning gains for its workers. For this reason it can be used by
the government and the bourgeoisie to make the idea of wage cuts more accept
able to all workers.
ECONOMIC FACTS -- NOT ECONOMIC POWER
The UAW's policy was summed up by Walter Reuther in 1949:
"We would like to see a situation in America where we can raise
collective bargaining above the status of a struggle between com
peting economic pressure groups, We would like to reso_lve our
economic demands on the basis of the economic facts and not upon
economic power ••• Table pounding and picket line marching are
part of the problem but you have to base your demands and f;trug
gle on sound economic facts. We keep saying to our workers that
they have to understand these facts because these facts. are the
arithmetic of our future."
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Implicit in Reuther's statement is the fact that the UAW accepts the
capitalist system, and it does not see the need to make a fundamental change
in that system, Since it accepts the society the way it is, it also accepts
the rules of the game as laid out by the bourgeoisie. For the union bureau
cracy, the first rule is that the unions and the companies have mutual inter
ests, and the union can work together with the companies to assure these
interests.
For the union apparatus, the means to assure the workers' interests is
collective bargaining with the company. The workers are supposed to be able
to guarantee their future, not through their own struggles, but through com
pany and union· negotiations and the product of negotiations, a contract. In
the contract, the company promises certain wages and benefits for a fixed
period of time. In return, the workers promise that they will respect so-called
management rights. This means that management runs its business and organizes
production the way it sees fit, with no interference from the workers. The
no-strike clause is the union's pledge that the workers will not disrupt pro
duction during the length of the contract, And the company and the union supply
a grie·vance procedure in which the workers are allowed to protest company
practices. But the grievance procedure is merely a way to take the protest out
of the hands of the workers. When all else fails, the union can resort to a
strike -- at the end of the contract.
Behind this so-called civilized relationship between the company and the
union is the idea that not only are workers tied to the capitalist system,
but also workers in each company are tied to the fate of that particular com
pany, If that company does well, these benefits will trickle down to the
workers. And also the inverse follows in this logic: the workers have no in
terest in hurting that company, because it would be the equivalent of hurting
their own interests.
On the general level, the UAW takes the same stance toward the bourgeoisie
and its government as it takes toward the individual capitalists. The needs
of the workers which go beyond what can be met in the contract, can be met
by government legislation. And this legislation can be influenced by working
with the Democratic party. By supporting and pressuring the Democratic party,
the workers could make it more progressive and responsive, The UAW holds up
as an example of what can be accomplished with the Democratic party what has
been accomplished in Michigan. Thus, Michigan's laws for unemployment com
pensation and workman's compensation for many years were more liberal and
generous than in most industrial states. And Michigan had far reaching legis
lation which protected women workers and early civil rights laws. The UAW
leaders explain that these things were won because in Michigan the UAW made
itself into a major force in the Democratic party by providing much of the
money and precinct workers for the party.
WHAT WERE THE RESULTS?
Did the UAW's policies benefit the workers? The leadership claims that
since World War II, the UAW has made unprecedented gains, On the leve 1 of the
contract, it led other unions in winning health and dental insurance, auto
matic annual productivity increases, cost-of-living adjustments, paid vaca
tions, retirement pensions and supplemental unemployment benefits. These were
supposed to protect the workers against al 1 adversity.
In fact, almost each gain in the contract had its own built-in limit, So,
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