Class Struggle #3

38 Pages·1980·3.122 MB·English

THE KU KLUX KLAN:
THE BOURGEOISIE1S INSTRUMENT
AGAINST THE UPSURGE OF THE ·
POOR LAYERS OF THE POPUL_ATION
A Trotskyist Quarterly
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FACING THE CRISIS, THE UNIONS SIMPLY
JUSTIFY THE BOSSES' RIGHT TO MAKE THE WORKERS PAY Page 1
IS REA.GAN WORSE THAN CARTER? Page 9
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS NOT A
LESSER EVIL FOR THE WORKING CLASS Page 15
THE KU KLUX KL.AN:
THE'BOURGIDISIE'S INSTRUMENT AGAINST
THE UPSURGE OF THE POOR LAYERS OF THE POPULATION Page 21
CUBA .AND THE PROBLEMS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT Page 29
FACING THE CRIS/SJ THE UNIONS
SIMPLY JUSTIFY THE BOSSES.,
RIGHT TO MAKE THE WORKERS PAY
Over the last year, the economic crisis has continued to worsen for the
working class. The big monopolies have followed a policy to shield themselves
from its problems. First they have raised their prices. Second they have
closed down either permanently or temporarily the least profitable sectors of
industry and tried to shift their capital to more lucrative sectors. And they
have used the decrease in the work force simultaneously with a speed-up to
raise productivity. Third, they have held down wages and benefits in recent
contracts; and now they are seeking contract reopeners and in some cases de
manding actual wage cuts or reduction on COLA payments. This policy has meant
to protect their profits by trying to force the working class to pay the price.
For the working class this has spelled increasing hardship. For instance,
by March of 1980, the purchasing power for the average married worker with 3
dependents had fallen 7.9 per cent compared to 1979. As of April 1980, spend
ing power for blue collar workers was lower than it has been 1962. New
si~ce
contracts negotiated in 1979 provided for average first year wage gains of
only 7.4 per cent, the lowest since 1973. Wage changes in 1979 contracts
have averaged less than the increase in prices. There was a 9.1 per cent
average wage increase for 9.3 million production and non-supervisory workers
compared to the official government figure of a 13.4 per cent rise in prices.
This past year marked the second year in a row that wages have fallen behind
prices.
The spectacular increase in interest rates over the last year has meant
that the price of many basic purchases has now become prohibitive for the
workers. For example, the average car loan rate has gone up 7 per cent over
what it was in 1977. The average monthly mortgage payment on a $50,000 house
~.-ent up from $475 in 1977 to $700 in 1979. All of these figures mark a deep
cut in the standard of living of the working class.
Coupled wit~ the problems caused by inflation ha$ been the growing level
of unemploymet;it"~,' ,As of May of 1980, the percentage ~f workers applying for
unemployment.compensation is about equal to that during the worst point of the
1974-75 recession. And there is every indication that this will get worse in
coming months. The level of unemployment in auto, steel, and construction is
a lot higher than the average. At the end of this period of crisis many auto
and steel workers will end up permanently out of these industries.
- 1 -
A CHAUVINIST CAMPAIGN
The response of the tmions to the crisis has been to aim most of their
efforts at demanding help from the government. They want the government to
intervene more, they say, to protect the interests of the workers. They call
on the government to pass new legislation, and ·to give financial aid to moder
ate the effects of the crisis. The major focus of the unions' efforts over
the last year has been on the issue of how to save jobs.
This effort has taken a very chauvinist form. The unions have campaigned
actively against the so-called invasion of the American market by foreign com
and
petition •. 'They have demanded that the govermnent act to limit imports they
call for a "Buy American" campaign. As early as the mid 1970s, the USWA has
made movies like "Where's Joe." In more recent years, the UAW has printed T
shirts and. bumper stickers, and unions like the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.
have paid for TV ads. More recently they asked local unions and retirees to
organize picketing of foreign. car dealerships, and even tried to get auto
workers' credit unions to refuse car loans to members seeking to buy a foreign
car.
The 11Buy American" campaigns, the lobbying for trade legislation limita
tions, are no solutions to the problems of unemployment, because it is not
foreign imports that are causing the problem. If we look at the problt?ms of
auto, for example, this becomes obvious. As of April, the American car compa
nies sales figures show that they sold 141,000 fewer new cars than in April
of 1979. But imported car sales were down also raising the over-all drop in
sales to 158,000 fewer:cars sold this year than the year before. If we look
at the problem also viewpoint of layoffs we see that the argmnent of
f~om ~he
the unions is a false one. As of April, Japanese imports' share of the auto
~arket waa up by 3 per cent over the last year, a. gain of from 17 to 20 per
cent of the market. Given the level of unemployment in April, this would have
acco\lllted for a loss of 30,000 jobs. But in reality there were 225,000 Ameri
can auto workers unemployed at the time. At least, for the other 195,000
unemployed auto workers, the responsibility can hardly lie with foreign
imports.
Not only is the argument about saving jobs false, but what the unions
propose, even if they were successful, would m~an a lowering of the standard
of living of the whole working class because prices would go up. If the ·
unions propose a ban on imports it is because imports are cheaper and there
fore more attractive to the consumer to buy. But who is this mysterious con
sumer? . In many cases, it is the workers themselves. Thus banning imports
would mean making the working class pay, even more for the American made
be
products which would the only products available. Particularly since the
ban on imports woul,d remove competiti~ and the price of ·all Amer.:I,can products
could go · ·· · ·
up~
Beyond this, as the bourgeoisie themselves no doubt tmderstand, and thu8
have hesitated to really push for such a policy, protectionism on the part of
the U.S. government would cause other countries to reciprocate. A barrier
against foreign imports would cause comparable barriers to be set up against
American products. Such a policy in the long run would lead to a slow down
and breakdown in trade on a world scale, which can only lead to a worsening of
the economic crisis. Thus under the pretext of protecting the workers against
- 2 -
the crisis, the policy advocated by the unions would in fact make the crisis
worse. Perhaps in the future the bourgeoisie could decide to take such a
desperate step, but in no sense could it be held up as an advance for the
workers.
SACRIFICE - -TO -MA-KE AMERICAN BUSINESS MORE COMPETITIVE
The unions, which begin their argument by telling the workers that it is
in their interests to protect the American economy against foreign imports by
trade restrictions, soon logically progress to argue that it is in the inter
ests of the workers to also ease restrictions against the bosses at home. All
of this is proposed in the name of making domestic-made products competitive.
The unions have tended to go along more in recent years with attempts by the
big concerns to relax health, safety and pollution standards. The USWA has
opposed anti-pollution requirements in steel production. The UAW has opposed
emission control and mandatory safety installations. There has also been an
open acquiescence on the part of the unions in relaxing work· standards on the
job, in the form of increased speed-up and reduction in safety precautions,
provision of safety equipment, proper maintenance of machinery and general
factory maintenr:dlce. Again, all of this has been agreed to on the grounds oi
cutting the costs of production as a necessity to keep jobs. In fact, all
these things have been done in the past and they have not prevented the unem
ployment. in fact, with the speed-up, more jobs are lost. And worse,
A.~d
have endangered the health and maimed and killed millions of
thes~.measures
workers and their families on and off the job.
But the road of sacrifices by no means stops here. The unions tell each
group of. workers not to be greedy and expect wage gains and benefit increases
that could m.ake it impossible for their boss to compete. Of course, they can't
say to the workers that the workers alone must sacri'fice, so the unions hide
what they are really asking under the guise of a so-called "equality of sacri
fice" by workers, consumers and the bosses. Or they use the argument that
giving up on wages Pnd benefits, while it hurts, will save jobs. The rationale
is that it's better to have a job paying less rather than to be unemployed.
They also use the same argument which they used on the general level and
apply it to a particular industry or company. They say that the steel industry
is hit hard by the crisis so steel workers must be prepared to give up more
than other workers. Or they say that Chrysler is the weakest of the auto com
panies -SP· Chrysler workers must be prepared to take less in a contract than Gl1
workers;• . · -;., .. ~ide effect of this policy is to encourage the workers to believe
that they might benefit from the misfortune of other workers. So, in a period
when the working class needs to be stronger by being united, the union bureau
crats inste<il.d ,_divide it. For example, GM workers could believe that if Chrys
ler goes uµder,. their jobs might be more secure because GM will be better off
without This is simply a continuation of the corporatist reason
.compe~ition.
ing that hap colored the \lllions' policies.
~lways
To propose to the workers the kind of sacrifices that the unions are
proposing solves nothing for the workers. It doesn't save jobs -- the
hundreds of thousands of steel workers who have lost their jobs in the last
decade can testify to that, as can the tens of thousands of Detroit Chrysler
- 3 -
workers who have seen their plants close down in the last year. It is simply
a way to allow the bosses to take back the gains that the workers won previous
ly in a better economic period when the bosses thought they could afford more
crumbs.
Behind the talk of "equality of sacrifice" is the proposal in fact that
the workers pay the whole cost of the crisis by themselves. Not only do the
bureaucrats propose that the workers accept such sacrifices but they try to
convince the workers that such sacrifices will save their jobs, will slow down
inflation, and pull the economy out of its slump.
And what has been the results for the workers of these union policies?
It· has meant that the Chrysler workers were forced to give up 480 million
dollars in wages and benefits. It meant that steel workers got a 3 per cent
wage increase with inflation running at 18 per cent. It meant that rubber
workers took a pay cut that will mean an average loss for them of $5,148 in
1~ years. It means that in the coming month the Teamster reopener could mean
more cutbacks for them. And it meant that the Communication Workers, in spite
of record 1. 4 billion dollar profits in the last quarter for the phone company,
still proposed a contract for.its workers that failed to keep up with infla
ti0n, in the name of the economic crisis.
,. ; ....
This is the situation for the workers in major industry and for the
workers of the biggest companies with the strongest tmions. The situation
for workers in small shops and for government and se-rVice workers is even
worse.
They talk about "equality of sacrifice." In the meantime, the increase
in the after-tax profits of the big corporations from 1978 to 1979 was al.most
19 per cent. This is the true meaning of the bosses' equality.
And the response of the unions to this reality is simply to accept it,
and even to warn the workers that they should be prepared to give up more in
the future.
.A CALL TO THE GOVERNMENT TO HELP THE BOSSES
Another aspect of the policy of the unions has been to call on the govern
ment to aid the corporatians in trouble, in the form of tax breaks and more
recently direct aid as in the case of the billion and some dollars given to
bail out Chrysler. They have done this on the grounds that govermnent aid is
needed to keep the open and thus save jobs.
pla~ts
But if there is no market for a product, then government aid doesn't
change very much. The government can help a monopoly such as Chrysler to
stay alive for awhile and not go under. But it can't force people to buy
their cars, or force investors to put money into the company. If auto sales
are down, government aid to Chrysler won't solve the problem. It can simply
mean a stay of execution, not a recovery.
The success of Chrysler in receiving government aid is less due to a
forceful and effective campaign by the unions, anyway, than to a big
- 4 -
monopoly's ability to get its friends in the government to help it out. In
fact, it was not the UAW that used the government but the other way around.
Fraser and the UAW's campaign on behalf of Chrysler provided a good cover for
the bosses and the government to justify giving the workers' money to the
bosses. How clever to be able to give a nice juicy welfare check to the bosses
while the workers accept wages and benefit cuts, and pretend all the while that
you are doing it because the workers' own representatives have demanded this.
Further it allowed Fraser to trick the workers into believing that the
government could be counted on to help out, without UAW members themselves
being mobilized to do anything for themselves. In fact, such a maneuver served
to convince the workers that it was better not to do anything because if they
made a fight it might hurt Chrysler's chances with the government. So the
workers were persuaded to count on Fraser which suited the government, the
Chrysler bosses, and Fraser himself, no doubt, just fine.
The money that Chrysler received has by no means saved jobs. Since the
money came through, Chrysler has closed down one plant after another in Detroit,
:md drastically reduced its work force. So all the Chrysler bail-out did was
give more money to the bosses to use as they please.
If the unions wanted to demand one and a half billion dollars from the
government to really help the Chrysler workers, they could have demanded that
tae government pay this money directly to the workers themselves. Of course
such a course of would not have changed anything in the crisis. But
actio~
it would provide them with temporary help and be better than giving the money
to the bosses, which for the workers has been no help at all.
The unions have called for some government aid directly to the workers in
the form of extended unemployment benefits and TRA money, but only a very small
proportion of the workers affected by the crisis qualify for this aid. It is
limited to one year. It is hardly a drop in the bucket compared to the unen
ployment.
THE LOGIC OF CLASS COLLABORATION
The policy of the unions today has nothing in common with for
fighti~g
the worke;:s' interests. The solutions the unions put forward are not real or
efficient ones even within the framework the union officials themselves pro
pose. The proposals of the unions are simply an acceptance of the reality
that the bosses have decided to impose on the workers anyway. Henry Ford I
once described an economic depression as a "wholesome thing in general." He
made this co:nment in the 1930s. No doubt the same sentiments are echoed today
by the big monopolies es they watch some of their competition go and as
u..~der
they the union officials do their dirty work for them.
watc..~
The policy of the bureaucrats consists of getti!lg the workers to passive
ly ley their heads on the block so it's easier for the bosses to chop them off.
The policies of the unions in the period of the crisis are by no re3ans a
change from th~ir usual policies. It is a policy of class collaboration: to
bind the workers to accept bourgeois legality; to accept the contracts,
- 5 -
arbitrations, injunctions, and other restrictions as a normal state of affairs.
It is a policy that tries to keep the workers within a legal framework created
by the ruling class to maintain the exploitation and oppression of the working
class. It is the policy of the "social contract."
Today, it is a bargain struck with the aid of the government to make the
working class accept the need for all to sacrifice to make the U.S. economy
get well. This harmonious relationship between labor and management was
extolled recently in an interview in the Detroit News with George B. Morris,
a retiring GM vice-president for industrial relations. Morris says:
There will always be critics who think that management and labor
must be in constant battle~ We don't agree and we think the
record will show that all concerned have benefitted from the
GM-UAW collective bargaining system. I sincerely believe the
UAW and GM have more in conunon than in conflict.
No doubt there are many rank and file auto workers who would find this state
ment to be only too painfully true though they do not find it to be to their
liking.
Such a harmonious relationship even in the best of economic times always
accepts that the capitalists have the right to share with the workers the
benefits of what the workers produce9 and .moreover that it is the capitalists
who decide what their share should be. Obviously, they take the bigger share.
The logic of this policy when carried over into bad times has a much more
serious impact on the workers. The unions' policy today consists not in op
posing the workers' interests to those of the bourgeoisie, but in imposing
the bosses' solutions on the working class. The discussion by the unions
today is not how to force the bosses to pay for the crisis but instead how to
get the workers to pay for them. The logic of the unions' policy today means
disarming the workers just at the time when the bosses are on the attack. It
means, even worse, to give the bosses more weapons and to collaborate in plan
ning strategy to make war on the working class.
THE WORKERS CAN COUNT ONLY ON THEIR OWN STRUGGLES
Of course the policy of the uniohs today is by no means the only possible
policy for the working class. In response· to the.unemployment, the workers
could put forth the demand for the sliding scale of wages and hours. In re
sponse to the inflation the working class could demand an equal increase in
wages for every increase in the cost of living. The working class has the
possibility of mobilizing itself around its own program -- one that offers a
series of proposals that correspond to the workers' real interests. This
would mean that the workers were refusing to sacrifice their standard of
living and instead were trying to force the bosses to pay the cast of the
.crisis. It is in this way that the working class could defend itself against
the effects of the crisis.
Such a policy could not be imposed on the bourgeoisie without a fight,
without a real mobilization of the working class acting in its own interests.
- 6 -
But there is no other way for the working class to avoid paying the cost of the
crisis.
Such a policy and mobilization of the workers is not in the sights of the
unions today. Their policy is not a defense of the working class. Certainly,
we cannot reproach the union officials today for organizing a struggle when the
workers themselves are not ready to struggle. But it is possible for these
officials at least to hold out to the workers the necessity for their own mobi
lization and struggle. And this they don't do.
Instead, at every turn the union officials tie the hands of the workers,
demoralize them, undercut the workers' confidence in themselves and their
ability to act. They counterpose themselves to the workers' own activity and
tell the workers that the solution to the workers' problems depends on the
union officials, on the government and on negotiations with the bosses.
These union officials are not the representatives of the workers at all.
They are, as De Leon put it, the "labor lieutenants of capital." For them,
there is a reward: for example, Fraser's seat on the Chrysler Board of Direc
tors. They try to make the workers believe that the workers' interests and
the bosses' interests are one and the same, because they see their own inter
ests as the same as the capitalists.
Despite the acceptance by the workers of the sacrifices imposed on them
today by these bureaucrats, we could see the working class begin to mobilize
itself. And if it does, we could also see these same bureaucrats, despite
their stance today, try to strike a more militant pose, the better to put
themselves at the head of such a mobilization. But we can be sure, if they
do it, it will be in order to divert the movement, to try to tie the workers
one more time within the framework of legalities, contracts and negotiations.
For the workers, the best chance of continuing their mobilization and fight
ing for their own demands will be if they can free themselves from the
influence of these bureaucrats.
- 7 -