civil-military relations1

32 Pages·2008·0.17 MB·English

by  Peter D. Feaver

Annu.Rev.Polit.Sci.1999.2:211(cid:150)41
Copyright'1999byAnnualReviews.Allrightsreserved
1
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
PeterD.Feaver
DepartmentofPoliticalScience,DukeUniversity,Durham,NorthCarolina27708-
0204;e-mail:[email protected]
g
or KEYWORDS: civiliancontrol,coups,militarypolitics,defensepolicy,armedforces,
ws. principal-agentrelations
e
vi
e
nualrnly. ABSTRACT
no
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wnloaded from arjo09/11/08. For perso ttltsvhiehcirvoedieeeuihnnrlga,icgghntehhag(cid:146)ceeseirsvofcotiiuolfec-gnlimrdhvteriilitlllabaaiitatxruiagnootriennyoalsoynurhmetifthlpooyaosctrofiuibooutseinrreetscswsuainoiestndanealnenotvrhatgsehetturiaeoyicnnnmodbg-nirisntolttrihagatoetadleorfsyosfi.uercaTlbdindjvhideriaiclesnc-tcmi,detvseiidiosnllaiinicstayaoconrmusfysusptosrrhaivcenesielegsaymittsnytiihoglpaenitottsarhle,erievytcpieeecrbornnayy--tl
Doon renaissanceintheliteratureaswellasfruitfulavenuesforfutureresearch.
11-241. entucky Tsimphapecoeer)tsastnhatyecmfoonacnturyisbecusatsiooennssttuhtodeiooerusertaikncnadloewdmelepvdierglioecp.amlterneatst,mselnigtshttihnagth(faovreraelassoomnsadoef
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ci. 1999.2:versity of INTRODUCTION
olit. Sy Uni Csoicviial-lmsciileitnacrye.rHeliasttioorniasniss,soonceioolfotghieststr,uployliitnictearldsicsiceinptliisntasr,yanfdiepldosliocyf satnuadlyysitns
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v. all have made major contributions to the field and, perhaps more surprising,
e
R regularlyreadandrespondtoeachother(cid:146)sworkinthisarea.Theinterdiscipli-
u.
n nary nature is neatly captured in the subfield(cid:146)s indispensable lead journal,
n
A
ArmedForces&Society,andmayhelpexplainwhynominallymainstreambut
increasinglyinsularpoliticalsciencejournalssuchasAmericanPoliticalSci-
enceReviewhavemadelessofacontributiontothesubfieldinthepastfew
decades.
1ThisessayadaptsmaterialspublishedvariouslyinFeaver1995,1997a,and1997bwiththeper-
missionoftheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,TransactionPublishers,andFunda-
ci(cid:243)nAriasparalaPazyelProgresoHumano,respectively.
211
1094-2939/99/0616-0211$08.00
212 FEAVER
This essay focuses on the political science component of the subfield,
makingmentionofassociateddisciplinesasnecessary.Politicalscientists,as
distinctfromhistorians,tendtolookforpatternedgeneralizationsofcauseand
effect.Politicalscientistsseeknotsomuchtodescribewhathappenedinapar-
ticularinstanceastoexplainwhathappensingeneraland,ifpossible,predict
whatislikelytohappeninthenextcase,giventheceterisparibusconstraint.
Asdistinctfromsociologists,politicalscientistsfocusprimarilyoninstitutions
ofpoliticalcontrol.Factorsofdirectconcerntosociologists(cid:151)forinstance,the
integration of the military with society(cid:151)are of interest only insofar as they
may relate causally to the primary political question of who decides what,
g
or when,how,andwithwhateffect.Sociologistsandhistorianswouldnodoubt
s.
w balkattheprominencegiventopoliticalsciencetheoryinthisessay.Theno-
e
vi motheticversusideographicdebateplaysoutinthisareaasinothers,anditis
e
nualrnly. not clear that political science is the lead discipline in the study of civil-
no military relations anyway. But sociologists and historians are likely to pay
urnals.anal use gwroeualtderinatotethnetiropnotloitipcoallitsicciaelntcheesourbetfiicealdlsd.eTvheilsopism,tehnetns,iannthuinsafbiaesldhetdhlaynptahreoy-
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Doon antimilitarism,especiallyVagts(1937)andLasswell(1941).Thesecondlarge
1-241. ntucky wenatvisetsosftrliutgergalteudretocraemcoenicniltehetheeanrleyedCfooldraWpearrmpearnieondt,aansdAlamrgereicstaannsdoincgiaalrsmciy-
1e
2K withAmerica(cid:146)straditionalsuspicionsofthethreatstolibertyposedbystand-
99.2:y of ing armies (Kerwin 1948, Smith 1951, Lasswell 1950, Ekirch 1956, Mills
olit. Sci. 19y Universit 1Sw9tra5itt6ete,(nM1s9ii5lnl7cis)e,ehwtaasaslbt1eh9een5c8aa)np.seHtxoupnnleitcitniotgotthorinis(cid:146)msepallrailncyditwmroeasrrkpk,osantnsueddytmo,oThsihtseoafSrgowuldhmiaeetrnhtaa.nsdbetehne
v. Pb AfterHuntington,thefieldsplitalongtwodistincttracks.Thefirstandar-
Re guablymorefruitfulwasasociologicallyorientedexaminationofthemilitary,
u. firstintheUnitedStatesandthenextendingtoothercountries.Thelandmark
n
n
A study,Janowitz(cid:146)sTheProfessionalSoldier(1960),spawnedliterallyhundreds
offollow-onstudiesexploringtherelationshipbetweensocietyandthearmed
forces (Moskos 1970, 1971; Larson 1974; Segal et al 1974; Sarkesian 1975;
Segal1975;Bachmanetal1977;Janowitz1977;Moskos1977;Segal1986;
Moskos&Wood1988;Edmonds1988;Burk1993;Sarkesianetal1995).The
second track was an institutionally oriented examination of postcolonial
civil-militaryrelationsindevelopingcountries,aprojectdominatedbypoliti-
cal scientists (Finer 1962; Huntington 1968; Stepan 1971, 1988; Perlmutter
1977; Welch 1976; Nordlinger 1977) and largely focused on the problem of
CIVIL-MILITARYRELATIONS 213
coups;thistrackhasspawnednumerousspecialtyliteraturesconsideringcivil-
military relations in specific contexts(cid:151)in communist regimes (Kolkowicz
1966,Herspring&Volgyes1978,Colton1979,Rice1984,Colton&Gustaf-
son1990,Zisk1993,Herspring1996),inethnicallydividedpolities(Horowitz
1980, 1985), in authoritarian and postauthoritarian regimes (Rouquie 1982,
Frazer1994,Aguero1995),andsoon.2Althoughthisessayaddressesthelit-
eratureacrosstheboard,specialattentionwillbegiventocivil-militaryrela-
tions within democracies and, within that set, civil-military relations in the
United States because the American case has figured so prominently in the
theoreticaldevelopmentofthefield.
g
or Although the sociological school dominated the study of American civil-
ws. military relations, the Vietnam War trauma produced a flurry of empirically
e
vi rich studies by political scientists that remain important even 20 or 30 years
e
nnualronly. lsaettetr&(KHoalnosdoznie1j917956;6B,eYttasrm19o7l7in)s.kTyhe19li7te1r,a1tu9r7e4c;oRnutsinseutetd&toSpteropvanef1r9u7it3fu;lR,uess--
urnals.anal use panecdiatlhlyeirtsolaenaolfyspeusbolficthoepiimnipolnica(tSiotineshmoft1h9e8e1n,d1o9f8t9h,e1d9ra9f6t;,gCeonhdeenris1s9u8e5s;,
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Doon States,muchofitastheoreticallyambitiousastheearlyworkofHuntington
1-241. ntucky aspnodnJsaentoowqiutze.stIifotnhserapiassetdisinatnhyegAumideer,icthaniscnoenwtexwt,owrki,llwgheincehrabteegaanlaragsearlriet--
21Ke eraturetreatingcomparativequestionsinanewway.
99.2:y of Theessayproceedsinsevenparts.Ibeginwithadiscussionofthecentral
ci. 19versit pcirvoibl-lemmiliutanrdyeprlryoibnlgemalaltiaqnuael.yIsethseonfidceivnitli-fmyitlhitearthyrereelfaotiromnss,owfahnicahlysIisc(cid:151)allntohre-
olit. Sy Uni mative,descriptive,andtheoretical(cid:151)thatcomprisepoliticalscience(cid:146)scontri-
Pb butiontoourunderstandingofcivil-militaryrelations.Thenexttwosections
v.
e brieflyreviewthepoliticalscienceliteratureoncivil-militaryrelations,pars-
R
u. ing scholars according to the different dependent and independent variables
n
An stressed in their work. The antepenultimate section addresses in more detail
therangeofciviliancontrolmechanismsidentifiedbytheliterature.Thepe-
nultimate section highlights the recent renaissance in the study of American
civil-militaryrelations.Iconcludewithabriefdiscussionofpromisingques-
tionsforfutureresearch.
2 2Athirdtrack,thoughfurtherremovedfromthedevelopmentofcivil-militarytheory,isthe
largeliteratureontheinterrelationshipbetweenwar,themilitary,andstatedevelopment(Tilly
1975,Downing1991,Goldstone1991,Holsti1996).
214 FEAVER
THEPROBLEMATIQUE
The civil-military problematique is a simple paradox: The very institution
createdtoprotectthepolityisgivensufficientpowertobecomeathreattothe
polity.3Thisderivesfromtheagencyinherentincivilization.Weformcom-
munitiespreciselybecausewecannotprovideforallourneedsandtherefore
mustdependonotherpeopleorinstitutionstodoourbidding.Civilizationin-
volvesdelegation,assigningdecisionmakingfromtheindividualtothecollec-
tive(intheformofaleaderorleaders)andconsigningthesocietalprotection
functionfromtheleadertospecialistsorinstitutionsresponsibleforviolence.
org Thecivil-militaryproblematiqueissovexingbecauseitinvolvesbalancing
ws. twovitalandpotentiallyconflictingsocietaldesiderata.Ontheonehand,the
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vi militarymustbestrongenoughtoprevailinwar.Onepurposebehindestab-
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Downloaded from arjoon 09/11/08. For perso sspmssheitooraroiovnynune(cid:151)tlbgsdwesenhbtwnoreeooorpunerssuggiiezrhtpeetcihdonnaasonafenuapngntcpootohrltnoeooiepsnndtragaietaabefatprleeilpnpsll.yehdrIoataatrtocgeapocnamrtuic.oneleItdsneettbctdottheetieheotahidenrpr,epatfahaorpnertreeecdirnnaeattatisaigpdoneoecndrqwosiun.tenhafArvrtefoeilunttnilmenttrioeginnlnaigovtetauiimttvrtihyseaieieltdiyesnpe,siobiatttilugtticuottgoytrinu.teoholsInde-tt
1-241. ntucky liunlgllienatdheersulitnitmoaatefamlsielictoarnyficdoenntcees,t.leadingthemtorashbehaviorandthenfail-
1e Ontheotherhand,justasthemilitarymustprotectthepolityfromenemies,
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99.2:y of somustitconductitsownaffairssoasnottodestroyorpreyonthesocietyitis
ci. 19versit icnivteenpdoedwteor,ptrhoeteacbt.iBliteycatousfeotrhceemitisliwtairlyl monusotthfaecres.eBneumt cieose,rictimveusptohwaverecoofteern-
Polit. Sby Uni gdiivreecstistetihzeurceaopfapboilliittyictaolpeonwfoerrcbeyittshwemilliloitnartyheisctohmetmraudnitiitoyntahlawtcorreryatoefdciitv.iAl-
ev. militaryrelationstheoryandaconsistentpatterninhumanhistory.Lessobvi-
R
u. ous,butjustassinister,isthepossibilitythataparasiticmilitarywilldestroy
n
n societybydrainingitofresourcesinaquestforevergreaterstrengthasahedge
A
againsttheenemiesofthestate.Yetanotherconcernisthataroguemilitary
couldinvolvethepolityinwarsandconflictscontrarytosociety(cid:146)sinterestsor
expressedwill.And,finally,thereisaconcernoverthesimplematterofobedi-
3 3Ofcourse,themilitarymaynotbeestablishedsolelytoprotectthepolityagainstexternal
threats.Othermotivations,e.g.preservingtheregime(cid:146)spoweroverthemassesorcreatingthe
trappings of the modern state for symbolic purposes, may also come into play. Nevertheless,
regardlessofthemotivationforcreatingtheinstitution,oncecreated,themilitaryraisesthesame
controlproblematiquedescribedinthetext.
CIVIL-MILITARYRELATIONS 215
ence:Evenifthemilitarydoesnotdestroysociety,willitobeyitscivilianmas-
ters, or will it use its considerable coercive power to resist civilian direction
andpursueitsowninterests?
Thisisavariantofthebasicproblemofgovernancethatliesatthecoreof
politicalscience:makingthegovernmentstrongenoughtoprotectthecitizens
butnotsostrongastobecometyrannical.Thetensionbetweenthetwodesid-
erataisinherentinanycivilization,butitisespeciallyacuteindemocracies,
where the protectees(cid:146) prerogatives are thought to trump the protectors(cid:146) at
everyturn(cid:151)wherethemetaphoricaldelegationofpoliticalauthoritytoagents
is enacted at regular intervals through the ballot box.4 Democratic theory is
g
or summedintheepigramthatthegovernedshouldgovern.Peoplemaychoose
ws. politicalagentstoactontheirbehalf,butthatshouldinnowaymeanthatthe
e
vi people have forfeited their political privileges. Most of democratic theory is
e
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urnals.anal use aproelijtuicsatlaagspenectsiaclo,netxrtorlelminegdcaesseigfnoarteddemmoilcitraartyicatgheenotrsy., involving designated
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Doon politicswithinthecontextofaparticularnormativeconceptionofwhosewill
1-241. ntucky sthheoiurlcdopmrepveateiln.cCeiivnilaiapnacrtoimcupleatresnecnesein;tthhaetgise,nceirvaillisaennsseareexmteonrdaslleyvaenndbpeyoolintid-
21Ke callycompetenttomakethedecisionseveniftheydonotpossesstherelevant
99.2:y of technicalcompetenceintheformofexpertise(Dahl1985).Thisisthecoreof
ci. 19versit tmhaeyduenmdoecrsratatincdathlteerinssautievebettotePr,ltahtoe(cid:146)esxppheirltoissonpohteirnkaipnogs.iAtioltnhotoudgehtethrmeienxeptehret
olit. Sy Uni value that the people attach to different issue outcomes. In the civil-military
Pb context,thismeansthatthemilitarymaybebestabletoidentifythethreatand
v.
e theappropriateresponsestothatthreatforagivenlevelofrisk,butonlytheci-
R
u. viliancansetthelevelofacceptableriskforsociety.Themilitarycanpropose
n
An thelevelofarmamentsnecessarytohaveacertainprobabilityofsuccessfulde-
4 4Thistensionisalsopresentinauthoritarianregimesandevenmilitarydictatorships.Thevery
existence of political power creates the delegation-agency problem. In military regimes, even
thoughpoliticalleadersandfightinggroupsalikewearuniforms,responsibilityisdividedbetween
thosewhodothefightingandthosewhoremainbehindtowieldpoliticalpower.Wearingthesame
uniformdoesnotpreventthosewhostaybehindfromworryingaboutwhetherthefightersare
adequatetodefendthemorwhetherthefightersareliabletoturnaroundandunseatthem,asthe
manycoupsandcountercoupsinmilitarydictatorshipsattest.ThisiswhatStepan(1971)hascalled
thedistinctionbetweenthe(cid:147)militaryasaninstitution(cid:148)andthe(cid:147)militaryasgovernment.(cid:148)
216 FEAVER
fense against our enemies, but only the civilian can say what probability of
successsocietyiswillingtounderwrite.Themilitarycandescribeinsomede-
tailthenatureofthethreatposedbyaparticularenemy,butonlythecivilian
can decide whether to feel threatened, and if so, how or even whether to re-
spond.Themilitaryassessestherisk,thecivilianjudgesit.
Thedemocraticimperativeinsiststhatthisprecedenceappliesevenifcivil-
ians are woefully underequipped to understand the technical issues at stake.
Regardlessofhowsuperiorthemilitaryviewofasituationmaybe,thecivilian
view trumps it. Civilians should get what they ask for, even if it is not what
theyreallywant.Inotherwords,civilianshavearighttobewrong.
g
or Thetwocentraldesiderata(cid:151)protectionbythemilitaryandprotectionfrom
ws. the military(cid:151)are in tension because efforts to assure the one complicate ef-
e
vi fortstoassuretheother.Ifasocietyrelentlesslypursuesprotectionfromexter-
e
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urnals.anal use iptrsoeclfurveulanegroaobdlelytoamproeudnattioofnsbofrthomkinexdtseronfaplreonteecmtiioesn.(cid:151)ItcmeratayinbleypthoessUibnleitetod
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Doon thatthemilitaryisbothcapableofdoingandwillingtodowhatciviliansask.
1-241. ntucky Tofhcuos,n(cid:147)trsoollvoinngan(cid:148)tohnegporionbglebmasiosf.coupsdoesnotneutralizethegeneralproblem
1e
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99.2:y of THREEFORMSOF ANALYSIS
olit. Sci. 19y Universit Ienmgpeirniecraal/ld,epsoclriitpictiavles,cainednctheecoornetsiicsatsl.oEfacthhrecoemfopromnsenotfmaankaelyssiims:pnoortramntatciovne-,
v. Pb tributionstothestudyofcivil-militaryrelations.Normativeanalysisaskswhat
Re oughttobedone,howmuchciviliancontrolisenough,andwhatcanbedone
u. toimprovecivil-militaryrelations.Becauseciviliancontrolofthemilitaryis
n
n
A ofsuchgreatpolicyimportance,thenormativeapproachoftenplaysacentral
roleinthestudyofcivil-militaryrelations.Politicalscience(cid:146)sanswerstothe
normativequestionsarevariouscriteriaconcerninghowmuchcontrol(andof
whattype)isenoughtosatisfythedefinitionofciviliancontrolorciviliansu-
premacy(Huntington1957,Colton1979,Edmonds1988,Aguero1995,Kemp
&Hudlin1992,BenMeir1995,Kohn1997,Boene1997).
The normative lens draws explicitly on the empirical/descriptive lens,
which seeks to describe cases in accurate detail. Applied to the problem of
civil-militaryrelations,theempirical/descriptivelensinvolvesdevelopingty-
CIVIL-MILITARYRELATIONS 217
pologies of various forms of civilian control or lack thereof(cid:151)for instance,
Welch(cid:146)s(1976)distinctionbetweenmilitaryinfluenceandmilitarycontrolor
Ben Meir(cid:146)s (1995) fivefold typology of military roles (advisory, representa-
tive,executive,advocacy,andsubstantive).Thekeytaskforthiskindofanaly-
sisisdistinguishingbetweenrealityandrhetoric,betweenwhatappearstobe
thecaseandwhatinfactisthecase.Measuredbysheervolume,thebulkofthe
civil-military relations literature consists of empirical/descriptive treatments
ofthecivil-militarysceneindifferentcountriesorregions.Areastudiesspe-
cialistshavelongnotedthecentralityofcivil-militaryissuestopoliticallifein
variousregions(cid:151)indeed,civil-militaryrelationsisacentralpreoccupationin
g
or most area studies subliteratures, except those dealing with the United States
ws. andWesternEurope.Asaconsequence,thereisarichliteraturedescribingthe
e
vi ebb and flow of relations between the armed forces and the polity (Boene
e
nnualronly. 1L9o9v0e,llZ&agAorlsbkriig1h9t9129,9D7a,nZoapmouolroas1&99W7)a.tson1996,Diamond&Plattner1996,
urnals.anal use formAlosofainmaplylisciist,itnheththeenoorermticaatlivleenlse.nTshaerethceoonrectliucsailoanpspdroraawchnmfraoymaltshoebtehgirind
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Doon the things to be explained/predicted, called dependent variables (DVs)(cid:151)for
1-241. ntucky epxlaaimnipnlge/,pcroeudpicstionrgr,ocbaullsetndeisnsdoefpecnivdielinatnocroenxtprolaln(cid:151)ataonrdytvhaeritahbinlegss(dIVoisn)g,stuhceheaxs-
21Ke the degree of military professionalism or the type of civilian governmental
99.2:y of structure.ThetheoreticalapproachspecifieswaysinwhichchangesintheIVs
ci. 19versit aproelirteicfalelcstceidenincec(cid:146)hsacnognetrsibinuttihoenDtoVtsh.eAsusbthfieelfdololfowciivnigl-mtwiloitsaeryctrieolnastidooncsucmanenbte,
olit. Sy Uni evaluatedintermsofsuccessivetheoreticaldebatesoverwhatthemostimpor-
Pb tantDVsandIVsare.
v.
e
R
nu. WHATIS THEDEPENDENTVARIABLE?
n
A
Traditionally,civil-militaryrelationstheoryhasfocusedonthedirectseizure
ofpoliticalpowerbythemilitary,i.e.thecoup.Withtheremarkablespreadof
democraticgovernanceoverthepastseveraldecades,thequestionofcoupsre-
mainsinteresting,butitisbynomeanstheonlyinterestingcivil-militaryphe-
nomenontobeexplained.Accordingly,itmakessensetodistinguishbetween
avarietyofDVs,anyoneofwhichmightbethemostimportantorinteresting
inaparticularregionataparticulartime.Thenextfivesubsectionsdescribea
listofDVsadaptedfromDesch(1999).Theevaluationofthelistismyown.
218 FEAVER
Coups
Coupsarethetraditionalfocusofcivil-militaryrelationsbecausetheysodra-
maticallysymbolizethecentralproblemofthemilitaryexploitingtheircoer-
civestrengthtodisplacecivilianrulers.Underthegeneralheadingofcoups,
politicalscientistshavelookedattworelatedbutdistinctquestions:ontheone
hand,theinstanceorfrequencyofcoups(orcoupsattempted),andontheother
hand,theprobabilitythatacoupwillbesuccessful.Classicalcivil-militaryre-
lationstheoryhasprimarilyaddressedtheformer.BothHuntington(1957)and
hisearliestcritic,Finer(1962),addressthepropensityofmilitaryinstitutions
g tocoup,asdosubsequentstudiesbyBienen(1968),Nordlinger(1977),Hor-
or
s. owitz (1980), Thompson (1975, 1976), Jackman (1978), Perlmutter (1977),
w
vie O(cid:146)Kane(1981),Zimmermann(1983),Johnsonetal(1984),Bienen&Vande
nualrenly. Winaalnleic(o1n9o9c0l)a,sLtiocnadnraelgyasnis&,aPddoroelses(e1d9t9h0e),seacnodnFdraqzueers(ti1o9n9o4f).hLouwtttwoacko(n1d9u7c9t)a,
no
urnals.anal use cBoiuenpesnu&cceVsasfnudlley,Wanaldleco(1u9p9s0u)c,caensdsFisraazlesro(c1o9v9e4r)e.dinZimmermann(1983),
oo Coupsareaproblematicfocusforfuturestudiesofcivil-militaryrelations,
wnloaded from arj09/11/08. For pers hAafclcaoetlcwcooptreiursnvopgetchrmet,ehsabsemy.emcIiilnaniiutldtaishitrecaiysarlytoswe(cid:146)uosampkyipini,nrlatieghtbsaoeisrlenyidtslyoy.sgtBtaroettuhngctagoeittttuhdpcw,oasahentcasalatnenliaostusotwtnbicdanaonerdmrtkisecmpsatthatiaerrmyeomdaubtgietelohimtthtathhierleyeimtonawotroheyrraeemikrnpanpfolleowupslesioetn,rliiccfrtueaei--ll.
11-241. Doentucky on attaannidnt,lydfoolrges.assMcferoerrtqeauoinevnientrg,inwwmhhiealtenhyceorreuogprisonnhosat,vthaeennddoetthmeenoctciorrauecplyysdiusicsrcaoepbspusesrata,rtetehdhe,atmhseoayrlseaoirmfeapclloeerrn--
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ci. 1999.2:versity of (cinZotauegpreowsrtsioknuigl1da9ny9di6ei,lmdHpfuoanritrtaelynrtc1co9hn9as8ni)gs.teeTsnhitnunsthu,eltlhnpearoteurdireeiscoteifoxcnpisvlaiilin-nmimniglainttayhreycarpesrleoaspt,ieomnnsisistosyivntegor
olit. Sy Uni toitmheer.iMssousetsr.ecent work on civil-military relations, therefore, has focused on
Pb
v.
e
R MilitaryInfluence
u.
n
n
A Becausethecoup/no-coupdichotomymissesmuchoftheinterestinggiveand
takeincivil-militaryrelations,sometheoristshavepreferredtostudymilitary
influence instead. Whereas the coup variable is dichotomous, the influence
variableiscontinuous,oratleastoffersmorethantwogradations.Thefocus
onmilitaryinfluencecapturestheideathatthemilitaryinstitutionmaybepo-
litically powerful even (or perhaps especially) when it does not seize direct
powerthroughaforcefultakeover.
Eventheclassictextsoncivil-militaryrelationsrecognizedthattheprob-
lemofcivil-militaryrelationswaslargerthanaquestionofcoups.Huntington
CIVIL-MILITARYRELATIONS 219
(1957:20)observed,forinstance,that(cid:147)theproblemofthemodernstateis
not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician.(cid:148) Finer
(1962) and Janowitz (1960) likewise acknowledged the utility of a non-
dichotomousvariable.Fineraddedathirdpossibility,covertintervention,and
Janowitz,althoughnotexplicitonthepoint,treatedcivil-militaryrelationsasa
continuum. Subsequent theorists, including Stepan (1971, 1988), Welch
(1976), Nordlinger (1977), Colton (1979), Rice (1984), Pion-Berlin (1992),
andBrooks(1999),alladdadditionalgradationstothemilitaryinfluencevari-
able.
Militaryinfluenceismuchhardertomeasurethancoups,however,andthe
g
or measurementproblemlimitsitstheoreticalusefulness.Nordlinger(1977)ad-
s.
w dressed this problem by inventing a tripartite typology of praetorianism,
e
vi consistingofmoderators,guardians,andrulers.Histypology,however,only
e
nualrnly. captures varieties of overt military control and misses the far more nuanced
no andmoreinterestingsituationwherethemilitaryisabletoshapegovernment
urnals.anal use accivtiiolinasnwcoitnhtoroult,dtihreecetxlytecnotnotfromlliilnitgarthyeimns.tSittuetpioanna(cid:146)slp(1re9r8o8g)astievceosn,dismaesauspuererioorf
oo
wnloaded from arj09/11/08. For pers girctnwaoansnuougtgbricenoooglrod,dfhifinronigonwasmft(cid:151)eilouvdneeleonrfb,wceyientaisfbsneoednrcpcoahoetu.ilagiscSevhyteei(rttphyoeaesxnteahpnltelsrsiaociltceiithegvlsaayeslpmisnaryeec(cid:147)trslromtuiegcdmo;aedths.ieevAmreaasslitlleoSit(cid:148)thwtaercrsopayufatoegbngrhedoeh1seraysf1veiniinionestrsisatushclehlriyevoaeiorrlteniiaoanlnysf-
Doon stances:activemilitaryparticipationinthecabinet,theroleofthepolice,and
1-241. ntucky tohpeemraitliiotnaraylirzoalteioinnostfattheeeinntfelrupernisceesD).VCoblytodnis(t1in9g7u9i)sohfifnegrsbaetswtiellemnfooruersteynpseitsivoef
1e
2K policy issues over which the military exercises influence (internal, institu-
99.2:y of tional, intermediate, and societal) and by distinguishing between the four
olit. Sci. 19y Universit mftiooerncasen)os.fCumsoielldtiotan(ro(cid:146)ysfifanicpfilpaurleonapccreehrsoohgfofarettriosvfeca,ocneoxsuipdpee,rrtbaubatldeivtaiiscnena,olytptcoiclleaitalirclteahvlaetbrhaaerggesauoicnvcienersgs,qfuuaelnlsyd-
v. Pb overcomestheproblemofhiddeninfluenceandcivilianabdication.
Re ArelatedproblemoftheinfluenceDVisthataparticularnormativeclaim
u. ofwhatoughttobethepropersphereofmilitaryinfluenceisoftenimplicitin
n
n
A theconcept.Whilethenormativelinemaybeeasytodrawinthecoupsetting,
itisdebatableinothersettings.Shouldthemilitarydecidetacticalquestions
only?Whatabouttacticalquestionsofspecialimportance,suchasnucleartac-
tics?Insomecountries,mostnotablytheUnitedStates,thechallengeofde-
signingtheproperdivisionoflaborbetween(cid:147)militarymatters(cid:148)and(cid:147)civilian
matters(cid:148) has driven much of the civil-military conflict (Feaver 1992, 1996).
Indeed,theoldestdebateincivil-militaryrelationsconcernsfusionism,the
argument that the line between the military and the political has become so
blurredthatthedistinctionhaslostitsmeaning(Boene1990).
220 FEAVER
Fusionismaroseoutofthepublicmanagementschoolasalogicalresponse
totheWorldWarIIexperienceoftotalwar,andappearedevenmorereason-
ableinthefaceofsuchColdWarexigenciesasapermanentandlargemilitary
establishment and the threat of nuclear annihilation (Sapin & Snyder 1954).
Huntington (1957) positioned his treatise as a self-conscious rejection of
fusionism.Everyhalfdecadeorsosince,someonerevivesfusionismasthein-
evitable consequence of whatever military mission seems ascendant at that
time:nuclearstrategyandlimitedwar(Lyons1961,Janowitz1960),counter-
insurgency(Barrett1965,Russett&Stepan1973,Slater1977),crisismanage-
ment(Betts1977),orpeacekeepingoperations(Tarr&Roman1995,Roman
g
s.or &Tarr1995,Hahn1997).Whatispuzzlinginfusionism(cid:146)scyclicalrebirthis
w
e thatitisnotclearwhoiskillingit;inotherwords,whymustthefusionistin-
vi
nualrenly. sniegghattibneg.reItvoivveedrreevacehryesfibvyecyoenafruss?inMgyovoewrlnapanbsewtweereinstthheatfufunscitoionnissmofitshseeclfi--
no
urnals.anal use vspilhiaenresanadremnielicteasrsyarsiplyhearneaslywtiicthallaymdiesrtginincgt(cid:151)ofatdhiestisnpchteiorensththaetmdeserilvveess.frTohme
oo democratic theory and the agency inherent in political community(cid:151)and so
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1-241. ntucky sthpahteirtesis. Ionvesrhloaridt,ownhaatnmevaeknesmthoereofvuenrdlaapmoefntfaulnscetipoanrsatiinotner(eWstiilnlgiamissth1e99fa7c)t.
1e Thisisnottosaythatfusionismprovidesnoinsights.Onthecontrary,itisa
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99.2:y of logicalpointofdeparturefordescriptiveempiricalwork,andsomeofthebest
ci. 19versit e1m99p5ir)i.cIatlhwaso,rhkowonevtehre,psurobvjeecntliesssfufsruioitnfiusltf(oBretnheMoreyirde1v9e9l5o,pmTaernrt.& Roman
olit. Sy Uni Civil-MilitaryFriction
Pb
v.
Re Afocusoncivil-militaryconflictcompensatesforthedifficultiesthatattend
u. thecoupandinfluenceDVs.Eveninacoup-freesociety,therearestilllikelyto
n
n
A beepisodesoffrictionandconflict,sothisDVisgeneralizable.Indeed,the
recentrenaissanceofthestudyofAmericancivil-militaryrelationsdiscussed
inthepenultimatesectionofthisessayhasbeentriggeredbytheheightened
acrimony that has characterized the civil-military relationship over the past
fiveorsixyears.Stepan(1988)makesfrictionanintegralpartofhisanalysis
ofBraziliancivil-militaryrelations,callingit(cid:147)militarycontestation,(cid:148)anditis
centraltoBenMeir(cid:146)s(1995)analysisoftheIsraelicaseaswell.Frictioncanbe
measuredasthedegreetowhichthemilitaryiswillingtodisplaypublicoppo-
sitiontoanannouncedcivilianpolicy.Moreover,frictionisnotatrivialcon-