civil-military relations in “islamic democracies”: military intervention & withdrawal in algeria ...

334 Pages·2011·1.2 MB·English

by  Paul Lenze

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN “ISLAMIC DEMOCRACIES”: MILITARY
INTERVENTION & WITHDRAWAL IN ALGERIA, PAKISTAN, & TURKEY

By
PAUL ERNEST LENZE, JR.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
Department of Political Science

MAY 2011

© Copyright by PAUL ERNEST LENZE, JR., 2011
All Rights Reserved
© Copyright by PAUL ERNEST LENZE, JR.
All Rights Reserved
To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of PAUL ERNEST
LENZE, JR. find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

___________________________________
Thomas Preston, Ph.D., Chair

___________________________________
Martha L. Cottam, Ph.D.

___________________________________
David Nice, Ph.D.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who made the completion of this dissertation possible. I would
like to thank my committee, Dr. Tom Preston, Dr. Martha Cottam and Dr. David Nice, for their
mentorship and support throughout my time at WSU. Each tremendous teachers in their own
right, I am better for the 5 ½ years I spent learning from them.
At Washington State University a number of people helped get me through the graduate
school experience and dissertation writing. I want to thank Glen Smith, Joy Smith, Joe Huseby,
Bruno Baltodano, Jeff Rosky, Ryan McMahon, Pete and Sancheen Collins, McKinnon Wilkes,
Stacy Olsen-Wilkes, Andrew Thomas, Anjie Thomas, Liz Wright, Ryan Wright, Jenna Balberg,
Lisa Quick, Hans Lindhardt, Kolleen Horton, Corrinne Johnson, Amber Robinson, Rachel
Brusati, Clare Cady, Christy Crudo, Katie Searles, John Nickerson, Aaron Ley, Kimberly Bari,
Brad Wazaney, Diane Wallman, Liz Bodine, Tasha Kunzi, Jeff Smith, Bethany Works, Micheal
Seraphin and the Sports Page. Thanks to Nick Lovrich for being a great teacher and someone
who was always there to listen and offer advice when needed. Diane Berger and Bonnie Kemper
in the Department of Political Science provided invaluable assistance. A very special thanks to
Michael Infranco, who never failed to offer encouragement and the support I (sometimes) needed
to get this done. Michael, “You’re the Man!”
I spent the last year and a half at the University of San Diego teaching and writing the
bulk of this dissertation. Thank you to Del Dickson for bringing me on and to Noelle Norton for
keeping me around. My students in “International Relations of the Middle East” discussed this
project in its early stages and wrote papers that helped sharpen my arguments and this work is
better as a result. Thanks to Laura Nunn and Kari DeLongpre for their administrative help and
good humor. Santana’s kept me going many a night with their burritos. Since my time as a

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graduate student at USD, Randy Willoughby taught me a great deal and I thank him for his
continued support over the years. Thanks also to Pete Peterson for kindly looking over a draft
and letting me share the office with him. Most importantly, I want to thank Mike Williams.
Mike is a wonderful teacher, mentor, and friend and I would not be where I am today without his
generosity and support.
Finally, this dissertation would not have been completed without the love and support of
my friends in Seattle, Los Angeles, and San Diego—Ross Caldwell, Wil Figueroa, Dan Ball,
Jessica Moore, Joe Mullenix, Jess Farwell, Julie Beard, Justin Hopkins, Sara Hopkins, Cyndi
Salsman, Adriane Stocking, Nisha Marvel, Luke Marvel, Sheena Kriekenbeek, Jeff James,
Padraic Jordan, Justin Taft, Crystal Sturm, Ryan Dobosh, Kelly Conway, Mark Jackson, Eric
Breshears, Jenny Jamin, Gibson and Mary Magill, Eric Green, and Rob Howard. Thank you to
the Lenze, Horan, and Guempel families for their love and support. I owe a special debt to Gene
and Judy Horan & George and Augusta Guempel for giving me a home away from home when I
needed to get out of Pullman. To my cousins Bridget Parkill, Carmen Gray, George Guempel
and John Guempel thank you for all the good times and looking out for me during my “college
years”. Thanks to my sister, Jennifer, and my nephew, Dylan, for their love, support, and always
asking if I was done yet. My greatest debt goes to my parents, Paul & Mary Lenze, who taught
me how life should be lived and whose emotional and fiscal stimulus were always there when I
needed it most. I can now, happily, say that this “paper” is done.


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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN “ISLAMIC DEMOCRACIES”: MILITARY
INTERVENTION & WITHDRAWAL IN ALGERIA, PAKISTAN, & TURKEY
Abstract

by Paul Ernest Lenze, Jr., Ph.D.
Washington State University
May 2011

Chair: Thomas Preston

This dissertation examines civil-military relations in Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey,
specifically how military interventions and withdrawals have occurred in these three states. The
major questions this project seeks to answer are: why do militaries intervene in politics and why
do militaries return to the barracks? These states' militaries use nationalism to justify their
interventions in politics while ensuring that withdrawal only occurs if national identity is
protected. Nationalism, for the Algerian, Pakistani and Turkish militaries, is used to paper over
the ethnic and linguistic differences of regional groups within the state. The use of nationalism
by the military is not used to strengthen the Algerian, Pakistani and Turkish nation-state; instead,
it strengthens the Algerian, Pakistani and Turkish praetorian state.
Using Preston and ‘t Hart’s (1999) bureau-political framework, this study builds upon
Schiff’s (1996; 2009) concordance theory to measure the level of conflict in the civil-military
relationships of Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey. Through a comparison of politicians, the military
and society in these states, this dissertation seeks to build mid-range theory to improve our
understanding of the persistence of military involvement in politics and enduring
authoritarianism in the Middle East and South Asia.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................. iii

ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... v

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

Civil-Military Relations in the Developing
World..…………............................................................................................................ 3

21st Century Nation-Building…………………………………………………………..4

Plan of the Dissertation………………………………………………………………...4

2. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................. 6

Military Withdrawal from Politics…………………………………………………….10

Military Intervention and Withdrawal in the Middle East…………………………….12

Concordance Theory…………………………………………………………………..15

Strengthening Concordance: Bureaupolitics as a Measure……………………………18

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………..23

3. METHODS.........................................................................................................................25

Conceptual Framework and Definitions…………………………………………...…..25

Methods………………………………………………………………………………..29

Design and Structure…………………………………………………………………..30

Selection of Appropriate Cases………………………………………………………..34

Algeria…………………………………………………………………………………35

Pakistan…………………………………………………………………………….......39

Turkey………………………………………………………………………………….43

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General Questions to be Asked………………………………………………………...47

4. CASE STUDY: ALGERIA………………………………………………………………49

Algerian Identity and Nationalism……………………………………………………..50

Algeria Pre-Independence, 1936-1952…………………………………………………54

Algeria’s War of Independence, 1954-1962……………………………………………58

Post-Independence Algeria and Ahmed Ben Bella, 1962-1965………………………...68

Henri Boumedienne, 1965-1978………………………………………………………..76

Chadli Benjedid, 1978-1991………………………………………………………….…82

January 11, 1992 Coup…………………………………………………………………..91

Algerian Civil War, 1993-1998………………………………………………………….95

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...…109

5. CASE STUDY: PAKISTAN……………………………………………………………...111

Pakistani Identiy and Nationalism………………………………………………………112

The Pakistani Army……………………………………………………………………..114

Independent Pakistan, 1947-1958……………………………………………………….115

Ayub Khan, 1958-1969………………………………………………………………….132

Yahya Khan, 1969-1971…………………………………………………………………140

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971-1977………………………………………………………….149

Zia ul-Haq, 1977-1988…………………………………………………………………...159

The “Democratic Period”, 1988-1999…………………………………………………....169

Pervez Musharraf, 1999-2008……………………………………………………………185

Asif Ali Zardari, 2008-Present…………………………………………………………...193

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..195

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6. CASE STUDY: TURKEY…………………………………………………………………197

Founding of the Turkish Republic and Kemalism……………………………………….198

Turkish Military in Society………………………………………………………………204

One Party Rule: The Republican People’s Party, 1925-1945……………………………211

Turkey After Ataturk: Multi-Party Politics, 1945-1960………………………………….216

The Transitition to Democracy, 1945-1950………………………………………..216

The Democrat Government and the Army, 1950-1960…………………………….221

The 1960 Coup and Interim Rule, 1960-1961……………………………………………226

1971 Coup by Memorandum……………………………………………………………..241

1980 Coup………………………………………………………………………………..249

The Third Turkish Republic, 1983-1997…………………………………………………259

1997 Coup by Memorandum…………………………………………………………….275

Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Military, 2002-Present………………….280

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..289

7. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………...292

Comparing Military Interventions and Withdrawals……………………………………..292

Relationships Among the Variables……………………………………………………...311

Implications for Theory…………………………………………………………...……...313

Implications for Further Research………………………………………………………..316

Implications for Applicability……………………………………………………………317

BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................319

APPENDIX………………………………………………………………………………….….325
Alexander George Codebook of Military Interventions and Withdrawals

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The same causes which produce military intervention in politics…lie not in the
nature of the group but in the structure of society. In particular, they lie in the
absence or weakness of effective political institutions in the society.—Samuel P.
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968, 195-6)

Huntington’s view that the political systems of a society best account for military intervention
appears to hold water. But that may not present the full picture. Many countries stumble on
their way to nationhood and stable polities without fully developed political systems. So, it may
well be the interaction of military and political leaders and their respective ambitions and
inclinations that account for some of these interventions.—Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords:
Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (2008, 139 [emphasis mine])

The clock strikes 4 AM. Over the radio a codeword is transmitted. Upon hearing this
signal, 2 armored brigades and 1 infantry brigade move out from their barracks just outside the
city limits. Within minutes troops have cordoned off the capital and the state’s two other major
cities, surrounding the state television, radio station, airport and major roads. Troops then moved
toward the offices of the two main political parties and the residences of the party leaders and
prime minister. The junta—consisting of the Chief of the General Staff, various generals, and a
handful of field-rank officers fanned out to key government offices, the television and radio
stations.
At this point, the junta announces over the air that they have overthrown the government
for excessive corruption and conduct threatening the “security” of the state. Over the next few
weeks, the junta establishes connections with bureaucrats within the massive state bureaucracy,
as well as with compliant politicians from one, or possibly both, political parties. In fact, one of
the ultra-conservative members of the junta reaches out to a friend in a far right (read: Islamist)
party to curry favor essentially to allow this party the opportunity to oppose the operation. This

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