CIA and the House of Ngo

228 Pages·2009·13.15 MB·English

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DedicationD
Tothe Memory ofGordon JOrgensen,
Friend, Mentor,Patriot, and Transcendently HonestMan
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Till
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AcknowledgmentsD
Without Ken McDonald's willingness to take a chance on a beginner, I
would nothave been privileged toundertake thisproject. Without his gently
guided on-the-job tour ofhistoriographical technique, the product would not
havewhatever meritmaybefoundinit.Itisextraordinarily gratifyingtohave
theassistance ofaneditorwhoseassiduousattentiontobothformandcontent
isalwaysaimedathelpingtheauthorwrite,nottheeditor'sbook,buthisOWll.
Allerrorsarestillminealone.D
All my other History Staff colleagues were also generous with their time,
andIamgrateful fortheircorrections andsuggestions.loweformerEditorial
Assistant Diane Marvinparticular thanksforhavingvolunteered toretype the
entire draftwhenitprovedimpossibletoconverttheoriginal versiontoanew
softwareformat, anefforttrulyaboveandbeyondthecau.D
Finally,thereisthedebttomyinterviewsubjects,someofwhom,likePaul
Harwood,JoeRedick,andLouConein,underwentrepeatedinterrogation with
unfailing equanimity and intDerest in helping me fill in the blanks. Toall of
them, myenduring gratitude.
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ContentsD
D ...
Dedi'cati.on 111
AcknowledgmentsD v
0
Foreword xi
Chapter1:AnticolonialismversusAnticommunismD 1
Chapter2:PatronsandClientsD 9
Chapter3:FillingtheVOidD 21
Chapter4: BringingtheArmiestoHeeiD 37
Chapter5:RuralPacificationandtheSectCrisisD 59
Chapter6:LeverageinWashingtoID:-: 75
Chapter7:DemocracyorAutocracy?U 87
B.e~t~f B~gai8
Chapter8:Makingthe the 101
Chapter9: AMoreQualifiedComnulmen 111
Chapter10:DividedCounselsD 129
Chapter 11:"People'sWar"D " 145
Chapter 12:"ThisCoupisFinished'D 163
Chapter13:PassiveEngagemenO 185
Chapter 14:ExecutionD 201
Chapter15:ADoomedExperimenD 217
CommentonSourcesD 225
fndeD · 227
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ForewordD
After the partition of Vietnam with the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the
Eisenhower administration began to directly support the government in the
South headed byNgo DinhDiem. President Eisenhower, in aletter to Diem,
promised to help Diem maintain a "strong, viable state capable ofresisting
outside aggression." Armed withthissupport,inJuly 1954,Diem rejectedthe
reunification elections provided for in the Geneva Agreements and declared
South Vietnamarepublic withhimselfaspresident. The CIA, although pessi
misticabout establishing astable,civilianregimeinSouthVietnam, neverthe
lesssetaboutassistingDiemincreating anewstate.ThisisthestoryofCIA's
effortsanditsrelationship withDiemandhisbrother NgoDinh Nhu[]
Based on a thorough examination of CIA's records and on in-depth inter
viewsofkeyparticipants, Thomas Ahem presents anauthoritative review and
assessment ofCIA's evolving relationship withDiem, first as he struggled to
consolidate his power and then as his increasingly authoritative regime fal
tered and collapsed when the South Vietnamese military seized power in a
coup favored by the,.lini.fed States. The military generals assassinated Diem
andhisbrotherNhu.U . .
This ultimatelytragicdramaisfollowedindetail byAhem ashetracesCIA
efforts to bring stability and democracy to South Vietnam and to influence
Diem. Although not uncritical of US policy and CIA operations, Ahern's
study revealsaCIA Station-indeed in theearly years, two Stations-work
ing diligently andeffectively toaid Diem informing aviable state. That this
effort to build a modern nation state failed greatly frustrated CIA officers.
Nevertheless,theCIAcontinued itseffortstoinfluence andshapepolicies and
programsinSouthVietnamlongafterDiem'sdeath.D
This thoughtful study isthefirst volumeinThomas Ahern's larger work of
CIA'sroleinSouth Vietnamfrom 1954to 1975.The second volume, CIAand
the Generals: CovertSupport to Military Government in Suuth Vietnamwas
published in 1999,and the third volume, The CIA and Rural Pacification in
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South Vietnam,willalsobeforthcoming inthe year2000.Togetherthese vol
umes provide a comprehensive review ofCIA programs and reporting from
Vietnam·D
GeraldK.Haines
ChiefHistorian
CIAHistoryStaff
CenterfortheStudy ofIntelligence
June2000
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orthand South Vietnam, 1954-1963
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CHAPTER 1
Anticolonialism versusAnticommunismD
The VietMinh destroyed colonial ruleinIndochinawhen theydefeated the
French atDienBienPhuon7May 1954.1NegotiationsbeginninginGenevaa
day later led in July to an agreement signed by France, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union, CommunistChina, and the three Associated States of Indoch
ina, including Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic ofVietnam. The United
States agreed torespect theGeneva Accords, but, unhappy withtheprovision
for thetemporary divisionofVietnam atthe 17thparallel, refused tosign. Bao
Dai, the puppet emperor of the French, remained in Cannes, and his new
prime minister, NgoDDinh Diem, hadplayed noroleinthewaror inthenego
tiations thatended it.2
AstheCold Wardeepened,'andespeciallyafter theoutbreakoftheKorean
war in June 1950, the United States had given the French massive material
support in their war against the Viet Minh. Now, with the Geneva Accords
going into effect, Washington faced thepainfulchoiceof either accepting the
extension of Ho Chi Minh's authority throughout Vietnam or picking up the
French burdenofresistancetotheVietMinh.The decision, hesitantandincre
mental, wastobackDiemandtopY10createanindependent,anti-Communist
U
nation southofthe 17thparallel.
ITheterm"VietMinh"isanabbreviationforVietNamDocLapDongMinh-theVietnamInde
pendenceLeague-thenationalfrontcreatedbyHoChiMinhin1941toresisttheJapaneseoccu
pation and the Vichy French colonial regime that collaborated with it. South.Vietnam as a
separate,provisionalentitycameintoexistenceasaresultoftheGenevaAccords.Theothertwo
AssociatedStates,whichtogetherwithVietnammadeupFrenchIndochina,wereCambodiaand
Laos.Underthetermsoftheceasefire, theDemocratic RepublicofVietnam(DRV)wastotake
control of all Vlernarnese.jerritory north of the 17th parallel, while the French Expeditionary
COI1).~retiredtothesouthU
2This introduction reliesonStanley Karnow,Vietnam:A History (NewYork:Penguin Books,
1984);George MeT.Kahin, Intervention: How AmericaBecame bIValvedin Vietnam(Garden
City,NY:AnchorBooks,1987);andGeorgeHerring,America'sLoneSITar: TheUnitedStates
lind Vietllam,1950-1975,2"dcd.(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1986)
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I
There wasgoodreason forAmericanleaderstohesitate,beginningwiththe
absenceofanyeffectiveopposition totheVietMinh.Therewerefewillusions
inWashington, either about Diem'spolitical stature orabout thecohesion or
determination ofthe anti-Communistclements in the South. On the military
side, the humiliation of the French confirmed theperils ofaland war onthe
Asian mainland for aWestern power,perilsonly recently emphasized by.the
stalemate in Korea. From theoutset in 1954,some US policymakers warned
thatmaterial support toDiemmightleadtoaninconclusiveorevendisastrous
0
commitmentofAmericangroundforces.
Iftherewerereasonstohesitate, therewerealsopowerfulincentivesforthe
United States to deny the legitimacy of the Communist regime in the North
andresist itsanticipated drivetoabsorbtheSouth. Anapocalyptic butwidely
accepted version of the domino theory held thatthe lossof Indochina would
invite Communist advances along the entire line from Japan to the Suez
Canal.3Domestic political considerations alsointensified thepressure toact.
The "who lostChina?" debate anditsexploitation bySenator JosephMcCar
thyinhibitedconsiderationofthepossibilitythatthejob couldnotbedone,or
at least notat anacceptable cost.The famousArmy-McCarthy hearings were
going onasthebattleofDienBienPhucametoaclose.D
Administration acceptance of the Geneva Accords would risk political
embarrassment as well as acquiescence in the probable Communization of
Vietnam. At the instigation of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; the US
had committed $400million to the French in late 1953to persuade them to
stay the course in Indochina. Toabandon theanti-CommunistSouthonly six
months later would call into question the wisdom of that investment. In the
end, the importance of halting the spread of Communism overshadowed the
risks, and the United States embarked onits 21-yearefforttocreate ins[ou,
Vietnamapermanent barriertoCommunist expansioninSoutheastAsia.
TheOriginofUSEllgagemelltD
,The USdecisiontoreplace theFrenchastheguarantorofanon-Communist
Vietnam represented the end of a tortuous path that first ran in the opposite
direction. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's generic hostility to,European
colonialismandspecific antipathy forCharlesdeGaulleledhim,duringearly
planning for the postwar period, to suggest a United Nations trusteeship for
Indochina. Helaterretreated fromthis,partlytoavoidfurtherdemoralizing an
already prostrate France, andpartly toavoidweakeningthebasisforretaining
, Infact,Indochinawasthefocusofthef~eofthedominoimage,atapressconferenceheld
byPresidentEisenhower0117April1954U
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