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CIA and the House of Ngo PDF

228 Pages·2009·13.15 MB·English
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C01268718 UNCLASSIFIED APPROVED FOR RELEASEnDATE: 19-Feb-2009 (b)(1) (b)(3) o C01268718 UNCLASSIFIED (b)(1) (b)(3) National Security UnauthorizedDisclosure Information SubjecttoCriminalSanctions Copyright This papercontains material thatissubject Restrictions tocopyrightand therefore should notbecopied, inwholeorpart, withoutpermission. I CopiesofthisdocumentareavailablefromCSI. Allstatements of fact, opinion, or analysisexpressedIn this study are thoseoftheauthors.They-denotnecessarilyreDect officialpositionsorviewsoftheCentral IntelligenceAgencyor any otherUSGovernment entity,past or present. NothingIn thecontents should beconstrued asasserting or implyingUS Government endorsement of an article's factual statements ,. andinterpretations. ;. PrintedbyPrinting&-Pholoc,aphyGroup UNCLASSIFIED C01268718 UNCLASSIFIED DedicationD Tothe Memory ofGordon JOrgensen, Friend, Mentor,Patriot, and Transcendently HonestMan SErl~TlfXl Till UNCLASSIFIED C01268718 UNCLASSIFIED •••••_ , ': ~, ~·._':"••.•_._":;'":_••_M·••:.· _."•.•••._ "._••.••.••.• AcknowledgmentsD Without Ken McDonald's willingness to take a chance on a beginner, I would nothave been privileged toundertake thisproject. Without his gently guided on-the-job tour ofhistoriographical technique, the product would not havewhatever meritmaybefoundinit.Itisextraordinarily gratifyingtohave theassistance ofaneditorwhoseassiduousattentiontobothformandcontent isalwaysaimedathelpingtheauthorwrite,nottheeditor'sbook,buthisOWll. Allerrorsarestillminealone.D All my other History Staff colleagues were also generous with their time, andIamgrateful fortheircorrections andsuggestions.loweformerEditorial Assistant Diane Marvinparticular thanksforhavingvolunteered toretype the entire draftwhenitprovedimpossibletoconverttheoriginal versiontoanew softwareformat, anefforttrulyaboveandbeyondthecau.D Finally,thereisthedebttomyinterviewsubjects,someofwhom,likePaul Harwood,JoeRedick,andLouConein,underwentrepeatedinterrogation with unfailing equanimity and intDerest in helping me fill in the blanks. Toall of them, myenduring gratitude. __________________----J C01268718 UNCLASSIFIED ContentsD D ... Dedi'cati.on 111 AcknowledgmentsD v 0 Foreword xi Chapter1:AnticolonialismversusAnticommunismD 1 Chapter2:PatronsandClientsD 9 Chapter3:FillingtheVOidD 21 Chapter4: BringingtheArmiestoHeeiD 37 Chapter5:RuralPacificationandtheSectCrisisD 59 Chapter6:LeverageinWashingtoID:-: 75 Chapter7:DemocracyorAutocracy?U 87 B.e~t~f B~gai8 Chapter8:Makingthe the 101 Chapter9: AMoreQualifiedComnulmen 111 Chapter10:DividedCounselsD 129 Chapter 11:"People'sWar"D " 145 Chapter 12:"ThisCoupisFinished'D 163 Chapter13:PassiveEngagemenO 185 Chapter 14:ExecutionD 201 Chapter15:ADoomedExperimenD 217 CommentonSourcesD 225 fndeD · 227 (~TIIXI r: SE UNCLASSIFIED C01268718 UNCLASSIFIED ForewordD After the partition of Vietnam with the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the Eisenhower administration began to directly support the government in the South headed byNgo DinhDiem. President Eisenhower, in aletter to Diem, promised to help Diem maintain a "strong, viable state capable ofresisting outside aggression." Armed withthissupport,inJuly 1954,Diem rejectedthe reunification elections provided for in the Geneva Agreements and declared South Vietnamarepublic withhimselfaspresident. The CIA, although pessi misticabout establishing astable,civilianregimeinSouthVietnam, neverthe lesssetaboutassistingDiemincreating anewstate.ThisisthestoryofCIA's effortsanditsrelationship withDiemandhisbrother NgoDinh Nhu[] Based on a thorough examination of CIA's records and on in-depth inter viewsofkeyparticipants, Thomas Ahem presents anauthoritative review and assessment ofCIA's evolving relationship withDiem, first as he struggled to consolidate his power and then as his increasingly authoritative regime fal tered and collapsed when the South Vietnamese military seized power in a coup favored by the,.lini.fed States. The military generals assassinated Diem andhisbrotherNhu.U . . This ultimatelytragicdramaisfollowedindetail byAhem ashetracesCIA efforts to bring stability and democracy to South Vietnam and to influence Diem. Although not uncritical of US policy and CIA operations, Ahern's study revealsaCIA Station-indeed in theearly years, two Stations-work ing diligently andeffectively toaid Diem informing aviable state. That this effort to build a modern nation state failed greatly frustrated CIA officers. Nevertheless,theCIAcontinued itseffortstoinfluence andshapepolicies and programsinSouthVietnamlongafterDiem'sdeath.D This thoughtful study isthefirst volumeinThomas Ahern's larger work of CIA'sroleinSouth Vietnamfrom 1954to 1975.The second volume, CIAand the Generals: CovertSupport to Military Government in Suuth Vietnamwas published in 1999,and the third volume, The CIA and Rural Pacification in SEtcL:T/fXl UNCLASSIFIED C01268718 S~ASSIFIED South Vietnam,willalsobeforthcoming inthe year2000.Togetherthese vol umes provide a comprehensive review ofCIA programs and reporting from Vietnam·D GeraldK.Haines ChiefHistorian CIAHistoryStaff CenterfortheStudy ofIntelligence June2000 UNCLASSIFIED C01268718 UNCLASSIFIED orthand South Vietnam, 1954-1963 THAILAND OU(/I (l1n o 50 100Jt-.o I o 50 100" I., 143104 SE(,{~T/fXl !~I UNCLASSIFIED C01268718 UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER 1 Anticolonialism versusAnticommunismD The VietMinh destroyed colonial ruleinIndochinawhen theydefeated the French atDienBienPhuon7May 1954.1NegotiationsbeginninginGenevaa day later led in July to an agreement signed by France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, CommunistChina, and the three Associated States of Indoch ina, including Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic ofVietnam. The United States agreed torespect theGeneva Accords, but, unhappy withtheprovision for thetemporary divisionofVietnam atthe 17thparallel, refused tosign. Bao Dai, the puppet emperor of the French, remained in Cannes, and his new prime minister, NgoDDinh Diem, hadplayed noroleinthewaror inthenego tiations thatended it.2 AstheCold Wardeepened,'andespeciallyafter theoutbreakoftheKorean war in June 1950, the United States had given the French massive material support in their war against the Viet Minh. Now, with the Geneva Accords going into effect, Washington faced thepainfulchoiceof either accepting the extension of Ho Chi Minh's authority throughout Vietnam or picking up the French burdenofresistancetotheVietMinh.The decision, hesitantandincre mental, wastobackDiemandtopY10createanindependent,anti-Communist U nation southofthe 17thparallel. ITheterm"VietMinh"isanabbreviationforVietNamDocLapDongMinh-theVietnamInde pendenceLeague-thenationalfrontcreatedbyHoChiMinhin1941toresisttheJapaneseoccu pation and the Vichy French colonial regime that collaborated with it. South.Vietnam as a separate,provisionalentitycameintoexistenceasaresultoftheGenevaAccords.Theothertwo AssociatedStates,whichtogetherwithVietnammadeupFrenchIndochina,wereCambodiaand Laos.Underthetermsoftheceasefire, theDemocratic RepublicofVietnam(DRV)wastotake control of all Vlernarnese.jerritory north of the 17th parallel, while the French Expeditionary COI1).~retiredtothesouthU 2This introduction reliesonStanley Karnow,Vietnam:A History (NewYork:Penguin Books, 1984);George MeT.Kahin, Intervention: How AmericaBecame bIValvedin Vietnam(Garden City,NY:AnchorBooks,1987);andGeorgeHerring,America'sLoneSITar: TheUnitedStates lind Vietllam,1950-1975,2"dcd.(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1986) SECfllJ(j UNCLASSIFIED C01268718 S~ASSIFIED I There wasgoodreason forAmericanleaderstohesitate,beginningwiththe absenceofanyeffectiveopposition totheVietMinh.Therewerefewillusions inWashington, either about Diem'spolitical stature orabout thecohesion or determination ofthe anti-Communistclements in the South. On the military side, the humiliation of the French confirmed theperils ofaland war onthe Asian mainland for aWestern power,perilsonly recently emphasized by.the stalemate in Korea. From theoutset in 1954,some US policymakers warned thatmaterial support toDiemmightleadtoaninconclusiveorevendisastrous 0 commitmentofAmericangroundforces. Iftherewerereasonstohesitate, therewerealsopowerfulincentivesforthe United States to deny the legitimacy of the Communist regime in the North andresist itsanticipated drivetoabsorbtheSouth. Anapocalyptic butwidely accepted version of the domino theory held thatthe lossof Indochina would invite Communist advances along the entire line from Japan to the Suez Canal.3Domestic political considerations alsointensified thepressure toact. The "who lostChina?" debate anditsexploitation bySenator JosephMcCar thyinhibitedconsiderationofthepossibilitythatthejob couldnotbedone,or at least notat anacceptable cost.The famousArmy-McCarthy hearings were going onasthebattleofDienBienPhucametoaclose.D Administration acceptance of the Geneva Accords would risk political embarrassment as well as acquiescence in the probable Communization of Vietnam. At the instigation of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; the US had committed $400million to the French in late 1953to persuade them to stay the course in Indochina. Toabandon theanti-CommunistSouthonly six months later would call into question the wisdom of that investment. In the end, the importance of halting the spread of Communism overshadowed the risks, and the United States embarked onits 21-yearefforttocreate ins[ou, Vietnamapermanent barriertoCommunist expansioninSoutheastAsia. TheOriginofUSEllgagemelltD ,The USdecisiontoreplace theFrenchastheguarantorofanon-Communist Vietnam represented the end of a tortuous path that first ran in the opposite direction. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's generic hostility to,European colonialismandspecific antipathy forCharlesdeGaulleledhim,duringearly planning for the postwar period, to suggest a United Nations trusteeship for Indochina. Helaterretreated fromthis,partlytoavoidfurtherdemoralizing an already prostrate France, andpartly toavoidweakeningthebasisforretaining , Infact,Indochinawasthefocusofthef~eofthedominoimage,atapressconferenceheld byPresidentEisenhower0117April1954U UNCLASSIFIED

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This thoughtful study is the first volume in Thomas Ahern's larger work of .. Americans at first called Free Vietnam, there existed neither a sense of nation- Anderton's subordinates thought it was the other way around, that the
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