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C Chinese Lessons from h i n Other Peoples’ Wars e s e L e s s o n Editors: s Andrew Scobell f r David Lai o Roy Kamphausen m O t h e r P U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE e o p l e s ’ W a r s ARE nod dyit re Kor was R DmAE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE oScapnd yovhdit Kbeidaureor amll Lsews: phain, D Sco Visit our website for other free publication a ab downloads u vie se d ll http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website n L a i To rate this publication click here. Strategic Studies Institute Book CHINESE LESSONS FROM OTHER PEOPLES’ WARS Andrew Scobell David Lai Roy Kamphausen Editors November 2011 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the De- partment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or mis- represent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empow- ers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sec- tions 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copy- righted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 632 Wright Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing an order on the SSI website. The SSI website address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute. army.mil/newsletter/. ISBN 1-58487-511-9 ii CONTENTS Foreword ........................................................................v 1. Introduction .............................................................1 Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen 2. P eople’s Liberation Army Lessons from Foreign Conflicts: The Air War in Kosovo..........33 June Teufel Dreyer 3. S inica Rules the Waves? The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Power Projection and Anti-Access/ Area Denial Lessons from the Falklands/ Malvinas Conflict ..................................................75 Christopher D. Yung 4. The People’s Liberation Army’s Selective Learning: Lessons of the Iran-Iraq “War of the Cities” Missile Duels and Uses of Missiles in Other Conflicts ................................................115 Christopher Twomey 5. Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars ...............153 Dean Cheng 6. The People’s Liberation Army Lessons Learned from Recent Pacific Command Operations and Contingencies .............................................. 201 Frank Miller 7. The Influence of U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan on the People’s Liberation Army .................................................237 Martin Andrew iii 8. Learning from the Neighbors: The People’s Liberation Army Examines the Small Wars and Counterinsurgencies Waged by Russia ..............................................................277 Yu Bin 9. About the Contributors ......................................321 iv FOREWORD I am delighted to introduce this 2011 publication by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), and the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), which focus- es on the lessons learned by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from the experiences of non-Chinese armed forces during the previous 30 years. The papers contained in this volume could not be more timely or valuable to policymakers and scholars alike. Throughout my career, and currently as the USPA- COM Commander, I have consistently sought a solid and relevant understanding of China, and the PLA in particular. The importance of China stems not only from its current international role and its influence on the Asia-Pacific region in particular, but also because China’s impact on global developments will likely continue to grow. One of our enduring imperatives, therefore, is to accurately survey China’s experiences as a means to grasp its existing perceptions, motiva- tions, and ambitions. More than ever, solid, evidence- based scholarship that evaluates what the PLA has learned from the use of force and conflict elsewhere in the world is needed to shed light on the prospects for its cooperation, or rivalry, with the international community. This jointly sponsored study by SSI, NBR, and USPACOM is an important contribution toward this end. The judgments associated with the PLA Con- ference in October 2010, and this volume, provide unique, valuable insights on how the PLA has applied the lessons learned from others’ military actions to its own strategic planning. For example, the PLA rapidly oriented itself to the importance of airpower, com- v mand and control, and precision munitions from the U.S. experience in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Of equal significance are the lessons learned by China’s armed forces that now apply to its new non-traditional military roles; such as the best practices to address all-hazard disasters and common transnational threats of piracy and terrorism. The expertise and scholarly analysis provided by SSI and NBR inform the decisions that affect our operations and approach throughout the Asia-Pacific region. I commend both organizations for their com- mitment to excellence with the presentation of the annual PLA Conference and the resulting conference volumes. Chinese Lessons from Other People’s Wars is an essential source for those seeking to understand China’s strategic judgment and calculus, and will help prepare us to address the challenges and opportuni- ties that lie ahead. ROBERT F. WILLARD Admiral, USN Commander, U.S. Pacific Command vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Andrew Scobell David Lai Roy Kamphausen The annual Conference on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took place at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on October 22-24, 2010.1 The topic for this year’s conference was the “PLA’s lessons from Other People’s Wars.” Participants at the conference sought to discern what lessons the PLA has been learning from the strategic and operational experiences of the armed forces of other countries during the past 3 decades. Why did observers of the PLA want to study what Chinese military analysts might learned about non- Chinese wars? The answer is twofold. First, the PLA has not fought an actual war since 1979. Yet, during the last 3 decades, fundamental changes have taken place on the battlefield and in the conduct of war. Since the PLA has not fought since 1979, it had no experience in the changing face of war, and thus could not follow Mao Zedong’s admonition to “learn by doing (在战争中学习战争)”; instead, it must look abroad for ways to discern the new pattern of warfare in the evolving information age. Studying Chinese military analysts’ observations of non-Chinese wars therefore provides us a glimpse of what the PLA takes from others’ experience to improve its capability and to prepare itself for dealing with China’s national security issues, such as Taiwan, the South and East China Sea disputes, and 1 internal unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, to name the most obvious ones. Second, Chinese military analysts have noticeably more freedom in assessing and commenting on the strength and weakness as well as the success and failures of other countries’ wars. Indeed, for political rea- sons, Chinese military analysts have to emphasize the heroics and triumphs of the PLA’s war experience and downplay setbacks and failures.2 While there is cer- tainly recognition of the daunting challenges—in Ko- rea, for example, accounts readily acknowledge that the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) were totally unprepared logistically and devastated by airpower— there are limits to the levels of candor. To date, there is no critical analysis of the PLA’s claimed success or dismissed failure in the Sino-Vietnamese Border War of 1979 by Chinese military analysts (however, there are a few studies done by scholars outside of China3). Studying Chinese military analysts’ observation of other people’s wars, therefore, provide us key hints as to what Chinese military analysts consider important aspects of current and future military operational success and failure. CHINESE MILITARY OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS In more than 80 years since becoming a formidable political and military force in China, the Chinese Com- munist Party (CCP) and the PLA (first as the guerrilla Red Army during the First [Kuomintang (KMT or the Nationalist Party]-CCP Civil War [第一次国共内战] of 1927-37, then as a “semi-professional” branch of the KMT-CCP anti-Japanese coalition, the 8th Route [八路军] and New 4th Armies [新四军], the PLA during 2 the Second KMT-CCP Civil War [第二次国共内战] of 1946-49, and finally a standing military of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have survived a tremendous amount of military conflict. Their experience spans from guerrilla warfare to large-scale campaigns and fighting against foreign armed forces in the Korean War of 1950-53, the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the Sino-Soviet border skirmishes of 1969, the Sino- Vietnamese naval battles of 1974, and the Sino-Viet- namese border war of 1979 (there were also naval skirmishes with Vietnam in 1988 and with the Philippines in 1994 over the Spratly Islands).4 In addition, the PLA has been employed domes- tically to deal with widespread civil unrest, protests, riots, and rebellions.5 Recently, the PLA has adopted a more serious and systematic approach to noncombat missions. As a result, Chinese military doctrine has evolved to include the concept of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). What this has meant is that, whereas in the past, nonwar missions were part and parcel of the military’s job, these operations are now becoming formally integrated into PLA doctrine.6 Nevertheless, PLA leaders are quick to stress that the military’s “core mission” remains warfighting.7 The richest PLA operational legacy is in land warfare—there is an extensive record to reflect upon. Some important lessons were learned, including the importance of concentrating forces for an attack, the value of massed firepower, and seizing and maintain- ing the initiative.8 Yet, some lessons do not appear to have been learned or perhaps they were learned but then promptly forgotten. For example, one major lesson of the Korean War concerns the importance of logis- 3