China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment

422 Pages·2016·3.81 MB·English

by  Swaine M.

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ALLIANCE IN 2030
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a strategic net assessment
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I H MICHAEL D. SWAINE | MIKE M. MOCHIZUKI
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DOUGLAS H. PAAL | RACHEL ESPLIN ODELL
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RAYMOND LU | OLIVER PALMER | XU REN
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AdvAnce PrAise
“The Asia century is well under way, and with it the emerging challenges of
a region in transition…. Any sound future policy will require a thorough
assessment of China’s evolving military and foreign security capabilities and of
the capacity and willingness of Tokyo and Washington to sustain their historic cooperation.
There are no guarantees that the future will resemble the recent past, and the best
approaches for continued deterrence credibility and regional stability will require careful
consideration and thoughtful analysis.
To this end, the Carnegie Endowment has offered up an extraordinary contribution:
China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment. The future
security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region may very well be defined by the content of
this assessment. But one thing is certain: the United States and Japan must recognize that
in the future, status quo thinking is unlikely to guarantee a stable security environment that
serves the long-term interests of the bilateral relationship or the region.”
—Governor Jon Huntsman Jr.,
former ambassador to CHina and former Governor of utaH
“Michael Swaine and his co-authors have done an admirable job of thinking
through the complex interactions of the U.S.-Japan-China relationship in
the future. Using scenarios and trend projections, they go beyond simple
predictions to examine the complex interactions of different developments and reactions
among the three countries and different groups within them. While I do not agree
with specific military and policy judgments in all the scenarios, I strongly endorse the
effort to examine potential developments along with likely and possible reactions and
counterreactions. The triangular interactive relations among these great Asian powers will
determine both the overall future of the region and much of the futures of each of the
individual countries.”
—admiral dennis blair (u.s. navy, retired),
former direCtor of national intelliGenCe
and former Commander of tHe u.s. PaCifiC Command
“The U.S.-Japan alliance has long been crucial to the military balance in the
Western Pacific. The balance of power in the region is now shifting toward
China, and tensions between Asian states are rising concomitantly. Current
trends suggest that the United States and Japan will not find it easy to sustain immunity
from coercion as they seek to preserve stability, secure their national interests, and manage
crises in the region over the coming years. This study is a remarkably timely, thoughtful,
and meticulous examination of the drivers and choices the allies will face through 2030. It
illuminates probable shifts in the strategic landscape of northeast Asia, their consequences,
CHINA’S MILITARY & THE U.S.-JAPAN
and the policy and resource allocation choices they pose. In this strategic net assessment,
the scholars Carnegie assembled have given decisionmakers in Tokyo and Washington a
ALLIANCE IN 2030
uniquely insightful and thought-provoking policy-planning tool.”
—ambassador CHas W. freeman Jr. (u.s. foreiGn serviCe, retired), a strategic net assessment
former assistant seCretary of defense
MICHAEL D. SWAINE | MIKE M. MOCHIZUKI
MICHAEL L. BROWN | PAUL S. GIARRA
“There is nothing out there like this—a very important piece of work…. This is an
DOUGLAS H. PAAL | RACHEL ESPLIN ODELL
elegantly framed study that systematically assesses the postures of China, Japan, RAYMOND LU | OLIVER PALMER | XU REN
and the United States and treats the dynamics between them. Obviously, this
is tough to execute, but the authors have done an outstanding job. The report addresses a
critical subject and offers empirically based suggestions…. There is nothing like it in terms
of looking at the interactions between states to produce a set of possible future regional
dynamics.”
—eriC HeGinbotHam,
senior PolitiCal sCientist at tHe rand CorPoration
CHINA’S MILITARY & THE U.S.-JAPAN
ALLIANCE IN 2030
a strategic net assessment
MICHAEL D. SWAINE | MIKE M. MOCHIZUKI
MICHAEL L. BROWN | PAUL S. GIARRA
DOUGLAS H. PAAL | RACHEL ESPLIN ODELL
RAYMOND LU | OLIVER PALMER | XU REN
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace © 2013
All rights reserved
The Carnegie Endowment does not take institutional positions on public
policy issues; the views represented here are the authors’ own and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or its trustees.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or
by any means without written permission from the Carnegie Endowment.
Please direct inquiries to:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
CarnegieEndowment.org
For electronic copies of this report, visit:
CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs
cOnTenTs
List of Tables and Figures vii
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
List of Acronyms xv
Summary xix
1
The NeT AssessmeNT ApproAch 1
2
chINA 31
3
JApAN 107
4
The uNITed sTATes 175
5
AlTerNATIve securITy sceNArIos IN 2030 235
v
6
ImplIcATIoNs ANd possIble AllIANce respoNses 287
Notes 311
Index 373
Contributors 393
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 395
vi
lisT Of
TAbles And figures
TAbles
Table 2.1
2011 Chinese Military Expenditure (in billions of nominal U.S. dollars) 69
Table 2.2
2010 Chinese Military Expenditure (in billions of U.S. dollars) 69
Table 2.3
Possible Trajectories for China Through 2030 89
Table 3.1
Japanese Self-Defense Force Structure, 2010 127
Table 3.2
Possible Trajectories for Japan Through 2030 149
Table 4.1
Possible Trajectories for the United States Through 2030 217
Table 5.1
Alternative Scenarios in the China–United States–Japan Security Relationship in 2030 237
Table 6.1
Three Possible Responses for the U.S.-Japan Alliance 292
vii
FIGures
Figure 1.1
Analytical Approach for Chapters 2, 3, and 4 (Individual Country Chapters) 26
Figure 1.2
Analytical Approach for Chapter 5 (Alternative Security Scenarios in 2030) 28
Figure 2.1
Chinese GDP Growth From 1980–2011 and GDP Growth Forecasts for 2012–2030 66
Figure 2.2
Chinese Defense Budget in Relation to GDP and Government Expenditure,
1995–2010 68
Figure 2.3
Frequency of Collective Public Security Incidents in China, 1993–2009 75
Figure 2.4
Chinese Public Opinion Toward Japan, 2005–2012 85
Figure 2.5
Chinese Public Opinion Toward the United States, 2006–2012 87
Figure 3.1
Japanese Public’s Sense of Affinity With China, 1986–2012 117
Figure 3.2
Japanese Public’s Views of Japan–China Relations, 1986–2012 118
Figure 3.3
Japanese Trade With Select Economies, 1995–2011 138
Figure 3.4
Japanese Exports to Select Economies, 1995–2011 139
Figure 3.5
FDI to China From Select Economies, 2001–2012 140
Figure 3.6
Japanese Defense Expenditure, 1988–2010 142
Figure 4.1
U.S. Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP, 1988–2010 205
Figure 4.2
U.S. Public Opinion Toward China, 2007–2012 212
Figure 4.3
U.S. Public’s Views of China as Partner, Competitor, or Enemy, 2012 213
Figure 4.4
U.S. Public’s Views of Chinese Economic vs. Military Strength, 2012 214
viii
PrefAce
The emergence of the People’s Republic of China as an increasingly significant military
power in the Western Pacific presents major implications for Japan, the U.S.-Japan
alliance, and regional security. Most notably, China’s acquisition of so-called anti-
access/area denial-type capabilities—centered on ballistic and cruise missiles, increasingly
capable air forces, submarines and surface combatants, long-range radars and sophisticated
C4ISR networks, and other types of offshore weapons systems—combined with its growing
military and paramilitary presence along the East Asian littoral and beyond, is providing
Beijing with a greater capacity to influence the security environment in this vital region of
the world. In fact, China’s increasing influence abroad is converging with rising levels of
nationalism at home to produce more strident domestic arguments in favor of using this
growing military capacity to advance Chinese security interests overseas.
These developments pose a challenge to U.S. and Japanese security interests for several
reasons. First, and most notably, they cast doubt on the ability of Japan and the United
States to operate freely and, if necessary, to prevail in future disputes with Beijing over a
variety of contentious national security issues, from maritime territorial and resource rival-
ries to the handling of crises over Taiwan or North Korea. Second, on a broader level, the
tensions and uncertainties associated with a greater and more active Chinese military and
paramilitary presence near Japan have the potential to reduce trust and spur zero-sum ap-
proaches toward Beijing in many nonmilitary policy areas—such as economic and trade re-
lations—while channeling more scarce resources into military development. If mishandled,
ix