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Wenzhao Tao China and America: Destined for Conflict? China and America: Destined for Conflict? Wenzhao Tao China and America: Destined for Conflict? Wenzhao Tao The Institute of American Studies The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Beijing, China Translated by Shengqi Wu The School of English for Specific Purposes Beijing Foreign Studies University Beijing, China ISBN 978-981-19-3451-3 ISBN 978-981-19-3452-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-3452-0 Jointly published with China Social Sciences Press The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland) please order the print book from: China Social Sciences Press. ISBN of the Co-Publisher’s edition: 978-7-5161-7351-0 Translation from the Chinese language edition: “Pojie Daguo Chongtu de Suming – Zhongmei Xinxing Daguo Guanxi Yanjiu” by Wenzhao Tao, China Social Sciences Press 2017. Published by China Social Sciences Press. All Rights Reserved. © China Social Sciences Press and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publishers, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Preface to the English Edition The Chinese edition of this book came out in March 2017. Since then, many events have happened to China–US relations. The Trump administration implemented extremely wrong China policy and severely harmed bilateral relations. Despite this, in retrospect, I believe that the narrative of China–US relations in this book is still fitting and proper and the views conveyed here are still relevant. Now with the publication of the English edition, I would like to add two points. The International Order in the Twenty-First Century Would Not be Bipolar But Multipolar There are various assumptions in academic circles about the pattern of power structure in the twenty-first century. Some say a “bipolar” China–US structure is a matter of fact. If that were the case, the United States would have to cede power to China, or China would have to grab power from the United States, which would thereby lead to a possible bipolar confrontation. However, international relations in the twenty-first century will no longer follow the old model of power transition between two countries. Instead, they have many new features, so we need to get rid of the conventional mindset on power transitions as we observe China–US relations. The Trend of Power Decentralization is the Key Factor Contributing to the Formation of a Multipolar World in the Twenty-First Century Economic globalization accelerated in the last decade of the twentieth century and such a trend will continue in the twenty-first century. One effect of globalization is the decentralization of powers. First, globalization has eroded some rights of sovereign v vi PrefacetotheEnglishEdition states. In the process of globalization, each sovereign state cedes a portion of its rights, while at the same time enjoys the benefits of those ceded by others. This is different from the situation in the past. For instance, in modern Chinese history, the most important economic sovereign right China ceded to Western imperialist powers was tariff. Both The 1842 Nanjing Treaty and The 1844 Wangxia Treaty stipulated that China could only levy a 5% tariff on imported goods, and if China wanted to adjust that rate, it had to consult foreign consulates. It was not until 1929 that China recovered tariff autonomy. Now since most countries have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), they must follow corresponding the rules of the WTO on tariff cuts or exemptions, and such cuts or exemptions must be reciprocal. Some countries have made better use of others’ tariff cuts and exemptions. That is a matter of seeking advantage and avoiding disadvantage. Second, the United Nations, other international organizations and international treaties all put restrictions on state power. Once a state becomes a member of a certain international organization or treaty, it must abide by its rules and fulfill corresponding obligations, which means restrictions on its powers. But it is fair to the states involved. The Trump administration withdrew from various international organizations and treaties, claiming that they undermined U.S. sovereignty and were inconsistent with its “America first” foreign policy. But such moves provoked widespread criticism from the international community. Third, while sovereign states remain the main actors in international relations, powerful non-state actors like multinationals have played increasingly significant roles. In globalization, formulation of the global industrial chain is mainly the outcome of corporate behavior, whereby multinationals are the main players. The Trump administration waged trade war on China and called on American multinationals investing in China to return to the United States, which received few positive responses. Instead, many are planning to expand investment in China. Fourth, technological progress undermines state powers. The wide use of internet has considerably expanded people’s access to information in the way that would be unimaginable in the past. It is still difficult to predict what impacts such new technologies—artificial intelligence, quantum computing and space exploration, to name a few—may bring about to human society. Given the trend of power decentralization, it is unrealistic for global power to be concentrated in the hands of one or two countries as what happened in the past. That is also why many American scholars argue that U.S. hegemony is in relative decline. Yet, equally clearly, the part of power the U.S. has lost will not necessarily be transferred entirely to China. Even though the present international order is not a mature multipolar one, such a pattern is on the horizon. PrefacetotheEnglishEdition vii The Reality of the International Order is Closer to a Multipolar Rather than Bipolar World Economically, China’s rise is atypical example of globalization. China and the U.S., the world’s two largest economies (each exceeding $10 trillion), seem to be “two poles.” But Chinese per capita GDP is only one-sixth of that of the U.S., still ranking in the middle in the world. In terms of quality of growth, China remains in the midrange of the global industrial chain, or slightly above midrange, with considerable room for improvement. China still has a long way to go in terms of globalization of its financial sector. Regarding security, nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia are still the two major players in international arms control. China’s strategic nuclear arsenal is relatively small compared with that of the United States and Russia. It seems that there still exists a yawning gap in the short run. In science and technology, according to Zhao Gang, a fellow at the Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), after the Huawei and ZTE incidents, China’s relevant departments invited more than 8000 experts to review 1149 technologies in the top ten high-tech fields and evaluate the gap between China and the world. That result is that 15% of China’s technologies take the lead in the world, 30% stay abreast with the world’s advanced level, and over 50% lag behind.1 That said, China cannot be counted as one of the two poles in science and technology. In terms of tackling climate change and protecting Earth’s ecology, China still has a lot to learn from Europe, which leads the world in these fields. China has committed to peak greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. China has paid a high environmental price for its rapid economic growth over the past 40 years and faces daunting challenges in ecological restoration. China has endeavored to restore ecological environment and has made remarkable progress. When it comes to social concerns, China has already crossed the threshold of an aging society. Owing to its population base, the global conundrum is especially conspicuous in China. How to ensure universal healthcare and pension security are the two major challenges. In coping with the challenge of an aging society, Japan has many successful experiences for China to learn from. China’s influence continues to increase in international affairs, but it is mainly concentrated in East Asia. In other areas, such as Europe, Africa, and Latin America, China’s influence is not balanced. In such strategically significant areas like the Middle East, China’s main interest lies in ensuring its energy security. In some significant hotspots, China’s influence is far behind that of Russia and the European Union. Some medium-sized, even relatively small countries, have created regional mech- anisms to increase their roles in regional and global affairs—the EU and ASEAN being typical examples. Some countries and regions, including India, Africa and 1 “Magnesium Power: China’s New Material Industry Still Lags Behind,” June 22, 2019, http:// www.magppc.com/mg/12082.html. viii PrefacetotheEnglishEdition Latin America, have strong potential for economic growth and should not be underestimated. In brief, in the current international system, except for the United States, which still has salient advantages in multiple areas (though such advantages are in relative decline), no other country is in the position to qualify itself as a “pole” in the world. Multilateralism Leads to a Multipolar Not a Bipolar World A major debate in contemporary international politics is the struggle between unilateralism and multilateralism. U.S. former president Donald J. Trump is a typical example of unilateralism. His “America First” foreign policy and practice was even opposed by American allies. China and the majority of other countries in the world stick to multilateralism because confronted with the major challenges in the contemporary world, from financial crisis to climate change, from Ebola to COVID-19, no country can tackle them alone. No country can escape from them. There is only one Earth for mankind. We are in the same boat. We should stay committed to openness and inclusiveness instead of closeness and exclusion. Multilateralism is about having international affairs addressed through extensive consultation and the future of the world decided by everyone working together. International governance should be based on the rules and consensus reached among all the countries in the world, not on the order given by one or the few. The Charter of the United Nations is the basic and universally recognized norms governing state-to- state relations. There are also international laws and international rules and norms. These are the basic principles that multilateralism adheres to. Of course, the practice of international relations is abundant and new issues continue to emerge. Therefore, to uphold multilateralism in the twenty-first century, we should promote its tradition, take on new perspectives and look to the future. We need to stand by the core values and basic principles of multilateralism. We also need to adapt to the changing international landscape and respond to global challenges as they arise. We need to reform and improve the global governance system on the basis of extensive consultation and consensus building.2 Multilateralism is a flag not a façade. It is a conviction not a rhetoric. It is a long-term, basic, and firm choice that China and most countries in the world adhere to regardless of the changes of particular circumstances. The outcome of multilateralism will not lead to a bipolar world. The only possible outcome is a multipolar world. Of course, a multipolar world is a dynamic concept, an unfolding landscape, and the general picture of the twenty-first century is this: Owing to power decentralization, while a particular country may play a leading role in one or many aspects, others 2 Xi Jinping, “Let the Torch of Multilateralism Light up Humanity’s Way Forward,” Special Address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the World Economic Forum Virtual Event of the Davos Agenda on January 25, 2021, https://language.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202101/26/WS600f6927a31024ad0ba a5046.html. PrefacetotheEnglishEdition ix may have advantages in other aspects. But power won’t be highly concentrated in the hands of one or two countries. All the countries have the capacity to play a leading role in one field or another and they have to coordinate with one another to achieve success. In this sense, multilateralism is a feasible solution to breaking the spell of great power conflict. In short, as scholars such as Fu Ying and Wang Jisi once said, international politics of the twenty-first century would not be a simple story of U.S. declining and China rising to take America’s place as a new hegemonic state. The rise and fall of hegemonies is part of the history of past centuries, which is an obsolete concept in the new century. That is a fundamental reason why we do not have to be overly pessimistic about China–US relations. China and the United States are Not in a New Cold War As a result of the Trump administration’s assault on China’s national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and development interests, China–US relations are at the lowest ebb in the four decades after normalization of the diplomatic relations. Faced with this situation, some scholars argue that China and the United States have entered a period of new Cold War, or the Trump administration has left a China–US Cold War to the Biden administration. I disagree. I contend that the current China– US relationship is fundamentally different from the U.S.–Soviet Cold War. China and the United States are Highly Interdependent While the United States and the Soviet Union were Not The United States and the Soviet Union never had such a high degree of interdependence China and the United States have today. Such interdependence is manifested in two categories. One is economic, and the other is non-economic. Economic interdependence is on both bilateral and multilateral levels. Over the past four decades since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, particularly over the three decades since the end of the Cold War, globalization has accelerated and China has embarked on the fast economic growth and played a significant role in the global production chain. It is particularly salient since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. China-–US economic interdependence has deepened, and they contribute considerably to each other’s success. The Trump administration waged trade war on China and imposed high tariffs on Chinese exports. The tariffs hurt bilateral trade, which slightly dropped in 2019. However, they did not strangle bilateral trade relations. The bilateral trade rose again in 2020 in spite of the negative impact of the COVID-19, amounting to x PrefacetotheEnglishEdition RMB 4.06 trillion, an increase of 8.8%.3 Such strong economic ties were nowhere to find in U.S.–Soviet relations during the Cold War. The U.S.–Soviet trade volume was several billion dollars at most. China–US economic interdependence on the multilateral level is most conspicu- ously typified by their cooperation to cope with the 2008 global financial crisis. After the outbreak of the crisis, U.S. high-ranking officials called their Chinese counter- parts. On many occasions, they used a Chinese idiom “pulling together in times of trouble (or Tong Zhou Gong Ji)” to express their wish to work with China to tackle the crisis. China actively participated in the G20, coordinated with the United States in macroeconomic policies, resisted trade protectionism, and prevented the financial crisis from escalating into a great depression akin to the one in the 1930s. Nowadays, China–US non-economic interdependence is usually ignored. However, it has equal weight. In the process of reform and opening up, China has gradually integrated itself into the international community and played an increasingly significant role in global governance. In the 1990s, a popular saying in China was “being geared to the international community.” At the dawn of the twenty-first century, as China grew stronger, it began to provide more public goods for the international community. The history of China’s reform and opening up over the past four decades shows that China is not only the beneficiary but also the builder and contrib- utor of the current international system. China has actively participated in the United Nations Security Council and the U.N. peacekeeping missions, upheld the international nonproliferation mechanism, and cooperated to deal with the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues. China worked together with the World Health Organiza- tion to fight SARS, Ebola, COVID-19, and other epidemics and pandemics. China also contributed considerably to reaching and implementing the Paris Agreement and endeavored to reduce greenhouse gases emissions. Nowadays, confronted with various regional and global challenges, no country can manage alone. No country can escape from them. We must work together. In this regard, China has made concerted efforts with the international community, including the United States. That said, China, the United States and the entire international community are interdependent. Admittedly, the United States and the Soviet Union also had interdependence and cooperation during the Cold War. But their focus was on arms control. After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the two superpowers felt the gravity of the danger of nuclear war. They began to put arms control on their agenda while continuing arms race. They signed a series of agreements and achieved “the balance of terror” and “mutually assured destruction (MAD).” This was the major interdependence between the two countries during the Cold War. Such an interdependence cannot be matched with China–US interdependence at the present time. 3 “China-US merchandize trade totaled RMB 4.06 trillion in 2020, an increase of 8.8%,” January 14, 2021, https://money.163.com/21/0114/11/G0A4S04600259DLP.html.