Chechnya’s Secret Wartime Diplomacy: Aslan Maskhadov and the Quest for a Peaceful Resolution

281 Pages·2013·1.43 MB·English

by  Ilyas Akhmadov, Nicholas Daniloff

Chechnya’s Secret Wartime Diplomacy
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Chechnya’s Secret Wartime Diplomacy
Aslan Maskhadov and the Quest for a
Peaceful Resolution
Ilyas Akhmadov and Nicholas Daniloff
Translated by Anatoly Semenov
With a Preface by Mark Kramer
CHECHNYA’S SECRET WARTIME DIPLOMACY
Copyright © Ilyas Akhmadov and Nicholas Daniloff, 2013.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-33878-5
All rights reserved.
First published in 2013 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States— a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world,
this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978-1-349-46418-0 ISBN 978-1-137-33879-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137338792
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Akhmadov, Ilyas, 1960–
Chechnya's secret wartime diplomacy : Aslan Maskhadov and the
quest for a peaceful resolution / by Ilyas Akhmadov and Nicholas
Daniloff; translated by Anatoly Semenov ; with a preface by Mark
Kramer.
pages cm
For the first time in English, this volume makes available transcripts
and commentary from the secret correspondence between former
Chechen foreign minister Ilyas Akhmatov and Chechen President Aslan
Maskhadov, who would be killed by the Russians during the second
Chechen-Russian War in April 2005.
1. Chechnia (Russia)—History—Civil War, 1994—Diplomatic
history—Sources. 2. Chechnia (Russia)—Foreign relations—Russia
(Federation)—Sources. 3. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations—
Russia (Federation)—Chechnia—Sources. 4. Maskhadov, Aslan
Alievich, 1951–2005—Correspondence. 5. Akhmadov, Ilyas,
1960—Correspondence. I. Maskhadov, Aslan Alievich, 1951–2005.
II. Daniloff, Nicholas, 1934– editor. III. Title.
DK511.C37A374 2013
947.5(cid:2)2—dc23 2013026829
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: December 2013
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
A Note on Translation vii
Preface ix
Mark Kramer
Acknowledgments xvii
Introduction 1
Ilyas Akhmadov
1 Maskhadov’s First Briefing 9
2 Immediate Tasks Ahead 19
3 Contact with Dr. Brzezinski 31
4 Taliban Recognition 43
5 Russian Army Disintegrating? 55
6 Election of George W. Bush 65
7 Russia Goes Authoritarian 75
8 The Mystery of Dr. Gluck 87
9 Russia Seeks to Bribe Maskhadov Out of Chechnya 97
10 Talks with Putin Suddenly Cancelled 105
11 Minister Akhmadov and the State Department 117
12 Maskhadov Hopes for CIA Support 123
13 Seeking Negotiations 129
14 The Challenge of Radical Commanders 141
vi Contents
15 General Gelayev in Georgia 149
16 Reaction to 9/11 159
17 Maskhadov Names a Successor 167
18 The January 27 Presidential Issue 175
19 Russia Takes Advantage of 9/11 187
20 The Problem with Lord Judd 195
21 The Russian Policy of Rape 205
22 Solving the Chechen Problem 215
23 Peace Plans Fail 227
24 Maskhadov’s Last Message 241
25 The Voice from Beyond 251
Notes 257
Index 267
A Note on Translation
The Russian-Chechen wars have been studied mostly through official
statements of the Russian government, recollections of Russian offi-
cers, and reports from Russian and Western journalists. To date, little
has come out that reflects the thinking and goals within the Chechen
political leadership. This is why the correspondence (1999–2003)
between President Aslan Maskhadov and his Foreign Minister Ilyas
Akhmadov constitutes the first substantial and unique resource into
the thinking of the rebellious Chechen leaders.
These communications were carried on by audio letters transmit-
ted by couriers and postal services. About 60 percent of the surviving
tapes were in the Chechen language and the remaining 40 percent in
Russian. Akhmadov translated the Chechen parts, creating a complete
collection in Russian. Dr. Anatoly Semenov of the Defense Language
Institute, Monterey, CA, translated the whole into English. Nicholas
Daniloff reviewed and edited the English translations to fit within
the length of 100,000 words set by the publishers. In shortening the
translations, we were guided by the following considerations:
1. Maskhadov, constantly moving around to avoid capture, spoke
in a discursive and often disorganized manner, repeating sen-
tences and thoughts. He sometimes repeated information in sub-
sequent cassettes because he was not sure the first ones had been
received. His speech was heavily larded with interjections, like
the Russian particle “mol,” which can be translated as “he says”
or “they say.” He frequently would close a sentence with “that’s
the way it is” or the Arabic expression “Vallakhi.” We have elim-
inated a good number of these interjections but preserved a few
to give a sense of the tone of these reports.
2. Some of the material was very sensitive because it concerned
individual Chechens who subsequently fled to the West and are
viii A Note on Translation
wanted by the Russians for treason. We cut some of this mate-
rial for their safety.
3. A good deal of Maskhadov’s conversations deals with the
details of internal problems. To remain within the word limit,
we deleted some of this material that we judged would probably
not interest a Western reader. We nevertheless made every effort
to retain details pertaining to the war, the possibility of negotia-
tions, and Maskhadov’s political and military opponents.
4. Finally, we agreed that a copy of the complete collection of audio
letters in Russian and Chechen would be archived for perusal by
specialists after a period of at least 15 years.
Preface
Mark Kramer*
After the Soviet Union broke apart, the Russian government fought
two large-scale wars in Chechnya: the first from December 1994 until
the signing of the Khasavyurt accords in August 1996 and the second
from 1999 through mid-2007. The three-year interregnum between
the wars was a period of de facto independence for Chechnya, but
instead of evolving into a robust state, Chechnya during that time
became plagued by violence, rampant lawlessness, warlordism, crimi-
nality, and kidnapping rings. Even though the second war did not
officially end until 2009, the insurgency was largely crushed by the
latter half of 2007, and it has not revived within Chechnya since
then.1 Under the iron rule of the brutal president Ramzan Kadyrov,
who was appointed by Moscow in March 2007, Chechnya has expe-
rienced the first prolonged period of relative tranquility and peace in
its post-Soviet history.
In neighboring regions of the North Caucasus, however, violent
instability has remained acute.2 In Dagestan, in particular, the situ-
ation over the past several years has been increasingly reminiscent of
Chechnya in the late 1990s. Dagestani insurgents have joined with
Chechen fighters based in Dagestan to foment violent turmoil and
destabilize the Dagestani government. The individual fighters and
groups in Dagestan are not a unified force—they often disagree about
tactics and goals—but they share the basic aim of establishing an
“Islamic caliphate” in some or all of the North Caucasus. Because the
attacks launched by these groups are likely to be a continuing source
of instability in the North Caucasus for many years to come (includ-
ing during the Olympics in Sochi in 2014), it is all the more important
for scholars and policymakers alike to understand the dynamics of
the two major wars that occurred in Chechnya from 1994 to 2007.
* Mark Kramer is director of Cold War Studies and a senior fellow at the Davis
Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University.