Charles University in Prague The Logic of Nuclear Strategy Explaining Small Nuclear Arsenals

232 Pages·2014·1.2 MB·English

by  Jan Ludvík

Charles University in Prague
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Political Studies

Jan Ludvik

The Logic of Nuclear Strategy
Explaining Small Nuclear Arsenals

Ph.D. Thesis

Prague 2014

Declaration:
I, Jan Ludvík, hereby declare that this thesis has been written by me, that it is the result of
work carried out by me and that all the sources used in this thesis are duly indicated and listed
in the bibliographical references.
Date: ……….............
Signature: ………………..............

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AAtB tShTisR tAheCsTis I am trying to address two critical questions: i) how does deterrence work
between a country with a small nuclear arsenal and a more powerful challenger? and ii) what
makes it work? My research is inspired by the method of historical comparative case studies
and aims at repairing several biases in the state of the art deterrence literature, most
importantly the empirically unwarranted analytical primacy of nuclear deterrence. Drawing
from available theoretical literature, the broadest possible range of theoretically underpinned
plausible factors is included in the analysis to grasp the complexity of deterrence relations the
way nuclear and conventional deterrence interact with non-military factors in the dyads
between a state with a small nuclear arsenal and its more powerful enemy. Military aspects of
deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, are part of the comparison together with various
perceptional factors, international circumstances, domestic politics, and norms. Five cases
anchor the comparison in empirical reality covering the history of hostile relations between
the United States and China in the early 1960s; the Soviet Union and China in the late 1960s;
Israel and Iraq in 1977–1981; the United States and North Korea in 1992–1994; and the
United States and the Soviet Union in 1962. My research shows that a lot needs to be
reexamined and reconceptualized in what is today common knowledge about the relationship
between conventional and nuclear deterrence and the effectiveness of deterrence with small
nuclear arsenals. First, through attention should be paid to the way conventional and nuclear
deterrence operate side by side. Deterrence in nuclear dyads should be reexamined to better
highlight the role played by conventional deterrence. Second, further research is needed with
respect to conventional retaliation. Existing literature treats conventional deterrence as denial-
dominated and conventional retaliation as ineffective. But an empirical record shows that
conventional retaliation constitutes an unduly omitted phenomenon.
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AThCeK wNriOtiWng LoEf DthGisM thEesNisT wSo uld not have been possible without help from many people. I am
heavily indebted to them; repaying this debt may not be even possible.
First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of my friend and supervisor
Nik Hynek. This thesis would have never been written without his encouragement and
occasional friendly-minded coercion. We spent hours discussing this research and Nik’s
comments were critical for the development of my ideas and my research approach. I cannot
be more grateful for his help.
Michal Smetana was our counterpart in a number of discussions, and his comments were no
less useful. His help with administrative requirements in the final stage of my studies was
indispensable. He deserves the warmest thanks. So does Luděk Moravec, with whom we have
almost institutionalized the practice of discussing, reading, and commenting each other’s
research.
The two reviewers, Nikolai Sokov and Jan Eichler, carefully read the manuscript despite the
tight schedule, and their comments unquestionably helped me further improve the text.
Furthermore, I have also greatly benefited from suggestions my classmates and teachers
offered during the PhD seminar at the Department of International Relations and during the
pre-defense of my thesis. I am deeply grateful for their contribution.
Others helped in one form or another. Běla Plechanovová, Head of the Department of
International Relations, offered to serve as my supervisor until Nik passed the formal
requirements for the position. She was also most helpful with all the requirements of graduate
study, despite her heavy workload. Katarína Svítková from the Center for Doctoral Studies
arranged the dissertation defense and helped handle the administrative musts. Jan Morávek
proofread the manuscript and his superb English was essential for correcting my mistakes. My
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colleagues from the Center for Security Policy were a supportive collective, and without this
base, it would have been very difficult to finish writing.
Last but not least, my family’s support was indispensable. My wife Jana survived all the ups
and downs that accompanied my research. She kept me in touch with the real world and I owe
her and our little son a lot of time that I spent with the thesis instead of them.
Needless to say, all errors are only my own.

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TABLE OF CONTENT

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... 3
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................................................................................... 4
TABLE OF CONTENT ............................................................................................................. 6
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 8
AN IMPRESSIVE YET INCOMPLETE LITERATURE ....................................................... 15
RESEARCH STRATEGY ....................................................................................................... 23
Weak theories and the need for plurality ............................................................................. 25
Concepts ............................................................................................................................... 26
Case selection ....................................................................................................................... 44
Establishing values ............................................................................................................... 48
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, 1959–1966 ............................................................... 50
The plot ................................................................................................................................. 50
Unfolding the complexity ..................................................................................................... 60
THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, 1969 ............................................................................ 81
The plot ................................................................................................................................. 81
Unfolding the complexity ..................................................................................................... 97
ISRAEL AND IRAQ, 1977–1981 ......................................................................................... 118
The Plot .............................................................................................................................. 118
Unfolding the complexity ................................................................................................... 130
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UNITED STATES AND NORTH KOREA, 1992–1994 ...................................................... 146
The plot ............................................................................................................................... 146
Unfolding the complexity ................................................................................................... 158
UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION, 1962 ................................................................. 176
The plot ............................................................................................................................... 176
Unfolding the complexity ................................................................................................... 183
PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER .................................................................................. 199
Key findings ........................................................................................................................ 199
Tentative findings ............................................................................................................... 209
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 217
REFERENCES: ...................................................................................................................... 220

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IMNyT rResOeaDrcUhC sTtaIrOteNd w ith the simple goal to understand how nuclear deterrence works between
a state with a small nuclear arsenal and its more powerful enemy. I was convinced that
nuclear deterrence cannot be as easy as most people think. Well acquainted with the work of
cold war deterrence theorists and strategists I was struggling with the critical question: Was
this considerable group of people completely wrong? They tried hard to figure out how much
is enough to deter. They designed large nuclear postures because they did not believe that
small numbers can suffice. Of course, they could have been completely wrong. Already
during the cold war, some dissenting opinions suggested that very little is enough. And most
importantly, the cases of clear deterrence failures between two nuclear states, even with small
arsenals, are missing. Something must have helped stability to prevail. Going through
empirical evidence, I started to sense that in fact there really is a critical omission. Nuclear
deterrence was given analytical primacy to the extent that few scholars seriously considered
that conventional deterrence works in nuclear dyads as well. Yet, it seems that conventional
deterrence worked better in a number of cases. Limiting research to studying how nuclear
deterrence works between big and small cannot be enough.
Deterrence is a complex phenomenon which is remarkably difficult to study empirically. Its
failures, at least, are observable, easy-to-recognize events. Yet clear-cut deterrence failures
are scarce in nuclear dyads. Deterrence successes, on the other hand, are essentially non-
events. Often it is even hard to say whether an empirical case in fact qualifies as a deterrence
success. It is well recognized that equifinality is a critical problem in the social sciences in
general, and it is an even more challenging problem in the study of deterrence successes.1 It is
well known that equifinality should not be underestimated in deterrence scholarship. But more

1 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005) 220.
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often than not, this advice is ignored or only paid lip service in appropriate methodological
sections.
In reality, a mere stable coexistence of nuclear weapons and stability in a hostile dyad does
not imply nuclear deterrence success.2 Of course, nuclear deterrence is a plausible
explanation, but not the only one. Other plausible causes should be taken into account for
control, particularly where nuclear deterrence operates with a small and vulnerable nuclear
arsenal. First, a state with a small nuclear arsenal is certainly armed with conventional
weapons as well. It can use them not only to defend itself, but also to retaliate. Researchers
usually fail to pay sufficient attention to this. Second, numerous domestic, international, or
normative factors may in fact affect challengers’ decisions. In most empirical cases, more
than one factor operate simultaneously in a delicate interplay. All this should be taken into
account. Therefore, I had to broaden the original scope of my research to pay adequate
attention to the complexity of deterrence; the way nuclear and conventional deterrence
interact with non-military factors in the dyads between a state with a small nuclear arsenal and
its more powerful enemy.
This is by no means an unimportant question. Quite to the contrary, profound implications for
practical policy rest in answering these vital questions about the deterrence value of small
nuclear arsenals in asymmetrical dyads and about the role conventional deterrence plays in
such dyads. As a matter of fact, proliferation of nuclear weapons is not only recognized as one
of the most worrying threats to international security, but also as one that is likely to continue
in the time to come. It is hard to imagine that newcomers into the nuclear club will be able to
skip the period of smallness. So far, every nuclear-armed country had to live through such
period. Yet likely newcomers are also likely to be in somewhat hostile relations with one or

2 John Mueller, ‘The Essential irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World’, International
Stability, 13/2 (Fall 1988) 55-79.
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