Celebrities of the Afterlife: Death Cult, Stars, and Fandom of Jihadist Propaganda on the Internet

415 Pages·2014·5.69 MB·English

by  Nico Prucha

DISSERTATION
Titel der Dissertation
“Online Territories of Terror – How Jihadist Movements
Project Influence on the Internet and Why it Matters Off-
line“

Verfasser
Mag. phil. Nico Prucha
angestrebter akademischer Grad
Doktor der Philosophie (Dr. phil.)
Wien, 2015
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 092 385
Dissertationsgebiet lt. Studienblatt: Arabistik
Betreuer: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Lohlker
Table
 of
 Contents

INTRODUCING THE ONLINE TERRITORIES OF TERROR 6
JIHADIST INNOVATION AND LEARNING BY ADAPTING TO THE ‘NEW’
AND ‘SOCIAL MEDIA’ ZEITGEIST 19
THE VALUE OF THE INTERNET FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 31
SOCIAL MEDIA AND ICONOGRAPHY – THE VISUAL LITERACY OF IDEOLOGY WITHIN
THE REACH OF A MOUSE CLICK 39
THE EVERYDAY JIHAD ON THE INTERNET 47
CELEBRITIES OF THE AFTERLIFE: DEATH CULT, STARS, AND
FANDOM OF JIHADIST PROPAGANDA ON THE INTERNET 57
ON JIHADI MEDIA ACTIVISTS AND NEW MARTYR ROLE MODELS 59
VARIOUS MARTYR TYPES AS ROLE MODELS 61
THE NEW MARTYRS OF THE INTERNET – THE DEATH OF AQ’S SECOND-IN-
COMMAND, ABU YAHYA AL-LIBI, EULOGIZED BY AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI 63
ELEMENTS OF THE MARTYR STORIES – WONDROUS TALES (KARAMAT) BY
‘ABDALLAH ‘AZZAM 69
INTERSECTIONS – THE THEOLOGICAL MAKING OF THE “MEDIA SHAHID” 80
ONLINE MARTYRS AND FANDOM DEATH CULT 83
THE MARTYRDOM OF THE MEDIA MUJAHID MU’AWIYYA ‘ABD AL-QAHHAR
BELHAJJ 85
THE FOUNDERS, PIONEERS AND ACTORS OF THE EARLY ELECTRONIC MEDIA
FRONTIER – ABU A’ID AL-FILASTINI 87
ABU ‘UMAR – THE NEW ROLE MODEL OF THE “MEDIA MARTYR” 99
THE MARTYRDOM OF THE MUNSHID OF THE AL-SHUMUKH FORUM 105
ABU QASURA AL-LIBI – FIGHTING AGAINST AL-QADHDHAFI TO DIE IN AL-ASSAD’S
SYRIA. 108
A NEW GENERATION OF SHUHADA’ – PATHWAYS AND INTERSECTIONS OF THE ON-
AND OFFLINE WORLDS 114
JIHADIST AGITPROP ONLINE AND NEW MEDIA STRATEGIES 117
THE ‘ARAB SPRING’ AS A RENAISSANCE FOR AQ AFFILIATES IN A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 120
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN DEFINING THE RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT FOR JIHADI CONFLICTS 136
DIVIDING THE SPOILS OF WAR – Q&A ON FACEBOOK 138
“FATAWA AL-MINBAR: QUESTIONS FROM #AL-SHAM REGARDING THE #LEGAL
RULING ON #PRISONERS AND #BOOTY?” BY ABU’ L-MUNDHIR AL-SHINQITHI 141
MEDIATING HISTORICAL SOURCES TO SANCTION PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT 147

  1
THE BIRTH OF A JIHADIST AND SALAFIST SCENE IN GERMANY – 2005
ONWARDS 153
COMMUNICATING JIHAD 156
FRAMING AND DATA SELECTION 158
BRIDGING THE GAPS – ONLINE AND OFFLINE RADICAL MILIEUS 164
THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD MAHMUD – FOUNDER OF THE GERMAN GLOBAL
ISLAMIC MEDIA FRONT 168
FROM SYRIA WITH LOVE: A GERMAN VOICE FOR THE GLOBAL ISLAMIC MEDIA
FRONT 180
“METICULOUS ANSWERS” BY THE MIGRANT AID WORKER AND MUJAHID 186
ISLAM IS LIKE A TREE. JIHAD IS THE CROWN AND THE ANSAR (SUPPORTERS) ARE
LIKE A BRANCH 189
A PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE TO ISIS: WHY JOIN AND FIGHT FOR THE ISLAMIC
STATE 191
NEW JIHADIS ON THE BLOCK: SYRIA AS THE MAIN BASE OF
FIGHTING AND FILMING 198
THE CAPTURING AND EXECUTION OF THE “MEDIA SHABIHA”, STATEMENT NO. 41
206
THE KILLING OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL MEDIA BUREAU, STATEMENT
NO. 49 209
AN EYE FOR AN EYE: PUNISHING ALAWITES AS REVENGE FOR USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS BY THE REGIME 211
THE LIQUIDATION OF THE PREACHER BADR WAHIB GHAZAL, “THE ALAWITE
MUFTI OF LATAKIA” 213
THE SECOND AN EYE FOR AN EYE OPERATION: THE KILLING OF SHABIHA BY
MAJOR MARTYRDOM OPERATIONS 216
CAPITALIZING ON SECTARIANISM: REVENGE OPERATIONS IN THE REGION OF
DAR’A 218
REPENTANCE FOR SUNNIS FIGHTING WITH ASSAD – EXECUTION IN THE MAINFRAME
OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 219
ENTER THE ‘JIHADI TWITTERSPHERE’ 230
TWITTER ACTIVISM AND JIHADI SUPPORTERS 232
WHAT ARE THEY SHARING? 233
AQ’S SYRIAN STAKEHOLDER JABHAT AL-NUSRA ON TWITTER 234
DATASETS OF JABHAT AL-NUSRA ON TWITTER 243
CASE STUDIES OF THREE PROMINENT USERS 245
LINKS ON YOUTUBE 252
SAMPLES OF THE TEN MOST SHARED SHORTLINKS 254
THE TOP FOUR SHARED SHORTLINKS OF JABHAT AL-NUSRA IN A SMALL SCALE
SAMPLE 260

  2
THE TURKISH-CHECHEN NETWORK IN THE SYRIAN CONTEXT OF TWITTER
ACTIVISM 261
ABORTING IED ATTACKS TO PRESERVE THE SACROSANCT BLOOD
OF MUSLIMS – YOUTUBE CLIPS AS PART OF AN IDEOLOGICAL
CLUSTER NETWORK 268
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT – LESSONS LEARNED FROM IRAQ AND ALGERIA FOR THE
JIHAD IN SYRIA 272
THE APRIL AND DECEMBER 2007 SUICIDE BOMBINGS IN ALGERIA AS A PRECEDENT
FOR JIHADIST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 274
THE CASE OF ALGERIA – ABU AL-HASAN RASHID AND THE RESPONSE TO
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE 11 APRIL SUICIDE ATTACKS IN ALGIERS 277
INTRODUCING ATTIYATULLAH AL-LIBI: THE ONLINE JIHADI SUPERSTAR 286
DEATH FROM ABOVE: DRONE STRIKES AND ABU YAHYA AL-LIBI’S
MAINFRAME TO OPERATIONALIZE SHARI’A CONDUCT 300
DRONE STRIKES IN YEMEN AND THE RESPONSE ON TWITTER 305
DRONE STRIKES AND SPIES AMONG US – TELEVISING CONFESSIONS AND
EXECUTIONS 312
GUNS ON THE ROOF: THE ACTION-REACTION SYMBIOSIS OF VIOLENCE 328
OPERATIONAL RADIUS OF SPIES: PENETRATING ISLAMIC HOUSES 334
TREASON AMONG THE ROWS OF THE BELIEVERS: THE CASE OF HATIB B. ABI
BALTA’A AS AN ANALOGY TO MODERN SPIES 344
HATIB BIN ABU BALTA’A – THE FIRST MUSLIM SPY? 354
“THE RULING ON KILLING THE SPY WHO POSES AS A MUSLIM” – DIGGING INTO
ABU YAHYA’S MINDSET 357
OPERATIONALIZATION AND INTERNALIZATION OF IDEOLOGY – THE INTERSECTION
OF ONLINE GUIDELINES BY ABU YAHYA AND THE IMPACT IN THE OFFLINE 361
THE ROLE OF TWITTER AND THE MOST IMPORTANT ACCOUNTS TO
FOLLOW – BY ADVICE OF A SHUMUKH AL-ISLAM FORUM MEMBER 366
TWITTER AS THE “ELECTRONIC RIBAT” – A NOTE ON THE TERM “RIBAT” IN
CONTEMPORARY JIHADIST MIND-SET 366
TYPES OF ACCOUNT IMPORTANT FOR JIHAD AND THE MUJAHIDIN ON TWITTER 368
“THE MOST IMPORTANT JIHADIST SITES AND SUPPORT FOR JIHAD AND THE
MUJAHIDIN ON TWITTER” 370
ENGAGED FOLLOWERS OF ‘IMPORTANT JIHADI’ ACCOUNTS 378
RELATIONAL DYNAMICS 381
KEY NODES IN THE NETWORK 384
INFORMATION FLOW 391
KEY ACTOR ANALYSIS 393
BIBLIOGRAPHY 397

  3
For
 my
 father

  4
I
 am
 grateful
 and
 indebted
 to
 my
 family,
 friends
 and
 colleagues
 who
 have
 supported
 and

inspired
 my
 work.
 I
 would
 like
 to
 thank
 the
 patient
 supervisor
 of
 this
 doctoral
 thesis
 in

particular.
 Not
 only
 has
 Rüdiger
 Lohlker
 by
 his
 supervision
 and
 with
 his
 meticulous

methodology
 sharpened
 my
 eyes
 and
 ears
 for
 the
 Arabic
 use
 in
 general,
 but
 also
 for
 the

jihadist
 slang
 and
 rhetoric
 especially,
 allowing
 me
 a
 deeper
 insight
 into
 the
 theme
 and

the
 ability
 of
 ‘translating
 terror’.

Ali
 Fisher
 has
 shared
 his
 insight
 and
 worked
 on
 data
 sets
 for
 this
 doctoral
 thesis,

allowing
 me
 to
 further
 the
 analysis
 and
 showcase
 findings
 by
 visualized
 data.
 For
 his

never-­‐ending
 support
 and
 good
 spirited
 help
 I
 thank
 Ali.

I
 am
 obliged
 to
 Alex
 P.
 Schmid,
 a
 thoughtful
 adviser
 with
 an
 always-­‐open
 ear,
 for
 his

support
 and
 for
 including
 me
 in
 project
 work
 he
 contracted.
 Conveying
 knowledge
 in
 a

pedagogical
 fashion
 is
 needed
 in
 the
 field
 of
 studying
 terrorism;
 I
 have
 had
 the
 privilege

to
 take
 my
 lessons
 in
 this
 important
 regard
 from
 Alex
 in
 many
 occasions.

Harald
 Weilnböck
 enabled
 me
 to
 share
 aspects
 of
 my
 knowledge
 with
 people
 that

matter,
 ranging
 from
 street
 workers
 engaged
 in
 the
 field
 to
 interact
 with
 juveniles
 to

policymakers
 that
 seek
 an
 understanding
 of
 the
 wider
 phenomena
 of
 radicalisation
 and

the
 role
 the
 Internet
 may
 play.
 I
 am
 indebted
 to
 him
 for
 his
 support
 and
 his
 always-­‐
helping
 hand.

Of
 the
 many
 people
 I
 want
 to
 thank,
 I
 am
 deeply
 grateful
 to
 C.
 Holland
 Taylor
 for

showing
 me
 the
 richness
 of
 Islam
 and
 spirituality
 –
 an
 essence
 one
 may
 forget
 when

solely
 engaged
 in
 dealing
 with
 extremist
 propaganda
 and
 content.

Judith
 Tinnes,
 who
 has
 written
 a
 masterful
 doctoral
 thesis
 on
 the
 jihadi
 use
 of
 the
 virtual

world
 has
 shared
 her
 insight
 –
 and
 material
 –
 with
 me
 for
 years.
 For
 her
 always
 friendly

feedback
 and
 support
 I
 am
 highly
 grateful.

I
 am
 thankful
 to
 Maura
 Conway,
 Lisa
 McInerney
 and
 Daniela
 Pisoiu
 for
 facilitating
 the

possibility
 to
 continue
 my
 work
 in
 an
 academic
 environment,
 for
 the
 exchange
 and
 for

their
 comprising
 support.

Furthermore,
 I
 am
 indebted
 to
 Robert
 Wesley,
 Martin
 Kahl,
 Pia
 Lichtblau,
 Laurent

Ziegler,
 Karin
 Wey,
 Joshua
 Sinai,
 Magnus
 Ranstorp,
 Joas
 Wagemakers,
 Kamal
 Allabwani,

Peter
 Neumann,
 John
 Bew,
 Shiraz
 Maher,
 Alexander
 Meleagrou-­‐Hitchens,
 Waleed
 Bonni

and
 Jamal
 El
 Freji.

Maja
 Ruscher
 is
 entitled
 for
 my
 special
 thanks,
 without
 her
 commitment
 and
 goodwill
 of

support
 this
 thesis
 would
 never
 have
 been
 realised.

Last
 and
 certainly
 not
 least,
 my
 gratitude
 is
 for
 Elisabeth
 and
 Jonathan.
 This
 work
 would

not
 have
 been
 possible
 without
 them.
 Despite
 the
 ‘dark’
 and
 bloody
 nature
 of
 especially

the
 jihadist
 videos,
 Elisabeth
 and
 Jonathan
 are
 the
 countering
 balances
 whose

understanding,
 patience,
 humor
 and
 thoughtfulness
 allows
 me
 to
 continue
 my
 work.

  5
Introducing
 The
 Online
 Territories
 of
 Terror

Oh my companions, male and female, don’t just study shari’a (Islamic law) or merely
by clever at reading, writing and telling stories (about religion). In the end, this will
lead to nothing but misery. Many who memorize the Qur’an and hadith love to
condemn other people as infidels while ignoring their own infidelity (to God) their
hearts and minds still mired in filth easily seduced by anger and passion amid the
glittering temptations of this world jealous and envious of their neighbor’s
possessions for their hearts are full of darkness and contemptible.1

H.E. Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur)

Jihadist groups have aggressively expanded their use of social media including
Twitter, Google+, Facebook, and YouTube, to disseminate a sophisticated blend of
audio-visual media that is intended to attract fighters and fundraisers to the cause.
This material on social media platforms produces a persistent and interconnected
multiplatform zeitgeist, which is constantly updated by the media mujahidin (pl.).
The media departments – or the designated individual media mujahid (sg.) – facilitate
all means possible to transport, broadcast and thus project strategic influence by
enabling individuals worldwide to tune into the jihadist monopoly of truth. This
monopoly is a dominant form of projecting only one truth, or haqq, in jihadist slang
while remaining that every Muslim outside of this tight definition is either treading on
the “path of falsehood (batil)”, is an apostate (murtadd), or simply excommunicated
(takfir) as a disbeliever (kafir). The jihadi monopoly of “truth” only allows a specific
interpretation and implementation of the corpus of Qur’an and Sunna, claiming
absolute authority over common Islamic habits and traditions to widen their potential
impact.
Symbols, icons, gestures, key words – and first and foremost the Holy Qur’an and

1 Remembrance of God & the Path to Inner Perfection “Without Rules”; Javanese mystical poem sung
by Indonesian LibForAll co-founder Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid at a spiritual gathering of
Nahdlatul Ulama followers, to praise God and convey the essence of Islamic teachings.
http://www.libforall.org/media/videos/video-­‐remembrance.html, accessed August 12, 2014.

  6
Prophetic Traditions, the Sunna are hijacked as the legitimate source for extremist
reasoning and acting. The jihadist strives and struggles by all means, foremost by
violent actions, to implement an orthodox and selective interpretation of Islamic
divine texts. Paradox and ironic is the jihadists’ usage of the Internet to archive an
efficient output of this massive propaganda, disseminated online on all channels and
platforms – in an increasing number of languages with differing appeal to the global
and respective local audiences. The most modern means of communication are as
playfully and to the outmost professional degree deployed to propagate an antiquated,
ancient-medieval worldview as a response to contemporary geopolitical
circumstances as well as local grievances; taking over a commitment fed by human
nature to resist and act against unfair and inhumane realities mirrored by the vast
majority of Arab regimes, backed and favoured by western states. Nevertheless, the
crafting and disseminating of propaganda, containing among many elements this act
of resistance by use of force is in the jihadists’ intention declared as ‘missionary
work’ (da’wa). Conducting da’wa online, on all channels and layers of the Internet,
has proven highly effective in past conflicts and is a main element for operations of
militant groups and also the related non-militant movements in principal.
With the innovative capacity of online forums, social media and in general ‘new media’
platforms, the jihadist ideology is effectively competing for the ‘hearts and minds’ of
young Muslims with other mainstream and legitimate schools and interpretations.
As such, and in particular after the death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, the role of
individual sympathizers as well as organized media workers has been further
acknowledged and equalized with the role of “martyrdom operatives” or ‘regular’
Mujahidin who actively fight in the field and who are framed, portrayed and made famous
within the online circles and spheres of global jihadism. Individual operatives, for
example the 9/11 hijackers, had filmed their testimonies (wasiyya) at an early stage of the
planned attacks. The jihadist – al-Qa’ida (AQ) – media therefore had for many years new
materials to broadcast celebrating the September 11, 2001, attacks, with the individual
hijacker speaking in his own words and on his personal terms, providing the audience
direct access to the mind-set and justification of the attacks embedded in a greater
narrative and story telling of post-colonial occupation2 and oppression3; of a global

2 The propaganda is coherent, however dependent on local history and circumstances. The post-
colonial struggle of Algeria, where AQ maintains a North Africa branch, finds its expression of

  7
‘conspiracy against Islam’ and the ‘crusader-Zionist’ intentions of annihilating the proper
religious worship for God. With the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in 2013/14 as a major
player in the Syrian revolution and it’s subsequent re-emergence in Iraq, the jihadist
media strategies have been further re-mastered and improved, with IS successfully
competing with the turned rival AQ for the hearts and minds – using the media strategies
and the ideology invented by AQ to broadcast and project influence on an unprecedented
level. The deliberate and fluent use of social media outlets, in particular Twitter, has
furthermore enabled the flow of images and videos from the real-life battlefields,
sometimes in almost real-time. As such, the Islamic State has taken the ideology of AQ
and outrun their mentors in terms of the scale and pace of flooding the Internet with their
content – mainly videos as proof of applying ideology, while maintaining a persistent
presence in both worlds: the territory in Syria and Iraq as well as the various
communications channels on the Internet. Content is shared through a broad support
network of media mujahedin in one of the clearest incarnations of Netwar since it was
first envisaged.4

The thrive of jihadist content online, expressing the implementation of a specific belief set
based on Qur’an and Sunna, follows an almost organic rhythm that is fueled by highly
committed – and able – individuals from both the battlefields as well as the solitude
elsewhere. It may be best compared to the paradigm of ants, as
“when a team of carpenters build a house, they follow a blueprint of
specifications to achieve the final structure successfully, and have a metal

European, mostly French, influence and military personnel depicted as sent to combat the jihadists
along “apostate” Algerian soldiers. A rhetoric justifying the execution and open war against
governmental soldiers and police who, as Sunni Muslims, are termed as apostates (murtaddin) of
Islam, loyal to man-made laws instead of divine legislation and therefore declared as legal military
opponents.
3 Oppression by tyrants, termed in the jihadist mind set as idols (taghut), are another evident
manifestation of the contradiction of the monotheistic principle of tawhid the jihadists fight for – the
service and worship to the one and only God, who shall not be associated with partners of any kind.
Thus, the jihadists define themselves as muwahhidin, exercising the tawhid principle in contradiction to
the mushrikin, who neglect the monotheistic belief set and are rather loyal servants of dictatorial,
secular or monarchist governments where individual leaders are hailed and praised in a similar fashion
as God.
4 For details on the concept of Netwar: John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar
(Revisited), RAND,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382.ch1.pdf,
accessed July 8, 2014.
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt: Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future, First Monday,
Volume 6, Number 10, October 1, 2001,
http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/889/798, accessed July 8, 2014.

  8
representation of what they do. However, when ants build their nest, there is
no leader or blueprint to guide them in their collective nest-building actions.
They do not base their behaviors on a global overview of the building but
simply interact locally with the closest neighboring ants or with pheromones
left by other ants.”5

In the jihadist online spheres, the pheromones are the tracks left behind by the corpus of
written and mainly in audio-visual data, the application of the propagated ideology and
the advocated role-models of what it means being a true believer. This is perhaps the
most powerful message, received worldwide in multiple languages and broadcast from
within jihadist, or in this particular case IS, controlled territory in Syria and Iraq –
nevertheless, core Arab-Islamic territories. Ideology, expressed partially in the
implementation of shari’a interpretation to deal with every-day aspects of life and as an
alternative to worldly law enforced by local regimes, embeds the actor and empowers the
individual to exercise the ends for what jihadist groups vow to fight for. The monopoly of
truth, conveyed by comprising writings and the textual degree that is tightly related, as
it’s expression, to the audio-visual genre of extremist propaganda engulfs and encircles
the consumer with the portrayal of real-life role models acting on behalf of ideology and
proclaimed prophetic as well as divine guidance. Rituals are employed in a fashion
whereas,

“rather, ideology acts in such a way as to reproduce the social order by
symbolically representing it as a unity in which the individual subject has a place.
At the same time the symbols operate so as to generate a sense of identification
and commitment. Thus the individual is hailed or constructed as a subject within a
symbolic discourse, and it is these symbolic discourses which constitute
ideological or imaginary communities.”6

5 Jean-Louis Deneubourg and Simon Goss, Collective patterns and decision-making. Ethology Ecology
& Evolution (1989), 1, 295–311.
6 Kenneth Thompson, Durkheim and Sacred Identity, in: N.J Allen et. al, On Durkheim’s Elementary
Form of Religious Life, Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought, Routledge: London and
New York, 1998, 94-95.

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