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C.D. JACKSON _________________________ Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Globalism _________________________ John Allen Stern University Press of America,® Inc. Lanham · Boulder · New York · Toronto · Plymouth, UK Copyright © 2012 by University Press of America,® Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard Suite 200 Lanham, Maryland 20706 UPA Acquisitions Department (301) 459-3366 Estover Road Plymouth PL6 7PY United Kingdom All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America British Library Cataloging in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Control Number: 2011937658 ISBN: 978-0-7618-5729-7 (paperback : alk. paper) eISBN: 978-0-7618-5730-3 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992 PREFACE Since starting the first draft of this manuscript in 2003, U.S. strategic goals have undergone a radical transformation from a Cold War Era policy of “Containment” to the present day policy of “Preemption.” What began after World War II as a quest for global economic security—some would say hegemony—through diplomatic initiatives which stressed broad-based trade incentives, has devolved into Roman-style, garrison-state, expansionist overreach. Madison Avenue expertise has given way to perpetual conflict and has resulted in blunder after adventurous military blunder. The Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), designed by the Pentagon as the propaganda arm of the nation’s military (and purportedly scrapped by its architects), has seemingly morphed into the Office of Special Plans (OSP). According to Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist, Seymour Hersh, “A small cluster of policy advisers and analysts … call(ing) themselves, self- mockingly, The Cabal … which was conceived by Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, has brought about a crucial change of direction in the American Intelligence Community.”1 Preempting other more recent exposés on this “White House Intelligence Group” (WHIG), Hersh noted that “These advisers and analysts, who began their work in the days after September 11 2001, have produced a skein of intelligence reviews that have helped to shape public opinion and American policy toward Iraq.”2 The immediate goal of the WHIG, post-9/11, was to “find evidence” that tied Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden, and thus to the destruction of the World Trade Center. Polling conducted in the months following the attack on the WTC and the Pentagon, and the downing of the civilian jetliner in Pennsylvania, points to the success of the propaganda that emanated from the OSP: Aseventy-two percent of Americans believed it was likely that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the September 11th attacks, although no definitive evidence of such connection has been presented.”3 While it may be evident that the influence of the OSP was crucial in swaying President Bush toward a preemptive war on Iraq, what is less obvious to the public are the roots of the “neoconservative” ideology that shapes current U. S. foreign policy. Former University of Chicago political philosopher, Leo Strauss, spawned such members of the “cabal” as Abraham Shulsky and Paul Wolfowitz. Strauss’s philosophy is that, Aphilosophers need to tell noble lies not only to the people at large but also to powerful politicians.”4 The utility of this philosophy can be seen in the evolution of a bipartisan American foreign policy after World War II. But its far-reaching corrosiveness to a liberal democracy is evinced in debacles like the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and both the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, to name but a few. THE MEN WHO NOW SELL WAR Where once American propaganda was utilized to present democratic capitalism in the best possible light, it is now employed by its present purveyors to sell war. So says journalist James Bamford, author of such groundbreaking works on American Intelligence as The Puzzle Palace (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982) and Body of Secrets (Anchor Books, 2002), who notes that the civilian sector of the Pentagon, along with like- minded cohorts in the CIA, set up a “clandestine operation—part espionage, part PR campaign—for the express purpose of selling the world a war.”5 Again, according to Bamford, the man in charge of the operation was “a secretive and mysterious creature of the Washington establishment named John Rendon.”6 Rendon and his firm, The Rendon Group, are in the business of “perception management, manipulating information … and, by extension, the new media … to achieve the desired result.”7 In this case, the Rendon Group “created” the Iraqi National Congress (INC) out of wholecloth; a PotemkinVillage, as it were, of anti-Saddam militants. Ahmad Chalabi, handpicked by Rendon to lead the INC, contacted Judith Miller of the New York Times who openly courted neo-cons in the Bush Administration, to disseminate “reliable and significant” information, which purported to expose Saddam Hussein’s renewed program to develop “weapons of mass destruction.” The information, which turned out to be spurious, was then woven into a larger web of deceit and disinformation; a pattern that has characterized much of U. S. foreign intervention since at least the infamous Gulf of Tonkin Incident. As it pertains to the current Iraq conflict, Bamford likens it to “President Kennedy … outsourc(ing) the Bay of Pigs Operation to the advertising and public-relations firm of J. Walter Thompson.”8 Bamford claims that Iraq may be the “first war based almost entirely on a covert propaganda campaign targeting the media.”9 More ominously, U. S. geopolitical strategy has shifted away from its reliance during the Cold War on the superiority of American values and know-how, to “communications networks and technologies that control access to, and directly manipulate, information. As a result, information itself is now both a tool and a target of warfare.”10 Today, American democratic propaganda has come full circle from its basic tenet that the best this nation had to offer could successfully be sold to the rest of the world, albeit by less than noble—and transparent—means. What we are now witnessing is the fully-realized ambition of every erstwhile dictatorship: control over a vast communications network—the likes of which the world has never seen—which can be used to manipulate public opinion to the extent that the public would accept, even welcome, the loss of its own liberties. Perhaps, then, what former practitioners of the art of propaganda failed to recognize more than fifty years ago was that, like the atom, once the genie is let out of the bottle, its spread and usage is impossible to control. This book is a study of U.S. propaganda strategy and some of its major proponents during the Cold War in the 1950s, including President Dwight Eisenhower, and, most notably, his chief adviser for psychological warfare, C. D. Jackson. My aim is to present a comprehensive analysis of so-called “democratic propaganda” as a tool in confronting post-war communist expansion. I focus on how it was employed as a method of celebrating the virtues of what we call, the “American way of life.” In addition, what unfolds is a story of how one individual, C. D. Jackson, evolved different modes of traditional advertising to construct an effective counterbalance to Soviet propaganda in Europe, and around the world. Finally, I will assay the efforts of these American “psywarriors” in ultimately stemming the Soviet quest for world domination, and ending the Cold War. ENDNOTES 1. Hersh, Seymour, “The New Yorker,” 12 May 2003. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Bamford, James, “Rolling Stone Magazine,” 2 February 2005. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The rigorous task of preparing a manuscript is made possible, and enjoyable, by the contributions of those people who support your work. I take great pleasure, then, in singling out for appreciation the mentors, colleagues, teachers, librarians, archivists, technicians, institutions, historical witnesses, and family, who aided this undertaking with their guidance, their knowledge, and most of all, with their encouragement. First, I would like to extend a special debt of gratitude to mentor, colleague, and, most important, my treasured friend, Blanche Wiesen Cook. The subject itself was motivated by the important and invaluable scholarship of Professor Cook. A Distinguished Professor at the CUNY Graduate Center and at John Jay College, Blanche opened up a vast field of study to me and generously shared her wealth of historical resources. When first I met Blanche Cook as one of her Diplomatic History students in 1996, she recommended psychological warfare during the Eisenhower Administration as a topic for my doctoral thesis. I agreed, and it has been a rewarding choice, for it afforded me the opportunity to work with one of the preeminent historians in the nation. Her ground-breaking biographies of former First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, and former President, Dwight Eisenhower, are cornerstones in the field of modern political history. Moreover, Blanche has remained a constant inspiration to my work, and her expert editorial suggestions contributed greatly to whatever excellence is reflected in this manuscript. At the State University of New York at Stony Brook, I had the great fortune to be mentored by David Burner, whose intellectual guidance over the years has been indispensable to the completion of this project. Professor Burner painstakingly read several drafts of my original manuscript, and provided insights and suggestions for improving the narrative. His own expertise in the field of political history added immeasurably to my understanding of the Cold War and the atmosphere that spawned it. His friendship over these last sixteen years has been greatly appreciated and his recent passing leaves a void in all he touched Also at Stony Brook, I want to thank Professors Michael Barnhart and Ian Roxborough for reading my manuscript, and for stimulating my historical curiosity with their challenging courses. The Stony Brook History Department helped support my research in part with a travel grant which was put to good use during my trip to the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. Professor Dmitry Urnov, a colleague and dear friend was, along with his wife, Professor Julia Palievska, always there to assist all my endeavors in any way they could. Dmitry offered valuable insight into the Soviet reaction to America’s propaganda wars of the 1950s, and he was a foundation to that area of this subject. I am also beholden to Tom West for fine-tuning my manuscript stylistically, and for advice that never failed to improve my writing. An integral part of my research, were the personal reflections of those whose careers were dedicated to fighting communism while keeping the United States at peace. The hours spent interviewing former CIA official, Tom Braden (recently deceased) at his home in Virginia, were both eye- opening and pleasurable. Likewise, the late Abbott Washburn, former United States Information Agency Deputy, and his lovely wife Wanda, were gracious hosts at their Washington D.C, home, and they had a treasure trove of first hand experiences to contribute. Noted historian, the late Arthur Schlesinger Jr., also took the time to impart through correspondences his views on the subject of psychological warfare. At Adelphi University Library, the entire staff was always helpful to my endless search for source materials, including the accessing of oral histories. For this I express my sincere gratitude, especially to Judy Weiss, Jean Bernardo, and to my greatest supporter, Maureen Dolan. I owe, too, a technological debt to computer geniuses, Melania Clavell and Darlyn Perez. Their assistance allowed me to get through this process with my sanity relatively intact. The archivists at the Eisenhower Library were always helpful, thoroughly knowledgeable, and perpetually friendly. I am particularly grateful to Herbert Pankratz. Appreciation goes also to those lifelong friends who both inspired and supported me when it was most needed. They include Patrick Michael McKenna, Douglas Berlin, and George Melendez and family. If I left anyone out I am truly sorry. My most heartfelt thankfulness and praise is reserved for my wife Francine, without whose love, understanding, and emotional support I might have faltered. At those times of greatest self-doubt, she made it all seem worthwhile. To my late mother, I am grateful that her curiosity about the past apparently rubbed off on me. And I know that she would have taken great pride, along with the rest of my family, in this achievement. I am sure that my late father would have been proud, too. Last, but certainly not least, I thank for his years of lively companionship during the lonely hours of toil, Sammy,