Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict

278 Pages·1999·32.7 MB·English

by  Stephen Van Evera

Causes of War
A volume in the series
Corne/1 Studies ill Security Affairs
edited by RobertJ. Art
Robert )ervis
Stephen M. Wall
A list of titles in this series is available at
www.comellpress.comeU.edu.
Causes of War
POWB:R AND nrn ROOTS OF CoNFLICT
STBPHEN VAN EVBRA
Cornell University Press
ITRACA AND LONDON
Copyright C 1999 by Comcll UniverSity
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First published 1999 by CorM:ll Univenlity Press
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Library o( Congress Cataloging·ln-Publication Data
C.~ of war ; power •nd. the TOOtl!l of ronflid I
Stephen V.1n Evera.
p. cm.
lndudd indoc.
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1. WM. ;t. l)all)n<e of power. )· lntem~tion..'l rtlarions-Case studit"S. l. Title
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Tables
1, Testing stability theory: The 1950 US.<hina conllict, World War L
and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War 6o
z. Testing window theory: Japan, 1940-1941; Germany, 1933-1945;
and the United States, 1950-1954 93
3· The offense-deknse balance among great powers, 1;ooos-present 171
4· Testing offense-defense theory: Europe, •789-19905; ancient China;
and the United States, 1789-1990' 18o
5· Testing offcnse-dcfense theory: World War I 2-34
Diagrams
J8
1. Stability theory old and new
z. Window theory 75
)· How offense-dcknse theory developed: A schematic history 120
4· Complex and simple explanations for World Wa.r I 237
(viiJ
Acknowledgments
Many people gave me important help with this book. Shai Feldman
and Barry Posen shared key ideas that shaped my thinking. My many ar
guments with Marc Trachtenberg and John Mearsheimer seldom had win
ners, but much was learned-at least on my side. They also gave indis
pensable substantive and editorial advice on the manuscript, as did Robert
Art. For insightful comments and suggestions I also thank Miriam Avins,
Na.zll Choucri, Charles Glaser, Robert }etvi.s, Chaim Kauhnann, Car! .l<ay
sen, Teresa Johnson Lawson, Jack Levy, Peter liberman, Michael Mandel
baum. Steven Miller, Sofia Mortada, William Rose, Michael Salman. Richard
Samuels, Margaret Sev~nko, Glenn Snyder, Jack Snyder. Mark Torrey,
Stephen Wait and Kenneth Waltz. Leon Navickas and Rich Brennan pro
vided cruciallogistical help. And I received important education on subjects
covered here from my students at the University of California at Davis,
Tufts, Princeton, and MIT.
Generous support for my research came from the MIT Security Studies
Program, the Harvard Belier Center for Science and International Affairs,
and the Woodrow Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution.
S.V.E.
[viii)
Causes of War

Contents
Tables and Diagrams vii
Acknowledgments vill
1. Introduction 1
Questions Addressed, Why They Atise 1
Atguments Advanced, Answers Offered 4
lmplic.1tions for Realism 7
Methods u
Plan of the Book 1)
2.. False Optimism: illusions of the Coming War 14
False Hope and War 14
ntusions of Victory 16
ntusions of Cheap War )O
To Prevent War, Promote Transparency )4
3· Jumping the Gun: First-Move Advantages and Crisis Instability 35
First-Strike, First-Mobilization. and First-Move Advantages 37
Hypotheses on the EHects of F'llSt-Move Advantages 39
Tests of StnbWty Theory 5)
Causes of and Cures for F'llSt-Move Advantage 69
4· Power Shifts: Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability 73
Types of Windows 74
Hypotheses on the Effects oi Windows 75
Tests of Window Theory 87
Causes and Cures of Windows 103
[v)
Contmts
5· Cumulative Resoure<!$ 105
WNt Is Cumulativity? 105
Cumulativity and Conflict 1o8
Types of Cumulativity no
Beliefs about Cumulativity and Their Implications 112
The Future of Cumulativity 114
6. Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma tt7
Hypotheses on the Effects of Offense Dominance 123
Qualifications: When Offensive Doctrines and Capabilities Cause Peace 152
Causes of Offense and Defense Dominance t6o
Predictions and Tests of Offense-Defense Theory 166
How Much History Can Offense-Delense Theory Elq>lain? 185
Offense-Defense Theory in Perspective 190
7· Offense-Defense Theory and the Outbreak of World War I 193
The~ of the Cult of the Offensive. •890-•94 194
Predictions of Offense-Defense Theory about Europe, •890-•9•4 199
Evidence on Offense-Oelense Theory, 1890-194 202
Offense-Delense Theory and the Test of 1914 233
Explaining World Wa.r I 236
8. The Nuclear Revolution and the Causes of War 240
MAD :unong OetetTable States 43
MAD :unong Nondetemble Smtes; MAD :unong Many States 47
Alternatives to MAD: MARNE, BAD. WORSE. and USA 250
The ]anus-Faced Revolution 253
9· Conclusion 255
Appendix: Hypotheses on Power and the Causes of War 259
Index 263
[vi)