Cassino to the Alps

625 Pages·2010·40.35 MB·English

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The Mediterranean Theater of
Operati()ns
CASSINO TO THE ALPS
by
Ernest F. Fisher, Jr.
) MIUTAKi INSlRvcrDN \,
Cl,'NlljR OF i"lIII/~4.RY I IISTORY
(TNTlTJ) ARMY
sr/~n~S
WA.SHINCTON, D.C, 1993
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Fisher, Ernest F I CJ I H-
Cassino to the Alps.
(l'nited States Arm\' in Workl War II: The \lectilcrra-
nean theater of operations: 4)
Biblio~ral'll\: p.
Includes IIldex.
I World War, I '1:-ICJ-I CJ45-Campai~IlS-ltah. ~. It-
ah-lliston-{;erman occupation, 194:-1-1945. I. Ti-
tle. II. Series: llnited States. Dept. oj the Arnl\
Office of \Iilitan Histon. l'nited States Arlll\ in
World War II. I)7ti9.A5:i:l yo!. II, pt 4 [Difi:I.IH]
940.54' 1~'7'-\OH,
7fi-4:l097
First Printed 1977-(t\1I I Pub b-I-l
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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Maurice Matloff, General Editor
Advisory Committee
(As of I March 1976)
Otis A. Singletary Russell F. Weigley
University of Kentucky Temple University
Edward M. Coffman Maj. Gen. Robert C. Hixon
University of Wisconsin United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command
Harry L. Coles
Brig. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson
Ohio State University
United States Army War College
Frank Freidel, Jr. Brig. Gen. William C. Louisell, Jr.
Harvard University United States Army Command and
General Staff College
Peter Paret Col. Thomas E. Griess
Stanford University United States Military Academy
Cen1er of Military History
Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr., Chief of Military History
Chief Historian Maurice Matloff
Chief, Historical Services Division Col. Walter L. McMahon
Chief, Histories Division Col. James F. Ransone, Jr.
Editor in Chief j()seph R. Friedman
1Jl

· . . to Th()se Wh() Served

Foreword
From September 1943, when Allied troops came ashore near Salerno,
until German surrender in May 1945, 312,000 Allied soldiers were killed,
wounded, or missing in Italy. Was a campaign that from the first faced the
bleak prospect of coming to a dead end against the forbidding escarpment
of the Alps worth that cost? Was the o~jective of tying down German
troops to avoid their commitment in northwestern Europe all that the
campaign might have accomplished?
The answers to those questions have long been sought but, as is the
nature of history, must forever remain cOl-Uecture. What is established bet,
as this volume makes clear, is the tenacity and intrepidity displayed by
American and Allied soldiers in the face of a determined and resourceful
enemy, harsh weather, sharply convoluted terrain, limited numbers, and
indefinite goals in what many of them must have looked upon ~lS a
backwater of the war.
This volume relates the story of the last year of their struggle. Three
volumes previously published tell of the campaign in northwest Africa, the
conquest of Sicily and covert politico-military negotiations leading to
surrender of the Italian armed forces, and the campaign from the Allied
landings on the mainland through the bitter disappointment of the
amphibious assault at Anzio. This volume is thus the capstone of a fcwr
volume series dealing with American military operations in the western
Mediterranean.
Washington, D.C. JAMES L. COLU;-";S. JR.
1 April 1976 Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
VII
The Author
Jr.,
Ernest F. Fisher, graduated from Boston University in 1941, and
in World War II served in Europe with the 50 1st Parachute Infantry,
lOlst Airborne Division. He returned to Boston University and received
an M.A. in 1947 and in 1952 a Ph.D. degree in history from the
University of Wisconsin. From 1954 to 1959 Dr. Fisher was a historian
with Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe. Since 1960 he has been a
member of the staff of the Center of Military History. He is a retired
colonel in the Army of the United States.
viii
Preface
"Wars should be f(H1ght," an American corps comnunder noted in his
diary during the GlmJxlign in Itah, "in better country than this." I It W~IS
indeed an incredibly difficult place to fight a war. The Italian peninsula is
only some 150 miles wide, much of it dominated by some of the world"s
most precipitous mountains. 1\'or \\'as the \\"L'ather much help. It seemed to
those involved that it was always either unendurabh hot or bOlle-chilling
cold.
Yet American troops f(H1ght with remark;lble courage ~lIld tenacity, and
in company with a veritable melange of Allied troops: BclgiallS, BLlZilians,
British, Canadians, Cypriots, French (including superb mountain troops
from Algeria and Morocco), Palestinian Jews, Indi;lIls, kdians, :\lqXllese,
New Zealanders, Poles, South Africans, Syro-Lcbanese, and Yugos\aviam.
The combat;mts also included the U nited St~ltes Army's only speci;dized
mountain division, one of its last two segregated all-!\'egro divisions, and ~t
regimental combat team composed of Americans ofJlJxlIlese descent.
Despite the f()l'bidding terr;lin, Allied commanders several times turned
it to their advantage, achieving penetr~ltions or breakthroughs OVCT some
of the most rugged mountains in the peninsub. To !nvass mOlll1t;linous
terrain, the Allies at times resorted to amphibious bndings, notabh at
Anzio. Thereafter German commanders, forced to reckon \\,ith the
possibility of other sllch operations, had to hold back f())"(es to protect their
long coastal flanks.
The campaign involved one ponderous attack ~Ifter ;lIlother ;Igainst
fortified positions: the Winter Line, the Gustav Line, the Gothic Line. It
called f()r ingenuity in employing tanks and tank destroyers over terrain
that to the armored soldier seemed to be one V~lst ;\I1tit~lI1k ditch. It took
another kind of ingenuity in devising methods to get at the enemy III
flooded lowlands along the Adriatic coast.
It was also a campaign replete with controversY, as might have been
expected in a theater where the presence of \ariolJs nationalities and two
fairly equal partners imposed considerable strain on the process of
coalition command. \1ost troublesome of the questions that caused
controversy were: Did the American cOlIlIIlander, Mark Clark, err in
focusing on the capture of Rome rather than conforming with the wishes
of his British superior to try to trap retreating German /(lITes? Did Allied
1 Martin Blumensotl, Sairrno to Cassino, CNITED STATES AR~IY 1:--; WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1969), p. 234, quoting Maj. Gen. John P. I.UC\'.
IX