Cannae 216 BC: Hannibal smashes Rome's Army (Campaign)

96 Pages·1994·17.24 MB·English

by  Mark Healy

GENERAL EDITOR DAVID G. CHANDLER
HANNIBAL SMASHES
ROME'S ARMY
MARK HEALY
<Ill The heavy African infanl1Jr il/ustraud on the left of mith his Macedonian-type helmet, shield mullong
this plate wears a maillorica stripped from a dead pike. The mounted figure 1vell illustrates the Greek
legionarJI after the Battle ofL ake Trasim.e11e. By the style parzoplJI ofa n Afiican hetW.JI infimtYJ!Ina11 prior to
time ofCamme, Htmnibttl had equipped many ofh is 217. The linen cuirass a11d pteruges were clearly felt by
troops with captured equipment so that Livy was a.ble Hat~nibalto be less effective thrm the heavy mail shirts.
to observe that on the day oft he baule the Afrimns The crescent and the disk are thought to be accura.te
looked like Romans. Others ma.y ha.ve wom a full renderings ofC arthaginian standards. (Painti1lg by
Roman panoPIJr, but the example here is still equipped Richard Hook)
FOR 1 <:H\I.()(;t.f. o~· \LL 0001..\
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Colour bird'~ C) c 1 icw illustrauons b)
Peter llar1x:r.
C:artograph> b~ .\licrom~p.
II R'fiOttlln[( Cunna' b~ Richud llrnol>.
l'nmcd on I long Kong.
Ackno" lcdgcmcnts
!\number of people ha1c 'cry lindl~
hcli>Cd me. In particular I \\ish 10
than~ \1ichacli for helping me "hen in
hal~. and Leslj and l'aul for gcuing me
there. llu1 rn) Cl>pccial thanl> an: for
I hlda "ho did so much to JtCI me to
C:annac
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the >upp1) of phot<>gTaphs and di•
ll'""'' u;cd on this book: l>r. ~I. C.
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Tuni<ion Tourist Board; French
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\lu<~.·o '\.rqucologico :"•cion•l.
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CONTENTS
Introduction 6 218: Ticinus and Trebbia 44
The Causes of the Second Punic War 7 First Blood: Ticinus 46
Hannibal and Saguntum 8 Trebbia 49
Hannibal's Strategy 10 217: Lake Trasimene 52
The March to the Rhone 13 217-216: The Fabian Strategy 59
Rhone to the Alps 13 216: Factions and Strategy 60
The Opposing Leaders 16 'A step which the Romans had_n ever
Hannibal Barca 16 taken before' 65
Consuls as Commanders 19 The Approach to Cannae 67
Quintus Fabius Maximus 20 Whither the River? 71
The Opposing Armies 21 The Battle of Cannae 73
The Carthagnian Army 21 Battle is Joined 80
The Roman Army of the Hannibalic War 27 Aftermath 86
The Legions 29 Chronology 89
The Cavalry 31 A Guide to Further Reading 90
The Infantry 33 The Battlefield Today 91
The Socii 43 Wargaming Cannae 93
<1/f. Although this WI'Ving
ji-om Trajan 's column
depicts Berber ca.valry,
like mal~)' Roman depic
tions ofn on-Roman
troops, it is highly
stylised. The hair and
d1·ess could equally rep1·e
sent Numidian cavalry
from the Punic Wm·s
period. (Courtesy of
David Nicolle)
.... Terrtuot.ta statuette
ofa . fa./ ling Numiditm
mt1.rri01· from southern
lta.ly, Jrd to 2nd centuries
BC. (Louvre Museum,
5223, Paris)
INTRODUCTION
It has been the verdict of most historians, whether never have been resolved by diplomacy - only war
ancient or modern, that the immediate cause of the could determine its outcome. Once hostilities com
Second Punic War was Hannibal's capture of the menced, the strategy chosen by Hannibal to further
Spanish city of Saguntum in 219 BC. While marking the cause of Carthage was so audacious, and his
the formal outbreak of hostilities between Rome mastery of the battlefield in the Italian theatre so
and Carthage, however, it was in reality the climax overwhelming, that he came very near to extin
of a series of developments, following the First guishing tl1e Roman state. Consciousness of how
Punic War, that made conflict between these two perilously close the enterprise of Rome came to dis
powers certain. The notion of an embittered and aster at his hands goes far ro explain how deeply the
economically revived Carthage living in peace name of this Carthaginian general became etched on
alongside a dynamic and expansionist Roman state the collective psyche of the Roman people in the
was unlikely, when it was only a matter of time centuries that followed. 'Hannibal ad portas'
before they clashed in the one area where their retained its efficacy as a rallying cry for Romans in
interests were bound to coincide- in Spain. While times of national distress and as a potent threat on
there is much to suggest that neither Carthage nor tl1e lips of every Roman matron until the end of the
Rome deliberately engineered this new war, the fall Empire. In the two years following his invasion of
of Saguntum nevertheless precipitated the Italy, Hannibal humbled and decimated the citizen
inevitable conflict that would decide the great ques legions of Rome in a number of great battles. The
tion that lay unresolved at the heart of their mutual high water mark of his campaign occurred in 216,
antagonism: which of them would control the west when at Cannae he inflicted upon his numerically
ern Mediterranean? An issue of such import could superior enemy, the greatest defeat ever suffered by
<lllii~Fem rema.ins oft he
original cilJI of Carthage
mhich pre-date its destruc
tion by the Roma.ns in 1h e
Third Punic War in 146
BC exist totlay. Those
remains seen on the site
date from Roman times
anti Later. The site mas
first settled by the
Phoenicians of7);re c.814
and mas named by them
Kart-Hadaslu meaning
'nem city', 1vhich is 1'en
dered iu Latin as
Cat·thago. By the ti111e
Cartlwge and Rome anne
into open conflict in 264
BC, the former pomer had a
mighty commercial empi1·e
tuul had been t.he tlonti-
6
THE CAUSES OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
Roman arms. He did so by employing tactics that lowing the end of the First Punic War that
even today are regarded as the classic example of prompted the undying enmity of Hamilcar and the
victory secured through the double envelopmem of Barcids. In 237 Rome seized Sardinia from
the enemy. Carthage. By so doing, she was technically break
ing the peace treaty of 241. When the latter pre
pared to reoccupy the island, an ultimatum from
The Causes of the Second Punic War
Rome forced the Carthaginians into a humiliating
It was at an early age' tha~ Hannibal acquired the climb-down, which was compounded when a fur
animus towards Rome that was to motivate him so ther indemnity of 1,200 talents was levied. Poly
strongly throughout his life. Growing up in the for bius observed that the Carthaginians 'deeply
mative shadow of his illustrious father, Hamilcar resented the injustice, but were powerless to pre
Barca, Hannibal could not help but be influenced by vent it'.
the bitterness and resentment felt by Hamilcar As a trading nation, the economic consequences
Barca and many in Carthage towards Rome. While for Carthage of the loss of Sicily, Sardinia and Cor
such feelings arose naturally from their defeat in the sica were grave. It was in search of compensation
First Punic War, it was Rome's behaviour towards that Hamilcar was dispatched tO Spain to re-estab
Carthage in the years following that conflict that lish the Carthaginian position there. The region had
fanned the flames of hate and sowed the seeds for a long been important to Carthage for the supply of
war of revenge. vital raw materials and as a recruiting ground for
Following the decisive Roman naval victory off mercenary manpower for her army. It was to carve
the Aegates Islands in 241, the Carthaginian Suf out an empire in Spain that Harnilcar landed there
fete (Senate) empowered Hamilcar to sue for peace with his army, Hannibal and his son-in-law Has
after twenty three exhausting years of war. A victo drubal, in 237. In the years that followed, Hamilc ar
rious Rome demanded that their Punic enemy pay conducted a highly effective campaign in the penin
a high price for ending the hostilities. Carthage sula. Subsequent interpretations by historians of his
was required to evacuate Sicily and to pay a huge policy there, and also of his longer term intentions,
war indemnity of 3,300 talents over a period of just have been mixed. However, there are sound reasons
ten years. While such painful terms had to be for believing, as did Livy, that 'Hamilcar's ultimate
borne, it was Roman actions in the three years fol- object was an enterprise of far greater moment, and
na11t power in the mestem
Mediterranean for the
previous three centuries.
Notwithstanding treaties
ofm utual recognitiou a11d
trade regt4lation dt~ting to
508 and 348, Roman dom
ination oft he ltalit~n
peninsula brought her into
inevitable conflict with
Cartlmge over Sicily. The
24-year mar was described
by the Greek historian
Polybius as 'the most con
timtous ofw hich we have
k11owledge'. The peace
that followed would seem
to have been but a truce
before the struggle
resumed. ( Tu11isian -
Tour;st Office) ~.-
7
INTRODUCTION
that had he lived the invasion of Italy would have war between Rome and Carthage. At some juncture
taken place under 1-Iamilcar's leadership'. prior to Hannibal's return to New Carthage in the
The policy of conquest continued when Has winter of220/219, a serious dispute had broken out
drubal assumed command, following Hamilcar's in Saguntum between respective factions favouring
death in 229. Hasdrubal's military success was allied the support of Rome and Carthage. The former
to his deft employment of diplomacy, through called upon Rome to arbitrate in the dispute. A del
which he forged alliances with many Spanish tribes. egation was dispatched by the Senate and a solution
It is most unlikely that Rome was unaware of found; but in the process a number of citizens of the
Carthage's burgeoning military power under Has pro-Carthaginian group were executed. It was pos
drubal. The city of Massilia (Marseilles) had strong sibly this same Roman delegation that now visited
economic interests in Spain and was highly suspi Hannibal and demanded he forego intervention in
cious of Carthaginian expansion there. As a long the internal affairs of Saguntum and abide by the
time 'friend of Rome' it was in her best interests to treaty of 226 not to advance beyond the Ebro. Han
make such intelligence available to Rome, and it was nibal's indignant response was to assert that
probably in response to Massilia's promptings that Carthaginian citizens had been killed and that he
Rome formally intervened in 226 to limit 1-Ias was also obliged to uphold the justice of their cause.
drubal's northward advance. The treaty agreed He decided to refer the matter to the Suffete m
between HasdrubaJ and Rome required that the Carthage, who in their turn advised Hannibal to
Carthaginians would not cross the River Ebro in deal with the problem as he saw fit.
arms. The treaty however made no mention at all of Matters had now come to a decisive pass, and
the city of Saguntum. Lying some 140 kilometres to Hannibal had to weigh carefully the consequences
the south of the Ebro, its status in the light of the of whatever course of action he chose to pursue.
treaty was clearly anomalous. According to Polybius, There was little hesitation in his response. In sub
the people of Saguntum had 'placed themselves mitting to the judgement of Hannibal, the Suffete
under the protection of Rome' some years before was fully cognisant that he would choose to oppose
226; the exact date when this was done is problem the Roman demands - indeed he could hardly do
atic, but it may have been as early as 231. That this otherwise. They were as aware as he that for
relationship was possibly an established fact by 226 Carthage to acquiesce to Rome in this matter would
perhaps explains Carthaginian acquiescence in the provide them with a precedent to justify future
situation, the proviso being that Rome did not use interference in Spanish affairs - and that was as
its friendship with Saguntum as a pretext for future unacceptable to them as Hannibal.
interference in Spain. It was, however, exactly that Although Hannibal could not be fully certain of
perception - mistaken or otherwise - that led to a militant Roman response to the attack on Sagun
Saguntum becoming the casus belli between Rome tum in April 219, he nevertheless proceeded on the
and Carthage just seven years later. assumption that war would follow. In that sense the
attack on Saguntum must be seen as the overture to
the invasion ofltaly. Saguntum's capture was neces
Hannibal and Saguntum
sary, for Hannibal could not leave this pro-Roman
When Hasdrubal was assassinated in 221 the army city as an unconquered 'bridge-head' deep in his
in Spain unanimously appointed Hannibal as his rear. He was thus setting his Spanish house in order
successor. At 25 years old, he was chosen 'notwith prior to initiating his main strategy the following
standing his youtl1 because he had already shown year. or could he have been unaware that to have
that he combined a daring spirit with a quick and this new conflict begin in Spain also served his
fertile brain'. Hannibal reverted to his father's pol longer term strategy by encouraging the Romans to
icy of military conquest and rapidly advanced believe that Spain would be the major theatre of the
northwards to the Ebro line. In the meantime, war.
events within the city of Saguntum initiated a series Rome's response to the plight of Saguntum was
of developments that would lead to the outbreak of to do nothing. Yet when news of its fall finally
8
HANNIBAL AND SAGUNTUM
... Hannibal's decision to
la,JI siege to, and carrJI b]!
storm, the Spanish cit]! of
Saguntum in 2/9 was the
event that brought about
the Second Punic War.
(Spanish Tourist Office).
reached Rome in February 218 it produced a pro without doubt a complex of motivations governing
found shock among the members of the Senate. the deliberations in the Senatorial body. It would
That they should have reacted so was not at all sur seem reasonable however to presume that underly
prising. They had assumed that the forcible presen ing all rational debate in the Senate lay a genuine
tation of Rome's position on Saguntum to Hannibal atavistic fear of the ambitions of a revived former
the previous winter would have been sufficient to enemy who barely a generation earlier had been
deter him from taking military action against the defeated in the greatest and most costly war Rome
city. Intimidation based upon bluff was the essence had yet fought.
of their policy, for such had succeeded before with After much debate it was agreed by the Senate
Carthage. ow that the bluff had been called it that an embassy would be sent to Carthage armed
would appear they were uncertain as to what course with a provisional declaration of war. They were to
of action to pursue. If this were so, then the fall of place before the Suffete a simple alternative. Give
Saguntum was not automatically perceived as a casus up Hannibal and his staff- thereby accepting that
belli by everyone in the Senate, and it was now wit he had attacked Saguntum of his own volition - and
ness to some lively debate over the future course of disown him or Rome would declare war. It was Livy
action. who described one of the most dramatic scenes fi·om
A number of sources speak of heated exchanges ancient history when in about mid-May 218 the
of views between members of the Senate, some of Roman delegation was brought before the
whom demanded an immediate declaration of war Carthaginian Senate. One of the delegation, Fabius,
while others counselled a more careful policy, heard the Carthaginian refusal to hand over Hanni
including sending a delegation to Carthage. It is bal then 'laid his hand on the fold of his toga where
possible even at this early juncture to discern the he had gathered it at his breast and "I I ere", he said,
clash of factional interests that was to form a major "we bring you peace and war. Take which you will".
element in the senatorial disputes over strategy Scarcely had he spoken when the answer no less
throughout the Hannibalic War. It is certainly a sig proudly rang out: "Whichever you please - we do
nificant theme in our understanding of Roman poli not care." Fabius let the gathered folds fall and
tics in the period leading up to Cannae. There was cried: "'vVe give you war." The Carthaginian scna-
9