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ABUS STRATEGY FORLONDON CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 1: WhyBuses Matter 1. Busesattractlesspublicattentionthanalmostanyotherformoftransport. Aproposal to build a new motorway, railway line or airportwill securebanner headlines and arouse intensepublicdebate. Thecapitalcostofsuchschemes,theirenvironmentalimpactandtheir transport benefits are all on a large scale. Local bus services do not require major new infrastructure ofthis sort. So, they seldom make front-page news. And, outside the bus industry,broadquestionsofbuspolicyarouselittlepublicinterest. Peopletaketheexistence ofbus servicesforgranted. Thisis amistake. 2. InBritainasawhole,busandcoachpatronagestartedtogointodeclineshortlyafter the Second World War. In 1952, buses and coaches accounted for 41% ofall passenger transport; by 1982, thisfigurehaddroppedto8%. Inmileagetermsthedeclinewasfrom 50billionpassengermilesto25billion. TheGovernmentconcludedthaturgentactionwas neededtostemthedeclineintheindustry. Itthereforesetaboutthederegulationofthebus market. Theaimofderegulation-forbuses, as elsewhere- istoensurethatcompaniesare free to provide the goods or services the public wants at a reasonable price. Artificial constraints onthe ability ofbus operatorstotailortheir services to theircustomers’ needs was, intheviewoftheGovernment, aseriousobstacletostemmingthelong-termdeclinein buspatronage. The 1985TransportActimplementedthisbusderegulationpolicyintherest ofEnglandandWales. Forreasonsexplainedatparas28-32below, theLondonbusmarket wasnotripeforderegulationin 1985. 3. LocalbusesinLondon carry4millionpassengersaday, whichisaboutthesameas Network SouthEast and LondonUndergroundcombined, Londonhad the same picture of declining demand between 1952 and 1982 as the rest ofthe country. Between 1982 and 1987-88, however, demandforbus services in London rose from 1,041 million passenger journeysto 1,240million. Butgrowthindemandforbuseswasmuchlowerthanthegrowth in demand for London Underground and Network SouthEast services. And in 1989-90 demand suffered a slight downturn again. A decline in the London bus market is not a prospectthatcanbeviewed with equanimity by anyone whohas London’s best interest at heart- 4. Buses serve a different marketfrom rail andunderground. The tables atAnnex A look at the use made ofbuses by different types ofpeople and how different modes of transportareusedbypeople livinginLondon. They show that; mostuse ofbusesis madebypeople aged 11-19 or over 60; women makemoreuseofbusesthan mendo; buses are used mainly forlocaljourneys, withan averagetrip length of2-3 miles; 1 PrintedimagedigitisedbytheUniversityofSouthamptonLibraryDigitisationUnit unlikerail, busesareusedmainlyforpurposes otherthantraveltowork.. 5. Asabroadgeneralisation, busesareusedmostbypeoplewhodonothaveaccessto cars, forjourneyswhichcouldnotbeundertakenbyotherformsofpublic transport. They arealso used morebypeopleon low incomesthanbythose onhigherincomes. For such people making suchjourneys, thereis norealalternativetothebus. This isthetraditional reason why it has beenjudged essential to maintain bus services. It is still a valid and compellingreason for doing so. 6. ButtherearethreefurtherreasonswhytheGovernmentisparticularly concernedto safeguardthefutureofbusesinLondon. 7. First,intheshorttomediumterm,greateruseofthebusistheonlywayofachieving anysignificantincreaseinthetotalcapacityofLondon’stransportsystem. TheGovernment has plansfornew roads andnewrailways, includingamassiveprogramme to increasethe capacityofUndergroundstations andtoconstructnewrailwaylinesincentralLondon, but suchinfrastructuretakestimetobuild. Evenoveralongerperiodoftime, itisnotpossible to rely on new roads and railways to accommodate all the growth forecast for transport demand inLondon. 8. Second, buses are more suitable than other forms of transport for the important network of non-radial routes which feed and link the suburban centres. The rail and undergroundnetworkstendnottoprovidesuchlinks, anditisforthemostpartuneconomic tobuildnewrailwaysto doso. Itisimportantthatsuchconnections areavailablebecause ofLondon’s largeareaandthesizeandimportanceofmanyofthesuburbancentres. Buses alsoplay animportantroleinprovidingfeederservicesintotheextensiverailnetwork. 9. Third,busesarethemostfuel-efficientformofpassengertransportcurrentlyavailable inLondonandemitlesscarbondioxideintotheatmospherethanothermodes. Thetableat AnnexBcomparestheC02emissionfortravelbybuseswiththatfortravelbycar, taxi,rail andunderground. Availableevidencesuggeststhat,foraverage loadings, apassengermile travelledbybusemits less C02 thanapassengermiletravelledby car, taxi, tube ortrain. This means that ajourney by bus contributes less to global warming. Forjourneys that cannotbemade onfootorbybicycle, thebusistheenvironmentallyfriendly option. TheWavForward 10. The Governmentbelieves thatbus services in London dfi have apromising future lut, like bus services elsewhere, thatfuturehastobe worked for. Itis notsomethingthat he Government, theoperators orthepubliccantakeforgranted. m11. ThefiitureofbusesinLondondependsontheirabilitytowinandretain passengers competitionwith othertransportoptions. They mustcontinue to cater for their existing market, buttheymustalsowinnewbusiness. customerspraretqiuciurleamre,ntosp.erTahtoerysnneeeeddthtehefrfereedeodmomtoteoxptlaoirloerthbeusscsoeprevifcoersinmnoorveaticloonseinlybutso routes,typesofserviceandvehicle,andfarelevels.TheGovernmentbelievestheyalso need 2 PrintedimagedigitisedbytheUniversityofSouthamptonLibraryDigitisationUnit tolookagainatthequalityoffacilitiesforbususersinLondon. Aboveall, theyclearlyneed toimprovejourneytimesandwaitingtimes, andthereliability ofbus services. 13. Bus operators need Government action to open up the marketby deregulation and privatisation to provide the opportunities for greater competition between operators and betweenbusesand othertransportmodes. Governmentactionwillalsobeneededtoimprove trafficconditionsforbusesinLondon. 14. Thispaper sets outatenpointplanto achievetheserequirements: (1) deregulationoftheLondonbusmarketassoonaspossibleinthenextSession ofParliament; (2) safeguardingthefutureofconcessionarytravelinLondonandencouragingthe provisionofpre-paidtickettypes; (3) future tendering programme: before deregulation, improving the route tenderingsysteminLondon;andafterderegulation, ensuringthatbusservices areprovidedonuneconomicbutsocially necessary routes; (4) privatisationofLBLsubsidiaries; (5) improvementoftraffic conditions forallusers; (6) makingbuspriority measures morewidespreadand effective; (7) encouraging LT to ensure that LBL enters a deregulated market with a satisfactory bus fleet; (8) encouragingprovision ofproperwaitingfacilities; (9) encouragingpromotionofbusservicesandensuringprovisionofreliableand comprehensivepassenger information; (10) researchintothewaysinwhichdifferentapproachestobus operationimpact oncongestion. The elementsofthisplan arediscussedin Chapters2 and3 ofthispaper. Therestofthis ChapterdiscussesthepositionoutsideLondonandaddressessomewiderissuesaboutfuture responsibilities in London. Chapter4 summarises the proposals and invites comments on themby 7 May. TransportAct 1985 : DeregulationoutsideLondon 15. The Transport Act 1985 abolished outside London the previous system of Road Servicelicensing(underwhichoperatorsneededalicenceforeachroutetheyran, andother operatorsandlocalauthorities couldobjecttothe grantofalicence). Itintroduced instead a new system whereby operators were simply required to register with the Traffic 3 PrintedimagedigitisedbytheUniversityofSouthamptonLibraryDigitisationUnit Commissionerfortheirareathe servicesthey intendedtooperate. Sixweeks’ noticeis all thatisrequiredtointroduceorchange services. Quality controlsonoperatorlicensingand vehiclesafetywere maintained. 16. Local authorities then had to establish what extra socially necessary services they wished to subsidise. In place of the previous blanket network subsidy paid by local authoritiestooperators,competitivetenderingforspecificroutesandserviceswasintroduced. Thesemeasuresensuredthattherewascompetitionforsubsidisedservicesundercontractas wellascompetitionontheroadforcommercialservices. 17. Deregulation was not introduced in London at the same time because London Transporthadonlyrecentlybeentransferredfromlocalgovernmentcontroltonationalised industry status, and it was felt that time was needed to prepare London buses for full deregulation. ResponsibilityforResidualCentral Functions inLondon 18. TheintroductioninLondonoftheregimeoutlinedaboveshouldbringgreatermarket freedom, which should benefit operators and passengers alike. But the Government acknowledgesthattherewillbeacontinuingneedforsomeagencyoragenciestodischarge responsibihties which the market has insufficient incentive to discharge or which would benefitfromcentral co-ordination. Thesemayinclude someor all ofthefollowing: registeringservices (thiswillprobablybedonebytheTraffic CommissiotierasoutsideLondon); identifying services which are socially necessary, but which have not been registeredbybusoperators; awardingcontractsbycompetitivetenderfortheoperationofsuch services; ensuringtheprovisionandmaintenanceofbus stops, stationsand stands; ensuringdisseminationofinformationaboutbus services inLondon; facilitatinguseofbuspassesorthroughticketing arrangements; facilitatingandifnecessaryimplementingaLondon-wideconcessionaryfares scheme (forfurtherdiscussionofthispoint, seeparagraphs46-53 below). isnecessarytodecidewho shouldassumeeachoftheseresponsibilities. L LondonTransport(LT)atpresentprovidesaLondon-widebusnetwork, andawards 3ntractsbycompetitivetenderforsome35%ofitsroutemileage. Itprovidesandmaintains 3ps, stations and stands. And itproduces passenger informationbothfor display atbus )ps and forjourney planning in advance, such as maps showing both bus routes and .R/tubestations. Itisthereforewell-placedtotakeon some oralloftheabovefunctions, fit did so, thetransition to deregulation would be achieved with minimum disruption to 4 PrintedimagedigitisedbytheUniversityofSouthamptonLibraryDigitisationUnit informationflowandwithasmoothtransitionfromtheexistingtenderingregimetothenew one. However, itwouldalsobepossibletotransferexpertstafffromLTtoan alternative successor body if necessary. Moreover, LT’s retention of the responsibilities above - particularlytheallocationofsubsidytoprivatecompanies-couldbeinconsistentwithitsrole as a trading body and transport provider in its own right. In particular, there could be conflicts of interest between LT’s role as an operator of rail services (and potential competitor) andasprocurerofsociallynecessary servicesandcontroller ofbusfacilities. 20. Alternatively, these functions could be devolved to the individual boroughs. This wouldensuredecisionson non-commercialroutesandprovisionofinformation weretaken at a local level, butpossibly atthe expense ofabroader overview. Although average bus journeys areless thanthree miles, there willbe many cases where atripto hospitalorthe nearestmajorsupermarket crosses atleastoneboroughboundary. Itmay be thatthe only waytoensureacomparablelevelofsocialprovisionacrossLondonisthroughaLondon-wide body. Moreover,theboroughshaveverylittleexperienceofpublictransportadministration orprovision. 21. AnalternativeoptionwouldbetocreateaPassengerTransportAuthority (PTA)for London, along the lines ofother metropolitan areas. These PTAs are responsible for all aspectsofpublictransportintheirareas-notjustforbuses. However, asbothBRandLT are nationalised industries, and as such areunderthe directcontrol ofthe Government, it wouldnotbeappropriate forthemtocomeunderPTA control. Moreover, althoughthere areargumentsinfavourofco-ordinatedlocalcontrol, the creation ofanew local authority supervisorybodywithnoprevioustransportexperiencentightleadtoLTmanagementbeing distractedfromthemajorchallengesfacingtheminrelationtoLondonUndergroundandthe DLR. London Underground, in particular, has simultaneously to invest in essential infrastructure and in further improvements in safety standards, and to provide additional transportcapacitytocopewithanupsurgeindemandfortubetravel. TheGovernmentdoes not, therefore, believethatthe creationofa PTAisnecessary or desirable. Its creation is not a logical consequence ofderegulation ofthe bus market. And a new body (with 33 members) couldbe large andunwieldy to establish - possibly delaying changes to thebus marketwhichare, intheGovernment’sview, urgentlyneeded. 22. Avariant ofthe PTA option wouldinvolvesetting up a new London bus authority which would represent the boroughs as a ‘bus-only’ PTA, leaving the tube and other LT functions separate and responsible to central government. Creating a London-wide bus authority composed of representatives of the individual boroughs could exploit the local knowledgeavailabletoeachborough,whileintroducinganoverallLondon-wideperspective. The identification of socially necessary bus routes will need to take account of the underground, DLRand otherfacets ofpublictransportprovisionin London. Itwouldbe necessaryto ensureappropriate meansofcommunicationbetweenanew bus authority and both BR and LT, for instance on information provision, and, in the case of LT, the concessionary fares scheme. 23. AfurtherpossibilitywouldbeanewLondon-wideagencyformedundertheauspices oftheDepartmentofTransportspecificallytocarryoutthefunctionsdescribedabove. This optionwouldplacedirectresponsibilityforthese aspects oftransportprovision muchmore clearlywithcentralGovernmentthanelsewhere, andwouldentail aclear splitbetweenbus 5 PrintedimagedigitisedbytheUniversityofSouthamptonLibraryDigitisationUnit andrailway markets, aswouldthenon-PTAborough-basedoptions. 24. TheGovernmentwouldwelcomecommentsonthesealternatives. The Government recognises that the boroughs will have a particular interest in how and by whom these functionswillbe carried out. Inparticular, they willhave views on how bestto identify socially necessary routes. They will continue to have responsibility for London’s concessionarytravel scheme, whichisdiscussed separatelyfurtheroninthepaper. Fundin g.. 25. The funding options depend on the body or bodies which are chosen to carry out whatevertasksarecentralised. Fundingofsociallynecessarybusescouldcomefromcentral government via a departmental agency, from LT via Government grant, or from local authorityfundsiftheborough, PTAorbus-only(ielocalauthority)optionswerepreferred. It might be sensible for individual boroughs to be able to buy in additional services, as districtcouncils outside London can supplement services provided at the county council’s behest. Concessionaryfareswill, asnow, befortheboroughs collectivelytodetermineand finance. Totheextentthatacentralauthorityprovidesfacilitiesforoperatorssuchasstops, stands and information, the costs ofthose services couldberecoveredfromthe operators. Thescaleofthecontributionfromeachoperatorwouldhavetobearareasonablerelationto the amountofusethey made ofthe differentfacilities. On the other hand, it is obviously desirable to keep the administration of any fee as simple as possible. Costs could be recoveredviaalevyperbusoperatedorperbusorpassengermilerun,onanyroutewhich picksuporsets downpassengerswithinthe greaterLondonarea. Provisionforsuchafee couldbemadeinlegislation.Paymentforuseofbusstationscouldberecoveredatthestation as aseparatefee. However,this isafurther matteronwhichwewouldwelcometheviews ofinterestedparties. ConsumerRepresentation 26. The London Regional Transport Act 1984 established a consumer watch-dog, the LondonRegionalPassengersCommittee(LRPC),torepresenttheinterestsoftransportusers inrelationtotransportprovidedbythenationalisedindustriesBRandLT. Ithasavoiceon mattersrelatingto allLT servicesandtoBRservicesintheLondon area. 27. Afterderegulation the LRPC’s role inrelation to LUL, DLR and BR services will remainasnow. Itsroleinrelationtobuses will change. Itwillnothaveastatutoryrole in respect of commercial bus services. Independent bus operators will not be formally accountabletoitforanyaspectoftheircommercialbusservicesprovidedpost-deregulation. ButtheLRPC will have a continuing role in relation to LT’s remaining activities, which could be extended tocover any otherpublic authority whichtook on the central fiinctions described above. This would mean that the LRPC could take up with that authority complaintsaboutthequalityofbusstations; stands;information;tenderedservices; orabout an area of London apparently lacking socially necessary bus services. Passengers on commercial services will be protected by the operation of the normal competition and consumerprotectionlegislation as itappliesnow orinthefuture outsideLondon. 6 PrintedimagedigitisedbytheUniversityofSouthamptonLibraryDigitisationUnit CHAPTER2: PROMOTING COMPETITION Point 1 : Deregulation Background 28. The Government has long been committed to the deregulation of bus services in London. In 1985, London’sbus marketwasnotreadyforderegulation. London Transport (LT)dominatedthemarkettosuchanextentthatcompetitorscouldhavefoundno foothold. AndLThad, itself, onlyjustpassed outofGLC control. Itneededtime totransform itself into amorecommercially orientatedoperation. 29. Itwas, therefore, cleartotheGovernmentthatthebus marketinLondonhadtobe preparedforderegulation. Inpursuitofthis, thefollowingmeasures have beentaken: LT’s bus operations have been vested in its subsidiary, London Buses Ltd (LBL); LBL, in turn, has established 12 bus operating subsidiaries and one coach operator; LBL has decentralised its engineering function and delegated management responsibility - egforrecruitmentandpay -tothe subsidiaries; the 12bus-operating subsidiaries competewith one another and withprivate sectorcompaniestooperatetenderedbus services onLT’sbehalf. 30. Until1985/6virtuallyallLT’sbusserviceswereprovideddirectlybytheirownbuses. Even now the majority are provided by the operating companies owned by LBL. The Government gave its full supportto LT’s bus tendering programme when it began in that year. Theprimeaimwastoprocurebus servicesby competitivetendering andby so doing achieveimprovementsinserviceperformanceandreductionsinoperatingcosts. Thesecond aim was to encourage other operators to enter the London bus market in advance of deregulation. 31. TheGovernmentwelcomestheprogressthathasbeenmadeto date. Just overone- thirdofLT’sroutenetworkhasbeenputouttotender.Operatingcostspermilehavereduced by20% inrealtermssince 1985/6overLBLasawhole; androutesonthetenderedservices (whetherprovidedbyLBLorbyindependentoperators)operateatalowercostpermilethan the remaining LBL services. They have a higher quality of service measured in terms of percentageofscheduledmileageoperated, averagewaitingtimeetc, althoughsomeofthese differencesreflectthe differenttypesofrouteoperated aswellas genuine improvementsin efficiency. Oftheroutestendered,LBLcompanieshavewon60% but17otherindependent operatorsnowprovide76servicesonLT’sbehalf. So,thereisno,wapoolofprivate sector operatorswhohavepractical experience ofoperatingbus servicesinLondon and areready totakeadvantageoftheopportunitieswhichderegulationoftheLondonbusmarketwillopen 7 PrintedimagedigitisedbytheUniversityofSouthamptonLibraryDigitisationUnit up. Itisthus clearthattenderinghasledtoprogress onboththekey objectivessetoutin paragraph 30 above. 32. However, althoughthisprogressismostencouraging, thereisalimittowhatcanbe achievedbythisprocess.IfLTsimplycontinuedlettingroutecontractsuntilallLondon’sbus routesweretendered, thenfurtherimprovementswouldresult.ButtheGovernmenttakesthe viewthatthepresentsystemisplanning led, andthatcentralplanning, howeverexpertly it may be conducted, is not an acceptable substitute for the free play of market forces. Decisionsonbusroutesarebesttakenbycompanieswhoknowthattheirsuccessdependson meetingtheir customers’requirements. Andsuchdecisionsarebesttakenbythosecloseto thelocalmarket,ratherthanbyremotecentral-planners. TherewasacaseinLondonrecently ofabusoperatorwantingtoenterthemarketandofferinnovativeserviceswhowasthwarted by theregulatoryregimeandthekeyrolewhichLT playsinthatregime, despite apparent passenger enthusiasm for his services. The Government is anxious to free the market to preventrecurrences ofthis sort offirustrationofenterprise. The Governmentbelieves that deregulation in London willbring a more flexibleresponseto passenger demand for new, more frequent or more accessible services. Outside London, deregulation has led to an increase in bus mileage of the order of 19%, at 50% less cost in real terms to local authorities. Some ofthe increase in mileagemay bedueto the increased use ofsmaller, more frequentminibuses. Itistoo soontotelltowhatextentthehistoricdownwardstrend in bus patronage has been stemmed, but it has certainly not been exacerbated. The Governmentbelieves thatLondon, too, isnowreadytotakethenextstep. HowWill DeregulationBeIntroduced? 33. Althoughitisimpossibletogivefirmdatesordetailedplansinadvanceoflegislation, thispaper sets outhowthe Governmentenvisages the arrangements working inLondonin therun-uptoandafterderegulationday. Itishopedthatthiswillhelpoperatorsprepareand planforderegulationwithmorecertaintythanhashithertobeenpossible. TheGovernment will ensure in deregulating London bus servicesthatthe capital benefits from any lessons which arebeing learntfromexperiences inotherareas. 34. ThebasicpowersneededtoderegulatetheLondonbusmarketarepresentinsection 46 ofthe TransportAct 1985. This empowers the Secretary ofState to repeal the special provisionswhichcurrentlyapplytoLondon,therebybringingthecapital’sbusmarketwithin the same deregulated regime as the rest of the country. However, the Government has decidedthatitcannotrely exclusively ontheseextantpowers. There aretwo mainreasons for this. First, the powers in the Transport Act 1985 cannot be used to put London’s concessionaryfares schemeon asecurefooting: thispointisdiscussedatparagraphs46-53 below. Second,LThasvariousstatutoryduties,notablyitsgeneralduty"toprovideorsecure theprovision ofpublicpassengertransportservicesfor GreaterLondon", whichwouldnot sitcomfortably witha deregulatedbusmarket. Italsohas aduty todetermine thegeneral levelandstructureoffares, thegeneralstructureofroutesandthegenerallevelofprovision intermsoffrequency ofoperationofits services. These dutiesobviously conflictwiththe deregulated market. The Government has concluded, therefore, that the way for the deregulationoftheLondonbusmarketshouldbepavedbytheintroductionofnewprimary legislation. Busderegulationis animportantchangeforany city, andparticularly important forLondon, wherethereareintensepressuresontheexistingtransportsystem. Itisclearly 8 PrintedimagedigitisedbytheUniversityofSouthamptonLibraryDigitisationUnit importantthatwegetderegulationright. Introducingnewprimarylegislationallowsustodo so. 35. We envisage introducing legislation as soon as possible in a new Parliament. The approximatetimetableforthatandtheassociatedeventswouldbeasfollows: Atorbeforebeginning ofyear: IntroductionofBill Year 1 March Tendering moratorium: no newtenders advertisedfrom now on; existing contracts extendedto April ofYear2 July Royal Assent StartoflastLTroutecontractsofferedunderoldsystem (pre-March) August Deadline for Registration of routes by incumbent operators September DeadlineforRegistrationofroutesbynewoperators,or ofnewroutes FromSeptember Central authority to identify uncommercial routes and putthem outtotender Boroughsto agreenew concessionary faresscheme Year2 By March Tendering of non-commercial routes is completed and operatorsarrangevehicles, publicity etc April DeregulationDay; LBLservicesceasetobeeligibleforGovernmentgrant; LT controlofbus faresends; OldLTroute contractsterminate; Startofsocialcontracts; Startofnew concessionaryfares scheme Year3 June PrivatisationofLBLsubsidiariescommences, oncethey haveproducedtheLmst setofannual accounts covering afullyear’s operation inthederegulated market 9 PrintedimagedigitisedbytheUniversityofSouthamptonLibraryDigitisationUnit DeregulatedRegime 36. Atpresent, operators of local services otherthan London Transport’s must obtain LondonLocal ServiceLicencesfromtheTraffic Commissioner,ratherasoperators outside Londonhadbeforederegulationtoobtainroadservicelicences.Afterderegulation,asoutside London, bus operators would be able to run services anywhere they thought there was sufficientdemand, subjecttotheirsatisfyingcertainbasicconditions(eghavingavalidPSV operator’s licence) andproviding theyregistered each service in advance withthe Traffic Commissionerfortheirarea. 37. He would not be able to restrict or refuse their operations except where he had determinedtrafficregulationconditions. Suchconditionscanimposearangeofrestrictions, egoverthesitingofbusstopsorthelengthoftimeabusmaystandataparticularstopping place. Any such conditions mustapply equallyto allbus operators. OutsideLondon such conditionscanonlybeimposedforsafetyorcongestionreasonsandattherequestofatraffic authority. In recognition of the particular congestion problems facing London, the MetropolitanPolice,theboroughs,theTrafficDirectorandanycentralbusauthoritywould bedeemedtobetrafficauthoritiesinrelationto servicesstoppinginLondon, andwouldbe ableto requestthe introductionoftrafficregulation conditions. As outsideLondon, there wouldbearightofappealtotheSecretaryofStateforbothoperatorsandtrafficauthorities againstdecisions ontrafficregulation conditions. 38. Inaddition, underSection 6 oftheRoad Traffic RegulationAct 1984, the London boroughshavethepowertoissuetrafficregulationordersrestrictingorprohibitingtheuse ofparticularclassesofvehiclesontheirroads. Thesepowersmaybeused, inconsultation withthepolice, to avoidrisks ofdangeror damage, to facilitate thepassage oftraffic, to preserve the amenities ofan area, orto prevent use ofa road by traffic in an unsuitable manner. UnderSection 122oftheAct, localauthoritiesmustinmakinganordergive due considerationtomaintainingaccesstopremisesandtheimportanceoffacilitatingthepassage ofpublic servicevehicles. RegistrationofCommercialServices 39. Again followingthe pattern set intherest ofthe country, the normal requirement wouldbeforoperatorstogivetheTrafficCommissioner6weeksnoticeofalterationsto, or withdrawalof,theirservice. Intheimmediaterun-uptoderegulationtransitionalprovisions would be needed. They would be very much the same as those which operated outside London. For example, althoughLondonLocal Service Licences would continue to apply untilderegulation day, all suchlicences mustterminateonthatday; licences dueto expire betweenpassmgoftheActandderegulationdaywouldbeallowedtocontinueuntilthatday andprovisionswouldbeneededtoensurethatallrouteswhichweretorunfromderegulation dayonwards wereregistered 8/9 monthsbefore, unlessthecentralbus authority supported Aeirlate additiontothenetwork. This freezeisnecessaryto allowtime forthreethings. First thebusauthoritymustmakeanassessmentofthecommercialnetworkandoftheextent towhich&erearesociallynecessaryrouteswhichtheoperators arenotproposingtoserve. Second, thoseroutesmustbeputouttotender. Third, thesuccessfulbiddermustbegiven timeto orgamsetheservicetostartonderegulationday. 10 PrintedimagedigitisedbytheUniversityofSouthamptonLibraryDigitisationUnit