Bullets with names : the deadly dilemma

164 Pages·3.4 MB·en_US

by  Herbert, Roger G.;Teti, Frank M.

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California
THESIS
BULLETSWITH NAMES:
THEDEADLYDILEMMA
by
Roger G. Herbert, Jr.
June 1992
Thesis Advisor: Frank M. Teti
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
'KNOXLIBRARY
I GRADUAT SCHOOL
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Unclassified
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2a. SECURITYCLASSIFICATIONAUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITYOFREPORT
Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.
2b. DCLASSIHCATION/DOWNGRADINGSCHEDULE
PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONREPORTNUMBER(S) MONITORINGORGANIZATIONREPORTNUMBER(S)
6a. NAMEOFPERFORMINGORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICESYMBOL 7a. NAMEOFMONITORINGORGANIZATION
NavalPostgraduateSchool (IfApplicable) NavalPostgraduateSchool
NS
6c ADDRESS(city,state,andZIPcode) 7b. ADDRESS(city,state,andZIPcode)
Monterey,CA93943-5000 Monterey,CA93943-5000
NAMEOFFUNDING/SPONSORING 6b. OFFICESYMBOL PROCUREMENTINSTRUMENTIDENTIFICATIONNUMBER
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PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORKUNIT
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11. TITLE(IncludeSecurityClassification)
BulletsWithNames: TheDeadlyDilemma(U)
12. PERSONALAUTHOR(S)
Herbert,RogerG.Jr.
13a. TYPEOFREPORT 13b. TIMECOVERED 14. DATEOFREPORT(year,month.day) 15. PAGECOUNT
Master'sThesis FROM TO 1992,June lfij
16. SUPPLEMENTARYNOTATION
TheviewsexpressedinthisthesisarethoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheDepartmentof
DefenseortheU.S.Government.
17. COSATICODES 18. SUBJECTTERMS(continueonreverseifnecessaryandidentifybyblocknumber)
FIELD GROUP SUBGROUP assassination;politicalassassination;assassinationandFidelCastro;assassination
andPatriceLumumba;OperationVengeance;PhoenixProgram;ExecutiveOrder
Number11905;ExecutiveOrder12333,
19. ABSTRACT(Continueonreverseifnecessaryandidentifybyblocknumber)
TheUnitedStates,byexecutiveorder,hasunilaterallyforfeitedassassinationasaninstrumentofforeignpolicy. Some
AmericansnowbelievethatadeclaredprohibitionunreasonablylimitsU.S.capabilitytocounterthenationalsecuritythreats
posedby-terrorists,revolutionariesandThirdWorldcrusaders. Thisthesisisanexaminationofthenationalsecuritypolicy
dilemmawhichpoliticalassassinationpresents. Circumstancesareconceivableinwhichutilitariancalculationswouldendorse
assassinationasthemostmoralapplicationofdeadlyforce. Yetthedraconianpracticeofassassinationasaninstrumentof
Americanforeignpolicyseemstoconradictdemocraticideals. Thisdiesisdetailsbothargumentsanddrawstwomajor
conclusions. First,assassinationcannotsupportlong-termU.S.policygoalsorwarfightingefforts. Ultimately,suchmethods
couldweakenAmerica'sglobalposition. Second,whileassassinationhasnoplaceintheU.S.warfightingarsenal,the
assassinationbanitselfhasbecomedysfunctionalandrequiresreevaluation.
20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITYQOFABSTRACT Q 21. ABSTRACTSECURITYCLASSIFICATION
\X\ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED SAMEASRPT. DTICUSERS Unclassified
NAMEOFRESPONSIBLEINDIVIDUAL 22b. TELEPHONE(IncludeAreaCode) 22c. OFFICESYMBOL
FrankM.Teti [phone] NS
OD FORM 1473, 84MAR 83APReditionmaybeuseduntilexhausted SECURITYCLASSIFICATIONOFTHISPAGE
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Bullets WithNames:
The Deadly Dilemma
by
Roger G. Herbert, Jr.
Lieutenant, United StatesNavy
B.S.,Davidson College, 1983
Submitted in partial fulfillmentofthe requirements
for the degree of
MASTEROFARTS IN NATIONALSECURITY AFFAIRS
from the
NAVALPOSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1992
K
E^OXUBR
MONTHS, SSB.JW00I
ABSTRACT
TheUnitedStates,byexecutive order,hasunilaterallyforfeited assassination
as aninstrumentofforeignpolicy. SomeAmericansnowbelieve thata declared
prohibition unreasonably limits U.S. capability to counter the national security
threats posed by terrorists, revolutionaries and Third World crusaders. This
thesis is an examination of the national security policy dilemma which political
assassination presents. Circumstances are conceivable in which utilitarian
calculationswouldendorseassassinationasthemostmoralapplicationofdeadly
force. Yet the draconian practice of assassination as an instrument of American
foreign policy seems to contradict democratic ideals. This thesis details both
argumentsanddrawstwomajorconclusions. First, assassinationcannotsupport
long-term U.S. policy goals or warfighting efforts. Ultimately, such methods
couldweakenAmerica'sglobalposition. Second,whileassassinationhasnoplace
in the U.S. warfighting arsenal, the assassination ban itself has become
dysfunctional and requires reevaluation.
111
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vii
THE DEADLY DILEMMA
I. 1
A. THE STATE OFTHE
INQUIRY INTO ASSASSINATION 6
B. FOCUSSING A BLURRY REALITY 10
1. Assassination Writ Large 11
2. What is Assassination? 13
II. ASSASSINATION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 18
YAMAMOTO
A. 20
1. Background 20
2. The Mission 22
3. Was Yamamoto Assassinated? 25
B. THE PHOENIX PROGRAM 26
1. Origins 27
2. Effectiveness 29
3. Phoenix and Assassination 32
C. CONCLUSIONS 34
DEMOCRACY OVERREACTS:
III.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE BAN 37
A. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 40
IV
1. The Nedzi and Pike Committees 40
2. The Church Committee 42
3. Church Committee Findings 45
B. POLICY REACTION 50
C. CONCLUSIONS 53
IV. POLITICAL ASSASSINATION
AS POLITICAL UTILITY 56
A. FRICTIONS 57
1. Reagan Tests the Executive Order 58
2. The Bush Administration Under the Ban 60
3. Reconsidering Clausewitz 62
B. ASSASSINATION AND WARFIGHTING 65
1. Warfighting at the National Level 65
2. Warfighting at the Sub-National Level 73
C. DETERRENT ADVANTAGES SURRENDERED 83
1. What Deters? 83
2. Can Assassination Deter? 85
D. CONCLUSIONS 87
V. ASSASSINATION, REALPOLITIK
AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 89
A. PRACTICAL UNCERTAINTIES 93
1. Operational Challenges 93
2. An Exaggerated Linkage? 99
3. Costs Unseen and Unseeable 103
B. THE PRICE OF REALPOLITIK 108
1. Ideology and National Power 109
2. The Force ofExample Ill
C. CONCLUSIONS 116
VI. ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA 118
A. POLICY ALTERNATIVES 122
1. The Exceptionalistic Approach 122
2. Normalizing Political Assassination 125
3. Recommendations 129
4. Recommendations for Future Research 132
B. CONCLUSIONS 135
BIBLIOGRAPHY 139
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 148
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The UnitedStateshas unilaterallyforfeited assassination as aninstrumentof
foreignpolicy. In 1976,PresidentFordissuedExecutiveOrder 11905inresponse
to allegations that in the early 1960s the CIA had been involved in plots to
assassinatepremiersPatriceLumumbaandFidelCastro. Containedinthisthirty-
six page document were seventeen words prohibiting assassination: "No
employeeoftheUnitedStatesgovernmentshallengagein,orconspireto engage
in,politicalassassination." TodaytheassassinationbaniscontainedinExecutive
Order 12333.
Itis difficultto argue with the commendablemoralperspective of the order.
YetsomeAmericansnowbelieve thata declaredprohibition unreasonablylimits
U.S. capability to counter the national security threats posed by terrorists,
revolutionaries and Third World crusaders. This thesis is an examination ofthe
national security policy dilemma which political assassination presents.
Those who favor rescinding the assassination ban contend that if a threat to
U.S. national interests assumes a personal character, then the counter to that
threatisjustified,inthenameofexpedience, to do thesame. Thispaperpresents
three arguments favoring this orientation. First, assassination could save lives.
Since assassination goes directly to the source, it is a more humane application
of deadly force. The second argument is that assassination may be an
vn
indispensable weapon in a Third World regional or low intensity conflict. In
manyThirdWorldnations,thelinesseparatingarmiesfromthepersonalagendas
of the dictator are blurred to the point thatitis difficult to effectively attack one
without attacking the other. Finally, in manyThirdWorld states, the conceptof
nation differs from theWestern version. It is the regime, not the security of the
state, which is most highly prized. A deterrent threat which fails to target the
regime, therefore, is ineffectual.
Squaring off against these arguments are six practical and philosophical
considerations. First, assassination, if attempted, is a highly complex operation.
Defeating the security which surrounds military and political leadership may
prove tobeprohibitivelydifficult. The second argumentagainstassassinationis
the difficulty of identifying agents to carry out such an operation. American
soldiers arenotassassins. Ifleft tosurrogates, U.S. political andmilitaryleaders
would lose control over the endeavor. Third, there is very little historical
evidence to suggest that assassination can accomplish its purpose. The linkage
betweena specificindividual, particularly atthelevelofnational leadership, and
a disagreeable policy which his nation or organization may embrace, is often
exaggerated andnevercompletelyclear. Forth, an assassination is onlylogical if
the successor is more benign. However, predicting the identity and character of
thatsuccessor is problematic. Fifth, iftheUnited States chooses to assassinate its
enemies, then, havingset the moral agenda, it invites retaliation in kind. Finally,
assassination, perceived by many to contradict democratic norms, may weaken
vin