House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee Building New Nuclear: the challenges ahead Sixth Report of Session 2012–13 Volume I Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Additional written evidence is contained in Volume II, available on the Committee website at www.parliament.uk/ecc Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed Tuesday 26 February 2013 HC 117 Published on 4 March 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £20.00 The Energy and Climate Change Committee The Energy and Climate Change Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department of Energy and Climate Change and associated public bodies. Current membership Mr Tim Yeo MP (Conservative, South Suffolk) (Chair) Dan Byles MP (Conservative, North Warwickshire) Barry Gardiner MP (Labour, Brent North) Ian Lavery MP (Labour, Wansbeck) Dr Phillip Lee MP (Conservative, Bracknell) Rt Hon Peter Lilley MP (Conservative, Hitchin & Harpenden) Albert Owen MP (Labour, Ynys Môn) Christopher Pincher MP (Conservative, Tamworth) John Robertson MP (Labour, Glasgow North West) Sir Robert Smith MP (Liberal Democrat, West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) Dr Alan Whitehead MP (Labour, Southampton Test) The following members were also members of the committee during the parliament: Gemma Doyle MP (Labour/Co-operative, West Dunbartonshire) Tom Greatrex MP (Labour, Rutherglen and Hamilton West) Laura Sandys MP (Conservative, South Thanet) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk. Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/ecc. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume. The Report of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Sarah Hartwell-Naguib (Clerk), Liz Bolton (Second Clerk), Jenny Bird (Senior Committee Specialist), Tom Leveridge (Committee Specialist), Luanne Middleton (Inquiry Manager), Shane Pathmanathan (Senior Committee Assistant), Jonathan Olivier Wright (Committee Assistant), Joe Strawson (Committee Support Assistant), and Nick Davies (Media Officer). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Energy and Climate Change Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 2569; the Committee’s email address is [email protected] Building New Nuclear: the challenges ahead 1 Contents Report Page Summary 3 1 Introduction 5 Context of the inquiry 5 Our inquiry 6 2 Nuclear new build in the UK 7 Plans for nuclear new build in the UK 7 Consequence of failing to deliver new build 7 Will the new nuclear programme be delivered? 9 Lessons from other countries 9 Is a Plan B needed? 11 3 Financing new nuclear 13 Where will the money come from? 13 Barriers to raising finance 14 The Government’s solutions 15 Contracts for Difference 15 Generic Design Assessment 16 UK Guarantees Scheme 16 Alternative approaches 17 4 Public attitudes 19 Public opinion at the national level 19 Fukushima 19 Foreign ownership of nuclear power stations 20 Local level opinion 20 Building public support 21 Government leadership 21 Trust, understanding of risk, and risk governance 22 Community benefit 24 5 Supply chain and skills 26 Potential for bottlenecks and delays 26 Opportunities for UK businesses 27 Skills 28 6 New technologies 30 Thorium 30 Pebble bed reactors 30 Fast reactors 31 7 Conclusion 32 8 Recommendations 33 2 Building New Nuclear: the challenges ahead 9 Annex 1: Summary of private session with Hitachi 37 10 Annex 2: Visit to Bridgwater and Hinkley Point C 40 Formal Minutes 41 Witnesses 43 List of printed written evidence 44 List of additional written evidence 44 List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 45 Building New Nuclear: the challenges ahead 3 Summary As a low-carbon technology, nuclear power could play an important role in helping the UK to meet climate change and energy security goals. However, all but one of the existing power stations are due to close by 2023. New build is therefore crucial if nuclear power is to remain part of the UK’s energy mix in future decades. If the projects currently under development are all delivered as planned, 16GW of new nuclear capacity will be added to GB’s electricity system by 2025. Without these power stations, it will be extremely difficult to meet our low-carbon obligations, and potentially more expensive too. A failure to deliver new nuclear would have a lesser impact on energy security, but could result in an increased use of gas to make up the shortfall. This could bring indirect security concerns if the UK were to become more dependent on imported gas as a result. Finally, if this tranche of new nuclear projects is not successful, it could undermine investor confidence in the sector, making it difficult (or impossible) to finance any subsequent attempts at nuclear new build. Many stakeholders consider the plans to build 16GW by 2025 as “ambitious” at best and “unrealistic” at worst. Given the delays and problems that have dogged nuclear new build projects in neighbouring European countries it is worrying that the Government does not have any contingency plans in place for the event that little or no new nuclear is forthcoming. These should be developed as a matter of urgency. Raising finance remains one of the biggest potential barriers to nuclear new build. We hope that the introduction of Contracts for Difference will help to reduce the policy and revenue risk associated with nuclear new build projects and thereby lower the cost of capital. Construction risk remains a problem for the nuclear industry and it was not clear to us exactly who will bear this risk in the UK; consumers, taxpayers or project developers. We seek to gain clarity on this aspect. Public opposition to new build projects could also present a barrier. While there is overall support for new nuclear at the national level, attitudes at the local level can be more polarised. During our visit to Bridgwater, we discovered that local concerns focused much more on the disruption that would be caused by the construction process than on the risk of a nuclear accident. There is scope to improve engagement with members of the public on issues regarding risk. The Office for Nuclear Regulation conducts some public engagement work, but this is separate from the planning process, although that is the process through which most members of the public will tend to engage with any new development. In addition, it is “one-way” in nature, rather than a two-way dialogue, which is a more effective method of risk communication. We would like to see better coordination between the ONR, Environment Agency and developers in their public engagement. We also believe there might be merit in establishing an independent advice service for communities living near to nationally significant infrastructure projects, since permission for these projects is granted by the Secretary of State, rather than local planning authorities. This service could support local communities in interpreting complex planning documents and improving 4 Building New Nuclear: the challenges ahead understanding of the process for obtaining planning permission. The UK’s nuclear supply chain industry and skills base has withered significantly since Sizewell B was completed in 1995. A nuclear new build programme presents an opportunity to rebuild this industry and to create new job opportunities in the UK. However, potential suppliers to nuclear new build projects need to have a proper understanding of the safety and quality requirements associated with nuclear projects in order to take advantage of these opportunities. Stronger leadership from Government will help to build confidence and to attract workers into this sector of the economy. Building New Nuclear: the challenges ahead 5 1 Introduction 1. Around 19% of the UK’s electricity generation is from nuclear power.1 However, all but one of our existing nuclear power stations are currently expected to close by 2023. As a low-carbon source of electricity, nuclear power could contribute towards the UK’s long- term climate change and energy security goals, but a new generation of nuclear plant will be required to deliver this. 2. Although the Government does not set deployment targets for particular types of electricity generation, The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) has always supported the idea of a “balanced mix” consisting of renewables, nuclear and fossil fuel with carbon capture and storage (CCS) as the route to delivering its energy and climate change policy aims.2 3. A number of steps to help facilitate nuclear new build in the UK have already been taken. These include the introduction of the Generic Design Assessment process (see chapter 2) and changes to the planning system for nationally significant infrastructure projects (including nuclear power stations). Most notably, the Energy Bill—before Parliament at the time of writing—will introduce a new system of long-term contracts for low-carbon electricity generators, which are intended to bring forward new investment in these projects. 4. The industry has set out plans to develop up to 16GW of nuclear power in the UK by 2025. Our inquiry was prompted by concerns that there may be barriers to delivering such a programme in the UK. We sought to identify these and to ascertain how they might be overcome. Context of the inquiry 5. Shortly before we launched our inquiry, energy companies E.ON and RWE npower announced that they would not be proceeding with their plans to develop Horizon Nuclear Power. This was a joint venture between the two companies with proposals to build new reactors at Wylfa on Anglesey and Oldbury in Gloucestershire. The sale of Horizon was on-going throughout most of our inquiry. In late October 2012, it was announced that Horizon had been acquired by Hitachi Ltd.3 6. The UK European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) design—which EDF plans to use for its new build project at Hinkley Point C in Somerset—was the first design to complete the new Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process. It was granted a Design Acceptance Confirmation in December 2012, shortly after we finished taking evidence for our inquiry.4 1 DECC, Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2012, July 2012 2 See, for example, DECC, Electricity Market Reform: policy overview Cm 8498, November 2012, para 16 - 17 3 “Ministers welcome Hitachi new nuclear investment programme”, DECC press release 2012/135, 30 October 2012 4 “UK regulators confirm acceptance of new nuclear reactor design” Office for Nuclear Regulation press release, 13 December 2012 6 Building New Nuclear: the challenges ahead 7. EDF were in negotiations with DECC about the terms of the “Contract for Difference” that would be offered to Hinkley Point C under the new market arrangements set out in the Energy Bill. Although it was hoped that an agreement would be reached by the end of 2012, at the time of writing, no announcement has yet been made. 8. There was also a change of Minister of State for Energy during our inquiry. We were fortunate to hear from both Charles Hendry MP and John Hayes MP in the course of our inquiry. Our inquiry 9. The National Audit Office provided a useful scoping note, which helped us to formulate the terms of reference for this inquiry. 5 We are grateful for their input. 10. We received 34 submissions of written evidence and held four oral evidence sessions. A full list of witnesses can be found at the end of this report.6 We are very grateful to all those who have contributed towards this inquiry. We visited Bridgwater and the site for the proposed new reactor at Hinkley Point C, where we met with representatives from EDF, local councils and the local community. We also visited the Energy Skills Centre at Bridgwater College. We would like to express our thanks to all those who took the time to meet us and to impart their first-hand knowledge of the opportunities and challenges for building a new nuclear power station in the UK. 11. We invited Centrica to give oral evidence to our inquiry. However, they turned down our invitation without offering an explanation. We note that on 4 February 2013, Centrica announced its decision not proceed with new nuclear investment in power stations at Hinkley Point and Sizewell.7 12. Dealing with nuclear waste is a complex subject. Given the limited time available in our inquiry programme, we were not able to look at this issue in any detail. Indeed, it would not be possible for us to address this important topic adequately without holding a dedicated inquiry into nuclear waste. We received several submissions stating that new nuclear should not go ahead until questions relating to long-term storage of nuclear waste and sea discharged radioactive waste have been resolved.8 After we had finished taking evidence, Cumbria County Council voted to withdraw from the process to find a host community for an underground radioactive waste disposal facility. As the last remaining Council taking part in this process, the question of long-term storage is now even more relevant than when we initiated our inquiry.9 5 NAO, The nuclear energy landscape in Great Britain, April 2012 6 Page 43 7 “Centrica announces decision not to participate in UK nuclear new build and launches £500 million share repurchase programme”, Centrica press notice, 4 February 2013 8 Ev w7, Ev w39 9 “Energy Secretary responds to Cumbria nuclear waste vote” DECC press notice 13/010, 30 January 2013 Building New Nuclear: the challenges ahead 7 2 Nuclear new build in the UK 13. Before exploring the potential barriers to nuclear new build in more detail, we start by examining the significance of failing to deliver new build projects as they are currently envisaged. In this section, we set out some of the key risks and challenges that will be encountered should planned new reactors not materialise. We also examine the likelihood that programmes will not deliver as planned. Plans for nuclear new build in the UK 14. The Government does not have targets for the deployment of particular electricity generation technologies. However, DECC is clear that it believes that a mixed portfolio containing nuclear, renewables and fossil fuels with CCS will deliver a cost effective route to delivering on our climate change and energy security goals.10 15. The Government’s Low Carbon Plan cites industry intentions to bring forward 16 GW of new nuclear power stations by 2025, with the first new power station beginning operation in 2019.11 The 16 GW consists of: • proposals from EDF and Centrica to build four new reactors (with a total capacity of 6.4GW) at Hinkley Point; • plans from NuGen (a consortium of GDF SUEZ and Iberdrola) to build up to 3.6GW of capacity at Moorside near Sellafield; and • the Horizon Nuclear Power scheme to develop around 6GW capacity at Wylfa and Oldbury, now owned by Hitachi Ltd.12 Consequence of failing to deliver new build 16. The primary major consequence of failing to deliver new nuclear would be the impact on the UK’s ability to reduce carbon emissions and thereby tackle climate change. 13 The impacts on energy security are likely to be less severe (see paragraph 19). Mr Earp (Institution of Civil Engineers) told us that it might be impossible to meet the UK’s climate change targets without new nuclear.14 However, environmental NGOs Greenpeace and WWF-UK (who do not support the use of nuclear power) claimed that the targets could be achieved without new nuclear.15 Nick Butler (author of a blog on energy and power for the Financial Times) believed that “nuclear could be part of the story if the price is reasonable but it is not absolutely essential [for meeting carbon targets]”.16 10 EV 81 11 HM Government, The Carbon Plan: Delivering our low carbon future, December 201, pp 75-77 12 EV 81, Ev 93, Ev 118, Ev w21 13 EV 81, Ev w24, Ev w35, Q 173 [Mr Earp, Dr Fox], Q 328 [Mr Butler] 14 Q 173 [Mr Earp] 15 Ev w86, Qq 323-327 [Mr George] 16 Ev 118 8 Building New Nuclear: the challenges ahead 17. Whether or not it is possible, it would certainly be much more difficult to achieve in practice. If there is little or no new nuclear, then much tougher action to reduce electricity demand will be needed, along with greater use of other low-carbon technologies. The scale of the challenge can be seen by comparing the difference between DECC’s “low cost” scenario as part of its 2050 pathway analysis, with the alternative scenario provided by Friends of the Earth.17 Under the “low cost” scenario, there is more than 40GW of nuclear power in 2050, along with 1,400 offshore and 4,400 onshore wind turbines in 2025, which fall to zero in the longer term as decommissioned sites are not replanted.18 Friends of the Earth’s scenario has no new nuclear but requires more than 10,000 offshore and 8,000 onshore wind turbines in 2050 (as well as greater effort on insulating homes). 18. Furthermore, DECC preferred a mixed energy portfolio including renewables, nuclear and fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS). Given the lack of progress that has been made to date in bringing forward CCS technology in the UK, the role for new nuclear in delivering on our decarbonisation goals seems likely to become even more significant. 19. If new nuclear capacity is not delivered as expected, some other measures will be needed to make up the resulting gap between demand and supply. Professor Steve Thomas (University of Greenwich) noted that gas, renewables and energy efficiency were all potential candidates for this task.19 Since any of these options could be delivered more quickly than a new nuclear power station, failure of the nuclear programme should not pose an immediate threat to energy security.20 However, greater use of gas could introduce new challenges for energy policy. Most obviously, increased use of unabated gas would make it much more difficult to meet carbon targets.21 There may also be energy security implications if the UK was to become more dependent on imported gas (but this risk could potentially be mitigated by increased use of domestically produced shale gas).22 20. DECC argued that if offshore wind and CCS were used to make up for any shortfall in nuclear delivery, there would be adverse cost implications for consumers. It estimated that the cancellation of the nuclear programme would lead to a welfare reduction of £22 billion relative to a baseline scenario where plants are deployed in line with lowest cost in order to meet renewables targets, decarbonisation and energy security objectives.23 21. We conclude that while the cancellation or reduction of the UK’s new nuclear programme may cause challenges for energy security, it would have a much more 17 Other example pathways include: “doesn’t tackle climate change”, “maximum demand, no supply”, “maximum supply, no demand”, “analogous to MARKAL 3.26”, “Higher renewables, more energy efficiency”, “Higher nuclear, less energy efficiency”, “Higher CCS, more bioenergy”, “Campaign to Protect Rural England”, “Mark Brinkley”, “National Grid” and “Atkins”. 18 http://2050-calculator-tool.decc.gov.uk 19 Ev w30 20 Ev w30, Ev 111 21 Ev 81 22 Q 173 [Mr Earp, Dr Fox] 23 Ev 81 – DECC explained that: “These results are influence by three targets: (i) meeting the renewables obligation target of 110TWh of renewable generation in 2020; (ii) meeting an assumed decarbonisation target of a grid intensity of 100gCO2/kWh by 2030 (it is recognised that this target is not agreed across Government); and (iii) keeping the de-rated capacity margin above 10% by using a strategic reserve capacity mechanism.”
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