British Dreadnought Vs German Dreadnought: Jutland 1916

43 Pages·2010·34.53 MB·English

by  Mark Stille

ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND ILLUSTRATORS
MARKSTILLE (Commander,United States Navy,retired) received his BAinhistory
fromthe Universityof Maryland andalso holds anMAfrom the NavalWarCollege.
RITISH DREADNOUGHT
Hehasworked inthe intelligencecommunity for 30 years,includingtours on
the faculty ofthe NavalWarCollege,onthe JointStaffandonUSNavyships.
Heiscurrentlyasenioranalystworkinginthe Washington DCarea. Heisthe
authorofnumerous Osprey titles,focusingonnaval history inthe Pacific,and
also ofseveralwargames. GERMANDREADNOUGHT
IAN PALMERisahighlyexperienced digitalartist.Agraduatein 3Ddesign,he
currentlyworks asArt DirectorforaleadingUKgames developer.Besides his JUTLAND 1916
artisticinterestsheisalso akeenmusicianandmotorcyclist.HelivesinSurrey
withhiswifeanddaughter,andtwocats.
HOWARDGERRARDstudied attheWallasey SchoolofI
freelancedesigner and illustratorfor over20 years. HI
ofpublishersand isanassociate memberofthe Guild
won both the Society of BritishAerospace Companies
SwordTrophyand hasillustratedanumberof books fe
andworksin Kent.
MARK STILLE
lpublishedinCrearBritainin2010byOspreyPublishing,
lJandHouse,WesrWay,Bodey,Oxford,0X2OPH,UK
0223rd51,Suite219,LongIslandCity,NY11101,USA
tail:[email protected]
:010OspreyPublishingLtd.
rightsreserved.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivatestudy,
arch.criticismorreview,aspermittedundertheCopyright.DesignsandPatents
.1988.nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced.storedinaretrieval
em,ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans.electronic,electrical,chemical,
'hanical,optical.phorocopyiug,recordingorotherwise.wirhourtheprior
tenpermissionofthecopyrightowner.Enquiriesshouldbeaddressedto the
lishers.
:IPcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
'IISBN:9781 84908 1672 CONTENTS
Fe-bookISBN:9781 84908 1689
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:xbySandraShotrcr
(setinfTCConduitandAdobeGaramond
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tedinChinathroughBookbuilders Introduction 4
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Chronology 8
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nowledgements
authorwouldlike10thankthesraffoftheNavalHistoryandHeritage TheStrategic Situation 28
imandPhotographicSection(formerlytheUSNavalHistoricalCenter)for
.assistanceinprocuringthephotographsusedinthisbook.Specialthanksgo
TechnicalSpecifications 34
(eirhAllenandfriendswhograciouslyreviewedthe(extandclarifiedmany
nicalpointsfortheauthor.
TheCombatants 46
ication
bookisdedicatedtoBillKarwacki
Combat S3
Statistics and Analysis 71
Aftermath 76
Further Reading 78
Index 80
Conquerorwasapowerfulship
withabalanced,impressive
appearance.Shownhere
beforethewar,herforemast
wasshortenedandthe
torpedonetsremovedbefore
Jutland.Sheservedinthe
GrandFleetthroughoutthe
warandwasscrappedin1923.
INTRODUCTION
squadrons of eight ships each along with two fleet flagships and four reserve
battleships.This dramatic German decision to challenge Britain's naval supremacy
Since1805,theRoyalNavyhad reigned supremeontheworld'soceans.Though this not onlyput the RoyalNavyon notice,butchanged thedirection ofBritish foreign
supremacywaschallenged at times,bythe turn ofthe20th centurythe RoyalNavy policy.Inordertomaintain itscommandingnavalposition andcontainGermany,the
wasf.1cing itsmost seriouschallenge in some 100 years.Thischallengecame in the British abandoned their policy ofisolation. From 1902 to 1907, agreements were
form ofa united Germany and its growing industrial strength. As the two most reached withJapan, France and Russia.Thus, when an event in Europe set offthe
powerful industrial powers in Europe, Germany and Britain wereengaged in trade powderkegbetweenthetwoopposingpowerblocks,theBritishwerevirtuallyensured
competition; by the turn of the century this competition was beginning to take a ofbeingdraggedinagainstGermany.ThisconsequencewasthetruelegacyofTirpirz's
morealarming turn in theform ofanavalrivalry. desire to build a largefleer.AsTirpirz'sdream ofa largeGerman Navy wasgaining
Withitsglobalempireand worldwide tradinginterests,Britain neededalargenavy favourin hishomeland,theRoyalNavywasundergoingatransformation,led bythe
to maintain itsposition andpower.Whatconcerned the Britishwasthedevelopment controversialFirstSeaLord,AdmiraloftheFleetSirJohnFisher.AstheRoyalNavy's
ofasizeablenavybyacontinental powerwith no navaltradition and,seemingly,no leader from 1904 to 1910, Fisher oversaw itstransformation from thecomplacency
need for such aforce.The reasonswhy Germany becamea maritime power remain oftheworld'sdominant peacetimenavy,toaforcereadytoconductmodern war.He
controversialeven today.Manyin Germanyfelt thatagreat power, asGermanywas directed that large numbers ofobsolete warships be scrapped and that the fleet be
becoming,had to possessastrongnavytobolsteritsstatusandtosupportanddefend concentratedinhomewaterstoopposethegrowing Germanfleet.The mostdramatic
itstrading interests.There isalsoevidence that the drivefora powerfulnavyhad its ofFisher'splanswastheintroductionofanewtype ofwarshipbased on hisconcepts
roots in German internal politics. When the StateSecretary ofthe Imperial Naval ofan all-big-gun warship. Thisship, named Dreadnought,wasso revolutionarythat
Office,Admiral Alfred vonTirpirz,began to agitateforalarge navyhefound fertile Bellerophonwasavirtual
groundand alargedegreeofsupport. repeatofDreodnought.
In 1897,Tirpitzoutlinedaplanto increasethesizeoftheGermanNavytoprovide Armourwasactuallyweaker,
butoneimprovementwasto
politicaland militaryleverageagainstGermany'smostdangerousenemy,Britain.The
movetheforemastinfront
goalfor 1905 wasto possessafleetof19 battleships.Thisforcewastheso-called'risk
oftheforwardsmokestack,
fleet' - a fleet powerful enough to act as a deterrent against a British attack, by reducingsmokeinterference
threatening the Royal Navy with such severe losses that it would lose its maritime inthegunnerycontrol
position.Sheservedthe
supremacy.Ifthe British wereallayed byGerman promisesthat thisfleet waspurely
entirewarassignedtothe
defensive, therewasno doubt about thepurposeoftheSecond German Naval Law ~l
GrandFleetandwassoldfor
ofJune 1900. The law provided for a fleet of 38 battleships, organized into four scrapin1922. 5
Navalbalance,August1914 it made every other battleship obsolete. II was also a chances that an enemy would be brought to battle. By the 20th century, however,
controversial move in Britain, as it wiped away the Royal new navaltechnologies had madeaclose blockade too dangerous.The introduction
Britain Germany
Navy's existing advantage in battleships and levelled the ofminesand torpedoesaboardsubmarines,torpedo boatsanddestroyersmade it too
Dreadnoughts
playing field, thus providing the ermans with a chance to dangerousto maintain largeunitsclose to enemy navalbases. Briefly,the RoyalNavy
Inservice: 22 15 catch up.TheadventofDreadnoughtwasfollowed byFisher's considered theuseofan'observationalblockade'centred onapointin theNorthSea
Underconstruction: 13 5 pet project, the bartlecruiser, which combined the hitting halfway between Germany and Britain, but even this was dismissed as impractical.
Battlecruisers power ofa battleship and the speed ofa cruiser.Thecost of When the British declared war on Germany in August 1914, they put in place a
thiscombination wasa relative lack ofarmoured protection, distantblockadewith theaim ofcontrolling theexitsfrom theNorthSea.The Grand
Inservice: 9 3
which Fisher, incorrectly,believed could be compensated for Fleetwascharged to conductfrequentsweepsintothe NorthSeatokeep the German
Underconstruction: 1 3
withsuperiorspeed.The resultofFisher's revolutionwasthat fleet in port and to assert controlof thewaters.The Channel Fleet, based around a
Pre-dreadnoughts 40 22
the strength ofany navy was now measured in termsofthe number of pre-dreadnoughts, blocked the English Channel. Cruisers patrolled the
numberofdreadnoughtsitpossessed.Allbattleshipsdesigned area from theShetlands to theNorwegian coast.
before Dreadnoughtwereconsidered as'pre-dreadnoughts' andwereno longer fit for TheGermanswere countingon theBritish to tryto imposeacloseblockadeofthe
dutieswith themain battlefleet. Heligoland Bight. Theintentionwasthatifthe RoyalNavyappearedcloseto German
Fisherwaswilling to take theriskofradicallychangingthenavalbalancewith the bases, U-boats, torpedo craftand extensiveminebarrageswould inflict losseson the
introduction ofDreadnoughtbecause he calculated that British shipyards could out numericallysuperior British until the German heavy unitscould engage the Grand
buildanyrival.Fisherwascorrectin thisbelief.BythestartofthewarinAugust 1914, Fleetatequalstrength. Even iftheRoyal Navydid notattemptacloseblockade,the
theRoyalNavyhad establishedafirm superiority,asdemonstrated bythetableabove. Germans believed that the British would still commit light forces to watch the
Heligoland Bight,and that theRoyal Navywould beforced to support these forces.
Thissituation would stilloffer the Germans ampleopportunity to arrrite the Grand
Fleet untiltheodds had been evened. In theevent that the battleshipsoftheGrand
NAVAL STRATEGY IN 1914
Fleet remained near Scapa Flow (their main naval base) on distant blockade, the
Germans felt they did not have sufficient strength to attack them at that location.
ForbothBritainandGermany,controlofthe NorthSeawasvital.Afterallthedrama Thisoutcome isactuallywhathappened whenwarbegan- the Grand Fleet went to
and expense ofthe great naval race between the two countries, the commanders of its blockade station at Scapa Flow and no light units were committed to watch the
both navies expected a titanic naval clash shortly after war was declared. Yet the German baseson theHeligoland Bight.The German navalstaffhad no plans to deal
strategies on both sides ensured that such a clash between dreadnoughts would not with thiseventuality.
occur for two years, and then byaccident. ThecommanderoftheGrand Fleet,AdmiralSirJohnjellicoe,realized thathe had
Traditionally, the Royal Navy preferred to institute a close blockade of its a significant advantage in dreadnoughts over the Germans, but was worried about
opponents to ensure that British shipping was undisturbed, and to maximize the whatheperceived asacriticalGermanadvantageindestroyers,aswellasthemineand
U-boat threat.Thesedangersreinforced hisdetermination nottotaketheGrand Fleet
too close to Germany'sNorth Sea bases.The commanderoftheGerman High Seas
Fleet was under orders from the Kaiser not to risk the fleet unless there was the
Rheinlandenteredservice
likelihood ofvictory. Such an opportunity could only exist if the Grand Fleet had
inApril1910andispictured
heresoonafterwards. already suffered attrition or if the Germans found an opportunity to engagejust a
AtJutland,shewashitbya portion oftheBritish warships.With bothsides reluctantto committheirmain fleets
singlesecondarygunround in anything but favourable circumstances, and both sides unlikely to believe that a
andrepairedinundertwo
given situationwas favourableanyway,amajorclash between fleetswasgoing to bea
weeks.Shewaslaterheavily
matterofaccident,not design.
damagedafterrunning
agroundofftheFinnishcoast
inApril1918.Thevesselwas
laidupasanaccommodation
shipbeforebeingturnedover
totheAlliesin1920and
6 scrappedin1921. ?

DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT
ADVENT OF THE DREADNOUGHT
On 2 October 1905, a revolutionary new warship was laid down in Portsmouth,
England.The ship was launched in an incredible four months and was completed
and ready to commence sea trialsin an equally remarkablespan of365 days.The
ship,named HMSDreadnought,wassoadvanced thatsheimmediatelyrenderedevery
\
other existing battleship obsolete. What made this ship so remarkable? Most
significant, Dreadnoughtwas thefirst'all-big-gun'ship.Previousbattleshipscarriedan Accompanying theadvent ofthe DreadnoughtwastheintroductionofFisher'spet The13.5ingunsaboard
array ofweapons, usually a main battery of12in guns supported by several other project, thebattleship-cruiser.Theseships, eventuallyknown asbartlecruisers,also EmperorofIndio,shownhere.
wereformidableweapons.
batteries of lesser size. Because actions were conducted at fairly short ranges, the featured an all-big-gun armament and the new steam turbines. The principal
At20degreeselevation.they
smaller guns supporting the slow-firing main guns were perfectly adequate for difference between them and a dreadnought was the provision ofa lighterscale of
couldthrowa1,4001bshell
penetratingthemorelightlyarmouredareasofan enemy battleship.Yetasimproved armour protection.This reduced weight burden,combined with the turbines, gave amaximumof23,800yards.
fire-controlprocedurespushedengagement rangesoutfarther,theeffectivenessofthe the new battlecruisers a several knot speed advantage over dreadnoughts and all Awell-trainedguncrewcould
smaller guns began to diminish.Additionally,fire controlwas actually made more armoured cruisersoftheday.Theextraspeed, Fisher believed,wouldactasameasure firealmosttworoundsper
minute.
difficultbythe impossibilityofdistinguishingthesplashesofthe 12ingunsfromany ofprotection.The batrlecruisers possessed the pace and armament to hunt down
oftheship'sotherguns. and destroy the most powerful armoured cruisers ofthe period, while their speed
Themeritsoftheall-big-gunship wereobviousnotonlytotheBritish.TheItalians gave them the option ofwithdrawing from action against a dreadnought with
and theAmericans were also exploring this concept, and the US Navy had already superiorarmament.This premise,however,wasforgotten by both sidesduring the
designed and been authorized two all-big-gun battleships earlier in 1905. However, war, when the battlecruiser was forced to engage ships equipped with heavy
theRoyalNavy underthe energeticand far-sighted Fisherwasthefirst to takeaction armament.Given thebartlecruiser'sinferiorprotection,the resultswere predictable.
with the construction ofDreadnought. Fisher ordered that the new steam turbine
powerplant,stillnotperfected,wasalsoplaced on Dreadnought,givingheraspeedof
10 21knots and makingher the fastest battleship in theworldat the rime, 11

ThemainstayGerman
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 1 , dreadnoughtweaponwasthe
12ingunmountedindouble
turrets,asseenhereon
Dreadnought designs are a fine balance between several competing factors. The
Kaiserbeforetheoutbreakof
foremost oftheseare firepower,protection and propulsion. Each factorcarrieswith war.Themaximumelevation
itweightand cost considerations. In general, British dreadnoughtdesigns tended to oftheturretwas 13.5
degrees,whichgavea
stressfirepower.Britishbattleshipscarriedlargergunsthan theirGermancounterparts,
maximumrangeof21,000
giving them greater firepower. Conversely, German battleship designers tended to
yards.AfterDoggerBank,the
emphasizeprotection at the expense offirepower.A major factor in the competing Germansbeganaprogramme
effortstoprovideadequateprotectionwasthatafteracertainpointinthedreadnought ofincreasingtheelevationof
raceitwasdictated to RoyalNavydesignersthatan increaseinbeam wasnotpossible their12inturretsto16
degrees,whichtranslatedto
due to thesizeofexisting dry docks toaccommodate the ships.TheGermanshad no
amaximumrangeof22,300
such restrictions.Their battleshipspossessedagreater beam thatin turn allowed for
yards.ByJutland,however,
increased protectivemeasures,which included greatersubdivision and the inclusion onlyPrinzregentLuitpoldhad
oftorpedo bulkheads. beensomodified.Thehoists
inGermanturretswerefaster
thanthoseinBritishturrets,
FIREPOWER sotherateoffireforGerman
turretsapproachedthree
The mainstayBritish navalweapon at the start ofthe dreadnought erawasthe 12in roundsperminute.
gun, dating back to 1893. In order to improve the muzzle velocity, range and
penetration ofthisweapon,itsbarrellength hadbeenexpanded from35 calibreto 50 advocated thatcapitalshipsshould mount anall-big-gunarmament.The Iron Duke
calibre.At longer ranges,however,itwasfound that the latest versionshad accuracy classwas the first to use a Gingun secondary armament, and this weapon became
problems.Thehighmuzzlevelocityalsohad theeffectofincreasingwearand tearon standardon allsubsequentdesigns.TheGerman Navyadoptedthe5.9in gun astheir
the barrel, thus reducinggun life. dreadnoughtsecondaryarmamentfrom thestart.
Tosolvethisproblem, the RoyalNavywent to the 13.5ingun beginningwith the
Orion classofdreadnoughts.Mostimportantly,thisgun provided for a much larger
shellwith improved penetration.Thelargershelland increasein borealsopermitted
alower muzzlevelocity,which made for much greateraccuracyand lessbarrelwear.
The final development of Royal Navy pre-war dreadnought armament was the
productionofa 15in gun. Itscombination ofreliabilityandaccuracy made itoneof
the best large guns ever developed by the Royal Navy.Because the muzzlevelocity
wascomparativelylow,the barrellifewasalsooutstanding. OSlfrieslandin1920under
The German Navy's first dreadnoughts used an 11in gun that possessed a high Americancontrol.This
overheadshotpresentsafine
muzzlevelocity and thusoutstanding range.It fired arelativelysmallshell,however,
viewofhermainarmament
which limited its penetration. In their second classofdreadnoughts, the Germans
andpart ofher5.9in
introduced aslightlylarger 12in gun.Theyclungto the 12inshellevenasthe British casemate-mountedsecondary
moved on to the 13.5in and finally a 15in shell, preferring the greater range and armament.Ostjrieslandwas
penetration against the higherbarrelwearand reduced accuracy. perhapsthemostwell-known
Germandreadnoughtbecause
Although British dreadnoughts carried a larger main gun than their German
oftheseriesoftestsshe
opponents,thiswasnot the casefor thesecondaryarmament.The RoyalNavy used
enduredin1921.Afterbeing
4in guns from Dreadnoughtup through the King George V class.Thesewere much hitby80bombsofvarious
criticized for being inadequate to dealwith the growing size oftorpedo boats and sizesand24shells,shewas
finallysunkbyColonelBilly
1- destroyers.The Royal Navywas unable to get a larger secondary armament due to
Mitchellon21July 1921by
14 the increased costs ofmountingaGin gun battery,and theviewsofFisherwho had 15
sixlargebombs.
officerprovidedbettersolutions.Amuch superiorsystem,theArgoClock,wasavailable
FIRE CONTROL
beforethewar,butwasrejected. Eventually,theArgosystemdid find itswayaboard a
Thetruemeasureofabattleship'seffectivenessisnotthesizeand numberofitsguns, fewdreadnoughts,and at leastfour shipswerefitted with itatJutland.
but itsability to hit its target. At short range,ashellfollowsa flat trajectory,which TheRoyalNavyusedasystemofcentralized firecontrol,which reliedon acentral
reduces the fire-control problem of compensating for the roll of the ship while director,usuallyfitted intheforetop,thatenabledalltheship'sgunstobetrained,laid
pointing the gun at the target. As the range ofguns continued to increase, the and fired from asingle position. The trainingangleand elevation for thegunswere
importance ofeffective fire control overgreater distances was magnified. At longer transmitted electronicallyfrom thedirector to each ofthe turrets,where thedesired
ranges, the trajectoryoftheshellincreasesand anumberoffactors affect theaccuracy settingswerelaid automaticallyby thecontrol systems in theturret.
ofgunnery. By the outbreak ofwar, the Royal Navy had devised a very elaborate The Germans did not develop such a sophisticated approach to fire control, a
system of fire control.The basisfor long-range fire was the useofa rangefinder to situationeasilyexplained bytheGermans'intention to fightat relativelyshort ranges.
measure the distance from a gun to its target. The standard British battleship However,atJutland,theGermanfirecontrolsystem provedatleastaseffectiveasthe
rangefinderwasthe9ft-longcoincidence rangefinderdeveloped byBarr and Stroud. Britishsystem.The Germansrelied on9ft lOin rangefinders,whichlikethoseofthe
Itwastechnicallycapable ofprovidingrangeswithin85yardsat 10,000yards.Aswas British,weremounted oneach turret and in thebridgework.In 1908,theGermans
laterevidenced atJutland,however,theaccuracyofthe rangefinderwasmuch reduced adopted a stereoscopic rangefinder and introduced a Dumaresq equivalent that
in service due to light refractionand the heatingofthe rangefinder tube. provided target deflection.The German firecontrolsystem wasvery dependenton
A rangefinder provided only the true range, however, not the gun range,which theskilloftheartilleryofficertoestimaterangerate.OnGermanbattleships,firewas
needed to include the distances of target movement and own ship's movement. controlled from the armouredconning tower,where theartilleryofficer took orders
Factoringinallthesevariablesprovidedwhat isknownastherangerate.Todo this,the from theship'scommandingofficerandspotted thefallofshot.Thedirector-pointer
Royal Navyadopted an analogue computingdevice (known more commonlyas the system in the gunnery control towergenerated a traininganglefor the turrets, but
Dumaresq,afteritsinventor),which helped computeand checkthe rangerateagainst each turret waslaid and fired individually.
otherdata.Therangerateinformationwastransmittedtogunselectromechanicallyby
meansofaVickersreceiver-transmitter,which equippedallshipsafterDreadnought.In
PROTECTION
1912, the Admiralty adopted the Dreyer Table to provide a fairly comprehensive
approach to fire control, allowing operators to visuallycompare ranges reported by By 1905, thestate-of-the-art battleship armour was Krupp cemented plate armour.
rangefindersto acontinuouslyevolving estimate ofthe range beingsent to theguns. At thistime,normalbattlerangeswereassessed to beat 6,000yards,and long-range
Unfortunatelyfor the RoyalNavy,the DreyerTablewasunabletocontendwith rapid engagements maybe out to 10,000 yards.At both these ranges, theshellofa high
changes ofrange rates, and pre-war exerciseshad demonstrated thataskilledgunnery velocitygunwould strikeitstarget'ssides.Forthisreason, adreadnought'sarmourwas
concentrated on its main belt on the hull. Weight penalties made it impossible to
Collingwoodunder
constructionbeforeherlaunch
onNovember1908.Shewas
partofthethird8ritishclass
ofdreadnoughts,butoffered
littleimprovementover
Orionshowinghertwo Dreodnought.Thisview
forward13.Singunturrets. showshersterntorpedotube.
Justaftoftheseistheheavily BoththeBritishandGermans
armouredconningtowerfrom thoughtthatbattleship
whichtheshipwouldfight launchedtorpedoeswould
andnavigateinbattle.The bepotentweaponsina
foremastispositionedaft dreadnoughtduel,andboth
ofthesmokestack,showing retainedthemthroughoutthe
theobviousproblemsits war.Inpractice,theyproved
occupantswouldencounter utterlyineffective.Alsonote
fromsmokeinmanywind therecessinthehullwherethe
16 17
conditions. beltarmourwouldbefitted.