British Campaigns in the South Atlantic, 1805–1807

289 Pages·2015·2.242 MB·English

by  John D. Grainger

British Campaigns
in the South Atlantic
1805–1807

British Campaigns
in the South Atlantic
1805–1807
Operations in the Cape and
the River Plate and their
Consequences
John D. Grainger
British Campaigns copyright page 26/2/15 14:11 Page 1
First published in Great Britain in 2015 by
Pen & Sword Military
an imprint of
Pen & Sword Books Ltd
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Copyright © John D. Grainger 2015
ISBN 978 1 78346 364 0
The right of John D. Grainger to be identified as the Author of this
Work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright,
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Contents
List of Maps and Diagrams vii
Introduction viii
Chapter 1 The Expedition 1
Chapter 2 The Cape – Conquest 14
Chapter 3 The Cape – Defence and Control 32
Chapter 4 The Consequences of the Cape Conquest 46
Chapter 5 The 71st Regiment of Foot 57
Chapter 6 Buenos Aires: the Conquest 69
Chapter 7 Buenos Aires: the Reconquest 85
Chapter 8 The Prisoners 109
Chapter 9 Reinforcements 123
Chapter 10 Montevideo 139
Chapter 11 Advances and Escapes 160
Chapter 12 Buenos Aires: The Second Attack 173
Chapter 13 Release 192
vi British Campaigns in the South Atlantic 1805–1807
Chapter 14 The Consequences of the Invasions in the River Plate 210
Chapter 15 Consequences in Britain and its Empire 221
Maps 234
Notes and References 249
Sources and Bibliography 267
Index 273
List of Maps and Diagrams
1. Blaauwberg and Cape Town, January 1806 234
2. Cape Colony 234
3. Sickness in the 71st Foot at the Cape 235
4. England: Origins of Recruits to the 71st Foot 236
5. Ireland: Origins of Recruits to the 71st Foot 237
6. Scotland: Origins of Recruits to the 71st Foot 238
7. Ireland: Labourers and Weavers in the 71st Foot 239
8. Scotland: Labourers and Weavers in the 71st Foot 240
9. Ages of Rank and File of the 71st Foot, 1806 241
10. Service in the 71st Foot 242
11. Heights of Soldiers 243
12. Civilian Occupations of Soldiers 244
13. British Landings in the Plate Estuary 245
14. Buenos Aires: the Approaches 245
15. Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires: the Prisoners 246
16. The Siege of Montevideo 247
17. Buenos Aires: the Assault, 5 July 1807 247
18. Northern Scotland: Clearances and Casualties, 93rd Foot 248
Introduction
T
here is a theory that a chain reaction of events may begin with the
beating of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil and end with a tornado in
Japan. In physics or meteorology this seems thoroughly unlikely,
but in human affairs something very similar does seem to occur. In this book
the proximate event which set events in motion was the meeting, more or
less by chance, between a Royal Navy captain and an ex-prisoner-of-war
army captain in Portsmouth; the end results were the independence of Latin
America and the development of the apartheid regime in South Africa.
These ends may well be likened to Japanese tornadoes in their
indifference to human life, but Captain Sir Home Popham is an unlikely
butterfly. Yet there is a clear connection between his meeting with Captain
Jones in Portsmouth and those ends. It is, however, the connection of
accident and happenstance as much as deliberation. At the same time,
Popham had long been interested in South America, and he had been
to the Cape of Good Hope more than once, so the accidents and twists
and turns of the story took place in a human environment already well
prepared for them.
It is therefore tempting to ascribe the results of these military operations
to chance, mere human actions, and absence of mind. But such an argument
scarcely works. The expeditions of 1806–1807 came in the context of the
war of Britain against the Napoleonic dictatorship in Europe, and took place
simultaneously with the great extension of that dictatorship as a result of
the victories of French arms at Austerlitz and Jena and Friedland and Eylau,
and the peace treaty of Tilsit. Further, these expeditions were only the latest
in a series of British attempts on both the Cape and the River Plate. When
Popham met Jones, therefore, the political and naval and military context
was ready.
But it is the Scottish dimension to these events which is perhaps the oddest
part of all. Popham had already worked with the General Sir David Baird,
and Baird always favoured using Scottish troops, so a situation developed
where the revival of the moribund Calvinist Christianity of the Dutch of
Introduction ix
South Africa was encouraged by the Scottish intervention at the Cape, and
together these helped the development of the ideology of apartheid, with
all its continuing consequences for life in South Africa; meanwhile across
the Atlantic the imprisonment of a Scottish regiment, deliberately selected
by Baird to undertake a hare-brained raid, as a favour, pushed forward the
achievement of independence among the peoples of the River Plate. This was
the first success of that movement and it led on to the eventual emancipation
of the whole continent.
And yet it need not have happened at all. It was not necessary for Britain
to control the Cape; in Dutch hands it would have been a nuisance, but no
more. Popham did not need to go to the River Plate, against orders; Baird
could have prevented him doing so without difficulty. The 71st Regiment of
Foot did not have to be retained as prisoners-of-war by the reconquerors of
Buenos Aires; if they had been released at once, unarmed, Popham would
have had to sail away, and would have been glad to do so. In Dutch hands
the history of South Africa would certainly have taken a different course; if
nothing else the expansion of Dutch control would have been slower.
In South Africa, however, almost simultaneously with Popham’s arrival
in the River Plate, Francisco da Miranda was landing in Venezuela, hoping
to provoke a movement for independence; and the revival of the Dutch
Reformed Church in South Africa would probably have happened without
the intervention of Scots ministers, once peace reopened connections with
Holland. These developments, however, would have taken differing courses.
If South American independence had begun in the north of the continent
rather than the south, if the Dutch Church had reformed itself, the results
would clearly have been different.
So this is the story of an armed expedition which was probably unnecessary,
which was certainly unauthorized, and which had wholly unanticipated and
unlooked-for results. And there is a sting in the tail (or tale): the absence of
several thousands of young and vigorous Highland men surely had an effect
on their homeland; had they been present, would their homes have been so
comprehensively ‘cleared’ by their clan chiefs – who had persuaded them,
in many cases, to join the army in the first place?
I have deliberately quoted repeatedly from the first-hand accounts of many
of the participants, particularly the soldiers, who appear to have been an
unusually literate set. Either that or they scented a journalistic opportunity.
But it is necessary to distinguish between those which are diaries or were
composed directly following the events they describe, and those which were
composed some years later. The latter had the advantage of knowing the result