British Army Logistics in the Burma Campaign 1942-1945

281 Pages·2017·49.67 MB·English

British Army Logistics in the
Burma Campaign 1942-1945
Graham Dunlop
PhD
The University ofEdinburgh
2006
PAM
ENO
CONTENTS
Abstract iii
Acknowledgements iv
Author's Note v
Glossary ofAbbreviations vi
Introduction 1-19
Part One
Chapter One: The Challenge Facing India: May 1942 20-60
Part Two
Chapter Two: The Development ofIndia as the Strategic Base 61-86
Chapter Three: Development ofthe Operational Lines ofCommunication 87-118
Chapter Four: The Development ofTactical Maintenance 119-153
Part Three
Chapter Five: The Logistic Influence Defensive Victory 1944 154-189
-
Chapter Six: The Logistic Influence Offensive Victory 1945 190-232
-
Conclusions 233-243
Appendices
Appendix One: The British Army Supply System 1942 244
Appendix Two: Outline Order ofBattle ofthe Burma Garrison
20 January 1942 245
Appendix Three: Outline Order ofBattle ofthe Allied Burma Army
19 March 1942 246
i
Appendix Four: Illustration ofOrdnance Factory Output Years Ending
March 1940, March 1942 and March 1944 247
Appendix Five: Extract from 14th Army Operational Research Report
No 24 248
Appendix Six: Outline SEAC Forces December 1943 249-250
Appendix Seven: Operation STAMINA Airlift ofArmy Stocks to
-
IV Corps at Imphal 251
Appendix Eight: Outline ALFSEA and CCTF Forces January 1945 252-253
Bibliography 254-263
MAPS
Insidefront cover
Map One India and South East Asia
Inside backcover
Map Two Burma and North East India 1942
Map Three The Assam and Bengal Lines ofCommunication
July 1944
Map Four North Arakan
Map Five Central Burma 1944
Map Six Operation EXTENDED CAPITAL
ii
ABSTRACT
The logistical challenges facing the British imperial Army in the Burma campaign of
1942-1945 were formidable, yet there has been no comprehensive, scholarly study of
the campaign from a logistic point ofview. The aim ofthis thesis, therefore, is to
examine logistic influences on the design, conduct and outcome ofBritish operations
in Burma in order to demonstrate the relative importance oflogistics to the final
victory. The thesis comprises three parts. Part one looks at the British retreat from
Burma inl942, as well as India's economic and military position at that time, in order
to establish the foremost logistic problems that had to be solved before the war could
be taken back to the Japanese. India was ill-fitted to become the strategic base for
further operations; the operational lines ofcommunication in the north east ofthe
country were inadequate; and, at the tactical level, suitable means ofmaintaining
forces in thejungle were lacking. Part two examines the building ofthe base
infrastructure in India; the improvement ofthe lines ofcommunication; and the
evolution ofair, water and animal-borne supply during 1942 and 1943. Part three
assesses the impact ofthese developments on the conduct and outcome ofoperations
in 1944 and 1945. It shows that the strategic timetable ofthe campaign until 1944
was dictated mainly by the progress achieved in assembling the resources and solving
the problems identified in part one. It reveals that the direction ofoperations
thereafter was determined as much by the alignment and capacity ofthe lines of
communication, and the need to control them, as by strategic intentions and enemy
actions. It demonstrates the crucial importance ofthe methods developed in tactical
supply to the achievement ofsuccess on the battlefield. Overlaid on all the above, the
thesis indicates that the priority attached to maintaining and expanding the supply line
to China, as well as the shortage ofamphibious and air transport resources, had a
decisive impact on the strategic and operational conduct ofthe campaign.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
For their assistance in my documentary research, I should like to thank the staffofthe
National Archive, Kew; the British Library; the National Library ofScotland; the
Indian United Services Institute, Delhi; the Imperial War Museum; the National Army
Museum; the 2nd Division Museum, York; the library ofChurchill College,
Cambridge; the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives; the Hartley Library ofthe
University ofSouthampton; the library ofthe School ofOriental and African Studies,
University ofLondon; the Second World War Experience Centre, Leeds; and the
Army Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell. I should like to thank also Patrick Cadell,
Archivist ofthe Hopetoun Trust. I am most grateful to Colonel Benz Jacob and the
officers ofthe 2nd Battalion, the Assam Rifles, Kohima garrison, for their warm
hospitality to an unexpected British visitor and for a superb briefing on the battle of
Kohima. I feel rather ashamed ofthe almost certain knowledge that an equally
unexpected visitor from India would be uncommonly fortunate to find such a level of
assistance in this country. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission provided
me with the details ofKhem Chand, for which I am most grateful, as I am, also, for
the hospitality and assistance oftheir staffat Kohima. I should thank U Kan and his
driver, 'Mr Glue', for taking me so efficiently and informatively around Burma, and
for putting up with numerous changes in the planned itinerary to visit obscure places
well offthe normal tourist route. I received invaluable advice, assistance and
recollection from Paddy Vincent, Chairman ofthe Burma Star Association: Sir Eric
Yarrow, Chairman ofthe Burma Star Association in Scotland; Stuart Guild, Chairman
ofthe Burma Star Association, Edinburgh Branch; George MacDonald Fraser; John
Winstanley; Donald Easten; the late David Wilson; John Nunneley; Walter Faulds;
Rex King-Clark; Bill Weightman; Bill Towill; Howard Woodcock; William
Gutteridge and Philip Malins; all ofwhom served in Burma. I am most thankful to
them all for giving me their time and answering my various communications. My
many visits to London to consult the archives would have been made infinitely more
difficult and expensive had it not been for the hospitality ofColin and Wendy Price;
Michael and Lynda Rose; my father and stepmother, Colin and Liz; my brother and
sister in law, Angus and Rosie; my son and daughter in law, William and Celia; and
my daughter, Stephanie; all ofwhom very kindly accommodated me at different times
during those visits, and to whom I am most grateful. Last but far from least I must,
ofcourse, thank Jeremy Crang and Paul Addison, my supervisors, for their guidance,
encouragement and faith that I would manage to complete this project on time.
iv
AUTHOR'S NOTE
The British Army that fought in South East Asia between 1941 and 1945 was notjust
British. It comprised Indians ofat least four faiths, Nepalis, east and west Africans
ofvarious nationalities, and Burmese. When referring collectivelyto the forces of
the British Empire and Commonwealth, however, I have used the generic term
'British' in order to avoid clumsiness. Individual divisions I refer to occasionally by
their nationality in order to distinguish them. From time to time, I identify particular
groups ofsoldiers by their nationality. I believe that it will be clear where the
distinctions lie.
The terms 'strategy', 'operations' and 'tactics' appear in different guises, which might
need a bit ofexplanation. In military doctrine the conduct ofwar is divided into four
hierarchical levels: grand strategic, military strategic, operational and tactical. Grand
strategy is the application ofnational resources to achieve policy objectives. It is the
highest level ofthe direction ofwar, involving every department ofstate in total war.
At the national level during the Second World War it was the business ofthe War
Cabinet and the Chiefs ofStaff. Military strategy is the application ofmilitary
resources to achieve the military aspects ofgrand strategy. It was at this level that
campaign objectives for each theatre ofwar were set and resources allocated. During
the Second World War it was largelythe business ofthe national Chiefs ofStaffand
the theatre level national Commanders in Chiefand, where appropriate, Supreme
Allied Commanders. At the operational level, military resources are directed within a
theatre ofwar to achieve theatre level strategic campaign objectives. Broadly, in the
Second World War, the operational level concerned the theatre, army group and army
levels ofcommand. At the tactical level, forces are employed to win battles.1 The
tactical level concerned army level and below. The boundaries between the levels of
war are not normally precise and commanders at boundary level are likely to find
themselves having to think at two levels - but that is a feature ofany command.
The term 'strategy' is also used to describe the manner in which a problem might be
approached or dealt with; the term 'operations' is used to describe the activities ofa
unit or formation and the term 'tactics' is used also to describe the way in which
formations, units and individuals fight. Again, I believe the distinctions will be clear
in the text.
The terms 'unit' and 'formation' appear frequently. A unit, in militaryparlance, is a
battalion or equivalent. A formation is any tactically organised group ofunits from
brigade upwards, but it is normally applied to brigade and divisional level.
Note:
1 ArmyCode 71451, Design forMilitary Operations: the BritishMilitary Doctrine, 1996.
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAD Advanced ammunition depot
ABD Advanced base depot
ABDACOM American, British, Dutch and Australian Command
ABSD Advanced base supply depot
ALFSEA Allied Land Forces South East Asia
AOD Advanced ordnance depot
AT Animal or army transport
ATC Air Transport Command
B & AR Bengal and Assam Railway
CAATO Combined Army Air Transport Organisation
CAI Chinese Army in India
CBI China-Burma-India Theater (the US national theatre, as
opposed to SEAC, which was the allied theatre)
CEF Chinese Expeditionary Force
CCTF Combat Cargo Task Force
C-in-C Commander in Chief
CIGS Chiefofthe Imperial General Staff
CGS Chiefofthe General Staff(ofIndia)
COS Chiefs ofStaff(the abbreviation refers to the collective
Chiefs ofStaffcommittees in London and Washington.
Individual appointments ofChiefofStaffare spelled
out in full to distinguishthem)
FAMO Forward air maintenance organisation
FMA Forward maintenance area
FSD Forward supply depot
GHQ(I) General headquarters (India)
GOC General officer commanding
GPT General purpose transport
GREF General reserve engineer force
IWT Inland water transport
L ofC Line ofcommunication
LGOC London General Ominibus Company
vi
LRP Long range penetration
LST Landing ship, tank
MGA Major general, administration
NCAC Northern Combat Area Command
PAO Principal administrative officer
PBS Prefabricated bituminous surfacing
POL Petrol, oil and lubricants
POW Prisoner ofwar
RAMO Rear air maintenance organisation
SEAC South East Asia Command
TCC Troop Carrier Command
USAAF United States Army Air Force
VLR Very long range
vii
INTRODUCTION
The Burma campaign was the longest continuous campaign fought on land by the
British Army during the course ofthe Second World War, but it was near the bottom
ofallied strategic war priorities and far from the minds ofanyone not closely
concerned with it. Consequently, Britishtroops having given themselves the wry
title of the 'forgotten army' during the campaign, the term 'forgotten' has come to be
associated with almost anything to do with wartime Burma. Indeed, in some rather
surprising areas ofthe historiography ofthe Second World War, the theatre has been
in danger ofbeing forgotten. Basil Liddell Hart, for example, consigned the Malaya
and Burma campaigns tojust thirty five pages in his 713-page History ofthe Second
World War} John Keegan devoted no more than nine pages to them in his 498-page
The Second World War. John Ellis is even more brutal in his Brute Force,
disposing ofBurma in a four page appendix attached to his 541 pages oftext.3 By
and large, though, the campaign in Burma is actually anything but forgotten. A
wealth ofhistorical literature, professional, technical, academic and popular, has been
published since the end ofthe war and it still continues to be written prodigiously.
An apparent gap in the work so far, however, is an examination ofthe campaign from
a logistic perspective. Indeed, the south east Asian theatre does not seem to be alone
in this position, for logistic histories ofany campaigns are hard to find, except as
chapters or sections in campaign histories supporting the operational account, or as
examples in works on logistics as a subject in its own right. Martin Van Creveld
thought that, logistics being so closely associated with 'cold, hard calculation', the
subject might not appeal to the imagination ofmilitary historians.4 In the same vein,
as David Moore reflects in The Oxford Companion to Military History, it has been
said that:
Logisticians are a sad race ofmen, very much in demand in war, who sink
back into obscurity in peace. They deal only with facts but must work for
men who merchant in theories. They emerge during war because war is very
much fact. They disappear in peace because, in peace, war is mostlytheory.5
The official but un-published War Office account ofadministrative planning in the
British Army during the war, observed that: 'military administration, at any rate,
1