British Aristotelianism and the New Science. Essay Review PDF
Preview British Aristotelianism and the New Science. Essay Review
JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY OF IDEAS 2015 Volume 4 Issue 8 Item 7 – Section 4: Reviews – A Matter of Method: British Aristotelianism and the New Science. Essay Review by F.G. Sacco c b n a JIHI2015 Volume4Issue8 Section1:Editorials 1.Introductiontothespecialissueon“GastronomyandRev- olution” (M.Albertone–L.Frobert–E.Pasini) Section2:Articles.SpecialIssue:Gastronomyand Revolution 2.Nourrirlesenfants,nourrirlepeuple.L’alimentationentre identiténationale,luttepolitiqueetactionrévolutionnaire. Commentaireauséminairesur“GastronomieetRévolution” (M.Margotti) 3. Wheat versus Maize. Civilizing Dietary Strategies and EarlyMexicanRepublicanism(S.Bak-GellerCorona) 4. Food and the Futurist ‘Revolution’. A Note (R. Ibba – D.Sanna) 5. Food and Cooking in Revolutionary and Soviet Russia (D.Steila) Section3:Notes 6.AResponsetoDoina-CristinaRusu(M.Thick) Section4:Reviews 7.AMatterofMethod:BritishAristotelianismandtheNew Science.EssayReview(F.G.Sacco) 8.BookReviews(S.Gino,R.Gronda) Section5:News&Notices 9.ActivitiesoftheGISI|LesactivitésduGISI(2015) ..................................................... A Matter of Method: British Aristotelianism and the New Science. Essay Review F.G.Sacco Essay Review of Steffen Ducheyne, The Main Business of Natural Philosophy: IsaacNewton’sNatural-PhilosophicalMethodology,Dordrecht:Springer,2012, p.XXV+354(ISBN9789400721258,€259);MarcoSgarbi,TheAristotelianTradi- tionandtheRiseofBritishEmpiricism:LogicandEpistemologyinBritishIsles (1570-1689),Dordrecht:Springer,2013,XII+260pp.(ISBN9789400749504,€209). 1 ThebooksofSteffenDucheyneandMarcoSgarbisharesomethingmore thanthepublisher.BothdealwithBritishempiricismanditsAristotelian background. The existence of such a background as claimed by Sgarbi, chal- lengesthetraditionalprevalenceofPlatonismandanti-Aristotelianismin17ᵗʰ- century Britain. Ducheyne, on the other hand, claims the Aristotelian roots of Newtonianmethodology.AccordingtoDucheyne,Newtonianmethodwas very different from hypothetico-deductive methodology. Newton’s use of hy- pothesis was part of a more general methodology divided in two phases: the construction of a model and its application including the formation and the testingoftheories(p.56-57).Inthiscontext,thenatureofhypotheseschanges withrespecttothemechanicalphilosophy. Newtonwasinvolvedinthequestforademonstrativeandrigorousmethod tillthe1680s,adecadethatrepresentsaturningpointinhisphysicalandmethod- ologicalwork.AfterthecorrespondenceonplanetarymotionwithRobertHooke JournalofInterdisciplinaryHistoryofIdeas4(2015),8,p.7:1–7:12.Nonpeer-reviewed. in1679-1680,Newtonradicallychangedhisideasoncelestialmechanics.Atthe sametime,hismethodologyreachedthestagelatermaintainedinthePrincipia. “AlthoughinhisearlyopticalworkNewtonhadclearlyformulatedanidealof establishingdemonstrativecauses,aclearformulationofthemethodbywhich toarriveat“deductionsfromphenomena”wasstilllacking.Itwasonlybythe timeofthePrincipiathatNewtoncouldanswerthisissueinasufficientlyde- tailedway”(p.184).Newton’smasterpieceof1687isatthecentreofDucheyne’s work.InthePrincipiathenewmethodoperatedinawaythatNewtonwasnot abletoreproduceintheOpticks.BookIandIIofthePrincipiaoffertheempiri- calfoundationtothediscussionofKeplerianlaws.Newtonian’smodelforthe explicationofcelestialmotionsaccordingtoKepler’slawsisbasedonthenew laws of mechanics developed with empirical evidence in the first two books. Thefirstphaseofthemethod,viz.theconstructionofthemodel,iscompleted withtheelaborationofamodelforKeplerianlaws.InbookIIIthesecondphase beginswiththeapplicationofthismodeltothemovementsofcelestialbodies andtheformationofthetheoryofuniversalgravitation.Theremainingofthe Principiaessentiallyconsistsinthelastphaseofthemethod,i.e.theapplication ofthetheory.UnlikeCartesianvortexes’hypothesis,Newtonianmodelisfirmly basedonthelawsofmotions.Newtonrefusedadhocfactorstoexplaindiscrep- anciesbetweenthephenomenaandthemathematicalresultsderivedfromideal conditions.Thankstothegoodapproximationbetweenthelawsofmotionsand thecelestialtrajectoriesdescribedbyplanets,whichentailedtheabsenceofany relevantresistancecompatiblewiththepresenceofadenseether,Newtoncould concludefortheinexistenceofCartesianvortexes. According to Ducheyne, the Principia’s methodology is consistent with a non-mathematical concept of gravity, since it is related to a non-mechanical idea of causes. Unlike Cartesian hypotheses, causes in Newtonian model are not only explanatory but also true because they supply the necessary expla- nationsoftheobservedphenomena.ForDucheyne,Newton’sassumptionofa causalapproachistheproofofthenon-mathematicaloriginsofhismethodol- ogy.“Fromaconceptualpointofviewthemathematicalaccountofanalysisand synthesisisincompatiblewithNewton’sconceptionofanalysisasdiscovering causes and of synthesis as assuming these causes to explain other phenom- ena. In the mathematical tradition analysis consists of reasoning from what is sought to what is known. In Newton’s natural-philosophical view, analy- 7:2 F.G.Sacco sis consisted in reasoning from what is known, the effect, to what is sought, the cause” (pp. 7-8). According to Ducheyne, the theory of regressus demon- strativus developed by British Aristotelians shares common features with the Newtonianmethodofdeductionfromphenomenaandrepresentsthebestcan- didatetoexplaintheoriginsofNewtonianmethodology.Botharecomposedof twoconsecutivephases:analysisorresolutio,proceedingfromtheeffectstothe causes,andsynthesisorcompositio,proceedingfromthecausestotheeffects (p. 4). Furthermore, Ducheyne’s thesis is supported by the evidence of New- ton’sdirectstudyofarelevantAristoteliantextbook,suchasSamuelSmith’s Aditus ad logicam (p. 16). Thus, Aristotelian influence, along with Isaac Bar- row’smathematicalwork,supportedtheNewtonianquestforademonstrative methodinnaturalphilosophyandhisrefusaloftheBaconianlegacyembraced bytheRoyalSociety’svirtuosi. WhatDucheynedescribesasthe“NewtonianStyle”,followingI.BernardCo- hen(1982),doesnotworkinNewtonianoptics.SincethebeginningoftheNew- tonianresearchesonlightandcolours,discrepanciesbetweenmethodological demands and epistemological results emerged. Unlike Principia’s laws, New- ton’s definition of white light as the heterogeneous mixture of coloured rays could not be deduced from experiments. According to Newtonian methodol- ogy,fromthebrilliantexperimentofdoublediffractionrealizedinthesecond halfof1660sonecanonlydeducethat,afterthedecompositionofwhitelight by the first prism, the singular coloured rays refracted by the second prism maintain their colours. “Since heterogeneity of light cannot be derived from phenomena, it qualifies as being a hypothesis according to Newton’s criteria. Ultimately,Newtonhadonlyprovidedasufficientcauseforprismaticdisper- sion,notanecessaryandsufficientone”(p.196).ButforDucheynethisisnot incompatiblewithNewtonianstyle,becauseNewton’sinferencefromtheob- servableimmutabilityofrefractedcolouredraystotheirstatebeforediffraction isconsistentwithhisthirdregulaphilosophandi,theso-calledanalogyofnature, andwithNewton’suseoftheso-calledtransductionortransdictiveinference intheanalysisofbrief-scaleattractiveforcesinthePrincipia.AsMandelbaum (1664,p.87)andMcGuire(1970,p.4)pointedout,sinceitenablestoovercome thelimitsofexperienceandsenseperceptioninferringtheunknownstatusof unobservable entities, the Newtonian third rule is not an induction rule. This isthecaseforNewtonianconclusionsonthestateoflightraysbeforethefirst AMatterofMethod:BritishAristotelianismandtheNewScience.EssayReview 7:3 diffractionintheexperimentumcrucisof1672.Attributingtocolouredraysthe propertyofimmutabilitybeforethediffraction,Newtonoperatedaninferential processsimilartothatdescribedinthethirdruleofthePrincipia. ThusDucheynecanconcludethattheepistemologicalproblemsofNewton’s optical works are due to the state of the discipline and not to the high de- mandsofhisjuvenilemethodology.DespiteNewtonianmethodologyevolved tillthematureformulationofthePrincipia,theepistemologicalproblemsatthe heartofhisconstructionremainedinTheOpticks,resistingtothePrincipia-style methodizing.AccordingtoDucheyne,thisisbecauseopticsdidnotreachthe status of physico-mathematics acquired by mechanics and remained a mixed science(p.220-1). Ducheyne’sanalysisofNewtonianopticsrigorouslyreflectsNewton’spoint ofview.Inhisreconstruction,littlespaceisconcededtothedisputesfollowing theappearanceofTheNewTheoryofLightandColoursin1672.Thereasonsof RobertHookeandChristianHuygensarenotadequatelydiscussed,despitethe emergenceofthemostevidentlimitsofNewton’searlyopticalworkisdueto Hooke’scriticism.AsNiccolòGuicciardini(2009,p.21)observed,themethod- ologicalprogrammeoftheNewTheorywas“aratherextremistmethodological position”.But,unfortunately,thewaythisinitialpositionevolvedtillthePrin- cipia’smethodologyisnotadequatelyhighlightedbythebook. 2 Sgarbi’sTheMainBusinessofNaturalPhilosophyisastudyoftwobooks, orratherone,thePrincipia.Itoffersarigorousandinsightfulanalysis ofthestructureofNewton’smasterpiece,butdoesnotnoticetheexistenceof a long and complex work of elaboration and revision of Newtonian work, so relevantfortheunderstandingofhistheories.Thisisprobablyduetotheau- thor’s questionable decision to restrict the analysis to the “method of justifi- cation”, excluding the “method of discovery” (p. 63). Nevertheless, Ducheyne 7:4 F.G.Sacco seems to believe that logical and methodological (British) Aristotelianism in- fluencedNewtonianscience. Despitesomeinitialcaveats,SgarbimaintainsasimilarbeliefaboutBritish experimentalphilosophyofthe17ᵗʰcentury.TherelationshipbetweenPaduan Aristotelianismandthenewscienceisatopicwidelydiscussedbyhistoriansof science.IntheintroductiontoTheAristotelianTraditionandtheRiseofBritish Empiricism,SgarbiinclinesforamoderateversionofJohnRandall’scontinuist thesis(Randall1961),because“Randall’sargumentwasnarrowerandlessam- bitious”thanhiscriticsrealized:“Heaimedsimplytodemonstratecertaincon- ceptualanalogiesbetweenthethoughtofsomePaduanAristoteliansandthat oftheearlyscientists,intheiruseofparticulartermssuchas‘analysis’,‘synthe- sis’,‘induction’etc.”(p.4).BuildingonRandall’smoderateprogramme,Sgarbi statesthathisbook“aimstoinvestigatehowthemapofPaduanAristotelianism wasreplacedandabsorbedintothemovementknownas‘BritishEmpiricism’, andnotintomodernscience”(p.6).Butbytheendofthebookreadersappre- hendthat“theemergenceofexperimentalphilosophymarkednotthedefeatof BritishlogicalAristotelianism,butastrongempiricistturnintheelaboration ofanewepistemology.TheheirstothistraditionwereLocke’sprecursors,who madesensationandinductiontherealinstrumentsoflogic:BritishAristotelians nolongerindulgedinhypotheticalandmetaphysicalspeculationsthatwereof- tenuntestableorinexplicable,ratheremphasizedthatexperience,acquiredby observationandexperiment,wasthegroundofscience”(p.233).Thisharmo- nizingviewofthelateScholasticismandthenewscienceisgroundedonthe empiriccharacterofBritishAristotelianismandsupportedbythedecisiveme- diationofthePaduanAristotelianHarveyandthe“latent”AristoteliansBacon andHobbes(p.197). TheinsufficiencyofthetraditionalviewofBritishempiricismischallenged byshowingthelargediffusionofAristotelianphilosophyin17ᵗʰ-centuryBritain. ThebookcarefullyfollowstheriseandfallofRamistlogicinBritishuniversities andtheaffirmationofPaduanAristotelianismfromtheendofthe16ᵗʰcentury. Sgarbi’s analysis is not limited to Oxford and Cambridge, but takes into ac- countalltheuniversitiesoperatinginearlymodernBritishIsles.Achapteron Zabarelladoctrineofinduction,analysisandsynthesis,precedestheaccurate reconstructionofthedefeatoftheprevailingRamisminBritishuniversitiesby meansofthedisseminationofPaduantextbooks,suchasGiulioPace’sbilingual AMatterofMethod:BritishAristotelianismandtheNewScience.EssayReview 7:5 (GreekandLatin)editionofAristotle’sOrganonof1584,hisInstitutioneslogicae (1597)andhisLogicarudimenta(1612).Thankstotheirpropaedeuticsimplicity, Pace’sworkswereabletoanswerthedemandofnewtextbooksrequestedby thereformsoftheuniversitystatutes,suchastheLaudianstatutesof1636.Fur- thermore,asSgarbiaccuratelypointsout,PaduanAristotelismreachedBritish Isles also by means of the works of German scholars, such as Bartholomäus Kekermann.ContinentaltextbooksofferedtoBritishscholarsanewapproach to the traditional peripatetic questions, and favoured the formation of a local tradition of Aristotelian thought with new features. Only in an initial phase British Aristotelianism took the shape of a simple repetition of the thesis of Zabarella.Incontrast,Smith,EdwardBrerewood,JohnSandersonandRichard Crakanthorpeemphasizedtheroleoftheempiricalpartofthemethoddevel- opingZabarella’stheoryofinduction. InthehandsofthePaduanprofessorofnaturalphilosophy,theAristotelian epagôgê was not a real syllogistic demonstration, but only a clarification of thingsalreadyknownbysensation.Unlikedemonstrativesyllogism,forZaba- rellainductiondidnotdemonstrateunknownthingsbymeansofpriorknowl- edge, rather it was a “process by which particulars are comprehended under thegeneraluniversalconcept,butproperlyitdoesnotcreatenewknowledge beyond what the mind has already acquired by sensation” (p. 69). Following Zabarella,agenerationofBritishAristoteliansemphasizedthesensibleorigin ofknowledgeandtheprimacyofanalysisonsynthesis.Sinceanalysisdidnot havethedemonstrativenatureofsynthesis,itproceededfromtheeffectstothe causes, and produced the fundaments of any possible knowledge. Then anal- ysis would be possible without synthesis, not vice versa because analysis is the base of synthesis. This empirical foundation of knowledge is stressed by Robert Sanderson, the author of Logicae artis compendium (1615), a treatise read and annotated by Newton along with Smith’s Aditus ad logicam (1613). For Sanderson induction is the last step of a complex process of knowledge- acquisitionstartingfromsensesperception.Itconsistsinasufficientenumer- ations of particular experiences and establishes a universal conclusion. Both Sanderson and Crackanthorpe were aware of the dangers of this kind of in- duction, because even a single case could invalidate it. Their development of Paduantradition,stressingtheimportanceofsensation,observationandinduc- tion,waslargelydominantinBritishuniversities.Thelargediffusionofthenew 7:6 F.G.Sacco textbooks suggests the influence of this empirically-oriented Aristotelianism on British modern empiricism. But this goes beyond the chronological limits ofthebook.Sgarbidoesnotrenounce,however,totakeintoaccounttherela- tionshipbetweentheprevailingAristotelianismandthethoughtsofthesome Englishreformersofscientificknowledge,FrancisBacon,WilliamHarveyand Thomas Hobbes. Thus, the accurate reconstruction of a neglected ancestor of modernBritishempiricismturnsintoareappraisaloftheoldcontinuisttheses. ForSgarbi,Bacon’sinterestforinductionandhisreformsisnothingelsebutthe effectsoftheinfluenceoftheBritishscholarsforthelogicaltools.“IfBaconfo- cusedonaninductivemethodologyforscience,itwaspreciselybecauseofthe greatattentionwhichcontemporaryAristotelianspaidtotheproblemofinduc- tionandexperience”(p.168).InSgarbi’seyes,Bacon’scriticismoftraditional inductiondoesnotentailarejectionofAristotelianlogic.Onthecontrary,Ba- conaccepteditbutinsistedforastrongreform(p.170).HiscriticismofAris- totelian logic was not against Brerewood’s, Sanderson’s and Crackanthorpe’s work,butonlyagainstZabarella,whoseconceptofinduction“wasnotreally aprocessofdiscovery,butratherofnotificationofsomethingalreadyknown bysensation”(p.172-3).TheinfluenceofAristotelianismonHarvey’smethod- ologyislessproblematic.Harvey’sdebtwithPaduantraditioniswellknown, butitissignificantthattheprefacetoDegenerationeanimalium(1651)restored theoriginalPaduanAristotelianismagainstitsBritishdevelopments.Accord- ingtoSgarbieventheanti-scholasticHobbescouldnotavoidtheinfluenceof thenewBritishlogicaltextbooksonasignificantpartofhislogicaltheory.Al- thoughSgarbirecognizestheexperimentalcharacterofthenewscienceandthe unfamiliarityofAristotelianphilosopherswithmechanicalartsandtheirinter- vention in nature, he affirms that “the dissemination of the works of Bacon, HarveyandHobbesdidnotmaketheendoftheAristoteliantradition;rather, withtheirlatentAristotelianismtheypromotedtheintegrationofAristotelian philosophyandthenewscience”(p.197). Asinothersimilarreconstructions,suchasAnsteyandVanzo(2012,pp.509- 514),inSgarbi’sviewBacon’sworkisnotawatershedseparatingthenewphi- losophyfromtheoldscholastic,ratheritisthenecessarylinkbetweenthem. Thus, in contrast with Ducheyne’s view, Sgarbi arguments for a wide influ- ence of British Aristotelian methodology on the whole experimental philoso- phy,fromBaconiansvirtuositotheyoungNewton.ThecontrastbetweenBa- AMatterofMethod:BritishAristotelianismandtheNewScience.EssayReview 7:7 con’s Aristotelian background claimed by Sgarbi and Bacon’s idea of science drawn by scholars such as Mary Hesse (1968), Paolo Rossi (1984) and Brian Vickers (1992; 2007) is evident. But whatever interpretation one chooses, it is difficult to ignore the substantial inefficacy of Bacon’s method along with thegeneralinsufficiencyofhistoricalpositivistreconstructionwhichidentifies modernsciencewiththeinductivemethod.Ifwelookbeyondtheirdeceptive methodologicalstatements,notanyoftheexperimentalphilosophersgathered intheRoyalSocietyreallyadoptedBacon’scumbersomemethodology,neither didtheyfaithfullyfollowhisinductionorhistables.Onthecontrary,Bacon’s workpassedthroughaprocessofselectivereading,influencedbydifferentcul- turalaimsandsocialbackgrounds.AsMichaelLynch(2001)observed,theresult ofthisprocesswastheexistenceof“differentstylesofBaconianism”.Inshort, everyexperimentalphilosopherselectedhisownBacon. 3 Inearlymodernnaturalphilosophy,methodologicalstatementsoften donotdescribetherealpracticeofnaturalphilosophers;insteadtheyare adecisiveargumenttosustainsomehypothesesandprinciples.Inthisrespect, Newton’sexperimentumcrucis issignificant.Intheletterof1672totheRoyal Society,thenewtheoryoflightandcoloursappearsastheresultofarigorous inductionorratherdeductionfromthephenomenaobservedintheexperiment ofthedoublerefraction.Onthecontrary,Newtonianunpublishedopticalpa- pers suggest a different genesis of his revolutionary ideas. Between 1661 and 1664,asthenotesoncoloursinQuaestionesquedamphilosophicaeshow,New- tonopticalinquiriesstartedwiththediscussionofCartesianandAtomistichy- pothesis.¹Atthisstagetheyoungstudentmadeafirststeptowardsadifferent ¹ TheQuestionesquaedamphilosophicae,likemostofNewton’sunpublishedpapersarenowavail- ableathttp://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk. 7:8 F.G.Sacco
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