Britain’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957–68

327 Pages·1986·29.84 MB·English

by  J. P. G. Freeman (auth.)

BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL POLICY IN THE
CONTEXT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1957-68
BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL
POLICY IN THE
CONTEXT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN
RELATIONS, 1957-68
J.P. G. Freeman
Foreword by
Laurence Martin
M
MACMILLAN
© J. P. G. Freeman 1986
Foreword © Laurence Martin 1986
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1986 978-0-333-38664-4
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First published 1986
Published by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
Typeset by Latimer Trend & Company Ltd, Plymouth
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Freeman, J. P. G.
Britain's nuclear arms control policy in the context of
Anglo-American relations, 1957--68.
I. Nuclear weapons-Government policy-Great
Britain-History 2. Great Britain-Military
policy 3. Great Britain-Foreign relations
United States 4. United States-Foreign
relations-Great Britain
I. Title
355'.0335'43 UA647
ISBN 978-1-349-07809-7 ISBN 978-1-349-07807-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-07807-3
To the memory of my sister Judith
1945-1983
'She bore much pain with calm
unspeaking endurance, and lived
in trust of a better world.'
- ANTHONY TROLLOPE
Contents
Foreword by Laurence Martin ix
Preface XI
Acknowledgements xiv
Abbreviations XVI
PART I HISTORICAL PRELUDE, 1945--57
l From Comprehensive to Partial Disarmament
PART II THE FIRST PHASE: TOWARDS NUCLEAR
SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND A
COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN TREATY 3
2 The Technical Background: British Scientists and
Nuclear Arms Control, 1957-63 23
3 The Influence of Protest: The Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament, 1957-63 44
4 Macmillan and Eisenhower: The Test-ban Negotiations,
1957-60 71
5 Macmillan and Kennedy: The Test-ban Negotiations, 1%0---3 103
PART III THE SECOND PHASE: IDEALISM AND
SELF-INTEREST: THE MULTILATERAL
FORCE AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY
6 Independence and Multilateralism: Morality and
Self-interest 155
7 The MLF and Centralised Nuclear Control, 1964-7 178
8 The Search for a Non-proliferation Treaty, 1964-6 195
9 Tact and Persuasion: The NPT Achieved, 1966-8 222
10 Endpiece 251
vii
viii Contents
Appendix I Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 257
Appendix II Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons 260
Notes and References 267
Bibliography 301
Index 311
Foreword
The decade or so covered by this lucidly presented book was probably
the golden age of what we now call arms control. Indeed, it was during
those war years that the very concept of arms control evolved to replace
the vaguer and utopian cause of disarmament. Moreover, the same
years were perhaps the most fruitful we have yet enjoyed in realising the
concept of arms control, a distinction admittedly as much due to failure
since as achievement then. Nevertheless, between 1963 and 1968 not
only were the Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties agreed but the
theoretical groundwork laid and preliminary negotiations completed
upon which the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were soon to succeed.
This represented remarkable progress compared with the sterile disar
mament diplomacy of earlier post-war years and was due very largely
to the fact that theory had now been adjusted to take account of the
revolutionary circumstances of the nuclear age.
In analysing Britain's part in this story, Dr Freeman meticulously
traces a considerable number of distinct themes: a particularly import
ant and perhaps the last genuine phase in the Anglo-American special
relationship, the formation of Britain's character as a nuclear power,
and the adaptation of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe to the
rising awareness of the United States' vulnerability to Soviet attack. In
today's world of constant public debate over the issues of security and
arms control, Dr Freeman's original treatment of the interplay of
scientific opinion, which he shows to be no simple or united force, with
political and military considerations is also of great interest in explain
ing the shape of our present controversies. Dr Freeman also demon
strates very well how contradictory British interests in arms control can
be, and how devious even the most well-intentioned policy may become
if it is to reconcile explicit arms-control measures with the broader
context of security policy. Many of those who feel frustrated by what
can easily seem the inexplicable lack of progress in arms-control
negotiations might be somewhat appeased by a careful reading of this
volume, which so clearly illustrates the variety of considerations to be
assimilated and the dangerous pitfalls that await the over-eager and
ix
x Foreword
unwary. At the same time, Dr Freeman's story is a hopeful one, for it
shows how a path can be found towards understandings that make our
dangerous world at least a little safer.
LAURENCE MARTIN
Preface
This book is a study of successive British governments' policy towards
nuclear-arms control between the years 1957 and 1968, defined in terms
of Britain's relationship with the USA and based on an examination of
the two most significant arms-control agreements prior to the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks - the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963
and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. It is not, therefore, a
comprehensive analysis of all the nuclear-arms-control measures with
which Britain was associated during that period. Nor is it an intimate
history of the international negotiations leading to the PTBT and NPT.
Rather it seeks to trace the main tenets of British policy through its
evolution from the grand goal of general and complete disarmament to
the more limited, partial measures of nuclear arms control that were in
fact achieved.
In one of the most distinguished postwar studies of arms control and
disarmament the late Professor Hedley Bull offered a definition of the
two processes:
Disarmament is the reduction or abolition of armaments. It may be
unilateral or multilateral; general or local; comprehensive or partial;
controlled or uncontrolled.
Arms Control is restraint internationally exercised upon armaments
policy, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their character,
deployment or use. 1
Helpful as these definitions are, both can, as Professor Bull recognised,
be used in a variety of other ways. In the study which follows we are
concerned with both categories.
In the early postwar period, and until the mid-1960s, British govern
ments pursued the elusive goal of General and Complete Disarmament
(GCD). The PTBT was a measure important in itself, but held to be
more so as a step on the road to GCD.2 In reality, government
adherence, in public, to the belief that GCD could be achieved in the
foreseeable future was on the wane from the late 1950s. In its place the
xi