BRITAIN, NATO AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS Also by Ken Booth AMERICAN THINKING ABOUT PEACE AND WAR (co-editor) CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY: Theories and Policies (joint author) LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY AT SEA THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1917-72 NAVIES AND FOREIGN POLICY SOVIET NAVAL POLICY (co-editor) STRATEGY AND ETHNOCENTRISM Also by John Baylis *ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY (editor) *ANGLO-AMERICAN DEFENCE RELATIONS, 1939-84 BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD (editor) CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY: Theories and Policies (joint author) *NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR PEACE (joint author) SOVIET STRATEGY (co-editor) *Also published by Macmillan Britain, NATO and Nuclear Weapons Alternative Defence versus Alliance Reform Ken Booth and John Baylis M MACMILLAN ©Ken Booth and John Baylis 1989 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 (as amended), or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 33-4 Alfred Place, London WCIE 7DP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 1989 Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS L TO Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world Typeset by Footnote Graphics, Warminster, Wiltshire British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Booth, Ken Britain, NATO and nuclear weapons : alternative defence versus alliance reform. I. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Role of Great Britain I. Title ll. Baylis, John, /946- 355' .031 '091821 ISBN 978-0-333-43404-8 ISBN 978-1-349-19667-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-19667-8 To Emma and Katie and to Rob and Tom Contents Preface X Acknowledgements xii PART I ALTERNATIVE DEFENCE 1 Ken Booth 1 A Debate to be Won 3 The Advent of Alternative Defence 3 The Broken Consensus 6 The 1987 General Election: Defence and Democracy 14 The Myths, Threats and Promises of the Double-Zero Agreement 25 Towards a Critical Non-Nuclear Mass? 42 2 What is Wrong with Britain's Existing Defence Policy? 66 Strategic Dangers 66 Political Problems 68 Economic Costs 70 Has the Deterrent Deterred? 72 Operational, Moral and International Security Issues 76 3 Towards a Stable Peace 87 A 'Legitimate International Order' 87 'The Soviet Threat' 90 'Process Utopians' 95 4 Towards a Non-Provocative Defence Policy 103 The Principle of Non-Provocative Defence 104 From Pro-Nuclear to Non-Nuclear 109 From Flexible Response to Defensive Deterrence 112 From an Atlanticist to a more European NATO 124 The Military Balance 142 An Alternative Agenda 144 5 Criticisms of a Non-Nuclear Defence Policy 156 Would it be Hypocritical for a Non-Nuclear Britain to remain within NATO? 162 VII Vlll Contents Would the Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons by Britain make War more Likely? 162 Would Conventional Defence be more Costly? 168 Would British Nuclear Disarmament Weaken if not Shatter NATO? 173 Can a Non-nuclear Strategy be Successful in War? 189 Would a Non-nuclear Britain be Exposed to Nuclear Blackmail? 194 Would Soviet Russia Reciprocate? 204 6 Conclusion 211 Reciprocal Security 214 Living with Soviet Russia 221 World Order Building 228 Losing a Burden, Finding a Role 232 PART II ALLIANCE REFORM 237 John Baylis 7 Nuclear Deterrence and the Preservation of Peace 239 Has Nuclear Deterrence Kept the Peace? 240 Is Nuclear War More likely in the Future than in the Past? 243 Defending the Status Quo 245 8 How Valid are the Criticisms of Nuclear Deterrence? 248 Morality and Nuclear Deterrence 248 The Dangers of Nuclear Deterrence 255 The Credibility of Nuclear Deterrence 261 Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation 264 Nuclear Deterrence, the United States and British Independence 266 Nuclear Deterrence and East-West Tensions 268 The Cost of Nuclear Weapons 272 Nuclear Weapons, Political Prestige and Influence 275 The Utility of Nuclear Weapons in Lesser Contingencies 277 A Summary of the arguments 278 Contents ix 9 The Political Problems of Non-nuclear Strategies 284 The Nature of Non-Nuclear, Non-Provocative Strategies 284 Alliance Difficulties 287 The Question of Nuclear Blackmail 293 10 The Military Problems of Non-nuclear Strategies 300 The Difficulty of dealing with Armoured Forces 300 The Difficulty of dealing with Nuclear-armed Forces 301 The Case of Yugoslavia 307 The Balance of Risk 309 11 Towards a New Strategic Concept for NATO 312 The Future of British Defence Policy 312 The Reform of NATO Strategy 320 The Advantages of an Extended Firebreak Strategy 327 Is the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) the Long-term Solution? 340 The Implications of the Global Double-Zero Agreement 346 12 Towards a Broader Conception of Security 353 The Political Aspects of Security 354 The Notions of 'Common', 'Cooperative' and 'Reciprocal' Security 355 An Agenda for the Future 359 Index 365 Preface This book, written at a time when so many issues in European security are at a crossroads, is by two friends and colleagues who are on opposite sides of the nuclear debate. It has been written in the hope that our own mind-clearing and dialogue will help others who continue to agonise over this most complex and important issue in British public policy. The reader will find the book an unusual con tribution to the subject, since it is neither a debate between ideological rivals who talk past each other, nor is it one of those ostensibly 'balanced' surveys which actually stack the cards one way or the other. We do not have radically different views of the nature of international politics or of the preferred direction for British society. In foreign policy we both rejected Cold War stereotypes and endorse notions of common or reciprocal security, while in domestic matters we belong in the centre. At the root of our differences over nuclear weapons are divergent assessments of the balance of the strategic, political and moral risks we all face. The book is divided into two parts, in which we each make our case. We have avoided addressing each other's arguments point by point, in a pedantic fashion, but instead have concentrated on presenting our own coherent and comprehensive explanations. How ever, we have criticised (or endorsed) each other's arguments where appropriate, and have also criticised the views of others who advocate different versions of the non-nuclearorpro/nuclearcases. The different approaches adopted mean that there is one major asymmetry in the book. Since Part I seeks to advance an alternative way of thinking about the problem, and how to cope with it, it has been necessary to deal with a much wider range of issues there (foreign and domestic, political and strategic) than is the case in Part II, which is concerned to improve the existing structure of policies and attitudes. We have deliberately avoided attempting to achieve a final com promise position, although this might be cause for criticism. We thought that such an ending would have been spurious, for what we could have accepted as friends and colleagues would not necessarily have been possible or relevant for those involved in the burly-burly of daily politics; in any case, we both believe that our individual cases are to be preferred to compromise positions. Before compromising, people should be clear where they stand, and why. X
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