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Britain and the Netherlands: VolumeVI War and Society Paper Delivered to the Sixth Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference PDF

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BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS Volume VI WAR AND SOCIETY PAPERS DELIVERED TO THE SIXTH ANGLO-DUTCH HISTORICAL CONFERENCE EDITED BY A.C. DUKE AND C.A. TAMSE II MARTINUS NIJHOFF 1 THE HAGUE 11977 Published with the support ofa grant from the Prince Bernard Foundation in Amsterdam. Respectfully dedicated to J. S. BROMLEY and E. H. KOSSMANN @ 1977 by Martinus Nijhof!, The Hague, Netherlands So/teover reprint 0/ the hardcover 1st edition 1977 All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-13: 978-94-009-9676-2 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-9674-8 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-9674-8 Contents Preface vii 1 The English People and War in the Early Sixteenth Century by C.S.L. Davies, Wadham College, Oxford 1 2 Holland's Experience of War during the Revolt of the Netherlands by A.Th.van Deursen, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam 19 3 The Army Revolt of 1647 by J.S. Morrill, Selwyn College, Cambridge 54 4 Holland's Financial Problems (1713-1733) and the Wars against Louis XIV by J. Aalbers, Rijksuniversiteit, Utrecht 79 5 Municipal Government and the Burden of the Poor in South Holland during the Napoleonic Wars by S. Schama, Brasenose College, Oxford 94 6 The Sinews of War: The Role of Dutch Finance in European Politics (c. 1750-1815) by M.G. Buist, Rijks- universiteit, Groningen 124 7 Britain and Blockade, 1780-1940 by G.F.A. Best, University of Sussex 141 8 Away from Impressment: The Idea of a Royal Naval Reserve, 1696-1859 by J.S. Bromley, University of Southampton 168 9 Problems of Defence in a Non-Belligerent Society: Military Service in the Netherlands during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century by F.C. Spits, Rijks- universiteit, Utrecht 189 10 World War II and Social Class in Great Britain by A. Marwick, The Open University, Milton Keynes 203 11 The Second World War and Dutch Society: Continuity and Change by J.C.H. Blom, Universiteit van Amsterdam 228 Index 249 Preface War has ever exercised a great appeal on men's minds. Oscar Wilde's witticism notwithstanding this fascination cannot be attri- buted simply to the wicked character of war. The demonic forces released by war have caught the artistic imagination, while sages have reflected on the enigmatic readiness of each new generation to wage war, despite the destruction, disillusion and exhaustion that war is known to bring in its train. If there never was a good war and a bad peace why did armed conflicts recur with such distressing regularity ? Was large-scale violence an intrinsic condition of Man? The answers given to such questions have differed widely: it has even been suggested that the states of war and peace are not as far removed from one another as is usually supposed. The causes of war and the interaction between war and society have long been the subject of philosophical enquiry and historical analysis. Accord- ing to Thucydides no one was ever compelled to go to war; Cicero remarked how dumb were the laws in time of war, while Clausewitz's profound observation concerning the affinity between war and politics has become almost a commonplace. War being the severest test a society or state can experience historians have naturally been concerned to investigate their rela- tionship. Moreover the preparation of war, the organization of the armed forces and financial resources, warfare itself and its reper- cussions are so many expressions of a society's character and pol- itical structure. War being too serious a matter to remain the pre- serve of military historians 'War and Society' was certain, sooner or later, to provide a fitting theme for an Anglo-Dutch Conference. Since their inception in 1959 these conferences have happily demonstrated (by the harmonious co-operation of British and Dutch scholars) that war has no exclusive claim to creativity. But it was not until the meeting held in September 1976 in the congenial surroundings of Kasteel Oud-Poelgeest, close to Leiden, that the interrelationship between war and society in the two countries be- came the chief concern of the participants. The organizing committee at Leiden enhanced the interest of the week's intensive ex:changes with memorable visits to the towns and viii PREFACE fortresses which have played a signal part in the defence of the Netherlands since the birth of the United Provinces. In particular Naarden, the scene of so notorious a massacre in 1572 and still pre- serving its impressively symmetrical fortifications, epitomized the horror and the power of war in early modern society. Both then and later war has been associated with so many changes in state and society and, in its turn, been influenced by political and societal circumstances that the eleven contributors had no difficulty in finding important and interesting subjects. These cover political, social, financial, psychological and juridical aspects of war be- tween the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. Since 1959 the Anglo-Dutch Conferences have served to foster closer ties between British and Dutch historians and stimulated original lines of approach. In his introduction to the first volume of Britain and the Netherlands the late Pieter Geyl doubted whether English historians would emulate their colleagues in the Nether- lands and take the trouble of learning Dutch. Could he see the present prosperity of Dutch historical studies in British universities he would be agreeably surprised. In the Netherlands too the interest in British history has deepened, so that a generation of historians are growing up on both sides of the North Sea conversant in the history of the other country. In particular the substantial studies on Dutch history by young British historians, one of whose number contributes to the present volume, would have given immense satis- faction to Geyl. Future conferences will surely fortify the remark- ably close relationship which exists between historians in the two countries and so realize more fully the vision of the original be- getters of the 'Anglo-Dutch'. Once more the Conference acknowledges with pleasure its generous benefactors. The Dutch Ministry of Education, the Leids Universiteits Fonds and Shell Nederland n.v. all gave assistance. Deeply appreciated, too, was the warm hospitality provided by the Rector Magnificus of Leiden University, the Department of Military History of the Royal Netherlands Army, the Burgo- masters and Councillors of Dordrecht and Oudewater and the Dijkgraaf and the Hoogheemraden of the Hoogheemraadschap Rijnland at Leiden. The Prins Bernard Fonds, which has a dis- tinguished record as a patron of the Humanities and Arts in the Netherlands, was graciously disposed to make a subvention towards the publication of the papers delivered to the Sixth Anglo- Dutch Historical Conference. A.C.D. July 1977 C.A.T. 1. The English People and War in the Early Sixteenth Century C.S.L. DAVIES WAR is not the first subject to come to mind when thinking about the Early Tudor period. The Reformation, with its far-reaching effects on political institutions, on the economy, on the whole nature of society, compels attention; while from the perspective of European history, England plays only a marginal (though vital) part in the Habsburg-Valois struggle. Only from the angle of Scottish history (and perhaps, too, that of England's dependency Ireland) does England in the first half of the sixteenth century appear largely as a military power; and Irish and Scottish history have been unreasonably neglected by historians of England. War, though, mattered enormously to Henry VIII. Only eighteen at the time of his accession, he set to work feverishly to build up England's military strength. Having inherited five ships from his father, he built no fewer than eighteen more within six years of his accession, including the monstrous, unwieldy, and in the event largely useless Henry Grace a Dieu; not content with this, at least three large ships were bought from Genoa, and one from Lubeck. Europe was scoured for weapons; handguns from Italy, armour from Innsbruck, great guns from Brabant, including Hans Poppen- ruyter of Mechelen's 'Twelve Apostles'. In 1512 an army was sent to invade Guienne from northern Spain, in alliance with King Ferdinand. In 1513 Henry himself led an army of some thirty thousand men into France, capturing Th6rouanne and Tournai, and put to flight a French column at the so-called Battle of the Spurs.1 The campaign was followed by elaborate ploys and counter-ploys of rather showy diplomacy, first the universal peace of London in 1518, then the Field of Cloth of Gold in 1520. Notwithstanding all this parade of peace, invasions of France were launched again in 1 e.G. Cruickshank, Army Royal (Oxford, 1968). 2 THE ENGLISH PEOPLE AND WAR 1522 and 1523, the second under the Duke of Suffolk getting to Montdidier within sixty miles of Paris, mainly because the French wisely refused to give battle, before being forced to turn back by cold and shortage of food. Further attempts to win glory in the 1520s came to grief on lack of opportunity and the unresponsive- ness of the English tax-payer. During the 1530s Henry, under the influence of the realist and cautious Thomas Cromwell, conducted a much more defensive policy. In 1544, however, there came another attempt to gain military glory; an attack on Paris on two fronts, by Charles V and by Henry. In the event, the Emperor was glad to conclude the peace of Crepy, and Henry contented himself with the capture of Boulogne. All this effort was largely useless. Tournai, captured with such eclat, was returned to France in 1518; Boulogne was recovered by the French in 1550; the town in any case, under the terms of the treaty of 1546, was due to be returned in 1554. Finally, in 1558 the French captured the last remaining English footholds on the con- tinent, the garrisons at Calais and Guisnes. All this had cost a good deal in lives and money. The greatest campaign, that of 1544, involved an army of some forty-eight thousand men, of whom about eleven thousand were Germans or Netherlanders, while the remaining thirty-seven thousand were English. This was almost certainly the largest English army sent abroad until that date, or at any time subsequently until the reign of William III. One historian has made a rough calculation that the proportion of men under arms (about ten per thousand of the population) was a good deal higher than was normal in France or Spain (about two to four men per thousand).2 The build-up of the Navy, in part at least a belated response to the much greater French threat since the acquisition of Brittany in 1491, was still more spectacular. During Henry VIII's reign the fleet expanded from some five ships to about forty-five, while to the single dockyard at Portsmouth were added those at Deptford and Woolwich in the Thames Estuary and Gillingham on the Medway. Moreover, whereas before 1509 naval administration had been usually handled by one full-time official, the Clerk of the Ships, the foundations were now laid for an organized naval administration, 2 For the size of the 1544 expedition, see Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII [hereafter L.&P.I, (ed. 1.S. Brewer et al., 21 vol., London, 1862-1910), XVII, pt. ii, no. 526; XIX, pt. i, nos. 273-6. The figures are discussed in Appendix A of my D.Phil. thesis (Oxford, 1963), on Supply Services of English Armed Forces, 1509-50. For rough comparisons, see R. Bean, 'War and the Birth of the Nation State', Journal of Economic History, XXIII (1973), 211. IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 3 complete with a regular financial allocation.3 Fear of invasion was responsible, too, for the building of an impressive series of small but efficient fortifications along the south coast, the rebuilding of the fortifications at Hull from 1541 and Berwick from 1558, and, at huge cost and to no effect in the long run, the pouring in of money to the defence of Calais and Guisnes, and those short-lived English possessions, Tournai (1513-18) and Boulogne (1544-50). 4 The most important theatre of war was, however, Scotland. James IV invaded England in 1513 in fulfilment of the traditional Franco-Scottish alliance while his brother-in-law Henry VIII was in search of glory on the battlefields of northern France. James was left dead on the battlefield, Queen Catherine writing exultantly to Henry 'your Grace can see how I can keep my promise, sending you for your banners a King's coat'. 5 For the next fifteen years Scotland underwent the trials of a royal minority; and the situation recurred in 1542 when, shortly after losing a battle to the English, James V died, and Scotland passed to a seven-day old girl. Henry promptly secured from the Scottish prisoners in England a promise to work for the marriage of Queen Mary to the English heir, Prince Edward. The marriage was accepted by a Scottish Parliament, then repudi- ated in favour of a French (and Catholic) alliance. Attempts, by military force and diplomacy, to force the Scots to keep to the engagement, known in Scottish history as the 'rough-wooing', dominated English politics between 1542 and 1550. They involved a mass invasion and burning of Edinburgh by Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford, in 1544; and another invasion by Seymour (now Duke of Somerset and Protector to his nephew, King Edward VI) in 1547, producing an English victory at Pinkie, followed by the establishment of a string of English garrisons through the Low- lands. English intervention prompted the arrival of a French army in 1548, and Queen Mary was spirited away to marry the Dauphin. The object of the war having disappeared, peace was concluded in 1550. English efforts had failed; except in so far (and it is a significant 3 M. Oppenheim, The Administration of the Royal Navy, 1509-1660 (London, 1896); C.S.L. Davies, 'The Administration of the Royal Navy under Henry VITI', English Historical Review, LXXX (1965), 268-86. 4 For Hull, see L.R. Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer (Oxford, 1967); for Berwick, D.H.SU. O'Neil, Castles and Cannon: a Study of Early Artillery Fortifications in England (Oxford, 1960); for Calais and Guisnes, H.M. Colvin, in The History oft he King's Works (ed. H.M. Colvin, London, 1963), III (pt. 1) 1485-1660, 337 seqq. The fortification of Calais cost about £150,000 from 1538-53; Tournai, during five years of English rule, £40,000; and Doulogne from 1544 to 1550 £120,000 (ibid., 361, 381, 392). These were substantial sums: the royal income at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign was about £160,000 p.a. S L.&P., I, pt. ii, no. 2268. 4 THE ENGLISH PEOPLE AND WAR and incalculable exception) that it had prompted French inter- vention on such a scale as to produce a Scottish reaction, and the eventual establishment, with the Scottish Reformation, of a regime generally well-disposed to England. War mattered and it was waged on a large scale. On the other hand, it was intermittent. The only permanent large-scale force was the Navy; and to some extent the garrisons at Calais and Guisnes though these were always rundown during peacetime. Military expenditure was a major portion of royal finance, and the whole history of taxation, forced loans, the acquisition and sale of royal lands, debasement of the coinage, with their multifarious effects, would require separate treatment. So, too, would the effect of war on the economy, and its technological spin-off in ship- building, gun foundries; the effect on the balance of payments; on commercial strategy, of the large-scale import of munitions; the disruption of trade in wartime, both from enemy action and from the 'call-up' of merchant ships and seamen for royal service. All this, though important, affected the average Englishman at one re- move. I would prefer to concentrate on his involvement in, and atti- tudes towards, war. England itself was in the fortunate position of not being directly affected by war at its most brutal and characteristic, for there were few incursions on English soil. Of course, along the Scottish border, raiding was endemic, part of the way oflife. From time to time there was a threat oflarge-scale Scottish invasion, most notably in 1522; but more commonly the North probably suffered more from the effect of provisioning large English armies sent to invade Scotland than from actual Scottish attack. The French burnt Brighton, then a small village, in 1514. More seriously in 1545 the fleet stood by and over a hundred thousand men were mustered on land to repel a French invasion. In fact the French did little more than land a raiding-party on the Isle of Wight; and after a brief naval engage- ment off Shoreham, the French fleet was dispersed by an outbreak of plague. What England was spared was vividly illustrated by English tactics elsewhere. Lord Dacre, defending himself in 1514 from accusations of lethargy, reported on the effectiveness of his raids into the Scottish borders, listing the townships burnt and the general devastation: 'whereas there was in all times passed four hundred ploughs and above, which are now clearly wasted and no man dwelling in any of them'. The Earl of Surrey in 1522, tried in vain to provoke the French to fight by wholesale burning of villages. Most striking of all, in 1544 Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford, on Henry's orders, burnt Edinburgh, Leith, and several other towns

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