Britain and Nuclear Weapons

174 Pages·1980·14.647 MB·English

by  Lawrence Freedman (auth.)

BRITAIN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Royal Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial hody which promotes
the scientific study of international questions and does not express opinions of its own.
The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author.
By the same author
US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT
EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY (forthcoming)
(Studies in International Security)
BRITAIN AND
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
Lawrence Freedman
M
Published for
Palgrave Macmillan
© Royal Institute of International Affairs I g80
All rights reseIVed. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without permission
Firstpublished 1980 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
Filmset by Vantage Photosetting Co. Ltd, Southampton and London
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Freedman, Lawrence
Britain and nuclear weapons
I. Great Britain - Military policy
2. Atomic weapons
I. Title II. Royal Institute of International Affairs
355.03'35' 4I UA647
ISBN 978-0-333-30511-9 ISBN 978-1-349-16388-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-16388-5
The paperback edition of this book is sold subject to the
condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent,
resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's
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this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser
Contents
Vll
Acknowledgements
IX
Lift ofA bbreviations
Xl
Introduction
The Nuclear Bias
10
2 From Skybolt to Polaris
3 The Problem of Strategy
4 The Labour Government and Nuclear Weapons
1964-70 31
5 Chevaline 41
6 The Problem of Replacement 52
7 Cruise Missiles versus Ballistic Missiles 69
8 Defence Priorities 79
9 Arms Control 86
IO The Strategic Context IO 1
II Nuclear Politics in Europe 114
12 Rationales 127
v
VI Britain and Nuclear Weapons
Appendices
Submarines
2 Characteristics of SLBMs '43
3 Expenditure on Nuclear Weapons (current £m) '44
4 Breakdown of Costs of Nuclear Strategic Forces '45
5 Manpower '46
6 Pola Tis Missile T es ts '47
7 Underground Nuclear Tests '48
Notes '49
Index '54
Acknowledgemen ts
It is not possible to thank all those who have helped me with this
book, but I would like to express particular gratitude to Charles
Douglas-Home, Rear-Admiral Edward Gueritz, Professor
Michael Howard, Professor Peter Nailor, Ian Smart and, as ever,
my wife for their encouragement and advice.
This book is in part a result of work undertaken for Chatham
House's British Foreign Policy Project, which was funded by the
Leverhulme Trust.
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN
List of Abbreviations
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ANF Atlantic Nuclear Force
BAOR British Army of the Rhine
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
GLCM Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
MIRV Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry
Vehicle
MLF Multilateral Force
MOD Minis try of Defence
MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
MRV Multiple Re-entry Vehicle
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPG Nuclear Planning Group
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SlOP Single Integrated Operations Plan
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile
TERCOM Terrain Contour Matching
TNF Theatre Nuclear Forces
UN United Nations
IX
Introduction
I
Plans for a future war assume that, if it should 'go nuclear',
Britain could within one day suffer attack from 200 warheads each
with an explosive yield equivalent to one million tons of TNT (one
megaton). Around the centre of each explosion would be miles of
complete devastation, with fire and radiation effects persisting
after the blast effects had run their course. Crude calculations can
be made of an individual's chances of surviving such an explosion
- 20 per cent at a mile from the centre, 40 per cent after three miles
and so on, but the margin of error is enormous. The long-term
consequences, of lingering radiation or social and economic dis
ruption, are even harder to predict.
The question of whether the Government could do more to
improve the survival chances of the population has become a
matter of some controversy. After optimism over the potential for
Civil Defence in the early 1950S, confidence began to wane in its
value until the organisation was virtually disbanded in 1968.
What remains is an impressive ability to sound the alarm and
monitor the effects of an attack, a capacity to maintain a function
ing administrative apparatus, a modicum of law and order in the
aftermath and some stockpiles of foodstuffs and other com
modities.
The controversy surrounds the question of whether much can
be done for the population at large. The official line is that
protection should be on a do-it-yourself basis. With some justice it
is pointed out that mass evacuations would gain little, because
there would be no guaranteed 'safe' place to which to go. People
would be encouraged to stay at home and do the best they could in
constructing a makeshift shelter in which to stay until the danger
Xl