Britain, Aden and South Arabia: Abandoning Empire

264 Pages·1991·25.57 MB·English

by  Karl Pieragostini (auth.)

BRITAIN, ADEN AND SOUTH ARABIA
Britain, Aden and
South Arabia
Abandoning Empire
Karl Pieragostini
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-21675-8 ISBN 978-1-349-21673-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-21673-4
© Karl Pieragostini, 1991
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1991
All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly and Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010
First published in the United States of America in 1991
ISBN 978-0-312-05723-7
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Pieragostini, Karl 1947-
Britain, Aden and South Arabia: abandoning empire/Karl
Pieragostini
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-05723-7
1. Aden (Protectorate)-History. 2. Aden-Foreign relations-
-Great Britain. 3. Great Britain-Foreign relations-Aden. 4. Great
Britain-Foreign relations-1945- I. Title.
DS247.A28P5 1991
327.4105335-dc20 90-22925
CIP
For Patricia with love and thanks
Contents
Preface viii
Acknowledgements xi
Maps xiii
Part I The Theory
Decision, Entrapment and Scuttle 3
Part II The Case Study
2 The Commitment Established
(1798-16 January 1963) 21
3 The Commitment Protected: Aden Joins the
Federation (16 January 1963-10 December 1963) 38
4 An Airport Grenade: The Urban War Begins
(10 December 1963-15 October 1964) 60
5 A New Broom? Labour Comes to Power
(15 October 1964-5 June 1965) 91
6 Taking the Hard Line: Emergency Powers
(5 June 1965-25 September 1965) 120
7 Desperation and Direct Rule
(25 September 1965-22 February 1966) 144
8 Scuttle (22 February 1966) 174
Part III Conclusions
9 How Did it Happen? 183
Part IV Epilogue
10 The Aftermath 205
Notes and References 212
Bibliography 240
Index 249
Vll
Preface
This book has its origins in an interest, stimulated in graduate school,
in the way people decide things, especially important things. Perhaps
largely because I witnessed the Vietnam trauma, this interest
ultimately focused on the way a government commits itself to a
certain pursuit, expends considerable resources on it, and then
suddenly changes its mind and quits. As I was studying in London,
I asked around for British examples of this phenomenon, and Aden
was repeatedly suggested.
My purposes in writing this book were two-fold. First, and
foremost as it turned out, I hoped to get to the bottom of what
happened in this particular episode. I wanted to provide a compre
hensive and plausible explanation of British decision making. I
wanted to tell the story well. Second, I hoped to construct a model
of how government decisions, particularly of this type, are made, and
show that such a model can be useful in explaining such cases. That,
of course, is the political scientist in me showing. In this regard, the
reader should be aware of a basic assumption that underlies the book:
it seems to me that history probably repeats itself, but never exactly.
The trick, if one hopes to be accurate and relevant, is to uncover
evidence of enduring generalities without trampling the characteristics
that make each case unique.
Even so, I expect I'll disappoint some colleagues. Historians may
become impatient with my theorizing. I can only say I found the
model provided a useful, if imperfect, road-map and filter. The road
map indicated promising paths of inquiry, while the filter suggested
what I should consider and what I could reasonably ignore. Some
political scientists, on the other hand, will shake their heads at
another single-case study lacking the breadth to provide scientific
generalizations. In the breadth versus depth debate, I increasingly
come down on the side of depth. In the complex and subtle world of
human behaviour, I would rather have something of substance to say
about one case than be left with inconclusive irrelevancies about
many.
Vlll
Preface ix
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
The book is divided into three main sections. The first, a single
chapter, describes the theoretical basis that underlies the rest of the
work. To understand why a specific decision was made at a particular
time, one should have an idea of how decisions tend to be made
generally. Chapter one provides a model of how governments go
about the business of deciding things. It also describes how certain
aspects of this decision-making process can bog governments down in
counter-productive commitments (entrapment) and then, at some
point, prompt them to bail out (scuttle). Examples from British
experience help illustrate the model throughout the chapter, with
particular attention paid to Britain's East of Suez policy.
The second, and longest, section of the book takes the theoretical
considerations developed in chapter one and applies them in a
detailed investigation of British decision making about Aden.
Chapter two sets the stage by outlining events during the century
and a quarter of British involvement preceding the crucial years from
early 1963 to early 1966. The remainder of section II, chapters three
to eight, unravels the confusion of events during these three years to
show how the British government came eventually to conclude that
this long-standing commitment should be relinquished. These years
fall naturally into five periods, each of which begins with an
important "benchmark" event that signalled a marked change in
how Britain dealt with changing circumstances in its relationship to
South Arabia. Each period occupies a chapter (3-7).
There were many facets to Britain's involvement in Aden. The
organization of chapters three to seven reflects this diversity. Each
chapter begins with a description of the event that launched the
period, and follows with an analysis of the several, interacting
political, economic, and geopolitical games that were being simultan
eously played out: the politics of constitutional advance; the security
challenge faced by British forces; Aden's importance as one of the
Western Alliance's few military outposts in the Middle East; and the
involvement in all this of outside powers (e.g. the U.S.) and
organizations (e.g. the U.N.). Each chapter closes with an analysis
of developments in these games that seemed to affect decision making.
Section II closes with a discussion (8) of the decision announced in
X Preface
February 1966 to discontinue the 127-year-old military presence in
Aden.
Section III consists of a single chapter (9) of conclusions that try to
answer two questions: how 'did Britain come to invest so much in a
commitment, only to abandon it, and what might that experience tell
us about other examples of similar behaviour?
The story does not, of course, completely end in February 1966.
The last British soldier did not leave for another twenty-one months.
Chapter ten, an epilogue, outlines how the British government coped
during this period of implementation.
KARL PIERAGOSTINI
Acknowledgements
Any book, especially one that took as long to write as this one, has
benefited from the help of many people. I will probably fqrget to
thank someone. For this I apologize. In Britain, John Groom
provided the initial ideas, direction, and much practical advice. He
also ploughed through and commented on numerous versions of the
original doctoral dissertation, and a great deal that was discarded
along the way. I cringe to think what I put him through. Jack Spence
also read and provided useful comments on the final version of the
original manuscript, and Frank Edmead was stimulating and
generous with his ideas.
I owe a particular debt of gratitude to my friend Bruce George,
who gave me the opportunity over a period of some six years to see
British politics first hand at the national and local levels. He was also
instrumental in securing the interviews that provided unique insight
into important aspects of the Aden case. Our many discussions about
British politics as it unfolded were both immensely enjoyable and very
instructive. I am also grateful to those government officials and
others, listed elsewhere, who agreed to be interviewed. My research
would not have been possible without the help of the librarians at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies and Chatham House,
especially those at the latter's press library, where I spent innumerable
hours exploiting that remarkable resource.
The editors at the publishers have been patient and helpful. I am
especially grateful to Simon Winder, who first said, "yes, let's do it,"
and Belinda Holdsworth, who has guided the project to fruition.
Keith Povey and Tony Waterman performed the unsung heroics of
copy-editing.
In the U.S., I would like to thank my colleagues Mark Kauppi,
Norman Cigar, and Max Gross. Mark read and extensively
commented on several versions of the theoretical chapter. Further
more, the many discussions we've had over the past several years have
been intellectually stimulating, fun, and the perfect antidote to the
bureaucratic nonsense one so often finds in government. Norman
read and commented on the entire manuscript, and Max did the same
for chapter two. I am not an Arabist, a fact that has caused me some
unease, given the detailed nature of my inquiry. I am grateful these
Xl