Brand Name Terror: Al-Qaeda Affiliate Organizations and Local Instability

144 Pages·2013·0.39 MB·English

Brand Name Terror:
Al-Qaeda Affiliate Organizations
and Local Instability
Jessica Ward
May 22, 2013
Honors Program in International Security Studies
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University
Advisor: Prof. Martha Crenshaw
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements.................................................................................................iii
Abstract...................................................................................................................iv
Introduction..............................................................................................................1
Chapter One: Literature Review...............................................................................6
Chapter Two: Methodology and Case Study Selection..........................................35
Chapter Three: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula...............................................57
Chapter Four: Laskhar-e-Taiba...............................................................................81
Chapter Five: Four Case Studies: Low Levels of Linkage to al-Qaeda...............104
Chapter Six: Conclusion.......................................................................................131
Works Cited..........................................................................................................140
Harmony Documents Cited..................................................................................149
Appendix One: Classification of Al-Qaeda Linked Groups.................................150
Appendix Two: Oath Sworn When Joining al-Qaeda..........................................151
Appendix Three: Figures......................................................................................151
Appendix Four: Acronym List.............................................................................152
Figures
Figure One: AQAP Attacks Over Time............................................Appendix Three
Figure Two: AQAP Attacks by Causality................................Total Appendix Three
Figure Three: Map of Yemen.................................................................................66
Figure Four: Map of Kashmir.................................................................................74
Note on Arabic Transliteration
There is no single commonly used standard for transliterating the Arabic alphabet
into the Latin alphabet. For this reason, Arabic words have been transliterated
according to their most common spelling in English language material.
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Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Martha Crenshaw, for all of her
advice over the past year. Prof. Crenshaw's advice has guided every aspect of this thesis.
Without her, this thesis would have incoherent, grammatically and logically, and probably
several weeks late.
Secondly, I would like to thank all of the staff at the Conflict Records Research Center
(CRRC) in Washington, DC, where I interned last summer. While I wasn't able to utilize
the research I did at the CRRC as much as I would have liked, my time at the CRRC
provided me essential time to do research, become better acquainted with the academic
study of terrorism, and to begin thinking about my thesis. The insights provided by
documents found at the CRRC and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point serve as
some of my most interesting evidence.
I'd also like to thank the rest of the CISAC International Security Program, including
Col. Joesph Felter and our Daniel Cassman, who along with Prof. Crenshaw, have served
as our brave leaders throughout the year. Also incredibly important is my CISAC cohort,
who throughout the year have offered insightful questions and support. Kathy, Flora,
Vaeme, Ravi, Daniel, Daniel, David, Scott, and Ryan, I'm incredibly glad that you were
along with me for this arduous, and rewarding, process.
There are many more people throughout Stanford and the academic community who
have contributed to my thesis through sharing their expertise and conversations that have
made me explain simply what exactly I was writing about.
Lastly, I would like to thank my family. Mom, Dad, Ryan, Grandpa, Grandma, you
made me who I am and you are the ones responsible for where I am today. I would also
like to thank my friends who are like family to me. Nikhil, Chris, Jorge, Breeshia, Albert,
Charles, Mark, and Sin Yee; thank you for putting you for putting up with me talking about
my thesis all year and being there for me these past four crazy years.
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Abstract
Al-Qaeda affiliation comes with both costs and benefits. For al-Qaeda affiliate
organizations, regardless of the strength of their connection to the al-Qaeda central
organization, an affiliation does not change the amount of instability that the affiliate
organization creates in its home country. This thesis uses case studies of groups at
varying levels of connection to al-Qaeda to determine the net effect of al-Qaeda
affiliation. The relationship with al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, Laskhar-e-Taiba, Fatah al-Islam, the Islamic Army of Aden, Harkat ul-
Mujahideen, and Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami, are explored as well as their influence on
instability in Yemen, Pakistan, and Lebanon to determine the effect of an al-Qaeda
affiliation on local instability. The strengthening mechanisms are resources,
knowledge, and ideology, while the mechanisms that decrease local instability potential
are identification, local distrust, and foreign targeting. Because the benefits of al-Qaeda
affiliation are canceled out by its costs, al-Qaeda affiliation has no net effect on local
instability.
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Introduction
For al-Qaeda the recent years have been both the best of times, with the rapid expansion of its
power through regional affiliate organizations, and the worst of times, with the death of Osama bin
Laden and the decline of its central organization. Some of these regional affiliate organizations, such as
al-Qaeda in the the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), have wrecked havoc throughout their homes. Some, such
as a-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), in addition to waging campaigns within their home
countries have taken up the al-Qaeda mission of attacking the west and have become themselves
powerful threats against the United States. However, al-Qaeda affiliate organizations are not new. Some
groups, such as Laskar-e-Taiba have had a relationship with al-Qaeda since its initial founding years in
Afghanistan through connections in Peshwar, Pakistan.
What being al-Qaeda affiliate means varies across the al-Qaeda network and the radical Islamist
movement. Some groups have pledged formal allegiance to al-Qaeda. These groups generally have a
closer relationship to the central organization. The leadership of the affiliate organization
communicates and consults with the leadership of al-Qaeda central and the affiliate organization adopts
the central organization's ideology and strategic priorities. However, other organizations have a weaker
relationship with al-Qaeda. Some groups may share some operations, and some may share resources
like training camps, or assist each other through tactical assistance or facilitation of recruitment. Some
groups do not even have this level of cooperation, and instead are only connected ideologically.
My thesis addresses the the topic of this variation in strength of the relationship between al-
Qaeda and its affiliate organizations. Do differing levels of connection to al-Qaeda result in any change
in the output of the group? I examine this question of output and effectiveness with particular regard to
local instability. Will a group that has a stronger connection to al-Qaeda make their home country more
unstable? The answer that I have found is no. Al-Qaeda affiliation comes with costs and benefits. While
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adopting an al-Qaeda ideology may draw more recruits, and at stronger levels of affiliation there are
benefits of strategic guidance and possibly resources, embracing the al-Qaeda name also has costs. The
first and strongest of these is immediately becoming a target and losing popular support from the local
population, causing a decrease in the amount of instability created by the group. With regard to
affecting instability locally, becoming an al-Qaeda affiliate can also influence targeting choices. This
finding has the implication that an al-Qaeda affiliation does not have a net benefit for the group and
does not make the group more dangerous in its home state.
To think about this question, the first topic that needs to be addressed is defining what the al-
Qaeda organization is. Founded in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, al-Qaeda was an Arab
organization based in a non-Arab country. After leaving Afghanistan and spending time in Saudi
Arabia, bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization moved to Sudan upon the invitation of the Sudanese
government (Wright 164). After the revocation of bin Laden's Saudi passport and his expulsion from
Sudan with next to nothing of the millions he had invested in the country, bin Laden took al-Qaeda
back to Afghanistan (Wright 222). The organization had safe haven in Afghanistan until the American
invasion of Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks and Taliban unwillingness to give up al-Qaeda.
The last sight of al-Qaeda leadership until bin Laden's May 2011 death was in March 2002, when
Ayman Zawahiri, al-Qaeda second in command, and masked Arabs “disappeared into the mountains”
near Khost, Afghanistan (Wright 373). This was the end of the initial period of the al-Qaeda
organization, during which the central organization was powerful. It also marked the beginning of a
second period, in which the organization spawned a global movement which would come to out power
the dying central organization.
Following the intense counterterrorism action that al-Qaeda faced, it could no longer operate
fully as an organization. Strategically, public awareness of the group, from the western world to flyers
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dropped in Afghanistan, had undermined the need to keep the group covert. Ideologically, the decline
of the central al-Qaeda organization can be attributed in part to a failure to gain legitimacy; this decline
has resulted in the trend of localization of jihadi conflicts (Mudd 2012). Because of this decline, there
are some who believe that al-Qaeda central no longer represents a threat to the United States, the west,
or the world (Gerges 2011). After 9/11 The next major theater of war for al-Qaeda wouldn't be against
the west, but in Iraq, through its affiliate organization al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Documents captured in
Abbottabad show that bin Laden felt “burdened” by affiliate groups, particularly AQI, rather than
viewing them as a source of strength (Lahoud et al 2012). They also show that bin Laden did not regard
the localization of conflict as part of the al-Qaeda strategy, such as this letter to an AQAP leader
regarding establishment of territorial control in Yemen, “I would say that Yemen is the Arab country
most ready for the establishment of an Islamic state, but this does not mean that the necessary
fundamental elements for success for such a project have yet been realized,” (CTC 3).
However, despite the fact that affiliate groups were not necessarily considered to be beneficial,
al-Qaeda maintained relationships with various Islamic groups throughout its history in order to spread
its influence and create alliances which could be beneficial to the group. In a charter document, al-
Qaeda comments on its relationships with outer groups, “Our relation with Islamic movements and
groups and workers of Islam is one of cooperation towards righteousness and strength, with continuing
attempts towards merger and unity,” and “our relation with non-Jihad Islamic groups is one of love and
friendship and advice, and bringing out the good in them and correcting their mistakes if the situation
requires it.” (CRRC 10). However, in order to become a member of al-Qaeda it was required that for
the individual, there be “no connection between al-Qaeda membership and any other Islamic group”
(CRRC 6).
Despite bin Ladens belief that affiliate organizations may be not be a source of strength, it can
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be argued that the greatest threat posed by al-Qaeda today is the local affiliate organizations. These
affiliations do not represent much of a threat to the United States. With the exception of AQAP, they
have generally avoided attacking the United States. They are do not possess the capabilities to
undertake a “spectacular” attack against the United States or the west even if they wanted to because of
reduced resource availability and increased security awareness and practices. Where the danger of these
groups come from is their threat to the domestic stability of the already unstable countries where they
have found bases. Al-Qaeda involvement can cause an escalation in an existing conflict, such as in
Mali or Somalia, or it can create its own area of conflict, like in Yemen.
State instability is a threat to society, both for those who live in the state and those abroad. From
an American view, instability in countries like Yemen or Pakistan can be a threat because instability has
been linked to increases in levels of terrorism (Piazza 2008a). Additionally, from a global view
instability can cause economic problems and fuel international tensions. One case where this can be
seen in Somalia, in which famine and a perpetual state of instability have led to an increase in piracy in
the seas near the Horn of Africa. Instability obviously also has domestic consequences. Instability,
through lack of government capacity, can result in increases in internal crime, and decreases in
government infrastructure such as police, and even basic health infrastructure such as hospitals and
clean water. This in turn can reduce the quality of life in the country. The country may become a
source of refugees, both internal and international.
By recognizing and evaluating the factors that fuel instability, such as terrorism, work can be
done to identify what the potential causes of inability are and then find a way to fight them. This study
can also increase knowledge about how al-Qaeda, and possibly other future large terrorist networks,
function. Such knowledge can be used to evaluate where to concentrate counterterrorist resources based
on threats and how to target terrorist networks.
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The central question that will be a addressed through the rest of my thesis is 'does variance in
strength of al-Qaeda affiliation cause change in the extent to which a group destabilizes a country?'.
Three sets of case studies of groups with varying levels of connection to al-Qaeda will be analyzed.
These case studies will ask what the connection is between al-Qaeda and the affiliate group, how
specifically the affiliate group has created instability in their home country, and how the affiliation
effected the creation of instability. This last section will be done through the model of six hypothesized
mechanisms of how an al-Qaeda affiliation could help or hurt an affiliate group: resources, knowledge,
ideology, identification, foreign targeting, and local distrust. I have found evidence to support all six of
these mechanisms, concluding that the net effect of an al-Qaeda affiliation is neutral. Instead the groups
that have the greatest impact on local instability are the groups with higher levels of capacity and those
that make local targeting choices. The first case study is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in Yemen.
The second case study is Laskhar-e-Taiba, in Pakistan. The last is a group of short case studies of all
four groups which make up the least connected category: Fatah al-Islam, in Lebanon; the Islamic Army
of Aden, in Yemen, and Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), both in
Pakistan.
Chapter One
Literature Review
The central question of my thesis can be distilled into three straightforward theoretical
questions. The first is 'does an effective terrorist group have an impact on state stability?'. The second is
'does having an al-Qaeda affiliation make a group more effective?'. The third question is 'why?'. There
is an extensive literature dealing with terrorism. This literature works to explain the organization of
terrorist groups, the strategic logic of terrorism, and searches for a root cause of terrorism at societal,
group, and individual levels. In addition, organizational theories explain about what makes
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organizations in general more effective. Based on the knowledge that al-Qaeda, like all terrorist groups,
is a strategic organization working towards goals, it is presumed that a more effective terrorist
organization will demonstrate more progress towards these goals, of which state failure is the primary
one. Lastly, I propose six possible mechanisms for how changes in the levels of al-Qaeda affiliation
could possibly increase or decrease the effect of a a group on stability of the country which they are
based. Recognizing that there are both benefits and costs from having an affiliation, three of these
increase instability while three decrease instability from the group.
Terrorism
Terrorism in general remains a infrequently occurring phenomenon in the world and
transnational or internationally based terrorism even more so. Since there year 2000, there have only
been 34,886 reported and recorded terrorist incidents, or about 3,000 a year (Global Terrorism
Database-GTD). The vast majority of these, 23,340 incidents, occurred in the Middle East or South
Asia (GTD). In comparison, there were 11,493 firearm homicides in the United States in 2009
(Kennedy 2013). While the number of transnational terrorist attacks did not increase 1979-2000, an
increase in the severity of the attacks led to an increased number of fatalities from transnational
terrorism (Enders and Sandler 2000). However, between 1973 and 2002 counterterrorism effectiveness
has increased (Drakos and Giannakopoulos 2009).
The predominant assumption of literature concerning terrorism is that terrorism is used as a
rational strategy for the pursuit of policy changes. In particular, terrorists can be identified as
representing a group, which represents a minority in ethnicity, religion, or ideology. These groups wish
to challenge the government but possess little political power. In the face of an asymmetric balance of
power these groups will turn to terrorist tactics (Crenshaw 1981). In general, terrorism could not be
called a strategy unto itself, but rather a set of terrorist tactics collectively become the strategy of an