Boko Haram: The Socio-Economic Drivers

120 Pages·2015·2.428 MB·English

by  Lucky E. Asuelime, Ojochenemi J. David (auth.)

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Lucky E. Asuelime
Ojochenemi J. David
Boko Haram
The Socio-
Economic Drivers
123
SpringerBriefs in Political Science
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8871
Lucky E. Asuelime Ojochenemi J. David
(cid:129)
Boko Haram
The Socio-Economic Drivers
Foreword by Azeez Olaniyan
123
Lucky E.Asuelime Ojochenemi J.David
Department ofPolitics andInternational Department ofPolitics andInternational
Studies,Faculty of Arts Studies,Faculty of Arts
University of Zululand University of Zululand
KwaDlangezwa KwaDlangezwa
SouthAfrica SouthAfrica
ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic)
SpringerBriefs inPolitical Science
ISBN978-3-319-21229-6 ISBN978-3-319-21230-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21230-2
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For
Nigeria
Late Mrs. Felicia Asuelime
Late Mrs. Theresa Onuh
Mrs. Raquel Asuelime
University of Zululand
Foreword
This book does not consider Boko Haram terrorism as a momentary threat that
would pass away merely by the counter-terrorist strategies of the Nigerian state
security agencies. The reason for such a view includes the fact of the growing
frustration and the political atmosphere of discontent among the populace in the
mostly affected northern region, particularly the youths of the area. This has been
mainly engendered by the political economy of state robbery that typifies the
national economy, which invariably has heightened the level of frustration and
desperationamongthepopulacesincethenation’sindependencein1960.Thus,ata
fundamental level, the Boko Haram uprising is largely symptomatic of the ambi-
anceofgeneralhumaninsecuritybroughtaboutbythepervasivecorruptionthathas
tainted Nigeria’s political and economic history. By implication, control measures
employed—if not entrenched in a long-term economic and political development
may merely amount to an ineffective quick-fix, which would only result in the
resurfacing of other “Boko Harams”, perhaps under another nomenclature.
WhileitmightbereductivetoexplainBokoHaramterrorismundertheheading
of socio-economic factors, to jettison root causes pertaining to socio-economic
factors as non-important, is arguably tantamount to a further deterioration in the
security and stability of the affected northern region. This, in turn, is counterpro-
ductive to Nigeria’s efforts towards development. Hence, against the backdrop
of the arguments that seem to disconfirm any link between socio-economic vari-
ables and terrorism, this book underscores the fact that the Nigerian context
presents a different food for thought, namely that socio-economic root factors
cannot be undermined based on the generalization from studies done in other
contexts. Indeed, unless Nigeria tackles those socio-economic issues that tend
hithertotolegitimizeresortstoviolence,theoccurrenceandre-occurrenceof“Boko
Harams”wouldremainamajorblockadetopeace,security,anddevelopmentinthe
northern region and Nigeria at large. This book is pivoted on the assumption that
adequate provision of social welfare service and good education, of which the
Nigerian government has generally fallen short thus far, is one critical way of
mitigatingthegrowingtendencytowardsviolenceinthecountry.Thisbookoffersa
vii
viii Foreword
fresh insight into the Boko Haram conundrum in the Nigerian state. It is my
pleasure to recommend it to those interested in understanding the underpinning
factors of one of the greatest challenges to the Nigerian state in the annals of its
existence.
Ekiti, Nigeria Azeez Olaniyan
March 2015
Contents
1 The Phenomenon of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria. . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Setting the Scene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Cleavage-Prone Colonial Heritage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Problematique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Root Cause (RC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 Understanding the Changing Context for Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 The Definition Problem: The Bermuda Triangle
of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Perspectives on Terrorism: A Historical Trajectory. . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Justification of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.1 Between Socio-Economic Factors and Terrorism . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 Political Economy of Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 State and Economic Symbiosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 The Nigerian Oil-Centric Economy and Consequences. . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Nigeria’s Economic Crises from the 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 The (Mis)Management of the Crises: From Shagari
to Obasanjo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6 Corruption in Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.7 Cost of Corruption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.8 Poverty in Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.9 Conclusion and Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
ix
x Contents
4 Evolution, Ideological Foundation, and Strategy
of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Evolution and Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3 Ideological Background, Mission, and Location. . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4 Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5 Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.6 Targets and Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.7 Indicators of International Link and Sponsorship . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5 RC of Boko Haram Terrorism: Socio-Economic Prism. . . . . . . . . . 83
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.2 Unemployment and Bourgeoning Population
in Northern Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.3 Pervasive Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.4 Economic Development and Income Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.5 Low Educational Profile in the Northern Region . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6 Conclusion: Responses and Recommendations
to End Boko Haram Terrorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.2 A Review of Government’s Response to Boko Haram . . . . . . . . 104
6.3 The Security and Development Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.4 Addressing the Socio-Economic Root Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.5 Creating Employment Opportunities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.6 Effective Poverty Alleviation Programme
and Social Welfare Improvement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.7 Improving the Education Profile in the Northern Region. . . . . . . 109
6.8 Good Governance and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.9 General Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114