ebook img

Boko Haram: The Socio-Economic Drivers PDF

120 Pages·2015·2.428 MB·English
Save to my drive
Quick download
Download
Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.

Preview Boko Haram: The Socio-Economic Drivers

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE Lucky E. Asuelime Ojochenemi J. David Boko Haram The Socio- Economic Drivers 123 SpringerBriefs in Political Science More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8871 Lucky E. Asuelime Ojochenemi J. David (cid:129) Boko Haram The Socio-Economic Drivers Foreword by Azeez Olaniyan 123 Lucky E.Asuelime Ojochenemi J.David Department ofPolitics andInternational Department ofPolitics andInternational Studies,Faculty of Arts Studies,Faculty of Arts University of Zululand University of Zululand KwaDlangezwa KwaDlangezwa SouthAfrica SouthAfrica ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic) SpringerBriefs inPolitical Science ISBN978-3-319-21229-6 ISBN978-3-319-21230-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21230-2 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015943439 SpringerChamHeidelbergNewYorkDordrechtLondon ©TheAuthor(s)2015 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpart of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission orinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilar methodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfrom therelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authorsortheeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinor foranyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade. Printedonacid-freepaper SpringerInternationalPublishingAGSwitzerlandispartofSpringerScience+BusinessMedia (www.springer.com) For Nigeria Late Mrs. Felicia Asuelime Late Mrs. Theresa Onuh Mrs. Raquel Asuelime University of Zululand Foreword This book does not consider Boko Haram terrorism as a momentary threat that would pass away merely by the counter-terrorist strategies of the Nigerian state security agencies. The reason for such a view includes the fact of the growing frustration and the political atmosphere of discontent among the populace in the mostly affected northern region, particularly the youths of the area. This has been mainly engendered by the political economy of state robbery that typifies the national economy, which invariably has heightened the level of frustration and desperationamongthepopulacesincethenation’sindependencein1960.Thus,ata fundamental level, the Boko Haram uprising is largely symptomatic of the ambi- anceofgeneralhumaninsecuritybroughtaboutbythepervasivecorruptionthathas tainted Nigeria’s political and economic history. By implication, control measures employed—if not entrenched in a long-term economic and political development may merely amount to an ineffective quick-fix, which would only result in the resurfacing of other “Boko Harams”, perhaps under another nomenclature. WhileitmightbereductivetoexplainBokoHaramterrorismundertheheading of socio-economic factors, to jettison root causes pertaining to socio-economic factors as non-important, is arguably tantamount to a further deterioration in the security and stability of the affected northern region. This, in turn, is counterpro- ductive to Nigeria’s efforts towards development. Hence, against the backdrop of the arguments that seem to disconfirm any link between socio-economic vari- ables and terrorism, this book underscores the fact that the Nigerian context presents a different food for thought, namely that socio-economic root factors cannot be undermined based on the generalization from studies done in other contexts. Indeed, unless Nigeria tackles those socio-economic issues that tend hithertotolegitimizeresortstoviolence,theoccurrenceandre-occurrenceof“Boko Harams”wouldremainamajorblockadetopeace,security,anddevelopmentinthe northern region and Nigeria at large. This book is pivoted on the assumption that adequate provision of social welfare service and good education, of which the Nigerian government has generally fallen short thus far, is one critical way of mitigatingthegrowingtendencytowardsviolenceinthecountry.Thisbookoffersa vii viii Foreword fresh insight into the Boko Haram conundrum in the Nigerian state. It is my pleasure to recommend it to those interested in understanding the underpinning factors of one of the greatest challenges to the Nigerian state in the annals of its existence. Ekiti, Nigeria Azeez Olaniyan March 2015 Contents 1 The Phenomenon of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria. . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Setting the Scene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Cleavage-Prone Colonial Heritage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.3 Problematique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4 Root Cause (RC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2 Understanding the Changing Context for Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.2 The Definition Problem: The Bermuda Triangle of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.3 Perspectives on Terrorism: A Historical Trajectory. . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.4 Justification of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.4.1 Between Socio-Economic Factors and Terrorism . . . . . . . 33 2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3 Political Economy of Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.2 State and Economic Symbiosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.3 The Nigerian Oil-Centric Economy and Consequences. . . . . . . . 41 3.4 Nigeria’s Economic Crises from the 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.5 The (Mis)Management of the Crises: From Shagari to Obasanjo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.6 Corruption in Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.7 Cost of Corruption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3.8 Poverty in Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 3.9 Conclusion and Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 ix x Contents 4 Evolution, Ideological Foundation, and Strategy of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 4.2 Evolution and Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 4.3 Ideological Background, Mission, and Location. . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 4.5 Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.6 Targets and Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 4.7 Indicators of International Link and Sponsorship . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 5 RC of Boko Haram Terrorism: Socio-Economic Prism. . . . . . . . . . 83 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 5.2 Unemployment and Bourgeoning Population in Northern Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 5.3 Pervasive Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 5.4 Economic Development and Income Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 5.5 Low Educational Profile in the Northern Region . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 6 Conclusion: Responses and Recommendations to End Boko Haram Terrorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 6.2 A Review of Government’s Response to Boko Haram . . . . . . . . 104 6.3 The Security and Development Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 6.4 Addressing the Socio-Economic Root Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 6.5 Creating Employment Opportunities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 6.6 Effective Poverty Alleviation Programme and Social Welfare Improvement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 6.7 Improving the Education Profile in the Northern Region. . . . . . . 109 6.8 Good Governance and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 6.9 General Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

See more

The list of books you might like

Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.