bibliography of alvin plantinga 1958 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ALVIN PLANTINGA
1958
(a) 'Dooyeweerd on Meaning and Being', Reformed Journal 8, October, 10-15.
(b) 'An Existentialist's Ethics', Review of Metaphysics 12,235-256.
1961
(a) 'Things and Persons', Review ofM etaphysics 14,493-519.
(b) 'A Valid Ontological Argument?' Philosophical Review 70, 93-101.
(c) 'It's Actual, so it must be Possible', Philosophical Studies 12,61-64.
1962
(a) 'The Perfect Goodness of God', Australasian Journal ofP hilosophy 40, 70-75.
1963
(a) 'Christianity and Analytic Philosophy', Christianity Today 8, No.2, 17-20.
1964
(a) Faith and Philosophy (ed.), William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, MJ.
(b) 'Necessary Being', Faith and Philosophy, pp. 97-110.
(c) 'On Being Honest to God', Reformed Journal 14, April, 11-15.
1965
(a) The Ontological Argument (ed.), Doubleday, Anchor Books, Garden City, NY.
(b) 'A comment on the Strategy of the Skeptic', Faith and the Philosophers (ed. J.
Hick), pp. 226-227.
J. E. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (eds.), 'Alvin Plantinga', 399-410. 399
© 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
ALVIN PLANTINGA
(c) 'The Free Will Defense', Philosophy in America (ed. by Max Black), Cornell Uni-
versity Press, pp. 204-220.
This article was my initial attempt to provide a precise and plausible modal
formulation of one traditional approach to the problem of evil - the free will
defense. I later expand and refme this modal formulation in The Nature of
Necessity (1974a) and God, Freedom, and Evil (1974b).
1966
(a) 'Induction and other Minds', Review ofM etaphysics 19,441-461.
(b) 'Kant's Objection to the Ontological Argument', Journal of Philosophy 63,537-
546.
(c) 'Pike and Possible Persons', Journal of Philosophy 63, 104-108.
(d) 'Comments (on Hilary Putnam's 'The Mental Life of Some Machines')', Inten
tionality, Minds, and Perception (ed. H. N. Castaneda), Wayne State University
Press, Detroit, pp. 201-205.
1967
(a) God and Other Minds, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
In this study I explore the rationality of belief in the existence of God. Part
I examines natural theology by way of treating the cosmological, ontological,
and teleological arguments for the existence of God. I conclude that each of
these arguments is unsuccessful. Part II deals with natural atheology, and I
take up the problem of evil, verificationism, and the paradox of omnipotence.
Here too I find that each of these fails. In Part III I explore various analogies
between belief in God and belief in other minds. I conclude that these two
beliefs are on an epistemological par: if either is rational, so is the other. But
surely belief in other minds is rational. Thus, we must say the same for belief
in God.
(b) 'Norman Malcolm', Encyclopedia ofP hilosophy , pp. 139-140.
(c) 'Radical Theology', Reformed Journall7 May/June, 7-10.
1968
(a) 'Induction and Other Minds II', Review ofM etaphysics 21,524-533.
1969
(a) 'De Re et De Dicto', Nous 3, 235-258.
1970
(a) 'Why Climb Mountains?' Reformed Journal 20, 6-8.
(b) 'World and Essence', Philosophical Review 79,461-492.
400
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(c) 'The Incompatibility of Freedom with Determinism', Philosophical Forum 2,
141-148.
1971
(a) 'Christians, Scholars and Christian Scholars', The Banner 106, June 18, 4-7.
(b) 'What George Could Not Have Been', Nous 5,227-232.
1973
(a) 'Which Worlds Could God Have Created?' Journal of Philosophy 70, 539-552.
(b) 'Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?' Logic and Ontology (ed. by
Milton Munitz), New York Univeristy Press, NY, pp. 193-212.
1974
(a) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England.
This book is a systematic treatment of modality. Chapter I locates and IlXes
the idea of broadly logical necessity. In Chapters II and III, I consider and reject
various objections to modality de re and argue that this notion can be explained
by way of modality de dicta. Chapter IV presents and explains the concept
of possible worlds. In Chapter V, I argue that each object has an essence: a
property essential to it and essentially unique to it. Chapter VI examines and
dismisses the so-called problem of transworld identity. In Chapters VII and VIII,
I take up the question of whether there are possible but nonactual individuals.
I argue against such items. Chapters IX and X consider the bearing of the above
modal matters on two issues in natural theology: the problem of evil and the
ontological argument. I attempt to resolve the former while providing a sound
version of the latter. Finally, in an appendix, I explore and partly concur with
Quine's claim that quantified modal logic presupposes what he calls Aristotelian
Essentialism - the view that objects typically have both accidental and essential
properties.
(b) God, Freedom and Evil, Harper Torchbook, New York, NY.
For the most part, the material presented here is an elementary version of
material developed in The Nature of Necessity (1974a). There is one major
exception: here I consider in addition the compatibility of divine foreknowledge
and human freedom. I argue that they are indeed mutually compatible.
(c) 'Aquinas - 700 Years Later', Reformed Journal 24, 5-7.
(d) 'God and Rationality', Reformed Journal 24, 28-29.
(e) 'Our Reasonable Service', The Banner 109, Oct. 18,6-8.
1975
(a) 'Aquinas on Anselm', God and the Good (ed. by C. Orlebeke and L. Smedes),
Eerdmans Press, Grand Rapids.
401
ALVIN PLANTINGA
(b) 'On Mereological Essentialism', Review of Metaphysics 28,468-476.
(c) 'Reply to Henry',Philosophical Books 16, No.3, 8-10.
1976
(a) 'Existence, Necessity and God', The New Scholasticism 50,61-72.
(b) 'Necessary Existence: A Reply to Carter', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6,
105-111.
(c) 'Possible Worlds', The Listener 95, June 30.
(d) 'Actualism and Possible Worlds', Theoria 42, 139-160.
According to the Canonical Conception of Possible worlds, there are or could
have been nonexistent objects. For surely there are possible worlds in which
you and I do not exist. Hence, where W is such a world, '" (W) is the domain of
objects that exist in W, and U is the union of the domains of all the worlds, we
find that", (W) of U. So, if W had been actual, U would have had some members
that do not exist - there would have been some nonexistent individuals. After
Robert M. Adams, suppose we use 'Actualism' to designate the view that there
neither are nor could be any nonexistent individuals. Now I enthusiastically
endorse Actualism; and the aim of the present study, therefore, is to set out the
essentials of an actualist conception of possible worlds.
1978
(a) 'The Boethian Compromise', American Philosophical Quarterly 15, 129-138.
After criticizing some recent anti-Fregean views of proper names, I advance a
view containing both Fregean as well as anti-Fregean elements. I propose that
proper names do indeed express properties. In particular, I hold that proper
names express essences. Since individuals have multiple essences, distinct proper
names of one and the same object can express logically equivalent but epistemi
cally inequivalent essences of that object. This view, I argue, enables us to
resolve various puzzles surrounding empty proper names, negative existentials
containing proper names, propositional identity, and the informativeness of
some identity statements.
1979
(a) 'The Probabilistic Argument from Evil', Philosophical Studies 35, 1-53.
Consider the propositions
G: God exists and He is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly
good
E: There are 1013 turps of evil
where '1013 turps' names the amount of evil the actual world contains. Suppose
we agree - as I have argued elsewhere - that G and E are jointly consistent.
Still, some natural atheologians have maintained that G is somehow improbable
402
BIBLIOGRAPHY
on E. Here I examine the leading interpretations of probability and argue that
on none of these are we entitled to think that the probability of G given E is
low.
(b) 'Is belief in God Rational?' in Rationality and Religious Belief, (ed. by C. Delaney),
University of Notre Dame Press, South Bend, IN, pp. 7-27.
(c) 'De Essentia', Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M Chisholm, (ed. E. Sosa),
Rodopi, Amsterdam, pp. 101-121.
1980
(a) Does God Have a Nature?, Marquette University Press, WI.
(b) 'The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology', Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association 54,49-63.
Many Reformed theologians have rejected natural theology, where the latter is
viewed as an attempt to provide proofs of the existence of God. They have held
not merely that the proffered arguments fail, but that the whole enterprise is
radically misguided. What is intended here, I think, is that belief in God need
not be based on argument or evidence from other propositions at all. In brief,
it is held that belief in God is properly basic. In this paper, I develop and defend
this position.
1981
(a) 'Is Belief in God Properly Basic?', Nous 15, 41-51.
(b) 'The Case of Kant' in Introduction to Philosophy (ed. by Jack Rogers).
(c) 'Rationality and Religious Belief', Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, (ed. by
S. Cahn and D. Shatz), Oxford Univeristy Press, New York, NY, pp. 255-277.
(d) 'Reply to the Basinger Brothers',Journal of Process Philosophy 11,25-29.
1982
(a) 'On Reformed Epistemology', Reformed Journal 32, January, 13-17.
(b) 'How To Be an Anti-Realist', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Associa
tion 56,47-70.
(c) 'Reformed Epistemology Again', Reformed Journal 32, July, 7 -S.
(d) 'Tooley and Evil', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60, 66 -7 5.
1983
(a) 'Hector-Neri Castaneda: A Personal Statement', in Agent, Language and the
Structure of the World (ed. James Tomberlin), Hackett Publishing Company,
Indianapolis, IN, pp. 7-13.
(b) 'Guise Theory', in Agent, Language and the Structure of the World (ed. by James
Tomberlin), Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, IN, pp. 43-77.
403
ALVIN PLANTINGA
In this paper I state and examine the sweepirtg ontological theory Hector-Neri
Castafieda has been developing the past few years: Guise Theory. Castafieda's
Theory is rich and complex; it is intriguing, indeed, utterly fascinating. But I
argue that it is fundamentally mistaken.
(c) 'The Reformed Objection Revisited', Christian Scholars Review 11,57-61.
(d) 'On Existentialism', Philosophical Studies 44, 1-20.
By the thisness of an individual, let us mean the property of being that indi
vidual. By an individual essence E of an object x, suppose we mean a property
that is essential to x and is essentially unique to x. Now I think that objects do
have thisnesses; what is more, I think that thisnesses are essences. But modal
existentialism opts for a great deal more. One existentialist thesis is that this
nesses are ontologically dependent upon their exemplifications: if an object x
had not existed, then its thisness would not have existed. A second existentialist
thesis holds that singular propositions are ontol ogically dependent upon the
individuals they involve: if an object x had not existed, then no singular pro
position directly about x would have existed. Here I argue against existentialism.
Forthcoming
1. Faith and Rationality (ed. with N. Wolterstorff), University of Notre Dame Press,
Notre Dame, IN.
2. 'Reason and Belief in God', in Faith and Rationality (ed. A. Plantinga and N.
Wolterstorff), University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN., pp. 16-93.
Part I explores the evidentialist objection to theistic belief - the claim that
theistic belief is irrational or noetically second-rate because there is insuffi
cient evidence for it. Part II begins with an account of Aquinas' views on faith
and knowledge; it argues that the evidentialist objection and the Thomistic
conception of faith and reason can be traced to a common root in classical
foundationalism, and that classical foundationalism is self referentially in
coherent. Part III explores the Reformed rejection of natural theology, seeing
in it ultimately a rejection of classical foundationalism in favor of the view
that belief in God is properly basic. What the Reformers meant to hold is that
it is entirely right, rational, reasonable and proper to believe in God without
argument or evidence from other beliefs at all. Part IV develops and articulates
this view and defends it against objections.
3. 'Fideism', in Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition (ed. by H. Hart).
4. 'On Taking Belief in God as Basic', in Religious Experience and Religious Belief"
Essays in the Epistemology ofR eligion.
5. 'Advice to Christian Philosophers Inaugural Address as John A. O'Brien Professor
of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame', Faith and Philosophy 1, July,
1984.
404
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Discussions (Compiled by Christopher Menzel)
Philosophy of Religion
The Free Will Defense
Ackerman, R.: 1982, 'An Alternative Free Will Defense', Religious Studies 18,365-372.
Adams, R.: 1973, 'Middle Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy 70,552-554.
Adams, R.: 1977, 'Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil', American Philosophical
Quarterly 14,109-117.
Anderson, S.: 1981, 'Plantinga and the Free Will Defense', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
62,274-281.
Botterill, G.: 1977, 'Falsification and the Existence of God: A Discussion of Plantinga's
Free Will Defense', Philosophical Quarterly 27,114-134.
Barnhart, J.: 1977, 'Theodicy and the Free Will Defense: Response to Plantinga and
Flew', Religious Studies 13,439-453.
Basinger, D.: 1982, 'Anderson onPlantinga: A Reponse',PhilosophicalResearchArchives
8, no. 1499.
Basinger, D.: 1982, 'Plantinga's Free Will Defense as a Challenge to Orthodox Theism',
American Journal ofP hilosophy and Theology 3,35-41.
Bennett, P.: 1973, 'Evil, God and the Free Will Defense', Australian Journal of Phi-
losophy 51, 39-50.
Burch, R.: 1979, 'Plantinga and Leibniz's Lapse', Analysis 39, 24-29.
Chernoff, F.: 1980, 'The Obstinance of Evil', Mind 89, 269-273.
Cooper, K.: 1983, 'Here We Go Again: Pike vs. Plantinga on the Problem of Evil',
InternationalJournal for Philosophy ofR eligion 14, 107 -116.
Dore, C.: 1971, 'Plantinga on the Free Will Defense', Review of Metaphysics 24,690-
706.
Evans, J.: 1983, 'Lafollette on Plantinga's Free Will Defense', International Journal for
Philosophy ofR eligion 14,117-121.
Feinberg, J.: 1979, Theologies and Evil, University Press of America, Washington, D.C.,
ch.4.
Flew, A.: 1973, 'Compatibilism, Free Will, and God', Philosophy 48, 231-244.
Gan, B.: 1982, 'Plantinga's Transworld Depravity: It's Got Possibilities', International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13,169-177.
Hedenius, I.: 1971, 'Disproofs of God's Existence?', The Personalist 52, 23-43.
Helm, P.: 1974, 'God and Free Will', Sophia 13,16-19.
Hoitenga, D.: 1967, 'Logic and the Problem of Evil', American Philosophical Quarterly
4,114-126.
Kenny, A.: 1979, The God of the Philosophers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, ch. 5.
Kondolean, T.: 1983, 'The Free Will Defense: New and Old', The Thomist 47,1-42.
Kroon, F.: 1981, 'Plantinga on God, Freedom, and Evil', International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 12,75-96.
La Croix, R.: 1974, 'Unjustified Evil and God's Choice', Sophia 13,20-28.
Lafollette, H.: 1980, 'Plantinga on the Free Will Defense', International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 11,123-132.
405
ALVIN PLANTINGA
Lomasky, L.: 1975, 'Are Compatibilism and Free Will Compatible?', The Personalist
56,385-388.
Mackie, J.: 1982, The Miracle of Theism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, ch. 9.
Mavrodes, G.: 1970, 'Some Recent Philosophical Theology', Review ofM etaphysics 24,
82-111.
Moore, H.: 1978, 'Evidence, Evil, and Religious Belief', International Journal for Phi
losophy of Religion 9,241-251.
Moore, H.: 1978, 'Evidence - Once More: Reply to E. Wierenga's "Reply to H. Moore's
'Evidence, Evil, and Religious Belief'''', International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 9,252-253.
Perkins, R.: 1983, 'An Atheistic Argument from the Improvability of the Universe',
Nous 17, 239-250.
Petersen, M.: forthcoming, 'Recent Work on the Problem of Evil',American Philosoph
ical Quarterly.
Pike, N.: 1977, 'Divine Foreknowledge, Human Freedom, and Possible Worlds', The
Philosophical Review 86, 209-216.
Pike, N.: 1979, 'Plantinga on Free Will and Evil', Religious Studies 15,449-473.
Pike, N.: 1966, 'Plantinga on the Free Will Defense: A Reply', Journal of Philosophy
63,93-104.
Ratzsch, D.: 1981, 'Plantinga's Free Will Defense', International Journal for Philosophy
of Religion 12,235-244.
Rowe, W.: 1973, 'Plantinga on Possible Worlds and Evil' (Abstract), Journal of Phi
losophy 70,554-555.
Sterba, J.: 1976, 'God, Plantinga, and a Better World', International Journal for Phi
losophy of Religion 7,446-451.
Steuer, A.: 1974, 'Once More on the Free Will Defense', Religious Studies 10,301-
311.
Tomberlin, J. and F. McGuinness.: 1977, 'Good, Evil, and the Free Will Defense',
Religious Studies 13,455-475.
Tooley, M.: 1980, 'Alvin Plantinga and the Argument from Evil', Australian Journal
of Philosophy 58, 360-376.
Wainwright, W.: 1968, 'Freedom and Omnipotence', Nous 2, 293-301.
Walton, D.: 1975, 'Language, God, and Evil', International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 6, 154-162.
Wierenga, E.: 1978, 'Reply to Harold Moore's 'Evidence, Evil, and Religious Belief',
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9,246-251.
Windt, P.: 1973, 'Plantinga's Unfortunate God', Philosophical Studies 24, 335-342.
Yandell, K.: 1981, 'The Problem of Evil',Philosophical Topics 12,7-38.
Young, R.: 1975, Freedom, Responsibility, and God Macmillan London, ch. 14.
The Epistem%gy of Belief in God
Ameriks, K.: 1978, 'Plantinga and Other Minds', Southern Journal of Philosophy 16,
285-291.
Baldwin, A., De Boer, J., and Losin, P.: 1982, 'Reformed Epistemology: Three Replies',
Reformed Journal 32 (April), 21-25.
Boyle, J., Hubbard, J., and Sullivan, T.: 1982, 'The Reformed Objection to Natural
Theology: A Catholic Perspective', Christian Scholar's Review 11,199-211.
406
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Christensen, W., and King-Farlow, J.: 1971, 'Gambling on Other Minds - Human and
Divine', Sophia 10,1-6.
De Boer, J., Baldwin, A., and Losin, P.: 1982, 'Reformed Epistemology: Three Replies',
Reformed Journal 32 (April), 21-25.
Depaul, M.: 1981, 'The Rationality of Belief in God', Religous Studies 17,343-356.
Friguegnon, M.: 1979, 'God and Other Programs', Religious Studies 15,83-89.
Goetz, S.: forthcoming, 'Belief in God is not Properly Basic', Religious Studies.
Grigg, R.: 'Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to Plantinga', International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion, 123 -127.
Gutting, G.: 1982, Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism, Univ. of Notre Dame Press,
Notre Dame, ch. 3.
Hubbard, J., Boyle, J., and Sullivan, T.: 1982, 'The Reformed Objection to Natural
Theology: A Catholic Perspective', Christian Scholar's Review 11, 199-211.
Hughes, G.: 1970, 'Plantinga on the Rationality of God's Existence', The Philosophical
Review 79, 342-352.
Iseminger, G.: 1974, 'Successful Argument and Rational Belief', Philosophy and Rhetoric
7,47-57.
Kenny, A.: 1983, Faith and Reason, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, ch. 1.
King-Farlow, J., and Christensen, W.: 1971, 'Gambling on Other Minds - Human and
Divine', Sophia 10,1-6.
Losin, P., Baldwin, A., and de Boer, J.: 1982, 'Reformed Epistemology: Three Replies',
Reformed Journal 32 (April), 21-25.
Ostien, P.: 1974, 'God, Other Minds, and Inference to the Best Explanation', Canadian
Journal ofP hilosophy 4, 149-162.
Ray, P.: 1976, 'An Inductive Argument for Other Minds', Philosophical Studies 29,
129-139.
Richman, R.: 1972, 'Plantinga, God, and (Yet) Other Minds', Australian Journal of
Philosophy 50,40-54.
Rudinow, J.: 1971, 'Gambling on Other Minds and God', Sophia 10,27-29.
Saunders, J.: 1973, 'Persons, Criteria, and Skepticism', Metaphilosophy 4, 95-123.
Slote, M.: 1966, 'Induction and Other Minds', Review of Metaphysics 20, 341-360.
Sullivan, T., Boyle, J., and Hubbard, J.: 1982, 'The Reformed Objection to Natural
Theology: A Catholic Perspective', Christian Scholar's Review 11, 199-211.
Tomberlin, J.: 1970, 'Is Belief in God Justified?', Journal of Philosophy 67, 31-38.
Tomberlin, J.: 1969, 'Plantinga's Puzzles about God and Other Minds', Philosophical
Forum 1,365-391.
van Hook, J: 1982, '''Knowledge'' in Quotes', Reformed Journal 32 (June), 8-9.
The Ontological Argument
Coburn, R.: 1971, 'Animadversions on Plantinga's Kant', Ratio 13,19-29.
Grim, P.: 1981, 'Plantinga, Hartshorne, and the Ontological Argument', Sophia 20,
12-16.
Grim, P.: 1979, 'Plantinga's God', Sophia 18,35-42.
Grim, P.: 1979, 'Plantinga's God and Other Monstrosities', Religious Studies 15,91-97.
Hasker, W.: 1982, 'Is There a Second Ontological Argument?', International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion 13,93-102.
Mackie, J.: 1982, The Miracle of Theism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, ch. 3.
407
ALVIN PLANTINGA
Mavrodes, G.: 1966, 'Properties, Predicates, and the Ontological Argument', Journal of
Philosophy 63, 549-550.
Mavrodes, G.: 'Some Recent Philosophical Theology', Review of Metaphysics 24, 82-
111.
Oakes, R.: 1974, 'God, Electrons, and Professor Plantinga', Philosophical Studies 25,
143-146.
Pinkerton, R.: 1977, 'Kant's Refutation of the Ontological Argument', Indian Philosoph·
ical Quarterly 5, 19-38.
Tapscott, B.: 1971, 'Plantinga, Properties and the Ontological Argument, Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 31,604-605.
Tooley, M.: 1981, 'Plantinga's Defense of the Ontological Argument', Mind 90, 422-
427.
Van Inwagen, P.: 1977, 'Ontological Arguments',Nous 11,375-395.
God's Attributes
Basinger, D., and Basinger, R.: 1981, 'Divine Omnipotence: Plantinga vs. Griffin',
Process Studies 11, 11-24.
Blumenfeld, D.: 1978, 'On the Compossibility of the Divine Attributes', Philosophical
Studies 34, 91-103.
Gellman, J.: 1975, 'The Paradox of Ombipotence and Perfection', Sophia 14, 31-39.
La Croix, R.: 1974, 'God Might Not Love Us', International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 5, 157-161.
Mann, W.: 1982, 'Divine Simplicity', Religious Studies 18, 451-471.
Ontology
Actualism and Possible Worlds
Austin, D.: 1981, 'Plantinga on Actualism and Essences', Philosophical Studies 39,
35-42.'
Brody, B.: 1972, 'De Re and De Dicto Interpretations of Modal Logic or a Return to
Aristotelian Essentialism', Philosophia 2, 117 -136.
Brody, B.: 1980,Identity and Essence, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, ch. 5.
Camp, J.: 1971, 'Plantinga on De Dicto and De Re',Nous 5, 215-226.
Carter, W.: 1975, 'On Relative Possibility',Philosophia 5, 489-498.
Carter, W.: 1976, 'Plantinga on Existing Necessarily', Canadian Journal of Philosophy
6,95-104.
Carter, W.: 1972, 'Plantinga on Disembodied Existence', The Philosophical Review 81,
360-363.
Chandler, H.: 1976, 'Plantinga on the Contingently Possible', Analysis 36, 106-109.
Corrado, M.: 1974, 'Plantinga on Necessity De Re', Logique et Analyse 17,445-452.
Fitch, G.: 1978, 'Plantinga's Necessary A Posteriori Truths', Canadian Journal of Phi·
losophy 8, 323-327.
Fumerton, R.: 1976, 'Chandler on the Contingently Possible', Analysis 37, 39-40.
Gean, W.: 1975, 'The Logical Connection Argument and De Re Necessity', American
Philosophical Quarterly 12,349-352.
Jager, T.: 1982, 'An Actualist Semantics for Quantified Modal Logic', Notre Dame
Journal of Formal LogiC 23, 335-349.
408