Beyond Roe: Why Abortion Should be Legal--Even if the Fetus is a Person

233 Pages·2019·5.106 MB·English

by  David Boonin

BEYOND ROE

BEYOND ROE
Why Abortion Should be
Legal— Even if the Fetus is
a Person
David Boonin
1
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Boonin, David, author.
Title: Beyond roe : why abortion should be legal—even if the fetus is a person /
David Boonin.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, [2019] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018029351 | ISBN 9780190904845 (pbk.) |
ISBN 9780190904838 (hardback case cover) | ISBN 9780190904852 (updf) |
ISBN 9780190904869 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Abortion—Moral and ethical aspects. | Abortion—Law and legislation.
Classification: LCC HQ767.15 .B658 2019 | DDC 179.7/6—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018029351
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Paperback Printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada

Hardback Printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
For Harriet, Leah, and Sadie Boonin

Contents
Preface | ix
PART I Why Abortion Should Be Legal
1. An Unusual Case | 3
2. The Lesson of the Case | 7
3. Changing the Case | 13
4. Hypothetical Cases | 18
5. Contraceptive Failure | 21
6. Failure to Use Contraception | 31
7. Sex Selection | 37
8. Genetic Screening | 41
9. Viability | 45
10. Infanticide | 49
11. Feticide | 52
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viii | Contents
PART II Objections and Responses
12. Consent | 59
13. Responsibility | 69
14. Child Support | 84
15. Parents | 88
16. Children | 96
17. Natural Purposes | 100
18. Cause of Death | 107
19. Intentions | 121
20. Other Differences | 127
21. Other Objections | 135
PART III Why Abortion Should Be Less Restricted
22. Insurance Restrictions | 143
23. The Hyde Amendment | 151
24. Mandatory Waiting Periods | 157
25. Mandatory Counseling | 169
26. Mandatory Ultrasounds | 181
27. Parental Consent and Notification | 187
28. Other Restrictions | 195
29. Summary and Conclusion | 199
POSTSCRIPT | 209
INDEX | 211
Preface
In 1971, the philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson published an
article called “A Defense of Abortion.” It has become one of the
most widely discussed articles in contemporary philosophy. Two
years later, in the case of Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court
produced its own defense of abortion, striking down a variety of
legal restrictions on the practice by a vote of 7– 2. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Harry Blackmun, has become one of
the most widely discussed opinions in contemporary law.
Thomson’s article and Blackmun’s opinion point in the
same direction. They both support a woman’s right to have an
abortion. But in one important respect, Thomson’s argument
goes beyond Blackmun’s. The argument in Blackmun’s opinion
depends on the claim that “the word ‘person,’ as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.” Invoking
a right to privacy on the part of the pregnant woman, the ma-
jority opinion in Roe v. Wade makes the case that abortion should
be legal, at least in the first two trimesters, if the fetus is not
a person. But the court’s decision provides no reason to think
abortion should be legal if the fetus is a person. Thomson’s ar-
ticle, while focusing on the moral question rather than the legal
question, argues that abortion is morally permissible even if the
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