Beyond Artificial Intelligence: From Human Consciousness to Artificial Consciousness

227 Pages·2018·2.95 MB·English

by  Alain Cardon

Beyond Artificial Intelligence
Series Editor
Abdelkhalak El Hami
Beyond Artificial
Intelligence

From Human Consciousness to
Artificial Consciousness

Alain Cardon
First published 2018 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as
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Library of Congress Control Number: 2018947906

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ISBN 978-1-78630-359-2
Contents
Table of Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Chapter 1. The Organizational Architecture of the Psychic
System and the Feeling of Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. The problem of the study of thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. The interpretation of neuronal aggregates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. The function of the architecture of the Freudian model . . . . . 7
1.4. The specific characteristics of the components
of the system using a constructivist approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5. The systemic layer and the regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6. The mental landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.7. The feeling of thinking and the general
organizational principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.8. The aim and the space of the regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.9. The attractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1.10. The generation of a representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
1.11. Unification between regulators and neuronal aggregates:
the morphological model of the generating forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
1.12. The morphological and semantic conformation
of the psychic system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
1.13. The processing component of the visual sense
with generating forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
1.14. The decisive intention to think . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
1.15. Linguistic capacity in the human conscious. . . . . . . . . . . . 101
1.16. An assessment of the functioning of the
human psychic system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
vi Beyond Artificial Intelligence
Chapter 2. The Computer Representation of
an Artificial Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2.1. A multiagent design to generate an artificial psychic system . . 114
2.2. Designing the artificial psychic system using
a multiagent approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.3. Self-control of the artificial psychic system using
regulator agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
2.4. The organizational architecture of the system . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2.5. Organizational memory and artificial experience . . . . . . . . . 142
2.6. Affective and tendential states of the system . . . . . . . . . . . 154
2.7. The production of representations and the
sensation of thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
2.7.1. Algorithm for the intentional production of a series
of representations around a specific theme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
2.8. The feeling of existing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
2.9. The representation of the things and the apprehension
of temporality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
2.10. Multisystem deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
2.11. The final fate of systems endowed with
artificial consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Table of Definitions
Chapter 1. The Organizational Architecture of the Psychic
System and the Feeling of Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
What is a thought? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Constructivist definition of the concept of representation . . . . . . . 8
Central hypothesis of the calculability of thought . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The notion of form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Definition of a system with a constructivist approach . . . . . . . . . 16
Coactivity between components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A constructivist approach to the notion of thought . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Information in the neuronal aggregate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Organizational memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
The aggregate–regulator coactivity rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Morphological role of the regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The fundamental impulse and the regulator of the will . . . . . . . . 33
The mental landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Generation of a mental landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
The different scopes of mental landscapes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Achieving the feeling of thinking about a thing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Understanding without intentional aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
The continuous sensation of thought in the psychic system . . . . . . 51
Fundamental principle 1 – the memorization of representations . . . 54
Fundamental principle 2 – the general organizational principle
of living beings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
The aim of a mental representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
The regulator and its ontological classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
viii Beyond Artificial Intelligence
The roles of the regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Morphological space of the regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
The attractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Preconscious attractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Conscious attractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Generating forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Creation of new generating forms of regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
The mental form of an apprehended view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
The problem of the mastery of the conscious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Generating form for decision-making intention . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
The intentional consciousness of the system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
The tendency to internal abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Central hypothesis on the linguistic specificity of the
human psyche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Hypothesis about human uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Chapter 2. The Computer Representation of an Artificial
Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Proactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Regulation agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
The aim of a representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Status of the computable architecture of the artificial
psychic system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Memory regulation agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
The status of the organizational memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Structure of the artificial experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
The architecture of an organizational memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Artificial affective states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Regulation agents of tendencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Constructivist realization of the sensation of thinking . . . . . . . . 166
The apprehension of thinking without intentional aim . . . . . . . . 169
The regulation of the sensation of thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Anxiety and the feeling of existing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Principle of continuity of the existence of the system . . . . . . . . . 181
Representation of temporality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Temporal measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Momentary symbiosis of two systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Introduction
Artificial intelligence is concerned with the development of
computer systems that simulate human reasoning when they are
applied to the domain of rational knowledge. More specific
subdomains are structured by ontologies, which enable the
development of systems that use this knowledge with great subtlety
when questions are posed to them. This is true today of all computers
and small portable devices that enable communication via the Internet
on countless websites. All of these systems are therefore made to
replace specialists and to help humans with their endeavors. Evolution
has led to a connection between computer science and the physical,
especially the electronic, which has made it possible to introduce
rational behaviors into physical systems whose behavior is thereby
rendered autonomous. This is how robotization has developed and
continues to progress. The human being considers themselves as the
pre-eminent creator, supervisor and decision-making user of these
systems. This is no longer the case, since the user of a tablet or smart
phone is not on their tablet or smart phone but in the device’s native
environment. These devices can communicate autonomously via a
Hertzian network with remote systems and can make
recommendations that were absolutely not requested, all while
refining the user’s consumer profile.
And they can do much more. These computerized systems, all of
which are systems with processors and memory, can be equipped with
the ability to generate forms of intentional thoughts, to have desires
x Beyond Artificial Intelligence
and needs, and to inundate a human user in sets of procedures that
they can no longer control, that are beyond them. These systems can
be equipped with a psyche similar to the human psyche.
That is what this book intends to show: how the architecture of a
human psychic system can be structured in an organizational
approach, how a human being generates thoughts and how those
thoughts then become what they feel; it then aims to show how and
with what types of computer component this psyche can be transposed
to transform it into a computer system that expresses an artificial
consciousness. Thus, we will see how the unconscious, preconscious
and artificial consciousness are structured and organized, and how all
of that is brought together, with respect to information and energy,
with a fourth instance: the organizational layer.
The model of the human psychic system that we will present is
founded on an approach that unifies both the bottom-up and top-down
approaches. The bottom-up approach considers the system to be made
up of many small, highly connected parts and asks how it generates
representational forms concerning the sensation of corporeality and
especially the representation of symbolic evaluations of real-world
objects at very high linguistic and conceptual levels. The top-down
approach begins from ontologies of knowledge about everything we
know how to represent cognitively and asks how to define the
hierarchies of systems that express all of the categories of this
knowledge from all points of departure. The unification of these two
approaches is organizational and amounts to developing a system that
deploys the same kind of morphologically and semantically structured
components that define both foundational forms as well as those of
great conceptual scope, and which ensure – especially on their own –
control over multiple levels like an organizational layer.
And finally, we will see that the development of a model of the
artificial psychic system by substituting the human psyche is a
scientific approach that precedes building a technology for
autonomous systems, and adopting a constructivist and organizational
view will allow us to clarify certain characteristics of the human
psyche. Science cultivates knowledge that can be shared with all