Beings of Thought and Action: Epistemic and Practical Rationality

254 Pages·2021·1.16 MB·English

by  Andy Mueller

BEINGS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION
Inthisbook,AndyMuellerexaminesthewaysinwhichepistemicand
practicalrationalityareintertwined.InPartI,hepresentsanoverview
of the contemporary debates about epistemic norms for practical
reasoning, and defends the thesis that epistemic irrationality can
make one practically irrational. Mueller proposes a contextualist
account of epistemic norms for practical reasoning and introduces
novel epistemic norms pertaining to ends and hope. In Part II,
Muellerconsiderscurrentapproachestopragmaticencroachmentin
epistemology, ultimately providing a new principle-based argument
for pragmatic encroachment. While the book defends tenets of the
knowledge-first program, one of its main conclusions is thoroughly
pragmatist:Inanimportantsense,thepracticalhasprimacyoverthe
epistemic.
andy mueller is a post-doctoral fellow at Goethe University
Frankfurt. He works on epistemology and practical reasoning and
has published articles in journals including Analysis, Analytic
Philosophy,Episteme,andSynthese.
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BEINGS OF THOUGHT
AND ACTION
Epistemic and Practical Rationality
ANDY MUELLER
GoetheUniversityFrankfurt
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Contents
ListofFigures pagevi
ListofTables vii
Acknowledgments viii
Prologue x
part i beings of thought in action
1 EpistemicEncroachmentonPracticalRationality 3
2 PracticalReasoning,Ends,andtheEndofHope 31
3 Contexts,Costs,andBenefits 55
4 KnowledgeandSeeminglyRiskyActions 81
part ii beings of action in thought
5 PragmaticEncroachmentinEpistemology 109
6 ReasonsforBeliefandthePrimacyofthePractical 140
7 AssessingPotentialExplanationsofPragmaticEncroachment 169
8 SocialBeings 193
Epilogue 212
Glossary 218
References 220
Index 229
v
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Figures
3.1 COEandCFI:Variations page74
5.1 Shiftingthresholdsview(STV) 136
5.2 Totalpragmaticencroachment(TPE) 138
6.1 Theprimacyofthepractical 158
vi
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Tables
4.1 SurgeoncaseinEUT page95
5.1 Practicaladequacy 127
5.2 Worsniponstakes 128
vii
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Acknowledgments
This book grew from my doctoral dissertation, which I submitted in
January 2016. I would like to thank both of my advisors, Marcus
Willaschek and André Fuhrmann. Marcus was a superb advisor, untiring
in providing feedback and encouragement even though we disagreed on
manyoftheissueswediscussed.Hishelpthroughoutmyacademiccareer,
priortothedissertationandsince,hasbeeninvaluable.
Whilewritingthedissertation,IwasabletovisitRutgersUniversityand
the University of Southern California (USC). Many thanks to Jason
Stanley, who was my advisor during my stay at Rutgers. His input at the
beginning of this project also helped to shape its final outcome. Huge
thanks go to Jake Ross, my advisor at USC. Jake pushed my thinking in
newdirectionsandhisencouragementwasprecious.Imetmanywonder-
ful people in the philosophy departments at Rutgers and USC. I cannot
mentionthemallbyname,butthankstoallofthem.Bothdepartmentsare
fantasticandIfeelblessedtohavebeenaguest.
Theexcellencecluster“TheFormationofNormativeOrders”atGoethe
University provided me with a PhD scholarship from 2013 to 2016. I am
grateful to everyone involved in the cluster for providing me with the
necessaryfinancialsecurityaswellasplentyof timetowork onthethesis
thathasnowbecomethisbook.
I was fortunate to receive many helpful comments while writing the
dissertation, and also the manuscript of this book. Many thanks, in no
particular order, to Ralph Wedgwood, Mikkel Gerken, Clayton Littlejohn,
AdrienneMartin, Alex Worsnip,Daniel Whiting,StephenGrimm,Davide
Fassio, Jie Gao, Matt Benton, Luke Davies, Julien Dutant, Daniel
Immerman, Amy Floweree, Roger Clarke, Jonathan Dancy, Wolfgang
Barz, David Löwenstein, Eva Schmidt, Susanne Mantel, Alexander Dinges,
ClaudiaBlöser,ThomasSturm,andTomKelly.MyapologiestothoseImay
haveforgotten.Iwouldalso liketo thankthetwoanonymousreviewersfor
CambridgeUniversityPressfortheirinsightfulcomments.
viii
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Acknowledgments ix
Chapter 1 draws on material from my article “How Does Epistemic
Rationality Constrain Practical Rationality?,” previously published in
Analytic Philosophy. Thanks to John Wiley & Sons for permitting me to
reusethismaterial.
Finally, this book would not have been possible without the support
fromthepeopleinmynonacademiclife.Myparentsandmyfamilyhave
mademanythingspossiblethatItreasure.Thefactthattheyoftendonot
understand what I am doing, and yet never fail to support me, must be
asignofunconditionallove.Forthat,Iamdeeplygrateful.Thankstomy
friends for some much-needed balance. Special thanks to my wife Steffi,
especially for having my back during the completion of this manuscript.
Iamveryexcitedtocontinuethisjourneywithyou.
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Prologue
HenriBergson’sadviceto“Thinklikeamanofactionandactlikeamanof
thought” is simple yet profound. In philosophy, there is a tendency to
address the question of how to regulate our thoughts about the world
separately from the question of how to regulate our actions in the world.
Divisionoflaborisafinethingbutnotwithoutitsrisks.Theoverarching
convictionthatmotivatesthisbookisthatwemisssomethingimportantif
we account for the practical and epistemic dimensions of our lives separ-
ately.Alackofconcernwithepistemologicalquestionsleadstoanimpov-
erished perspective on practical rationality. Conversely, a lack of concern
withpracticalmattersleadstoanimpoverishedperspectiveonepistemol-
ogy.Here,Ioutlinewhatmotivatesthisconviction.
Wehumansarebeingsofthoughtandaction.Humansnecessarilyform
thoughtsabouttheworldtheyinhabit.Evenwithholdingbeliefisakindof
mental attitude toward the world. And we necessarily act in the world.
Evenadecisionnottoengagewiththeworld,anomissiontoact,isawayto
act.Moreover,ourthinkingandouractingaredeeplyintertwined.When
weact,ouractionsareguidedbyhowwethinkabouttheworld.Ifoneis
starvingandbelievesthataplantinone’simmediatesurroundingisedible,
onewilleatit.Butthenecessitytoactcanshapehowwethinkaboutthe
world as well. Acting in the world always comes with the risk of failure.
Eating the plant, if it is edible, is advisable. However, if it is not, the
consequences might be severe. This will influence whether and how we
makeupourmindaboutthequestionwhethertheplantisedible.
These examples intentionally have the ring of an evolutionary story.
I believe it to be a plausible hypothesis that if there was not this deep
intertwinement between thought and action, human beings would not
havemadeitveryfar.Itseemstobeaplausibleconjecturethathavingthis
intertwinement is an evolutionary advantage. It is hard to imagine that
aspeciesthatactedwithouttakingintoaccountwhatitthoughtaboutthe
world would have made it very far. Similarly, if a species’ thoughts about
x
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