Being Me Being You: Adam Smith and Empathy

231 Pages·2019·3.206 MB·English

by  Samuel Fleischacker

Being Me Being You

Being Me Being You
Adam Smith and Empathy
samuel fleischacker
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago and London
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
© 2019 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner
whatsoever without written permission, except in the case of brief quotations in
critical articles and reviews. For more information, contact the University of
Chicago Press, 1427 E. 60th St., Chicago, IL 60637.
Published 2019
Printed in the United States of America
28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 1 2 3 4 5
isbn-1 3: 978- 0- 226- 66175- 9 (cloth)
isbn-1 3: 978- 0- 226- 66189- 6 (paper)
isbn-1 3: 978- 0- 226- 66192- 6 (e- book)
doi: https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226661926.001.0001
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Fleischacker, Samuel, author.
Title: Being me being you : Adam Smith and empathy / Samuel Fleischacker.
Description: Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 2019. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: lccn 2019018464 | isbn 9780226661759 (cloth : alk. paper) |
isbn 9780226661896 (pbk. : alk. paper) | isbn 9780226661926 (e-book)
Subjects: lcsh: Smith, Adam, 1723–1790. | Empathy.
Classification: lcc b1545.z7 f54 2019 | ddc 152.4/1—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019018464
♾ This paper meets the requirements of ansi/niso z39.48- 1992 (Permanence of Paper).
In all people I see myself, none more and not one a barley-
corn less,
And the good or bad I say of myself I say of them.
walt whitman, “Song of Myself”

Contents
Preface ix
List of Abbreviations xiii
1 Varieties of Empathy 1
2 Smithian Empathy 23
3 Updating Smith 49
4 Empathy and Culture 77
5 Empathy and Affectional Ties 89
6 Utilitarianism and the Limits of Empathy 102
7 Empathy and the Limits of Utilitarianism (I) 116
8 Empathy and the Limits of Utilitarianism (II) 128
9 Empathy and Demonization 149
Acknowledgments 167
Notes 169
Bibliography 201
Index 209

Preface
Talk of empathy seems to be everywhere these days. Psychologists, primatol-
ogists, political scientists, promoters of Eastern religions—e veryone seems to
have something to say on empathy. Why write another book on the subject?
Three reasons: First, the vast literature on empathy has yet to distinguish
clearly among the different meanings of that term. Second, there has yet to
be any good response to the powerful critiques of empathy recently put out
by writers like the philosopher Jesse Prinz and the psychologist Paul Bloom;
those who praise empathy and those who criticize it also seem to be talking
past each other. Third, these problems are linked, and the eighteenth- century
thinker Adam Smith’s understanding of empathy can, I think, help us address
both of them. I’ll try in this preface to summarize how I propose to do that.
Human beings share feelings with one another and, out of those shared
feelings, care for one another. Neither our shared feelings nor our concern
for others need run deep, however, and sometimes they lead us in the wrong
direction, morally speaking: they direct us to fellow members of our local
groups, rather than to humanity as a whole, and thereby contribute to preju-
dice and ethnocentrism. Why put any moral weight on this capacity for shared
feelings— on empathy?
Well, to begin with, we empathize in many different ways, some of which
are more morally valuable than others. I devote the first chapter of this book
to laying out the wide range of meanings that the word “empathy” can bear,
and to suggesting that confusion among these things helps explain why some
writers are so enthusiastic about empathy while others regard it as misleading
and dangerous. I also argue that Smith’s version of empathy has advantages
that other versions of that idea lack. I end by indicating in outline what these
advantages are. The rest of the book will fill in that outline.